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Paid working patterns are currently regulated by governments around the world for a 
range of social and economic reasons: to increase labour supply and skills; to provide 
a strong tax base to support an ageing population; to help people reconcile work and 
family life over increasingly diversified life courses; and to be in line with the 
general principle of the activating, employment led welfare state. Environmental 
considerations rarely feature in the design or evaluation of working time policy. 
Nevertheless, various authors working on policies for sustainable development argue 
that reductions in average paid working time could lead to environmental benefits: as 
people work less, they in turn earn less, and so consume less, resulting in lower 
environmental impacts from lower levels of production of products.  
 
This thesis takes this argument as its starting point, and synthesises these distinct 
perspectives on working time and its regulation to address two key questions: what 
level of environmental benefits could arise from such reductions in paid working 
time?; and what are the implications for the design of working time policy? 
 
The research addresses these questions, taking the case of greenhouse gas emissions, 
and the UK and the Netherlands in the early 2000s as case studies. Using household 
expenditure survey data and data on product emissions intensities, the relationship 
between paid working time and emissions is analysed at both the household and 
national levels. At the household level, statistically and substantively significant 
correlations are found between higher levels of paid work and higher levels of 
consumption and so greenhouse gas emissions. The effects on emissions of 
hypothetical changes in the working patterns of the national populations are then 
modelled. The research estimates that meeting current national objectives to increase 
labour market participation rates would increase national greenhouse gas emissions 
by 0.6-0.7%, a cost that might be considered acceptable if it also achieves its aims of 
reducing income poverty, benefit dependency, and social exclusion. Meanwhile, 
widespread reductions in average working hours and increased use of career breaks, 
with corresponding reductions in income, would reduce national emissions. The 
scenarios modelled (a 20% reduction in the working hours of full time workers, and 
increasing use of 3 month career breaks) lead to reductions of 3-4.5% in national 
emissions, with the corresponding increases in “leisure” time, reductions in income 
inequality, and reduced gender imbalances in the distribution of paid work 
potentially also improving wellbeing, social cohesion, and gender equality in work 
and care.  
 
The results indicate that environmental factors warrant consideration in the design 
and evaluation of working time policy, and that challenging but achievable levels of 
working time reduction could contribute a small but significant share to meeting 
greenhouse gas emissions targets. Policy instruments would need to address a range 
of values, attitudes and norms around employment and consumption, as well as 
employer and situational factors, if substantial working time reduction were to be 
achieved. Reconciling diverse environmental, social and economic goals also 
requires careful policy design, particularly for certain demographic groups such as 
the low income, who would need financial and other support to turn rights to reduce 
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 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Paid working time is currently regulated by governments around the world for a 
range of economic and social reasons.  Governments seek on the one hand to 
increase participation rates in paid labour, setting up rules and incentives to 
encourage people to work more, to boost labour market supply and skills and hence, 
it is hoped, economic growth, and to reduce income poverty and social exclusion.  
Such increases in participation rates also support state fiscal sustainability, reducing 
benefits payments, increasing income tax receipts, and hence providing extra funds 
to service debt and support the needs of ageing populations (Knijn, Martin, and 
Millar 2007; European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment 2007; 
Viebrock and Clasen 2009a).  On the other hand, other policies support reductions in 
paid labour.  These include regulation of the maximum working hours per week, 
minimum holiday entitlements, and controls and rights relating to different periods of 
the life course: minimum and maximum working ages, and rights to career breaks 
and financial support for periods out of the labour market for parental leave, for 
(early) retirement, for skills training, for illness, disability and unemployment, or 
even just for leisure and personal reasons (Plantenga 2005a). 
 
Policy development, and academic literature in the field of social policy, highlight 
these social and economic goals and have developed detailed perspectives for the 
design and evaluation of policy instruments to reconcile them against the backdrop 
of increasing global competition, ageing populations, falling fertility rates, greater 
demands for gender equality, and increasing diversity in individual life courses 
(Bovenberg 2007).   
 
Meanwhile, a parallel literature emphasises a further aspect of working time 
regulation that is rarely mentioned in the social policy literature.  Various authors 
researching sustainable development policy, in a field sometimes described as 
ecological economics, highlight the link between paid work and environmental 
impacts: the more people work and earn, the more they consume, and the higher their 
environmental impacts as a result, as the goods they consume have impacts in their 
 2 
production, distribution, use and eventual disposal.  Encouraging reductions in paid 
working time, with concurrent reductions in earned income, will, they argue, lead to 
reduced consumption and environmental impacts (e.g. Coote, Franklin, and Simms 
2010; Robinson 2006; Schor 2005).  In this way, working time reduction could 
contribute to solving the world’s ever-growing environmental problems, and 
represents a way in which paid work and income could be distributed equitably 
among the population even as total demand for consumer goods, and hence for paid 
labour, falls (Victor 2010). Furthermore, supporting and encouraging people to 
escape the cycle of work and spend could bring wellbeing benefits, as people have 
more time outside of paid work to spend with their families and friends, getting 
involved in the local community and in voluntary activities, and spending time on 
creative pastimes and personal and spiritual development, all things which the 
literature on happiness demonstrates contribute more to wellbeing among affluent 
societies than does increasing material consumption (Speth et al. 2007).  The 
argument has a long pedigree: in the mid 1800s, John Stuart Mill argued for working 
time reduction to give people time to practise “the Art of Living” instead of the “art 
of getting on”, and to check growth in consumption (and population) before there is 
“nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature[, with] every rood of land brought 
into cultivation .. and [there is] scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower 
could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved agriculture” 
(Mill 1870:ch. IV). 
 
Such arguments are also increasingly pertinent to current policy concerns: happiness 
is receiving increased policy attention.  In 2008, French president Nicolas Sarkozy 
commissioned Joseph Stiglitz and Armatya Sen to produce a report on alternative 
indicators of progress to GDP growth that better captured non-consumption 
contributors to wellbeing, perhaps irked that GDP measures fail to reflect the 
wellbeing benefits of the French welfare state and work life balance policies 
(livemint.com 2008; Davies 2009; and see Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009).  British 
Prime Minister David Cameron is intent on measuring the nation’s happiness and 
taking it into account, with a new survey of national happiness recently launched to 
inform policy (BBC News 2010; Else 2011).  Meanwhile, sustainable development, 
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and climate change in particular, have risen from something of a specialist interest of 
environmentalists to a mainstream policy, and media, concern in recent years. The 
intention to tackle the “Inconvenient Truth” (Al Gore, in Guggenheim 2006) of 
global warming is now strong, even if action itself is slow.  The 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord, whilst weak on details, lays out a global consensus among governments that 
greenhouse gas emissions should be cut to levels that would limit average 
temperature rises to 2
o
C (UNFCCC 2009) (although several states are still pushing 
for this to be 1
o
C).  Current scientific models suggest this equates to a cut of at least 
50% of 1990 global emissions levels (the year commonly used as a baseline against 
which to compare) by 2050, with the largest reductions coming from high income 
countries.  The European Union echoes this goal, and has imposed targets on itself to 
reduce territorial emissions by 80-95% over 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim 
target of a 20% reduction by 2020 (European Commission 2011), possibly to be 
raised to 30%.  The UK recently became the first national government to put its 
climate change goals into law in the 2008 Climate Change Act.  “Carbon 
management” has also become a multibillion pound industry, thanks in part to 
initiatives such as the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, where 
businesses can buy and sell rights to emit greenhouse gases. 
 
Mitigating climate change is currently framed largely as a technological and 
engineering issue, one of “decarbonising” production methods by breaking the link 
between economic growth and the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.  
Economic policy initiatives, such as the emissions trading described above, or green 
investment schemes, in turn typically focus on incentivising these production side 
solutions.  Policy options to reduce consumption, as the driver of production, receive 
much less attention except in particular, peripheral areas of the economy (such as 
reducing plastic bag use), arguably as this conflicts with the central tenet of GDP 
growth.  The production side solutions, meanwhile, include increasing the use of 
renewable energy such as wind, solar and wave power, increasing use of nuclear 
power, capturing and burying carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels 
using carbon capture and storage, electricity grid developments, development of 
electric or hydrogen vehicles, and increasing energy efficiency in buildings, 
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manufacturing and appliances.  Whilst some sources argue this could be done at a 
relatively minor cost to the economy (Stern 2007), others question whether the 
technology can be developed and made commercially viable quickly enough, and if 
the political will exists, to achieve such a major global infrastructural change 
sufficiently quickly (Jackson 2009b:67–86).  Currently, global rates of emissions 
have continued to rise year-on-year, while the meteoric economic growth of China 
has seen its domestic emissions outstrip even the United States to take pole position 
as largest national emitter (although its per capita emissions are far lower).  Financial 
crisis and rich-world recession has done nothing to slow the emissions increases 
(Harvey 2011). And breaking the link between the growth in greenhouse gas 
emissions and economic (GDP) growth is only one issue: economic activity has 
similarly major impacts on ecosystem services and biodiversity, and are similarly 
difficult to tackle, potentially bringing huge costs to humans and non-humans alike 
(ten Brink et al. 2009; Rockström et al. 2009).  These impacts are driven largely by 
the growing demand for consumer goods in the West and increasingly in other 
countries, a demand which has driven the rapid construction of factories and coal 
power stations in China and elsewhere, boosting emissions and resource use alike.  
Approaches to improve the sustainability of consumption seem to have a clear place 
too therefore.   
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on working time in several ways.  Firstly, 
chapter 2 assesses the commonalities and differences between the two distinct 
perspectives on working time found in the ecological economics and social policy 
literatures.  A synthesis of the two is created which adds environmental goals to the 
conventional social and economic ones, and which draws on insights from both 
literatures to build an enhanced “life course” perspective with which to design and 
evaluate working time policy instruments which contribute to these diverse goals and 
mitigate tensions between them, considering the interests of different state and 
sectoral actors, and the changing situations and preferences of different demographic 
groups over their life courses.  Acknowledging that people’s behaviours are more 
complex than typically considered in the design of working time policy, the thesis 
assesses not just the time rights and financial incentives that could be used to achieve 
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working time reduction, but looks at further policy instruments to influence values, 
attitudes, habits and preferences around work and consumption, as well as wider 
situational factors such as employer attitudes. 
 
The thesis then addresses a central outstanding question in the ecological economics 
literature on working time.  Whilst it is intuitively sensible that reducing working 
time, and hence income, reduces expenditure, and so environmental impacts, this 
argument appears never to have been tested, nor has the substantive size of such 
effects been estimated for different changes in working time.  Arguably, the 
environmental effects of working time changes are worthy of consideration in the 
design of working time policy only if they are large.  The thesis addresses this gap, 
considering the case of greenhouse gas emissions as probably the most pressing of 
current environmental concerns.  Specifically, it asks two related questions.  
 
The first of these is: what is the relationship between working time and greenhouse 
gas emissions? The second is: what are the implications of this relationship for the 
design of working time policy?  The first question is addressed empirically, whilst 
the second is addressed discursively, drawing on the empirical results and the 
modified life course perspective. 
 
Two countries are chosen as case studies: the UK and the Netherlands, using data 
from the early 2000s.  The two countries represent highly suitable cases.  Both are 
high income, high consuming countries, which have goals to reduce emissions by 
some 80% by 2050, broadly in line with the global requirements for climate stability 
mentioned above.  They are also similar in several respects: they are both EU 
members, their populations have similar age profiles, they have high labour market 
participation rates, and aim to increase these rates further.  At the same time, there 
are substantial differences in working patterns and working time policy instruments 
that make them interesting comparators.  Both have substantial variation in working 
hours in their populations, with high numbers of part time jobs.  However, average 
working hours in the early 2000s were substantially higher in the UK than in the 
Netherlands.  Furthermore, whilst the Netherlands has a range of innovative policy 
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instruments which provide collective regulation of working hours and extensive 
individual rights to reduce weekly hours and take career breaks, UK policy support is 
much weaker.  This is interesting for the second of the research questions. 
 
The analytical approach addresses the research questions at two levels.  Firstly, as the 
arguments relate to how people’s patterns of work affect their private consumption 
levels, a household level of analysis is taken.  The household rather than individual 
level is taken as this is the unit at which income and time resources, and expenditure 
decisions, are typically co-determined by its members (Phipps and Burton 1996).  By 
using household expenditure survey data combined with data on “product emissions 
intensities” (the greenhouse gas emissions emitted in the production and distribution 
of different products per pound or euro of their market price), estimates are made of 
the annual greenhouse gas emissions of a representative sample of UK and Dutch 
households.  The consumer behaviour literature is drawn on to build an analytical 
model of the household, linking working patterns, via income, to greenhouse gas 
emissions. Using representative samples of the working age populations drawn from 
these data, and the model of the household developed, how patterns of paid work and 
income affect household expenditure patterns and the resultant greenhouse gas 
emissions is statistically modelled using regression analysis.   
 
In the second stage of the empirical work, these household level results are drawn on 
to consider how national greenhouse gas emissions might be affected by different 
scenarios of change in the working patterns of the UK and Dutch populations.  What 
is the size of change in emissions that could be expected under certain changes in 
working patterns, and is it large enough to be of policy interest?  This stage of the 
work involves modelling the effects on greenhouse gas emissions of different 
hypothetical scenarios of change in the working patterns of the two populations.  
Estimating how a dependent variable (in this case, greenhouse gas emissions) would 
change under different hypothetical scenarios is a relatively uncommon methodology 
in social policy research, but quite common in environmental fields, in which the 
likely environmental effects of different untested policy instruments is often of 
interest.  Two sets of scenarios are modelled.  The first set relates to current 
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government objectives, which are to increase labour market participation rates, and 
hence to increase rather than decrease total working time among the working age 
population.  What are the greenhouse gas implications of this?  The second set of 
scenarios takes the starting point of attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
and asks what kind of reductions could be achieved by different levels of reductions 
in working time.  Here, the effects on greenhouse gas emissions of substantial 
reductions in the average paid working hours of full time workers, and the increased 
use of career breaks, are modelled.  The effects of these scenarios on household 
incomes, expenditure and levels of work are also considered for different 
demographic groups.  These empirical results then inform the discussions of the 
implications for working time policy.  How could environmental goals be combined 
with the social and economic goals that such policy already aims to meet, to 
maximise compatibility and minimise tensions between them?  How can policy 
instruments be designed to influence people’s working time behaviour? 
 
In short, the thesis seeks to analyse and quantify how different scenarios of change in 
the working patterns of the UK and Dutch populations would affect greenhouse gas 
emissions in the two countries.  The ultimate aim of the research is to assess the role 
working time changes might play in meeting, or failing to meet, greenhouse gas 
targets, to inform the design of working time policy instruments that can support 
multiple environmental, social and economic goals.  In doing so, it contributes to the 
social policy literature on working time by raising the rationale for considering 
environmental impacts, and by extending the range of instruments considered for 
influencing working time behaviour.  It contributes to the ecological economics 
literature by providing the first estimates of the effects on greenhouse gas emissions 
of different working time changes, and by elaborating on how policy instruments to 
encourage such changes might look. 
 
The development of the thesis questions and methodology was, as with most 
research, a long process, and it is fitting to elaborate on that process a little here.  
Moving from the initial general interest, in working time reduction as an approach to 
increasing both environmental sustainability and wellbeing, to specific testable 
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hypotheses took a substantial amount of time and effort, and involved discussions 
with academics from ecological economics, environmental sciences and social 
policy, who generously gave advice, information and insight, particularly into the 
fields of measuring household environmental impacts and the life course approach to 
conceptualising working time policy.  There were dead ends, with some possible 
research avenues having to be left to one side.  Early on, investigating the usage 
patterns of the Dutch Life Course Scheme seemed one ideal avenue of research, but 
after conversations with, in particular, Janneke Plantenga and her research team, it 
became clear that the scheme was still in its infancy and that it would still be some 
years before substantial numbers of employees were able to use it for career breaks.  
In effect, although the scheme has, as will be discussed in chapter 7, many of the 
characteristics of a “good” working time reduction policy, there were no employees 
yet using it that could constitute participants in this research.  Notably, the wish of 
the author to investigate how individual wellbeing is affected by working time 
reduction, through survey data and qualitative interviews with career breakers in the 
Netherlands, had to be left for another future research project, given the difficulty in 
measuring happiness and identifying its determinants, as well as the time, financial 
and word limit constraints.  Similarly, early on the author investigated the potential 
of utilising time use data to assess how people’s use of time outside paid work 
affected their environmental impacts and behaviours.  Again, it was the kind help of 
and conversations with other researchers, this time Jessie Vandeweyer, Prof. Ignace 
Glorieux and Bert Desmet at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel in Belgium in June 2007, 
which made it clear that this avenue would be prohibitively difficult to pursue.  As 
the focus on measuring and modelling the environmental impacts of households 
developed, it was again other academics working in this field kindly giving their time 
to meet me and give advice and, ultimately, giving me the data I needed, which made 
this research possible.  Thanks go to Kees Vringer, René Benders, Henri Moll and 
colleagues in the Netherlands, and all at the Stockholm Environment Institute-York 
working in this field.  The numerous meetings with academics in the Netherlands, 
and with the team in Belgium, was made possible by the generosity with which 
Janneke Plantenga and Utrecht University’s School of Economics hosted me for a 
three month research visit in April to July 2007, and with funding from the 
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RECWOWE European Network of Excellence for a further two week visit in May 
2008. It was the advice of these and others at key junctions in the research process, 
through formal meetings and chance conversations at conferences and the like, as 
well as the invaluable ongoing support of my supervisors throughout the PhD, which 
helped crystallise the research topic into specific testable hypotheses and a functional 
methodology, and ultimate helped me to produce this thesis as a coherent document.  
Finally, my internal and external viva examiners, Dr Claire Haggett at the University 
of Edinburgh, and Prof Ian Gough at LSE, helped with recommendations for 
finishing touches to the thesis. Thanks go to all those named and unnamed here who 
helped me. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 begins with a review of the two largely 
distinct literatures on working time found in the fields of ecological economics and 
social policy. It then compares the two, assessing the similarities and differences in 
the goals they address and their underlying values relating to work, individual 
freedoms, and routes to happiness.  A new, modified, life course perspective is 
developed out of the synergy of the two literatures, which is used in later chapters to 
frame the discussions of the implications of the research results for the design of 
working time policy instruments.  Chapter 3 elaborates the analytical framework, 
discussing the approach by which a household’s greenhouse gas emissions are 
estimated based on what it consumes, developing the model of household 
consumption behaviour which links household greenhouse gas emissions with the 
working patterns of its members, and detailing how the greenhouse gas effects of 
different scenarios of change in working patterns will be estimated. Chapter 4 
contextualises the research, beginning by presenting the case study countries of the 
UK and the Netherlands, the datasets used, and their preparation for analysis, before 
providing a first look at the patterns of greenhouse gas emissions from their 
populations as revealed by the data.  Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis that reductions in 
the paid working hours of household members will reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions arising from that household’s consumption.  Drawing on these household-
level results, chapter 6 estimates how much national greenhouse gas emissions would 
increase if UK and Dutch objectives to increase labour market participation rates 
 10 
were met.  Chapter 7 takes the opposite approach, estimating how emissions would 
reduce under different scenarios of reductions in paid working hours, and increases 
in the use of career breaks, in the two populations.  Chapter 8 concludes, 
summarising the key results of the thesis, and their implications for the research 
questions and for working time policy. It also discusses limitations to the work and 
possible topics for further research. 
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Chapter 2 The regulation of working time for 
environmental, social and economic ends: two 
perspectives, common ground? 
Patterns of paid working time have attracted increasing policy attention across high 
income nations.  Starting out mainly as a labour market issue, with efforts to increase 
labour market participation for economic ends or, in times of difficulty, to manage 
unemployment levels, policy goals have evolved with changing conditions and 
cultural values to increasingly consider social factors, relating in particular to gender 
equality, to the effects of paid work on childcare provision and fertility, and to 
changing, increasingly individualised life courses (Lewis, Knijn, et al. 2008).  
Environmental considerations meanwhile still remain largely unconsidered in the 
design and evaluation of policy to regulate working time, indeed the linkages 
between environmental and social policies in general are largely unexplored (Gough 
et al. 2008).  Despite this, a small but growing body of literature highlights this 
environmental aspect, arguing that working time reduction could be an important 
tool in addressing such environmental crises as climate change, habitat loss and 
biodiversity loss.  Such broad environmental benefits would arise, it is argued, 
because working time reduction would ultimately lead to concurrent reductions in 
income and, as a result, consumption of market goods and services, reducing the 
current unsustainable levels of demand for multiple natural resources and the 
generation of diverse forms of pollution.  What is more, working time reduction 
could provide people with more time to pursue happiness in other, less material, 
ways (see, for example, Coote et al. 2010; Hayden 1999; LaJeunesse 2009; Robinson 
2006; Schor 2005). 
 
This environmental perspective is the starting point of the research in this thesis.  
What contribution to these environmental issues could working time reduction 
make?  What are the implications for policy design?  This chapter reviews the 
existing literature on working time, both from the ecological economics perspective, 
from which the environmental arguments arise, and from the social policy 
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perspective, in which existing policy is framed, conceptualised, designed and 
evaluated for social and economic ends.   
 
The first section of this chapter presents the arguments relating to working time 
reduction as a route to environmental sustainability, presenting the environmental 
issues facing society and the role working time reduction could play in addressing 
them.  It also reviews the argument that such reductions in working time could bring 
wellbeing benefits too. It discusses the size of contribution working time reduction 
could make to these issues, and then looks at the policy instruments that the literature 
proposes to achieve these reductions in paid work. 
 
The second section of the chapter reviews the social policy literature on working 
time, or “work life balance” policy, reviewing its social and economic goals and its 
instruments.  Being grounded in the analysis of real, implemented policies, it has 
developed nuanced analytical perspectives from which to evaluate and propose 
policy design, something which the ecological economics literature largely lacks.  
One of the most prominent of these perspectives, the life course perspective, is 
presented. 
 
The third section compares the two literatures.  Despite the two distinct starting 
points, it is found that they have similar values around the role of paid work, and in 
many ways are complementary.  A novel synergy of the two perspectives is 
presented in the form of a modified life course perspective, incorporating 
environmental goals alongside the social and economic, and considering a wider 
range of areas of policy intervention to influence patterns of paid work.   
 
The final section summarises the key points and the several outstanding questions 
raised by the literature, and discusses the rationale for this thesis’ focus on one of 
these questions in particular: the environmental impacts of changing patterns of work 
in a population. 
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2.1 Working time reduction: Working time policy for sustainable 
development 
“Shorter working hours could help to adapt the economy to the needs of society 
and the environment, rather than subjugating society and environment to the needs 
of the economy” (Coote et al. 2010:3). 
 
Working time reduction is proposed as a solution to balancing the needs of 





Ecological economics take a rather different perspective to mainstream economics 
with respect to environmental problems and to human wellbeing, and proponents of 
working time reduction draw on these perspectives.  With respect to mounting 
ecological problems, ecological economics, rather differently to Neoclassical 
economics, explicitly considers the economy “as an open subsystem of the larger, but 
finite, closed and nongrowing [natural] ecosystem” (Daly 1992:186).  Rather than 
nature being an inert source of raw materials and a place to dump waste, its role as 
life support system upon which humanity (and of course the economy) depend is 
taken as a starting point when addressing environmental problems  (Boulding 1966).  
A key question from this perspective is then, what is the optimum size of the 
economic subsystem (Simms, Johnson, and Chowla 2010:118–124)?  It cannot, in 
material terms, go on growing forever on a planet that is fixed in size, as there is only 
so much ecological space.  This is something mainstream economics doesn’t 
consider, with a focus firmly on GDP growth (Daly 1992:186).  The answer is also 
nuanced, involving questions about the fair distribution of ecological resources 
between people alive today, and between current and future generations (World 
                                                 
1
 Ecological economics is, as we shall see, by its nature interdisciplinary, focused as it is on 
elaborating how a sustainable and just economic system could be achieved, rather than on a specific 
analytical perspective (see, e.g. Edwards-Jones, Davies, and Hussain 2000).  As such, authors might 
not identify themselves as ecological economists: others identify themselves with, for example, 
Steady State Economics (Daly 1991) and, more recently, degrowth (Fournier 2008), which 
respectively focus particularly on what a sustainable economy, once achieved, might look like, and on 
how the process of transition to it could be smoothly achieved. Work also draws on research from 
various other disciplines.  The term ecological economics is used throughout the rest of this thesis to 
refer to this field, as arguably the most encompassing term. 
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Commission on Environment and Development 1987), and indeed between human 
and non-human species.   
 
In essence, there is separate consideration of three factors: the “biophysical 
throughput” of the economy (that is, its levels of resource and energy use and waste 
production), the achievement of high levels of human welfare, and levels of 
economic activity, commonly measured by GDP.  The three “have a complex and by 
no means fixed relationship to each another” (Ekins and Jacobs 1995:22).  Indeed, 
GDP growth as a goal in itself is criticised for its lack of consideration of its side 
effects on the other two factors, in terms of environmental damage from high levels 
of resource use and pollution, and impacts on wellbeing, which arise from “the 
stressful demands of too much work, consumption and competition” (Fitzpatrick 
2000:10) in high income countries, and from inadequate attention to the highly 
unequal global distribution of wealth that it has brought (Jackson 2009a). In short, 
the effectiveness of pursuing indefinite GDP growth in meeting these environmental 
and social goals is questioned (Woodward, Simms, and Murphy 2006), indeed its 
compatibility with these goals is questioned, given the need to stay within ecological 
limits (Simms et al. 2010; Daly 1996; Ekins and Jacobs 1995).  Past a certain level of 
GDP the negative impacts of further growth on wellbeing and the environment could 
even outweigh the positive (Max-Neef 1995). 
 
Ecological economics does not however involve a total rejection of neoclassical 
economics by any means.  Indeed, if anything, the market system of production and 
distribution is generally considered even more vital: its capacity to enable innovation 
and a steady increase in production efficiency seems essential to support a future 
projected population of over 9 billion people (by 2050) within environmental limits 
(Daly 1995; Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, Population Division 2008). 
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The next section discusses why working time reduction
2
 is argued by some authors in 
the literature to be necessary. The arguments are firmly linked to the issues of 
environmental sustainability and human wellbeing found in ecological economics, 
and so these two key issues are discussed, with a focus on the role working time 
reduction is argued to play with regards to them.  Following that, the scope and limits 
of working time reduction as a solution to these issues is discussed, followed by a 
look at how working time reduction might be achieved in practice. 
2.1.1 Why working time reduction is needed 
2.1.1.1 Environmental benefits 
The literature on working time reduction takes as a starting point the assertion that 
current levels of economic activity lead to levels of environmental damage so high 
that the very life support services of the Earth upon which societies rely are being 
undermined at local, regional and increasingly global scales, threatening the 
livelihoods of future generations (Rockström et al. 2009; WWF 2010).  Working 
time reduction can help address these environmental issues, it is argued, by 
contributing to reducing the consumption of market goods and services, the 
production of which is the primary source of environmental impacts.  Put simply, if 
people work, and so earn, less, they will in turn spend and consume less, resulting in 
lower environmental impacts (Coote et al. 2010:17).  As production falls as a result 
too, a lower amount of labour would also be required, and working time reduction 
also then helps to distribute this more evenly through the population, by allowing 
more people to be employed for fewer total hours each, rather than having some 
working long hours and high numbers unemployed (Lintott 2004).  
 
The evidence on the environmental impacts of economic activity, and the need to 
address the scale of these, is discussed briefly below, followed by the arguments in 
                                                 
2
 The term working time reduction is used throughout this thesis as a convenient shorthand to refer to 
the arguments for reducing average paid working time per capita as part of an environmentally 
sustainable and just economic system. 
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the literature about what this means for levels of work in the economy, and the role 
of working time reduction as a policy response. 
 
The overwhelming weight of research evidence indicates that human activities, 
particularly economic, have recently grown to the extent that they are using an array 
of resources, and producing levels of waste and pollution, at rates that are 
increasingly reaching or exceeding the capacity of the planet’s ecosystems to support 
(Rockström et al. 2009).  Recent human activity of the last 50 years or so has seen 
modern gross domestic product (GDP), one measure of the productive output of the 
economy, increase by more than 7 times.  Natural resource extraction, waste and 
pollution generation, land use, climate changing emissions, species extinctions, and 
so on have increased by substantial amounts as a result too (Young and Steffen 
2009:295–315). Materials use has grown more slowly than GDP but has still 
increased substantially, and per capita has doubled in the last century, primarily due 
to increases in the use of non-renewable materials such as minerals, ores and fossil 
fuels (Krausmann et al. 2009).  Use of renewable resources such as wood, land and 
fisheries has also grown substantially.  Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of select 




Figure 2.1 Size of human actions and responses in the “Earth System” since the start of 
the Industrial Revolution 
Source: Young and Steffen (2009:300) 
 
Why should this be of concern?  For one thing, evidence suggests that renewable 
natural resources are now being used faster than nature can produce them.  Research 
on the “ecological footprint” of our economy, a measure of its total impact on the 
natural world, suggests globally we had, in 2007, an “ecological overshoot of 50 per 
cent.” As WWF describe, “This means it would take 1.5 years for the Earth to 
regenerate the renewable resources that people used in 2007 and absorb CO2 waste. 
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Put another way, people used the equivalent of 1.5 planets in 2007 to support their 
activities.” (WWF 2010:34).  Figure 2.2 below shows how humanity’s ecological 
footprint grew from 1967 to 2007, broken down by source of the impact.  Over 50% 
of this impact is now the result of carbon dioxide emissions.  Given the wide global 
disparity in affluence, if everyone consumed resources and produced waste at UK-
average per capita levels, at least 3.4 planets would be needed (Simms et al. 
2010:12). 
 
Figure 2.2 Ecological Footprint by component, 1961–2007 
“The Footprint is shown as number of planets. Total biocapacity, represented by the dashed line, 
always equals one planet Earth, although the biological productivity of the planet changes each 
year.” 
 
Source: WWF (2010:34) 
 
Some argue that innovation, driven by market forces, will simply allow us to 
substitute one resource for another as it becomes scarcer due to this overexploitation, 
so that these issues are not of concern.  This is controversial in itself (see for example 
Ayres 2007 for a discussion of the important limits to such substitutability), but 
anyway misses a more important issue: natural resources are not inert goods awaiting 
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economic exploitation, but rather they provide a huge array of life support services 
for the planet, including for human life.  The Earth is a complex, dynamic, self-
regulating climatic, biological and geological system.  Throughout recorded human 
history (within the last 10,000 years or so), this “Earth system” has been in a period 
known as the Holocene, in which an uncharacteristic level of climatic stability has 
prevailed (Rockström et al. 2009:2) (see Figure 2.3).  This, some argue, is what has 
enabled human societies to develop to an advanced level, as the generally predictable 
climate has provided a secure supply of natural resources and allowed reliable 
agriculture to develop, a stable setting for civilisations to develop in (Young and 
Steffen 2009:296).  
 
Figure 2.3 Levels of oxygen-18 (18O), an indicator of temperature, since the last glacial 
period, and selected events in human history. 
The Holocene is the last 10,000 years. 
 
Source: Rockström et al. (2009:3), adapted from Young and Steffen (2009:297) 
 
Research suggests that human impacts on the environment are now becoming so 
large that they are pushing values of key biophysical variables
3
 outside the range in 
which they have existed for the entire Holocene period.  Large and sometimes 
multiple impacts risk pushing key Earth systems past “tipping points” beyond which 
sudden, non-linear and irreversible changes occur at the local, regional and global 
                                                 
3
 Such as atmospheric greenhouse gas levels, release of active nitrogen into the environment, levels of 




, pushing the planet’s regional and global climate and ecosystem services into 
new dynamic stable states that could be far less hospitable to human life and 
civilisation than they are in their current form (Rockström et al. 2009).  In addition to 
the risks to humanity, these activities are driving the sixth mass extinction of species 
on earth, with extinction rates at an estimated 100-1,000 times the natural 
background level (and estimated to increase a further 10-fold over the coming 
century) (Leakey and Lewin 1996; Rockström et al. 2009).  These species arguably 
have an intrinsic right to exist independent of any value they have to humans, with 
humans having a corresponding duty to protect them (see e.g. Rolston III 1995 for a 
discussion). 
 
At the time of writing, the environmental impact receiving most attention is climate 
change due to human emissions of greenhouse gases, produced primarily from 
burning fossil fuels for power generation and industry, from deforestation, and from 
agriculture (Stern 2007:iv).  These have resulted in levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) in 
the atmosphere growing from pre-industrial levels of 280ppm (parts per million) 
(Pachauri and Reisinger 2007:37) to over 386ppm in 2009 (Tans and NOAA/ESRL 
2010).  Concentrations of other greenhouse gases are also increasing due to human 
activity (Pachauri and Reisinger 2007:37).  Expressed in terms of “equivalents” of 
carbon dioxide (CO2e),
5
 the atmospheric concentration of all greenhouse gases was 
already 430ppm in 2007 (Stern 2007:vii). Estimates of “safe” atmospheric levels 
vary depending on assumptions regarding the ability of humans to adapt and the 
acceptability of different levels of climate change and associated impacts, but range 
between 350ppm (Rockström et al. 2009) and a risky, high, but perhaps more 
                                                 
4
 For example: recent record lows in Arctic summer sea ice appear to be driven by local positive 
feedback mechanisms initially triggered by climate warming but now self-sustaining and causing 
further regional warming (Lindsay and Zhang 2005); climate change and agricultural and other 
pressures have the potential to trigger a large scale die-back of the Amazon rainforest ecosystem, this 
itself releasing billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere, driving climate change 
even further (Nepstad et al. 2008). 
5
 Carbon dioxide equivalent, CO2e, provides a standard unit of measurement for different greenhouse 
gases expressed in terms of their potential for contributing to global warming compared to that of 
carbon dioxide.  Six gases are included in the measure, being the principle contributors to human-
induced climate change: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride (UNFCCC 2008:106).  Atmospheric concentrations of 
these gases are measured in parts per million, whilst emissions of these gases are typically measured 
by mass (kilograms or tonnes). 
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attainable 500-550ppm (Stern 2007:vii).  Such levels, evidence suggests, would 
provide a good chance of the resultant mean global temperature rise staying below 
2
o
C, the current EU and international objective (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007:3; UNFCCC 2009), and arguably sufficient to stand a high 
chance of avoiding “dangerous” climate change.   This implies that global CO2e 
emissions need to fall well below 50% of current rates by 2050, the majority of this 
reduction to occur in high income countries if per capita emissions are to become 
more equitable at a global level.  Currently, by contrast, CO2 levels in the atmosphere 
are increasing at some 1.9ppm per year (Pachauri and Reisinger 2007:37) with the 
global rate of emissions also increasing year on year, even despite the recent 
financial crisis and recession in high income countries (Harvey 2011).  
 
The comparatively limited action on emissions that accompanies the global 
agreement on the urgency of the issue is in part because of fears, particularly in the 
major emitters the USA and China, that acting on climate change would impede 
global GDP growth, and there is deadlock over who should be allowed (ecological) 
space for economic growth and who should not (Retallack 2010; Victor 2010).  
There is justifiable suspicion that emissions targets for stabilising atmospheric 
greenhouse gases cannot be reconciled with GDP growth and increasing global 
income equity: even if everyone by 2050 were to have today’s EU-average level of 
material affluence, in a world of 9 billion people this would imply emissions per 
dollar of GDP would need to fall by 55 times between now and then (Jackson 
2009b:81).  On top of this, some still-dissenting voices continue to argue that 
concern over climate change is based on tentative or unsound science, or is even a 




Even if the reader is not convinced of the need for action on greenhouse gas 
emissions and other environmental impacts because of the danger they pose to 
humanity and other species, or considers it a normative issue outside the field of 
                                                 
6
 Despite significant attention in the media given to those questioning climate change, the scientific 
consensus is extremely strong: one study of nearly 1,000 climate change related journal articles found 
not a single one questioning the consensus that climate change is both happening and largely due to 
human activity (Oreskes 2004). 
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academic research, a more pragmatic issue is that governments have set themselves 
policy goals to be met in relation to them.  The EU has set itself a goal of reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20% of 1990 levels by 2020
7
, and 80-95% by 2050 
(European Commission 2011), and the UK and the Netherlands have long term goals 
of 80% reductions by 2050, with interim 2020 goals exceeding the EU’s of 34% in 
the UK and 30% in the Netherlands (DECC 2009:36; Peeters 2010:6). The current 
globally agreed aims are unclear, although the tentative goal of ensuring a low risk of 
mean surface temperature increases of 2
o
C above pre-industrial levels implies total 
global reductions in annual emissions of over 50% by 2050, and some 80-90% from 
current high income countries.  Factors affecting the ability of nations to meet, or fail 
to meet, these goals are worthy of consideration and research from this perspective 
also.  
 
So how does working time reduction contribute to these aims?  For one thing, it is 
argued that it is an effective and just way to reduce consumer demand, the ultimate 
driver of the economic activities which cause these impacts.  Households are the 
largest “final demand category” in most high income countries (Hertwich 
2005b:4676), i.e. they account for the largest share of national consumption.  In this 
thesis’ case study countries of the UK and the Netherlands, households account for 
approximately 76% and 65% of total national consumption emissions respectively 
(Hertwich and Peters 2009).  The public sector and investments account for the 
remaining consumption emissions of the two countries.  Working time reduction 
would reduce these household emissions and other environmental impacts, as people 
work less, and hence earn less, and so spend and consume less.
8
  This in turn also 
means that less labour is likely to be needed by the economy as a whole, and working 
time reduction therefore becomes an effective way to spread the remaining labour 
across the population, as it institutionalises shorter average hours per employee.  In 
principle this should mean that for a given total labour demand in the economy, more 
                                                 
7
 With a European Parliament vote on increasing this to 30% due in July 2011. 
8
 As the production of these goods, and the resultant emissions, are globally dispersed, then these 
emissions reductions would also be dispersed around the world.  As such, whilst they would 
contribute equally well to global goals, only a proportion of these emissions reductions would 
contribute to the goals of the country in which the household is situated, i.e. those emissions from 
products and services produced within that same country, including energy generated for home use. 
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people are employed, but working fewer hours each on average, than would 
otherwise be the case, thus helping to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to 
earn a living rather than some working full time and there being increasing 
unemployment, an unjust outcome that would limit the acceptability of efforts to 
reduce environmental damage (Lintott 2004:41). 
 
This might be all well and good, but what about the effects of this on people’s 
wellbeing?  What might the effects on wellbeing be if they consume less? What 
about the extra spare time people will have if they spend less time in paid work?  The 
next section looks at these issues. 
2.1.1.2 Increasing wellbeing 
“Scientists are discovering a convenient truth: our happiness does not depend on 
the consumption of conventional economic goods and services, but instead is 
enhanced when we have more time and space for socializing, for nature, for 
learning, and for really living instead of just consuming” (Speth et al. 2007). 
 
The ecological economics literature is characterised by a concern not just for the 
environment but also with human wellbeing, including minimum material living 
standards.  This again takes a different approach to mainstream economics, drawing 
on the literature on happiness studies, or “positive psychology”, to move beyond 
simple utility functions to attempt to identify determinants of wellbeing.  The results 
have important implications for what constitutes a wellbeing-maximising balance 
between paid work and non-paid time: many activities correlated with high levels of 
happiness require time rather than substantial amounts of money to pursue (Speth et 
al. 2007), whilst increasing income has apparently little impact on wellbeing once a 
certain level of material comfort has been attained (Frey and Stutzer 2002).  The 
values and beliefs of individuals also seem to be central to wellbeing regardless of 
their external environment and situation (Delhey 2009:32).  Below, the literature on 
the factors that contribute to high levels of happiness is summarised.  The 
implications for working time are then discussed. 
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In the positive psychology literature, the term happiness, or subjective wellbeing is 
typically defined as “a predominance of positive over negative affect, and 
satisfaction with life as a whole…thus encompassing both affective and cognitive 
aspects” (Lu et al. 2001:1161–2).  It thus has three components: “positive affect – the 
presence of pleasant emotions such as joy, contentment and affection; negative affect 
– the relative absence of unpleasant emotions such as fear, anger, and sadness; and 
personal judgements about satisfaction” (Biswas-Diener, Diener, and Tamir 
2004:19).  But what, if anything, can be said to be a ‘cause’ of happiness?  Are their 
universal causes? 
 
The psychologist Abraham Maslow developed in the 1950s an influential model of 
human needs that contribute to happiness.  This split needs into two kinds: ones 
related to “deficiencies”, material and social requirements for wellbeing; and “self-
actualisation” needs related to the achievement of moral factors (Edwards-Jones et 
al. 2000:72) (see Figure 2.4).  The modern literature also broadly supports the factors 
included by Maslow: Layard, in his review of the happiness literature, concludes that 
there are a “big seven” factors influencing happiness: family income, family situation 
(married, divorced, widowed, cohabiting, etc), work (e.g. unemployment and 
security of job), community and friends, self-rated health, personal freedom, and 
personal values. Age, gender, looks, IQ and education seem to make little difference 
meanwhile (Layard 2006:62–70). Csikszentmihalyi (1997) also proposes a theory on 
the importance of “flow” experiences for subjective wellbeing.  He argues that 
experiencing flow, the frame of mind that occurs when fully engaged in creative 
activities or those that involve discovery, is a route to longer-term, fuller life 




Figure 2.4 Maslow’s model of human needs 
 
* Self-actualization needs are of equal importance (not hierarchical) 
Source: Edwards-Jones et al. (2000:72) 
 
Of the factors that do contribute to happiness, their effects vary however.  Some 
seem to often have long term, even permanent impacts on happiness, including 
changes in family situation (marriage, divorce, becoming widowed, etc) and changes 
in health and disability (Easterlin 2004a; Biswas-Diener et al. 2004), whilst others 
(such as increases in income) seem to bring only transitory benefits, as looked at 
more below. 
 
Of the deficiency needs in Maslow’s hierarchy, high social capital, including the 
intimacy of close personal relationships, connections with ones local community, and 
the sense of security and trust afforded by living in a stable, amicable and accepting 
society with health services, pensions, employment and job security, seems to be an 
important contributor to people’s happiness (Gowdy 2005:218; Helliwell and Huang 
2006:20).  However, whilst such strong social connections are apparently necessary 
for high levels of happiness, they are seemingly not sufficient (Diener and Seligman 
2002; Biswas-Diener et al. 2004). 
 
What of income, and consumption?  Certainly in market societies, a certain level of 
income is generally necessary to be able to meet a person’s physiological material 
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needs (water, food, shelter).  However, the effect of income in increasing happiness 
seems to diminish or even disappear once a certain level is surpassed, one that is 
enough to meet these basic needs securely.  Easterlin (1974) first observed this cross-
nationally, noting that the correlation between wellbeing and per capita income falls 
to close to zero once a certain, fairly low, level is passed (see Figure 2.5 for more 
recent data on this effect).  This so-called Easterlin paradox is further supported by 
within-country studies over time: in the UK, for example, life satisfaction was found 
to remain unchanged between 1973 and 1995, despite GDP per capita rising over 
50% during that time (Figure 2.6).  The correlation between individual income and 
happiness becomes weak past about US€10,000 per year (Frey and Stutzer 2002).  A 
range of other important measures of quality of life, such as life expectancy at birth, 
infant mortality and participation rates in education, follow similar patterns, with a 
strong correlation with GDP per capita rapidly disappearing above about US$10,000
9
 
per person (Jackson 2009b:55–61).  This questions the idea at the very heart of 
modern free-market economics, that increased consumption can increase subjective 
wellbeing.  What explains it? 
  
                                                 
9
 US dollars, 2005 values, adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
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Figure 2.5 Mean self-reported happiness against mean GDP per capita across nations 
 
Source: Jackson (2009b:42) 
 
Figure 2.6 UK life satisfaction and GDP per capita 1973-1997 
 
Source: Sustainable Development Commission (2003) 
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Firstly, it is worth noting that mainstream economics acknowledges that the marginal 
utility of income should fall as income increases, i.e. as people get more materially 
affluent, further money will do less for their wellbeing (Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell 
2008; Easterlin 2004b).   
 
Two theories suggest that this marginal utility actually falls to zero.  The first of 
these, which takes the perspective of the individual, is “hedonic adaptation”, or 
setpoint theory.  This draws on the observation that people seem to adapt fully to 
many life events within even a few months, returning to their previous level of 
happiness.  Hence, it is argued, people “have a fixed setpoint of happiness or life 
satisfaction determined by genes and personality” (Easterlin 2004a:26–7).  As 
mentioned above, this does not hold for all life events; if it did, it would suggest a 
certain nihilism is permissible in the development of any social policy by 
government, as nothing it did would make any difference to the happiness of its 
population. Nevertheless, complete and rapid adaptation apparently does occur when 
a person receives a pay rise, at least in the affluent societies in which such studies 
have occurred, where basic material needs are generally already easily covered by 
wages (Easterlin 2004a).  It is argued that under these conditions, people quickly 
adapt their preferences to match their new level of income, developing a new internal 
norm of what should be considered an adequate income (Schor 1995:74). 
 
The second theory looks at the societal level, arguing that a person’s income level 
relative to others in a country seems to have more importance for their happiness 
than their absolute income (Donovan, Halpem, and Sargeant 2010:16).  Easterlin 
(2004a:32) suggests that this is because people shape a concept of what is a good 
income with reference to the apparent affluence of their friends, family, peers and 
wider society.  Another argument is that, as people earn more, an increasingly large 
share of consumption is of so-called positional or status goods.  This “status 
consumption” is designed to make the buyer feel, and signal that they are, of a higher 
status than those around them, part of “keeping up with the Jones” (Mason 1998:ch 
9; Schor 1995:75).  In this situation, Mason notes, increases in income increase an 
individual’s happiness only inasmuch as he or she becomes more affluent compared 
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to those around him or her.  As this leads to the relative affluence of others falling, it 
is harder for a society’s average happiness to increase in this scenario (LaJeunesse 
2009:240–241); indeed, the impacts on wellbeing due to the competition between 
individuals to increase their relative standing, and on the environment as a result, can 
even lead to welfare being reduced by GDP growth (Ng and Ng 2001). 
 
There are ways around this apparent impasse in increasing wellbeing through means 
of consumption.  Countries with lower levels of inequality tend to have, at least in 
Europe, higher levels of life satisfaction particularly, unsurprisingly, among lower 
income groups (Donovan et al. 2010:23), which suggests reducing inequality could 
raise wellbeing as people feel less acute relative poorness. Growing levels of status 
consumption could also lead to increased wellbeing if the status goods consumed 
have, on average, positive externalities, for example if status is indicated via 
philanthropic projects such as donations to charities.  However, Veblen (1899) 
argued that waste was an essential element of such status consumption: goods are 
bought to conspicuously display status, not because they are needed or will be used 
fully, or because they imbue benefits to others.  This is further the case when 
consumption is used not just to indicate status but also to construct and signal 
identity and belonging to a particular social group, the physical markers of which, 
such as clothing, are in constant flux, requiring replacement of goods before they 
have reached the end of their usable life (see chapters 3 and 4 in particular in Bocock 
1993).  Given the scale of negative environmental externalities of much 
consumption, any positive externalities that do arise are likely to be comparatively 
trivial. 
 
Humans are by no means trapped in some primal desire to materially outclass those 
around them however: Biswas-Diener et al (2004:24) note that studies of groups 
from around the world that live “a materially simple lifestyle” such as the Maasai 
and Amish, indicate that they “exhibit positive levels of subjective wellbeing despite 
the absence of swimming pools, dishwashers and Harry Potter.”   
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This links to the observation that personal characteristics seem to be one of the most 
important contributors to happiness.  For one thing, personality traits are important: 
extroversion for example seems to correlate with generally higher levels of 
subjective wellbeing, while neuroticism correlates with lower levels (Biswas-Diener 
et al. 2004).  But more importantly, an individual’s values are “an important filter 
through which living conditions translate into subjective well-being” (Delhey 
2009:32).  Valuing and pursuing something deeper in life than merely the 
accumulation of ever more mass-produced goods is important to happiness 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1999; Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002).  Materialistic people have 
been found to be consistently less happy and satisfied with life, more distressed, 
more likely to suffer “depression, anxiety, and narcissism; [have] less frequent 
experience of pleasant emotions in daily life and more frequent experience of 
unpleasant emotions; more problems with substances, such as cigarettes, alcohol and 
illegal drugs; and even physical health problems, such as headaches and stomach 
aches” (Kasser 2006:202).  A fixation on consumption for the individual, and on 
GDP growth by society as a whole, arguably corrodes “moral standards [through] 
glorification of self-interest and a scientistic-technocratic world view” which 
undermines individual and spiritual beliefs and goals both for individuals and society 
(Daly 1991:229–239).  However, this is not an inevitable process: even those living 
in consumer capitalist environments can choose and pursue alternative life goals, and 
benefit from doing so.  “Post-materialistic” as opposed to “materialistic” values are 
on the rise in affluent countries, particularly among younger cohorts: with physical 
needs and safety largely secure, people are increasingly concerned with non-material 
factors in their lives, such as belonging, self-expression, environmental issues, and 
quality of life, as determinants of happiness (Delhey 2009; Inglehart 1990:66–103).  
Those who spend more time in volunteering work for example have significantly 
higher average levels of happiness (both because happier people volunteer more, and 
because volunteering boosts wellbeing) (Thoits and Hewitt 2001). Some people in 
high income countries already “voluntarily simplify” their lives, consuming less 
overall, and less from large corporations, producing more of their own material 
needs, so as to live in a manner compatible with their environmental, community and 
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personal development life goals and values (McDonald et al. 2006)
10
.  Having 
spiritual life goals and following religious values can also improve wellbeing. In 
Buddhism, for example, happiness, and eventually enlightenment, requires freedom 
from desires of all kinds, including material ones.  It is desires which are seen as the 
cause of suffering, as they bring a longing, an “unsatisfactoriness”.  Wishing for 
more, for different, we end up living in our minds, focusing on some idealised future 
state in which we have acquired that new car or house, or wishing some past event 
would be changed. Freedom from suffering requires relinquishment of and freedom 
from these desires (Pauling 1993:54–57). In Buddhism, this in turn is achieved 
through following the Buddhist path, in no small part requiring, time consuming, 
meditation practice to cultivate “mindfulness”, a mental state in which full awareness 
is brought to and held on the present moment and ones own experiences of it, not jut 
in meditation but in the rest of ones time too, enjoying the present fully as it is.  As 
the famous Buddhist monk Thích Nhất Hạnh puts it, “If we’re really engaged in 
mindfulness … then we will consider the act of each step we take as an infinite 
wonder, and a joy will open our hearts like a flower” (Nhất Hạnh 2008:12).  Modern 
psychological evidence also lends empirical weight to this ancient wisdom: people 
who practice mindfulness meditation, even non-religiously, without any Buddhist 
links, tend to be happier, less materialistic and more environmentally-minded 
(Kasser 2006), and whilst it requires time to practice and cultivate the technique, it 
can be effectively taught to increase positive and reduce negative emotional states 
(Kabat-Zinn 2004; Baer 2003).   
 
Such alternative perspectives are rarely promoted in consumer capitalist societies.  
Indeed, we are taught materialism from our earliest years, when our deeply felt 
values are predominantly shaped and formed.  “Children in western social formation 
have to learn to become consumers; they are not born with a set of wishes to 
consume the goods on offer in modern capitalism.  Babies’ and young children’s 
early learning experiences affect the ways in which they develop later on in life in 
                                                 
10
 The voluntary nature of this simplification of lifestyle, and reduction in income, is important 
though: when such simplification fits with the individual’s values and life situation, it can be 
beneficial to wellbeing, but this is in marked contrast to those who “involuntarily simplify” through 
job loss, for example, on which see below for more. 
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relation to consumerism” (Bocock 1993:82–4).  These experiences are shaped by 
education and “the pervasive influence of advertising which emphasise[s] self-
interest and social status in persuading people to buy” (Mason 1998:141).  A false 
path to happiness, through endless material consumption, is a dominant, pervasive 
message in Western, high income, countries that shapes and builds materialistic 
norms and values from childhood (Kasser 2006:200–202).  The fact that individuals 
are strongly influenced in their ideas about the route to happiness by the dominant 
messages found in a country perhaps helps explain why “nationality is by far the 
strongest predictor of both life satisfaction and happiness” (Inglehart 1990:242). 
 
The review above indicates that income and consumption seem to do little for 
wellbeing once a basic level of material security has been met; indeed, valuing 
consumption seems to actively damage wellbeing.  Labouring to earn more money to 
consume more is unlikely to bring much benefit if this is the case.  By contrast, the 
literature shows that many of the contributors to wellbeing and flourishing require 
personal time, and energy, to pursue.   
 
Time is a key resource in achieving happiness and other life goals then. This implies 
a need to provide people the freedoms and capabilities to pursue these other life 
goals (Sen 2001:16–27), including the freedom to control their own time.  Time 
outside paid work especially is argued to bring benefits, to allow for more child care, 
to participate in community, society and politics, and simply to relax (Coote et al. 
2010:20–23).    These bring benefits not just to the individual: there are wider 
societal benefits of many non-paid activities (positive externalities) which are argued 
would contribute to increased wellbeing: greater gender equality in work and care 
distribution, more time to spend with children, and more time and energy for what 
Coote et al (2010:3) describe as the “core economy”: non-commodified human 
activities that contribute to community, caring, participation, and so on.  The New 
Economics Foundation sees a future in which people are “less attached to carbon 
intensive consumption and more attached to relationships, pastimes, and places that 
absorb less money and more time” (Coote et al. 2010:3).    
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But doesn’t time spent in paid work bring benefits too, as a source of wellbeing in 
itself, aside from the income earned from it? Whilst traditional economics sees it 
firmly as a source of disutility, something that people must be compensated for (via 
pay) to undertake (Robinson 2006:25), there is also a substantial literature espousing 
the benefits of paid work (summarised in detail by Waddell and Burton 2006).  This 
concludes that, in such cultures where paid work is a common activity, it generally 
plays an important role, not just in providing material wellbeing (via earned income), 
but also in promoting wellbeing through mental and physical health, a sense of 
contribution to society, and social status.  These factors are also improved when 
people transition to employment from sickness or disability statuses (when their 
health permits) and from short and long-term unemployment (ibid.).  Unemployment, 
for its part, can be an experience sharply in contrast to voluntary working time 
reduction, with a host of associated social ills, not to mention financial stress, rising 
with the length of unemployment, from boredom and depression to increasing family 
tensions and social exclusion (Glyptis 1989:71–91). 
 
The quality of jobs is important here however: menial and unfulfilling or unsafe 
work can be less good for wellbeing.  Paid work in which the employee lacks job 
security, control of their labour or of the times of day or week they work does not 
bring the same benefits, and can instead lead to job dissatisfaction, a general 
reduction in wellbeing and even depression (Radcliff 2005). There is also some 
evidence that work is becoming increasingly stressful, and that both over and under-
work (in terms of hours worked) can damage wellbeing (Coote et al. 2010:18). 
 
The contribution of paid work to wellbeing, as an activity to use ones time on, rather 
than for the income it provides, seems really thus to depend on the situation: on the 
nature of the job, on the values placed on and around work by society, and, 
ultimately again, on how the individual themselves values and perceives it.  Certainly 
the argument that work is socially the most acceptable way for people to derive 
income seems defensible. But as a use of time itself, little can perhaps really be said 
on its contribution to happiness beyond the fact that, as work generally involves the 
individual subjugating their will and energy to that of another, it is likely that the 
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time spent in work will not match ideally what people prefer to be doing.  Indeed, 
Putnam (2001) found that some 84% of people in the US preferred their time outside 
work to that in it, a percentage that has increased with time, and is likely to be even 
worse in more heavily industrialised countries. 
 
It is worth noting that the relative importance, for the happiness and wellbeing of 
both the individual and society, of free time over paid work and material 
consumption is hardly a new concept. John Stuart Mill saw a time when a stationary 
state of economic activity (i.e. in which the economy was no longer growing) would 
be achieved that would allow human needs to be met and increasing leisure time to 
be achieved: 
 
"It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary condition of capital and 
population implies no stationary state of human improvement. There would be as 
much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress; 
as much room for improving the Art of Living, and much more likelihood of its 
being improved, when minds ceased to be engrossed by the art of getting on. Even 
the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as successfully cultivated, with this 
sole difference, that instead of serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, 
industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging 
labour" (Mill 1870:ch. IV). 
 
In fact, it is very interesting to see that Mill in this chapter of his work presents, in 
very similar terms, essentially all the arguments put forward in the working time 
reduction literature for moving towards greater time outside of paid work for social, 
wellbeing and even environmental reasons (see Introduction). 
 
Keynes meanwhile, in his Economic Prospects of Our Grandchildren, foresaw a time 
when we would be finally free from the “economic problem” of meeting our material 
needs and could get by with an average of just 3 hours of paid work a day: 
 
“Thus for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his 
permanent problem – how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how 
to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, 
to live wisely and agreeably and well.  
 
“The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all of us along with them into 
the lap of economic abundance. But it will be those peoples, who can keep alive, 
and cultivate into a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves 
 35 
for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes” 
(Keynes 1930). 
 
Cultivating the “Art of Living” seems to be the real challenge of modern high 
income nations.  Growing up taught to be consumers, we are arguably somewhat 
deskilled in producing our own happiness, relying on market goods and services to 
distract us from the unsatisfactoriness of life without deeper meaning or purpose.  
Time outside of paid work seems to be a necessary precursor to addressing this 
problem, and people need the freedom to choose how to use their time to pursue life 
goals: it takes time to develop social bonds, to contribute to community and nature 
altruistically rather than for pay; to reflect, meditate on and pursue life goals; and to 
be able to take the time to sit and bring full awareness, mindfully, to the wonder of 
the world around us. 
2.1.2 Only part of the solution 
Reducing paid working time, with concurrent reductions in earned income, seems 
then to be a route by which we can reduce the environmental damage of our 
consumer society.  As people work less, earn less, and so spend and consume less
11
, 
both demand for labour and its supply drop in conjunction, in turn reducing the 
demand for the nature around us to be turned into consumer goods.   
 
It also seems to be a necessary precursor to moving from a consumerist value-system 
to something more compatible with increasing happiness and the pursuit of spiritual 
development.  With less paid labour required, more free time is available to pursue 
life outside of employment, with the associated wellbeing effects reviewed above.  
 
Working time reduction is a way to avoid this reduction in labour demand resulting 
in wellbeing-damaging unemployment.  Traditionally this is achieved through GDP 
growth, with labour productivity increases being turned into higher levels of 
production so that total labour demand is maintained (Tim Jackson 2009a:488).  
However, there are already concerns about the feasibility of meeting traditional full 
                                                 
11
 Taken over the whole lifecourse, an individual’s or family’s total expenditure on average matches 
their total income. 
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employment (in the sense of full time jobs for all) by this means, both in terms of the 
quantity and quality of jobs created (Bowring 1999; Lerner 1994).  The problem of 
maintaining full employment with full time jobs is likely to be exacerbated if GDP 
growth were constrained by environmental considerations (Alic 1997).  Working 
time reduction should allow the diminishing level of labour required to be distributed 
more evenly throughout society, so that all have the opportunity to earn their way 
and high unemployment is avoided (Victor 2010).  
 
However, as a modification to market economies, working time reduction, and 
policies to support it, are not argued in the ecological economics literature to be 
sufficient on their own to achieve environmental sustainability.  For a given level of 
technological development, the optimal balance for happiness between paid 
work/consumption and non-paid time to pursue non-material routes to wellbeing may 
still mean unsustainably high levels of environmental impacts (Gowdy 2005:219).  
Druckman and Jackson (2008b) for example find that even if all UK citizens reduced 
their consumption levels to what a survey suggested was commonly considered the 
absolute minimum for a satisfactory life, greenhouse gas emissions would fall just 
37% below the baseline levels, a far smaller reduction than the evidence suggests is 
needed to stabilise the climate.  Technology and material efficiency improvements 
are therefore needed too, if a given population size is to maintain a level of material 
affluence within environmentally sustainable limits.  Working time reduction policy 
effectively places boundaries on the influence of the economy in time: it limits the 
proportion of people’s time, both individually and for society as a whole, which is 
commodified, that is, made available for market exploitation.  It also provides 
incentives for people to reduce their material affluence
12
.  The economy still also 
needs to be bounded physically too: limits need to be placed on how much, and 
which parts of, the natural world are available for exploitation as raw materials for 
the economy, and how much pollution and waste is generated and returned to nature 
(Victor 2010).  And a new “ecological macroeconomics” is needed so that the 
economy, and people, can manage, adapt and thrive during and after the transition 
                                                 
12
 Which may or may not fit with their own preferences and capabilities to live off a lower income.  
See the next section, 2.1.3, for more about how such policy might work, and the potential for and 
limits to reconciling the environmentally, socially and individually optimal levels of consumption. 
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period to a sustainable economy in a way that is “socially sustainable, i.e. a 
prosperous and stable, rather than a catastrophic, descent” (Jackson 2009a:489; 
Kallis 2011:873).  A wide range of policies have been proposed to achieve these 
goals, from taxes and tradable quotas on different resources and emissions to 
“correct” market prices to reflect externalities (Stern 2009:7–11, 162–165) through 
reform of the debt-based monetary system (Lietaer 2002), programmes to combat 
poverty, and to stabilise the world population (Victor 2010), to alternative goals and 
indicators of economic success than GDP growth which include social, wellbeing 
and ecological considerations, and non-market (unpaid) labour (Daly and Cobb 
1994:443–508; Fitzpatrick 2000:349).  Daly (2008) gives a brief summary of the 
multiple areas of economic policy that might need modification, Jackson (2009b) 
among others gives a more detailed perspective.   
 
Whilst working time reduction is clearly only part of a solution to a sustainable 
economic system, it is seen to be a necessary part, both in theoretical arguments 
about creating a socially just and environmentally sustainable economy (e.g. 
Fitzpatrick 2000:348), and in macro-economic models which have attempted to 
create scenarios of transition of economies to environmental sustainability, low 
unemployment, low poverty and inequality, and a sustainable government debt to 
GDP ratio (see Spangenberg, Omann, and Hinterberger 2002; and Victor 2008, and 
2011 for the German and Canadian economies respectively).  It is also perhaps a 
politically expedient starting point for a transition to a sustainable economy. Setting 
quotas to limit resource use and pollution is unlikely to suffice, or even be politically 
possible, whilst consumer demand remains so much higher than sustainable limits.  
In a recent UK government review of the possibility of using personal tradeable 
energy quotas to reduce carbon emissions, for example, it was noted that “[w]hile it 
is tempting to think of a tightening cap on emissions as a solution in itself, the true 
challenge is to transform our society so that it can thrive within this limit” (Fleming 
and Chamberlin 2011:40). Quotas and caps can be set based on ecological evidence 
to define the boundaries of the economy and keep it to a sustainable scale, but further 
policies are needed to reshape the economic system to make sure these boundaries 
can be kept within, and in a way that is socially just.  It also needs to be socially 
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acceptable: simply labelling consumption levels in high income countries as 
excessive doesn’t encourage people to reduce consumption, as it “underestimates the 
complexity of human motivations and risks alienating those whose behavior [policy] 
seeks to change” (Jackson 2005a:20).  Working time reduction has a potentially 
substantial role in this respect in encouraging reduced consumption: it gives people 
alternatives to high levels of material consumption, providing a benefit, in the form 
of more time for non-paid activities, in exchange for reducing consumption, and 
hence in theory increasing its appeal and reducing political pressure to allow 
unsustainable consumption levels.  At the same time it institutionalises one of the 
key components necessary to prevent the high unemployment and inequality that 
could otherwise result from reducing consumption levels: policies to justly distribute 
a diminished and diminishing pool of work and income. It is also argued to support 
not just the environment but key wellbeing-improving services provided for free by 
people in their time outside of paid employment, which require time and energy to 
pursue (Coote et al. 2010:16). 
2.1.3 Achieving working time reduction 
2.1.3.1 Historical trends and preferences in paid working time 
Paid working time has indeed been in decline for some substantial period.  For this 
thesis’ case study countries, the UK and the Netherlands, Schor (2005) finds that the 
average annual working hours for employees dropped by 22% and 37.5% 
respectively between 1950 and 2000, in line with other countries, and also in line 
with trends going back at least to the 1870s  (Maddison 1987). 
 
At the same time however, participation rates have increased substantially, 
particularly for women, where participation rates of 30% or so in the first part of the 
20
th
 century have grown substantially to be 60, 70 or even over 80% in many high 
income countries (although this is lower during periods of childcare and in later 
working life) (Esping-Andersen 2009:20–25; Taylor-Gooby 2004:3).  The quest for 
gender equality, one driver of this latter trend, has been realised as an increase in 
women’s participation in paid work much more than it has in men’s reduction of paid 
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hours to take on a more equal share of non-paid work responsibilities (such as 
household tasks and childcare), a “masculisation” of women’s roles (Esping-
Andersen 2009:20–25).  Women, particularly mothers, are however much more 
likely than men to be working part time, and tend to have more broken labour market 
contact over the life course (den Dulk 2008:135; Spiess et al. 2004:80–88).  In 
addition, governments are increasingly pursuing increased labour market 
participation rates in an effort to maintain economic growth, and to support the 
sustainability of welfare state expenditure by having a strong tax base and few 
claimants of unemployment, disability and other benefits associated with “inactivity” 
(European Commission 2010:2; Hetzler 2009). 
 
The overall result of the above trends is that the majority of increases in labour 
productivity (measured in terms of market value added per hour worked) since the 
industrial revolution has been converted into producing more manufactured goods 
and services rather than into more time outside of paid work: some 70% in the UK 
and the Netherlands, and even more in some other countries (Maddison 1987). The 
role of industrial improvements in reducing total labour hours per capita (“abridging” 
labour, as Mill 1870, quoted above, referred to it) have been somewhat limited 
therefore.  
 
At the same time, there is evidence of apparently substantial unmet demand for 
reduced paid working time (Bowring 1999:80–89), particularly at certain stages of 
the life course, such as when a couple has young children to care for, and as 
retirement age is approached (Heuvel 2004:7).  Even this demand is potentially 
underestimated as a result of the format of the questions used in surveys gathering 
such data.  For one thing, people are known to be more averse to cutting current 
income in exchange for more time outside of work than they are to sacrificing a 
future pay rise for it, as people become accustomed to particular income levels 
(Schor 2005:45–6).  Surveys on working time satisfaction tend to phrase the 
questions in terms of the former option however, of cutting income in exchange for 
more free time, so that respondents indicate a lower preference for reduced hours 
than they would if they were asked to choose between a pay rise or more free time.  
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Also, in societies which emphasise and value paid work, undervalue non-paid 
activities like childcare, and promote consumption as a route to wellbeing rather than 
personal activities, people are more likely to (incorrectly) perceive wellbeing benefits 
from high levels of paid work and income, and less likely to see the benefits of 
reduced working time, especially if they see this as being out of step with the social 
norm level of paid work (Easterlin 2004a; Bowring 1999:80–81). People may then 
also misreport their working time reduction preferences in surveys to better fit with 
the perceived social norm of high levels of paid work. 
2.1.3.2 Individual behaviours: deviation from the “optimal” 
Some authors argue that these historical trends in paid working time simply reflect 
people’s preferences: they have preferred an increase in consumption more than an 
increase in leisure time (e.g. Robinson 2006:25).  However, this argument requires 
that individuals are free to choose their own working time.  This has arguably been 
the case for the collective over the decades (given that collective working hours have 
fallen historically), and for individuals as they are free (in principle) to choose their 
retirement age (Robinson 2006:25).  However this ignores important variations in an 
individual’s preferences across the lifecourse (for example, surrounding child care), 
which they often cannot freely adapt their working time to meet.  Even where policy 
provides rights to reduce working hours, various barriers can inhibit individuals from 
making use of these rights.  Financial constraints may limit the capability to survive 
for even a short period on a reduced or zero income.  People fear impacts on career 
and future employment (Groot and Breedveld 2004:294), and hence income security, 
and not without reason: employers often report that they feel more senior jobs cannot 
be done on a part time basis (European Commission et al. 2005).  This particularly 
affects women, whose earning power after childbirth (and the associated reduction in 
labour market contact) is often severely impacted, either from leaving the labour 
market or only be able to get a lower wage rate job compatible with combining work 
and care responsibilities (Spiess et al. 2004:86–87).  Perceived social pressures and 
norms that prioritise paid work and undervalue non-paid activities are also strong 
barriers (Bowring 1999:80).  The very high levels of part time work in the 
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Netherlands are in part due to strong moral support for this from supervisors and co-
workers (den Dulk 2008:143). 
 
Another issue is that the preferred, “optimal” work life balance for individuals, even 
if they were met, are unlikely to match the social and environmental optima.  It is 
unlikely that they would lead to sufficient working time reductions to achieve 
environmental sustainability.  There are, for one thing, arguments why the 
economically rational actor would choose a suboptimal level of paid work even when 
they have complete freedom to choose their work life balance.  This is because many 
environmental impacts are still externalities: that is, they are not reflected in the price 
of the goods and services which cause these impacts, nor in the wages of the jobs 
which cause them.  Individuals as a result choose to work too much, because the 
costs of their work in terms of environmental damage are external, and so not 
included in their decisionmaking when choosing their optimum balance of work and 
non-work time (Robinson 2006:26–31). As environmental externalities have grown 
in step with economic growth from generally minor, localised impacts to costs which 
increasingly dwarf the value of the economy itself, individual working patterns have 
become hugely out of step with the social and ecological optimum.   
 
Furthermore, behavioural psychology research demonstrates that people’s behaviour 
is often far from rational in this narrowly economic sense
13
.  People’s behaviours are 
inevitably constrained by their own capabilities and external opportunities.  As 
discussed above, they usually have far from perfect knowledge of the effectiveness 
of different strategies for pursuing happiness and other life goals.  They are guided 
by values and beliefs that are absorbed from the world around from birth.  They also 
act out of habit, a logical strategy for navigating the huge complexities of the social 
world without being overwhelmed (Dwyer 2009).  And individual behaviour is 
shaped by the world around not just by the limitations it places on different options 
available to them, but also by the value judgements relating to those different 
options, which can lead to people acting in ways that are out of line with their own 
                                                 
13
 Darnton (2008) provides a detailed review of psychological models of human behaviour. 
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values to fit with (perceived) social norms (Kasser 2006:209).  In consumer capitalist 
countries this can all lead to an excessive focus on paid work and consumption. 
 
All this means that there are varied and in some cases deeply entrenched barriers to 
work life balance matching individual, social and environmental optima.   
2.1.3.3 Motivating sustainable behaviour: the role of working time reduction 
policy 
Given this disjoint between individual working patterns and the wider aims of 
society and environmental sustainability, there is arguably a role for government to 
play in regulating working time to align them. 
 
What does the ecological economics literature say about the shape that working time 
policy instruments could, or should, take to achieve this?  
 
The literature reviewed so far suggests multiple instruments could be used to 
influence working time behaviour: to provide opportunities to reduce working time, 
and support individual capabilities to use these opportunities (i.e. to provide truly 
“functional” freedoms).  Further interventions could be to correct the market prices 
of products and labour to reflect their environmental impacts; to counter cultural 
values and restrict marketing messages which lead to suboptimal values, norms and 
habits of behaviour relating to paid work, consumption and non-work activities, and 
to promote mindfulness and the wellbeing value of non-work activities. 
 
However, the ecological economics literature generally does not go very far in 
suggesting detailed policy instruments for influencing working time patterns.  As 
Schor (2005:47) notes, even in the literature there are few articles arguing for 
working time reduction for sustainability.  As such, they tend to focus on points of 
principle rather than on the details of policy instruments; that is, they primarily 
discuss why other policies (such as increasing technological efficiency) are 
insufficient as solutions to environmental problems, and why working time reduction 
would be a functional solution.  Nonetheless there are some suggestions made, which 
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are summarised below in Table 2.1.  The first set of ideas relate to influencing 
individual functional freedoms to choose preferred working patterns.  The second set 
relate to wider policy interventions.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Policy instruments for working time reduction in the ecological economics 
literature 
Instruments to influence individual opportunities and capabilities 
Working time reduction mandated by government: as there is market failure it should intervene, via 
mandating shorter weekly hours, increased vacation days, and fewer years of work over the life 
course*
,§§ 
Collective working time reduction with union support (including pro rata pay reductions)* 
Regulate flexible working arrangements to balance the preferences of employees and the needs of 
employers, including “job sharing, school term shifts, extended care leave and sabbaticals”
 #
 
Employee rights to shorten working hours, in effect to “purchase” more time off work from 
employer – employee sacrifices some income in exchange for more free time, or foregoes a future 




Protection of part-time workers’ employment rights (pro rata with full time)
§§
 
Financial penalties on overtime (higher taxes on long hours)
§§
 
Ensure those below median income can reduce working hours without income loss, via benefits 
(funded by taxes on long hours)
§§
 
Instruments to influence wider factors 
Instruments to encourage employers to reduce the use of overtime and to instead increase the 




Increased training to combat skills shortages and to help the unemployed find work
#
 
Providing better protection to the self-employed against “low pay, long hours, and job insecurity”
 #
 
Public information campaigns to increase support for working time reduction by: 
 educating about externalities (as there is an information failure); 
 attempting to change values around work* and around materialism and consumerism** 
To support the pleasantness and different uses of non-work time: 
 Support from government for “uncommodified” activities, and for “local action to build 
neighbourhoods that everyone feels safe in and enjoys”
 #
 
 Encourage value change to value community, nature and local activities more
##
 
Teach people mindfulness to counter materialistic values
$$ 
Teach people how marketing cultivates materialistic desires
$$
 
Emphasise quality of life improvements of spending more time outside of paid work
$
 




Increase the share of jobs with positive externalities: for example, those relating to public goods 
such as greening of infrastructure, ecosystem and biodiversity protection, restoration and 
enhancement, core research on sustainable technologies, etc.* 
Sources:   
#
  Coote et al (2010:29,32)  
   
§
  Fitzpatrick (2000:351) 
   
##
  Hayden (1999:75)  
   **  Jackson (2009b:183) 
   
$$
  Kasser (2006:205–209)  
     
§§
  LaJaneusse (2009:235–242) 
     *  Robinson (2006:105–111) 
     
$
  Schor (1995:70) 





There is also a focus on the need for a transition period: rapid working time reduction 
is not suggested.  On the one hand, by phasing in reduced working hours gradually 
over a number of years, the resultant wage reductions could at least partially be offset 
by increases in wage rates, and businesses are given time to adapt (Coote et al. 
2010:28; Schor 1995). On the other hand, the transition to a sustainable economy 
could also mean major shifts in the relative sizes of economic sectors: some 
industries may grow (e.g. in renewable energy generation), others shrink (e.g. fossil 
fuel energy generation), and others change production methods (e.g. switching to 
greener production methods such as in agriculture, aquaculture, forestry and mining).  
Hence the availability of particular types of jobs will change too, requiring facilitated 
transitions and reskilling. Also, time would likely be needed for further institutional 
change, as “[i]nstitutions of all kinds — financial, political, legal, educational, 
religious and social — that have evolved to thrive in a fast-growing economy will 
have to adapt” (Victor 2010:371). 
 
Working time, and wider employment, policy for a sustainable economy thus, it 
seems, will need to be able to manage both an overall reduction in the total paid work 
requirement, and major, sometimes rapid, changes in the relative sizes, and 
workforces, of different economic sectors. While the ecological economics literature 
makes the case for working time reduction, and the need for policy to support this, 
the policy instruments suggested are less detailed.  What could the social policy 
literature contribute in this respect? 
2.2 Regulating “work life balance”: Working time policy as social 
policy 
Policies to influence the working patterns of individuals are by no means novel.  
They are often referred to as “work life balance” policies, and in many high income 
countries, especially in Europe, work life balance policies have already been in place 
for many years, and have an extensive list of social and economic goals to which it is 
argued they contribute, including better utilisation of the productive working age 
population in paid labour, for economic efficiency and international competitiveness, 
reduced levels of unemployment, greater support for individuals to balance work and 
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family commitments and non-work interests, and greater flexibility to lead one’s life 
as one wishes.   
 
Whilst these policies have no environmental aims, and often exist alongside policies 
aimed at increasing total paid work in the economy rather than reducing it, they and 
the academic literature on them nevertheless provide useful insights into how 
working time reduction policies could be designed and work in practice. 
 
This section reviews the literature on work life balance policies, focusing on those 
elements more explicitly aimed at enabling and incentivising reduced working time, 
that is, approaches in work life balance policy that most inform and are compatible 
with working time reduction.  The focus is on European Union-related literature, as 
EU Member States have, among high income countries, among the most developed 
and innovative work life balance policies, and the thesis’ case study countries, the 
UK and the Netherlands, are situated in the EU. 
 
The section begins with a look at the goals and underlying values informing the 
development of work life balance policies.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
life course perspective for the design of work life balance policy instruments: this 
perspective underpins the development of work life balance policies in one of this 
research’s case study countries, the Netherlands, in particular, and is helpful in 
conceptualising how multiple macro-level policy goals around paid labour can be 
reconciled and combined with individual working preferences.  This informs the next 
section (2.3), which discusses the commonalities and differences between the work 
life balance and working time reduction approaches, and looks at the contribution the 
two literatures can make to one another.  
2.2.1 The goals and values of work life balance policy 
A common narrative can be seen in the work life balance literature regarding the 
modern context within which policy developments in the EU are set.  Social, 
economic and demographic changes and considerations common across high income 
countries leave the EU with a dilemma.   
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On the social front, it wants to preserve the best of the European Social Model in the 
face of these changes: strong welfare state protection of citizens from risks, 
increasing gender equality, a more even distribution of the “benefits of prosperity”, 
social inclusion for all, and recognition, respect and support for changing and 
increasingly individualised, diverse life courses (Knijn et al. 2007; Freud 2007; 
Esping-Andersen 2002; Heinz and Krüger 2001) 
 
At the same time, its economies are facing increasing international competition on 
globalised markets, as a result of increasing economic integration and rapid 
technological change (European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment 
2007:8).  In response to this, EU countries have set common goals for high rates of 
participation in paid work for their populations, with high labour market mobility, 
and high and continuously updated skill levels in the workforce through lifelong 
learning (European Commission 2010:15; European Commission, Directorate-
General for Employment 2007:12).  The aim is for the labour force to be flexible to 
changing economic requirements, whilst still having a good level of income security 
for all individuals: so-called “flexicurity” policy (European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Employment 2007; Viebrock and Clasen 2009b).   
 
All this is against a context of an ageing and increasingly long lived population and 
falling fertility rates (Lewis, Knijn, et al. 2008:262) which threaten the fiscal 
sustainability of welfare state systems, an issue greatly exacerbated by the financial 
crisis of 2008 (Gough 2010).  In response to these issues, policy goals have been set 
to try to increase tax revenue (including through increasing levels of paid work at 
different stages of the life course) and reduce benefit payments (by shifting pensions 
funding to business and individuals, increasing retirement ages, and reducing the 
numbers claiming other types of benefit), as well as to increase fertility rates  (Knijn 
et al. 2007; Committee on Labour Market Participation 2008; European Commission 
2010; Jacquot, Ledoux, and Palier 2011). 
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The goals modern work life balance policies aim to meet (or at least contribute to, as 
part of wider social and economic policy) are thus diverse, reflecting the diverse 
challenges to be met.  In addition, various institutions, controlling elites, and interest 
groups inevitably want their interests met by policy too: the state, businesses, unions, 
and the general population of citizens, the latter three in particular of which can be 
broken down further into differing sectors and demographic groups, each having 
potentially diverse needs, preferences and values.  Tensions between goals and 
interests inevitably arise, but there is nevertheless substantial policy convergence in 
the EU.  This is in part down to the similar contexts EU countries are in, and also due 
to common European goals and policy instruments laid down in the Lisbon Agenda 
and European Employment Strategy, and various Directives.   
 
Similarity in policy goals and approaches is also down to common values that are 
increasingly informing their development.  Values embedded in policy, often 
implicitly, shape both what can be achieved by policy, and how, and have a strong 
influence in this field (Lewis, Knijn, et al. 2008:263). Work life balance policy, as 
with wider social policy, is becoming more employment-led (see O’Connor 2005), 
with the role of the welfare state being seen increasingly as being to encourage and 
help people into paid work (to “activate” them) rather than simply to support their 
income security in times of need (Dingeldey 2007).   This is in keeping with the idea 
that “[p]aid labour plays an important part in the modern ideal of citizenship and 
makes up a vital element of any viable welfare state” (Plantenga 2005a:55).  This 
focus on employment is apparent in EU-level documents, such as in the Lisbon 
Strategy for Jobs and Growth, a central pillar of EU labour market reform in the 
decade up to 2010, which sets the goal of “achieving sustainable growth with more 
and better jobs” (Commission of the European Communities 2006:3).  It is assumed 
just that people do not derive their income from the state (and hence, ultimately, 
from the labour of others) unless there is good reason (Department for Work and 
Pensions 2008). Work itself is argued to be good for wellbeing and social inclusion 
(Waddell and Burton 2006).  Finally, it is argued that the approach makes the least 
normative assumptions about the lifestyle of individuals, treating all the same as 
“citizen workers”, and hence affording them the greatest freedom of choice to meet 
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the demands of diversifying lifecourses and behaviours (Knijn et al. 2007:638; Lewis 
and Giullari 2005:79). 
 
In line with this employment-led approach, two related principles are being 
increasingly used to restructure the approach taken by European welfare states to 
meet their social policy goals: the adult worker model, and welfare to work (Lewis 
and Giullari 2005; Freud 2007).  Both give paid work a central role in social policy 
and in modern welfare state regimes: the normative assumption is that all adults 
should be in paid work, and should derive their own individual income (primarily) 
from undertaking paid work (Knijn et al. 2007:638), except when there are specific 
accepted reasons why the state should instead support them (such as in retirement, 
due to illness or disability, or for briefer periods of involuntary unemployment or 
parental leave: see below for a more detailed discussion). (Re)commodifying the 
population in this way (Dingeldey 2007) is argued to meet the diversity of social and 
economic goals already discussed, providing an adaptive, financially independent 
population for economic growth and state fiscal sustainability, and making the 
minimum of assumptions about individual behaviour: all are financially independent 
to live life as they prefer, without state interference.   
 
The adult worker model is, in essence, this approach applied to the working age 
population as a whole.  Welfare to work meanwhile is the manifestation of the adult 
worker model for a specific group of the population, i.e. those once considered either 
unable to or unsuitable for work, particularly the incapacitated (Hetzler 2009) and 
lone parents (Knijn et al. 2007), or those able to work but unwilling to do so 
(Department for Work and Pensions 2008). Paid work for these groups is argued to 
bring all the same benefits to the individual (and their dependents): an escape from 
social exclusion and from either poverty or social security dependency, from the 
negative impacts on wellbeing of not being a productive member of society, and a 
reduction in child poverty (for lone parents) (Freud 2007).   
 
The approach is certainly not without criticisms, which relate particularly to three 
issues: childcare, gender equality, and incapacity. 
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With respect to childcare, the presumption that people should be in paid work unless 
there is a good reason to (temporarily) leave it has lead to increasing pressure to 
“commodify” care, so that parents hand over childcare to professional services so 
that they can rapidly return to work.  There are question marks over the desirability 
of this, both in terms of the limits of parents’ willingness to hand over responsibility 
for raising their children to professional services (Lewis and Giullari 2005:87) as 
well as possible negative impacts on child wellbeing and development, especially for 
children under 18 months old (Lewis 2006:390), which concerns even those 
concerned primarily with the purely economic aspects of this (as children represent 
tomorrow’s labour supply) (Bovenberg 2005).   
 
Care is also central to tensions regarding gender equality.  There are criticisms that 
this gender neutral policy approach, which treats men and women the same, as “adult 
workers”, ignores that, culturally, women are still generally assumed to be, and most 
commonly in practice still are, the primary care-giver (Smith and Williams 2007). 
Policy instruments offer support for women to re-enter the labour market after a 
break for childcare via a focus on increasing childcare provision, but do less to 
promote greater equality in non-paid care work, through improved paternal leave for 
example (León 2009).  The labour market focus in the way in which gender equality 
is interpreted points to a primary concern with ensuring it contributes to economic 
growth through increasing female labour market participation (Lewis and Giullari 
2005), and the framing can even then reinforce existing gender inequalities if the 
outcome of flexible working policies is that women make more use of them than men 
to take on care responsibilities (Vandeweyer and Glorieux 2008).  This is arguably 
clearly seen in the Netherlands with its high levels of working time rights, which has 
highly gender-unequal distributions of time use, with women tending to work part 
time and men full time (as demonstrated later in chapter 7).  
 
Finally, there are question marks over who is capable for work, by what criteria, and 
who judges, in the case of incapacity from sickness or disability.  Whilst avoiding 
social exclusion for these groups is a desirable goal, whether recent reforms in many 
 50 
EU states, including the UK and the Netherlands, intended to radically tighten 
eligibility criteria for incapacity benefits really serve the wellbeing of the sick and 
disabled is questionable (Hetzler 2009), particularly when employer reluctance to 
employ these individuals mean they are simply moved from incapacity benefits to, 
sometime far lower, unemployment benefits (Devetzi Forthcoming). 
2.2.2 Policy instruments in theory: the life course perspective 
2.2.2.1 Main elements of the life course perspective 
Modern work life balance policy instruments therefore have to try to integrate 
various policy goals, contexts, values and levels of analysis.  A “good” work life 
balance policy can thus be assessed against how well it meets the policy goals and 
values discussed above and against how well it tailors diverse policy instruments to 
reconcile the diverse goals of government, different industrial sectors, demographic 
groups and individuals.  A perhaps unexpected result of the increasing recognition, 
and respect for, diverse individual life courses and preferences is that people are 
coming to all be treated the same by policy: as adult workers.  The result is that 
policy areas once considered and treated separately – parental leave, child care, 
retirement, disability and sickness benefits, unemployment, labour market 
participation rates, workforce skills training, and so on – are increasingly being dealt 
with in the same way, even with the same, unified, set of policy instruments (Delsen 
and Smits 2010).  This allows for institutional simplification by allowing various 
leave schemes to be combined into one scheme with a common approach to 
identifying and accommodating needs and preferences (Plantenga 2004).  
 
The life course approach provides a useful analytical perspective from which to 
analyse these work life balance policy instruments and evaluate how well they meet 
these diverse aims.  It arose in the Netherlands, where it is an “important frame of 
reference” for policy reform (Plantenga 2005a:54).
14
  The perspective considers how 
                                                 
14
 Whilst the life course perspective is used in this discussion, there are other approaches that could be 
mentioned that appear in EU policy discourses, notably the Transitional Labour Market perspective 
and the social investment perspective (Knijn and Smit 2009).  The approaches share substantial 
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policy can provide individuals the freedom to lead life how they wish, but also 
considers how this can be combined with labour market functioning and the interests 
of the collective (Leijnse et al. 2002:16–17; Plantenga 2005b:302–303), i.e. it looks 
at how the sum of individual behaviours can be shaped to meet the social optimum 
(here defined in terms of policy goals for society and the economy as a whole and for 
different industrial sectors). 
 
The life course perspective essentially considers two key resources which are juggled 
by individuals over the life course, money and time.  It can be said that in a market 
economy, these two resources allow individuals or households to either buy or 
produce all the things needed to maximise their wellbeing (Becker 1981).  Policy 
from the life course perspective should provide individuals with functional freedom 
to manage their time use and income as they wish, to meet the varying demands on 
these over the life course, providing opportunities to exit and (re)enter the labour 
market in manners which suit individual circumstances, facilitating transitions 
between labour market statuses whilst protecting income security (Schmid and 
Schömann 2004).  The perspective allows an analysis of how policy can be tailored 
to meet the diverse goals of different actors at different levels, so that whilst broad 
freedom to meet work life balance preferences can be provided to individuals, time 
rights and the relative financial costs and benefits of different working patterns can 
be tailored to meet overall macro (national) and differing meso (sector and employer) 
goals, as well as being tailored to particular demographic groups considered worthy 
of distinctive treatment.  Although there is an attempt to recognise diverse life 
courses, the “rush hour of life” is still recognised as a phenomenon occurring in most 
people’s lives around the ages of 30 to 50, and extra policy support is provided for 
this period: greater rights for career breaks (such as maternity leave) and reductions 
in working hours; financial support (such as child benefits); and services in kind 
(such as childcare services). 
 
Whilst a wide range of ways could be envisaged to support people in meeting their 
work life balance preferences and to influence their decisions, it is these three areas 
                                                                                                                                          
common ground; indeed the Dutch life course perspective was inspired by the Transitional Labour 
Market approach (Maier 2007:340). 
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that tend to be exclusively focused upon in the life course perspective literature and 
policy: increased time rights for employees (rights to career breaks and to flexible 
and part time hours); fiscal instruments (tax credits, benefits restructuring, paid leave 
rights); and services in kind (primarily childcare services, which exist to facilitate 
and encourage a return to paid work, especially after maternity leave) (Lewis and 
Giullari 2005:47; European Commission et al. 2005:25).  To these can also be added 
policies aiming more specifically to support people to return to work after an 
involuntary exit from the labour market: Active Labour Market Policies, lifelong 
learning services, job centres, etc., which form part of “flexicurity” policy 
(Wilthagen 2007).  The targeting of policy instruments is also important: to different 
demographic groups, to different industrial sectors, and also to different individuals. 
 
The sections below discuss these different types of policy instruments in more detail. 
2.2.2.2 Time sovereignty 
Policy can influence working patterns at different stages of the life course, to shape 
the hours per week worked, levels of holiday, and periods of career break, and the 
rights people have to determine these for themselves.  Such rights involve greater 
“sovereignty” over one’s own time (Klammer 2004), to change working hours or 
leave the labour market more easily, such as for childcare, skills training, sabbatical 
or even leisure purposes.  This should be a functional right too, that is, it should be 
useable in practice without prohibitive costs or barriers: it should include, for 
example, protection from adverse future career impacts such as job loss or labour 
market exclusion.  The Belgian Time Credit Scheme is a good example of such a 
policy.  Private sector workers have the right to a career break at any stage of their 
career, taking up to a year off work full time, two years part time (with 50% 
reduction in hours), or up to five years with a 20% reduction in hours.  Public sector 
workers have access to a similar scheme.  This is a functional right: the employer 
cannot prevent an employee from taking a career break, except under exceptional 
circumstances, and must give the employee their post back at the end of the break 
(Debacker, de Lathouwer, and Bogaerts 2004).  A more common policy example is 
parental leave rights, where mothers (and to a generally lesser extent fathers) may 
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take a period off work to care for newly born children, with their job protected for 
them for some period. 
 
Policies may also act collectively, reducing working time or prohibiting work for 
entire demographic groups; for example, a minimum age for undertaking paid work 
exists in the form of child labour law; a maximum age may exist in the form of a 
compulsory retirement age (or employer rights to require retirement after a particular 
age); whilst maximum weekly working hours and minimum holiday entitlements are 
protected by law. 
 
For such policy instruments to help people meet their preferences, individuals, rather 
than employers, must be able to control not just how much they work at given 
periods, but when, in terms of what times of day and the level of regularity (Gorz 
1999:93–98).  A study of the popularity, among parents of children aged under six 
years, of the French policy to collectively limit the paid working week to 35 hours 
(or, more accurately, to limit paid work to 1600 hours per year), found that 
employees whose employers gave them unsociable or irregular working hours often 
felt little benefit from the policy (Fagnani and Letablier 2004). 
2.2.2.3 Financial instruments 
Financial instruments sit alongside time rights to further support individual 
capabilities to use these rights, and also to incentivise particular patterns of working 
time at different stages of the life course. 
 
On the one hand, such instruments provide facilities for the decoupling, to an extent, 
of when an individual works in the labour market and when they receive income, 
essentially using borrowing and savings facilities.  For example, an individual saves 
part of their income during periods of employment, for use during a later career 
break or period of shorter working hours, as in the Dutch Life Course Savings 
Scheme.
15
  Alternatively, they borrow for a career break now and pay it back later 
through paid work (although there is a risk to the lender of never being repaid) 
                                                 
15
 Which is described in detail in chapter 7, section 7.1. 
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(Groot and Breedveld 2004:300).  Such facilities simply make it easier for 
individuals or households to manage, or “smooth”, their income over longer periods 
of varied labour market contact.  Incentives such as tax-free saving or small benefits 
payments may also be provided to encourage use of such facilities, as they are in the 
Dutch scheme (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2011). 
 
On the other hand, financial transfers (benefits payments) can be made from the state 
to the individual to protect them from income loss when they exit the labour market 
for specific “socially and politically acceptable reasons” (Lewis, Knijn, et al. 
2008:278).  These can roughly be divided into involuntary reasons (“external risks”), 
when individuals have left work due to factors outside of their control (such as job 
loss or illness); and voluntary reasons (“internal risks”), when individuals choose to 
leave for socially valuable or acceptable reasons (which may include for child care, 
lifelong learning to improve their labour market value, to set up their own business, 
for retirement, due to stress, etc.).  There are many potential reasons for transitions 
out of the labour market, and the distinction of them between those that are 
involuntary and those which are voluntary is not necessarily clear (Plantenga 
2005a:56–57, 2005b:311; Leijnse et al. 2002), although neither is it really necessary 
for the perspective.  It could be argued, for example, that in some cases 
unemployment arose from a personal failure to invest in ones own skills. What 
factors are socially valuable and acceptable is also a matter of debate. 
 
In any case, the life course approach in this way covers benefits dealt with under 
current social security systems, which tend to insure against “traditional” risks 
(unemployment, retirement, incapacity, etc.), as well as “new social risks” relating to  
child and other care responsibilities, establishing a career and obtaining and 
maintaining sufficient skills to access better jobs, labour market exclusion and long 
term unemployment, lone parenthood, and so on, which tend to be less well covered 
under traditional systems (Bonoli 2005; Taylor-Gooby 2004).  The key point of the 
perspective is that the degree of responsibility for individual income security should 
be set appropriately between the individual and the collectivity, based on assessment 
of the degree to which the reason for exiting the labour market was outside of the 
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person’s control, and the degree to which the purpose of it was socially valuable or 
acceptable (Koopmans and Plantenga 2008).  Benefits payments from the state to the 
individual could then represent anything from zero to 100% of lost income, for 
varying periods of time, depending on the reason for the exit from the labour market. 
 
Aside from financial support for these two sets of reasons, the life course perspective 
follows the adult worker model assumption that individuals should derive their own 
individual (or family’s) income from undertaking paid work, so that their total 
income from paid work over the life course should match their total lifetime 
expenditure. 
2.2.2.4 Other instruments 
Time rights and financial tools support functional freedoms to alter work life balance 
patterns to match preferences, by providing opportunities and capabilities to do so.  
To some extent too, they aim to alter behaviours by altering the costs and benefits, 
and risks, of different work life balance patterns, with the aim of matching the sum of 
individual behaviours to macro goals. 
 
Other instruments can also be used.  These policy instruments are often aimed at 
increasing the participation rates of particular demographic groups.  Provision of 
childcare services, either directly by the state or by providing parents money to find 
services privately in the market, unambiguously raise the participation rate of 
mothers, as long as the services are of sufficiently high and reliable quality (Lewis, 
Campbell, and Huerta 2008). Employment law also provides protection against 
discrimination against women in general, particularly around this period of 
childbearing age and during pregnancy, to reduce labour market exclusion. 
 
Meanwhile, “active labour market policies” aim to increase participation rates more 
generally: skills training, subsidised jobs, and obligations on the unemployed to seek 
work or take up employment in exchange for benefits, are all used to reduce long 
term unemployment, increase participation and increase the employability of people, 
the quality of jobs they obtain, and the skills of the labour force.  
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Active labour market policies and lifelong learning form parts of the EU labour 
market model of “flexicurity”.  Flexicurity aims to combine labour market flexibility, 
to meet whatever job needs businesses in an (assumed) unpredictable, dynamic 
economy might need, with an element of security for individuals, carefully 
coordinating employment and social policy (Viebrock and Clasen 2009b).  
Importantly in this approach, this security is not job security (i.e. protection from 
losing a particular job with a particular employer) but employment and income 
security (i.e. the ability to find employment and maintain an accustomed level of 
income).  Employment security here means that if one is made redundant by an 
employer, or is outside the labour market (unemployed or inactive) but wishes to 
work, one is able to find a (new) job (Borghouts-van de Pas 2010:122): receiving 
state or sector support as necessary to do so, including to reskill if necessary.  Income 
security meanwhile implies high levels of income replacement during periods of 
unemployment between jobs.  Although acknowledgement of the diverse situations 
EU Member States find themselves in means that flexicurity is promoted as a range 
of possible policy combinations rather than a prescriptive package, the Danish 
“golden triangle” of policies is nevertheless held up as the exemplar:  low protection 
from job loss (being made redundant), high expenditure on active labour market 




Policies have also existed to reduce labour supply to prevent unemployment in times 
when labour demand was insufficient to meet supply.  In the Netherlands, the 1982 
Wassenaar Agreement between the unions and employers was an explicit attempt to 
share a reduced level of labour demand among the workforce, using working hours 
reductions and wage moderation to attempt to prevent rising unemployment 
(International Labour Organization 2011).  The Belgian Time Credit Scheme 
mentioned earlier also had the same aim initially (Debacker et al. 2004).  Despite the 
ongoing effects of the financial crisis, the longer term view, based on the aim of 
continued GDP growth, is rather of labour market supply shortages in future: 
                                                 
16
 Although Jørgensen (2009) notes that the current Danish government is itself dismantling this 
labour market policy utopia in favour of a more neoliberal approach. 
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increasing participation rates across the life course is thus the general policy goal 
(Plantenga 2005a:59). 
2.2.2.5 Targeting of rights and incentives, sharing of risks 
The rights and incentives provided by policy can also be adjusted for particular 
groups, i.e. they can be targeted.  In the life course perspective, policy instruments 
are targeted to different industrial sectors and to different demographic groups, to 
respond to their differing situations, preferences and needs.  Hence there are three 
levels, “three pillars” of support for work life balance policy rights and tailoring of 
incentives, at macro (state), meso (economic sector or demographic group) and 
individual levels (Plantenga 2005a:63–64; Leijnse et al. 2002).  At each level, and 
for each sector, the optimum balance of rights and incentives may vary and can be 
tailored.  The optimal division of responsibility between these pillars for supporting 
work life balance changes over the life course is also emphasised (Bovenberg 2007). 
 
At the national level, insurance and rights are tailored to meet national goals and 
solidarity against risks.  Individuals meanwhile can save or borrow under the 
schemes to give them the capabilities to adapt their working patterns to personal 
preferences, and to cover voluntary risks the state level does not fully cover (Leijnse 
et al. 2002:18–24).   Different economic sectors meanwhile can tailor (extend) these 
rights and incentives further, to meet the needs of their particular context, allowing 
accommodation of factors such as their level of exposure to international 
competition, the relative level of skilled labour abundance or shortage, need for 
lifelong learning to maintain workforce skills, whether their sector is in expansion or 
decline, and so on, which can mean that from the employer perspective working time 
rights can be accommodated, or be beneficial, to a greater or lesser extent.   
 
Policy also targets different groups of the population defined along lines of their 
characteristics: their work history, life course stage, the reason for their exit from the 
labour market, etc.  This reflects the already discussed point that the validity of their 
reason for not being in the labour market may be different (from the perspective of 
the policymakers), and also that they have different opportunities, capabilities and 
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preferences.  In short, the desired policy outcome (in terms of labour market 
participation) may vary by demographic group, whilst achieving a given outcome 
may require different policy instruments for different groups.  Hence permitting and 
supporting career breaks for childcare may be more politically desirable than for 
leisure, whilst low income single mothers may need more financial support to be 
with their child than high income dual earner parents.  Policy instruments particularly 
focus around the ages of 30 to 50 years, the so-called “rush hour of life”. The 
rationale, it is argued, is that with education lengthening and a new phase of young 
adulthood in the 20s characterised by having few responsibilities, and the period after 
retirement lengthening, many demands on time and money are increasingly 
compressed into this period, a “shrinking middle”, during which people tend to form 
stable relationships with partners, build a career, pay off student debts, take on a 
mortgage and save for retirement, as well as have children, paying for them and 
saving for their future, and having to juggle work and family commitments (Maier 
2007; Bovenberg 2005:402–403). Time comes to be seen as a scarce commodity (de 
Gues and Rutte 2004). Women tend to take on more of the family commitments, 
working part time and having more and longer career breaks, whilst men tend to have 
a more continuous, full time, labour market attachment (Maier, de Graaf, and 
Frericks 2007:348). 
 
Finally, another group targeted by policy are those who are able to work but 
unwilling to do so, or at least are not doing so.  This particularly applies to those who 
are also claiming state benefits: the unemployed, particularly longer term, being seen 
as a social problem, whilst the definition of ability to work is becoming broader to 
encompass more of those once considered sick or disabled and hence eligible for 
incapacity benefit, and excluded from requirements to work.  Even those who are not 
claiming benefits, i.e. the “inactive”, are increasingly being targeted: the Netherlands 
for example states that due to perceived future labour shortages, everybody has “an 
obligation to either be in education or participate in the work process. Whether 
someone accepts that obligation is no longer a voluntary matter” (Committee on 
Labour Market Participation 2008:3).  These groups of individuals become subject to 
activation policies to attempt to move them into paid labour. 
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2.3 A comparison of the two perspectives: A sustainable approach 
to working time 
The two literatures on working time have different starting points and perspectives, 
one looking at the role of working time in achieving an environmentally sustainable 
economic system whilst meeting wellbeing goals, the other analysing policy 
instruments and developing an analytical framework with which to assess their level 
of match to existing social and economic goals.  What are the similarities and 
differences in the two approaches? Can they be combined to provide an integrated 
approach to working time?  Would integrating them help working time policy be 
better designed to meet multiple policy goals? This section considers these questions, 
providing a novel integration of the two perspectives. 
2.3.1 Goals and values 
From supporting economic and business growth through improving the skills and 
flexibility of the labour force, ensuring the fiscal sustainability of the public sector 
and welfare state, increasing fertility rates and gender equality, as well as meeting the 
diverse individual work life balance preferences of the population, all within a 
specific value framework, a lot is expected of working time policy in the social 
policy field.  Whether a life course approach or any other can combine them all is 
questioned by some, despite often optimistic promotion of such an approach 
(Jansweijer 2004:54).  Certainly, it seems inevitable there will be tensions between 
goals, and different countries prioritise goals in different ways under such conditions. 
As seen, tensions seem to arise primarily between labour market participation goals 
and particular social aims, particularly around gender equality, childcare and 
incapacity.   
 
The working time reduction literature adds environmental considerations to the 
heady mix of policy goals, arguing that working time patterns have substantial 
implications for environmental goals and sustainability, which thus need 
consideration in working time policy design.  But it does a lot more: it takes a critical 
perspective of policy goals as a whole, stepping up an analytical level to question 
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what goals should be from a wider perspective that is rarely touched upon in the 
social policy literature.  Rather than largely accepting “the major contours of present 
society, such as the structures of global capitalism, the dominance of paid work, the 
inequalities of the market” and working out small incremental changes from there, it 
“think[s] first about where we want to be, and then about how we might get there”, a 
“utopian method” in some respects (Levitas 2001:450).  In particular it questions the 
centrality of GDP growth as a policy goal, from two angles. 
 
Firstly, from the environmental perspective, economic activities are causing 
unsustainable levels of damage to ecological systems (Rockström et al. 2009; WWF 
et al. 2008). Whilst this does not inherently rule out GDP growth in the longer term, 
as production efficiencies improve and more can be produced with fewer resources 
and less pollution, in the short term, resource use and pollution levels seemingly need 
to fall substantially, suggesting that substantial “degrowth” in economic activities is 
needed. This degrowth particularly applies to high income nations, if they are to 
leave space for other lower income nations’ economies to grow to meet their 
populations’ basic needs, and for global inequality to reduce. 
 
An interest in how to increase human wellbeing under these conditions gives the 
second angle.  The evidence in the happiness literature and beyond provides a 
“convenient truth” (Speth et al. 2007) that time is more important for human 
flourishing than money, once basic material needs are securely met.  This raises 
questions about the value of GDP growth even if there were no environmental 
considerations. 
 
A reduced requirement for paid work is both an outcome of the necessary reductions 
in consumption and production, and a driver of these reductions.  This is relevant to 
the current social policy perspective on working time too, in two respects.  Firstly, it 
is observed by some in the ecological economics literature that working time 
reduction could also help to reduce the gender inequalities in care that affect existing 
work life balance policy.  In families with children and other care responsibilities, it 
is men who more commonly work long hours, and hence would be more likely to 
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reduce their hours, which at least offers greater possibilities for a more gender equal 
distribution of care time (Coote et al. 2010).  Secondly, one goal of working time 
reduction is to spread a reduced level of paid work more evenly among the 
population, to prevent high unemployment amid pockets of workers.  It could thus 
address the problem of economies facing either increasing unemployment or 
increasing numbers of low-skilled marginal jobs that threaten high income countries 
(as discussed above in section 2.2.1). 
 
Whilst there is some difference in policy goals between the two literatures, the 
underlying values are similar.  There is an assumption in working time reduction that 
unemployment is an undesirable state, and that individuals should, in general, earn 
via paid work all the money that they spend over the life course, with policy ensuring 
that they have the opportunities to do so.  This follows the adult worker model 
principle found in the work life balance literature.  The interpretation of this principle 
arguably differs between the two literatures however.  In social policy, the adult 
worker model principle is often taken to mean that the central role of the adult in 
society is to participate in paid labour, except where there are “socially and 
politically acceptable reasons” of education, care, or, perhaps, leisure (Lewis, Knijn, 
et al. 2008:278).  Wellbeing is thus either subsumed below economic growth goals or 
is equated with paid work and the consumption of market goods and services.  The 
approach conveniently allows governments to work towards the economic goal of 
high labour market participation whilst claiming to minimise normative assumptions 
about the structure of human relationships (in the sense that everyone can thus be 
economically independent to live life as they wish, within the boundaries this 
imposes) (Lewis, Knijn, et al. 2008:262, 278).  Other social policy authors do take a 
different perspective though: van der Meer and Leijnse (2005:5), for example, note 
that a person’s lifecourse is “an individual project, one in which employment may 
not necessarily be dominant”.  This is more in line with the perspective in the 
working time reduction literature, where paid work has a more instrumental value, as 
a means to earn money to pay for goods and services to meet needs. 
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The structure of paid work is different in the two literatures too: whilst flexicurity 
and high employment rates see job security fall and many services such as childcare 
increasingly commodified, provided by the state, Bowring critiques the wellbeing 
impacts of this also, arguing that it monetises and formalises human interactions, 
eroding the individual and societal capacity to confer meaning to their own activities 
and relationships (Bowring 1999:81–82). 
 
Table 2.2 below shows a summary of the goals and values discussed above that are 
found in the two literatures. In general, whilst there are clear differences between the 
two, many are differences in emphasis rather than principle, with many of the goals 
and values being complementary rather than conflicting.  The different perspective of 
the ecological economics approach could even help relieve some of the tensions 
around the nexus of childcare, labour market participation and gender equality that 
are found in the social policy perspective.  The clear tension between the two 
approaches centres on economic growth, which is taken as the implicit context within 
which social policy operates in one literature (Gough 2010), whilst being explicitly 
questioned by the other literature.  Following this comes tension regarding the 




Table 2.2 Policy goals and values of EU work life balance policies and the Working Time 
Reduction literature 
Summary of work life balance policy goals and 
values 
Summary of working time reduction policy 
goals and values 
Environmental 
 The official EU approach is to mainstream 
environmental sustainability considerations 
into all policymaking, but this is not apparent 
in EU and Member State documentation nor 
academic literature in this area. 
Environmental 
 Reduced resource use. 
 Reduced pollution. 
 And hence reduced environmental impacts. 
 And hence greater security of environmental 
services for life, greater ecosystem resilience, 
reduced species loss, greater environmental 
security for future generations. 
Social 
 Protection from new, and old, social risks. 
 Social inclusion including solidarity with all 
social groups segmented along different axes 
(gender, race, class, etc.). 
 Income should generally be earned through 
paid work. 
 Employment (rather than job) security is 
protected. 
 Smooth transitions between labour market 
statuses. 
 Support for childcare and the rush hour of 
life. 
 Commodification of care work. 
 Generally longer working lives, but early 
retirement rights. 
 Support for individualised life courses, and 
individualised rights to choose work life 
balance. 
 But only within limits, i.e. when compatible 
with labour market goals. 
Social 
 Greater happiness through focusing on non-
material routes to wellbeing. 
 Importance of having adequate time for 
these. 
 Just distribution of the reduced paid work 
needed to produce a sustainable level of 
goods and services. 
Economic 
 Market model with state intervention. 
 GDP growth-oriented. 
 International competitiveness. 
 High labour market participation rates. 
 Dynamic, flexible, skilled labour force. 
 Low resistance (from the labour force) to 
change in industrial sectors. 
 Structured around high-skilled, high-
technology, high-added value sectors. 
 Security/ resilience. 
 Government fiscal sustainability. 
Economic 
 Market model with state intervention. 
 Total maximum size of economy determined 
by ecological evidence on sustainable levels 
of resource use and pollution generation. 
 Optimum size of economy determined by this 
and by wellbeing considerations i.e. the 
balance between paid work and non-paid 
time. 






Table 2.2 continued. 
Summary of work life balance policy goals and 
values 
Summary of working time reduction policy 
goals and values 
Values 
Wellbeing 
 Consumption of market goods and services 





 Gender equality: in work opportunities, and 
theoretically in care. 
 Equalities along other social lines. 
The role of paid work 
 Adult Worker Model (replacing male 
breadwinner): 
o Individuals should work to earn what they 
spend. 
o Social inclusion through paid labour. 
 
 
Individual preferences and interaction with 
policy goals 
 Respect for individualisation of life courses 
and behaviours. 
 Individualisation of welfare state services 
 Individual preferences taken as exogenous 
and should be accepted and met: reduced 
normative assumptions in policy design. 
 Except for a small group whose behaviours 
do not align with the adult worker model, i.e. 
those who “can but won’t work”. 
Values 
Wellbeing 
 Consumption of market goods provides many 
deficiency needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc). 
 But non-market activities are key to human 
flourishing, and require substantial time 
outside of paid labour to achieve. 
Equalities 
 Gender equality: in work opportunities, and 
in care. 
 Equalities along other social lines. 
The role of paid work  
 Partial Adult Worker Model 
o Individuals should work to earn what they 
spend… 
o But paid work is not the central purpose 
of or duty in life. 
o Social inclusion through community 
participation, volunteering, etc. 
Individual preferences and interaction with 
policy goals 
 Respect for individualisation of life courses 
and behaviours. 
 Individual preferences are generally 
suboptimal as environmental, and social, 
externalities are not considered, and a range 
of cultural and marketing factors 
overemphasises the role of paid work and 
material consumption in achieving wellbeing. 
 Multiple policy instruments should correct 
these market and information failures to 
align individual preferences, values and 
behaviours with the social and ecological 
optima. 
 As such, many groups’ behaviours are 
influenced to align with these optima. 
 
2.3.2 Conceptual approach 
The ecological economics literature lacks a clear conceptual approach for designing 
policy instruments to achieve the goals it argues working time reduction can achieve 
in principle.  As such, the literature on the life course approach provides a valuable 
perspective for the design of working time reduction policy.  It focuses on the two 
resources of the household that are also identified in the working time reduction 
literature as being key, in a market economy, to producing, buying and achieving all 
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the elements needed for human flourishing: time and money.   The perspective 
focuses on mechanisms – time sovereignty and financial savings and borrowings – 
that should provide individuals with real freedoms, that is, the opportunities and 
capabilities, to realise their preferred work life balance pattern at any point in the life 
course, acknowledging that preferences will change over the life, and are 
increasingly varied between individuals.  However, what instruments there are that 
are designed to adjust individual behaviour to match macro and sector goals tend to 
be designed to increase work rather than decrease it, in keeping with the general EU 
aim of achieving “more and better jobs”.  Such instruments include active labour 
market policies, lifelong learning, childcare provision and coercion of the unwilling 
but able to find work.  Ideas on how to incentivise reduced work are essentially 
limited to financial instruments, i.e. benefits payments aiming to encourage specific 
non-work activities where there is a perceived societal interest (e.g. to support 
childcare and retirement, or to protect against income loss due to involuntary 
redundancy, illness or disability).  It thus misses the implications of behavioural 
psychology that are increasingly being considered in policymaking for sustainable 
consumption, i.e. the role of influencing values, preferences, habits and norms, and 
in correcting information failure. 
 
Hence, whilst the life course perspective is valuable for the design of instruments to 
provide people the opportunities and capabilities to alter working time, its 
understanding of how to encourage reduced working time is more limited.  The 
ecological economics literature has a contribution to make to the life course 
perspective therefore. 
 
In Table 2.3, the author has produced a modified life course perspective for the 
design of working time policy instruments, which integrates the strengths of the 
perspectives of the two literatures.  This modified perspective is used to help frame 
discussions later in the thesis regarding the implications of the research results for the 
design of working time policy.  It takes the life course perspective as its starting 
point, so that policy considers the goals and interests of government, different 
industry sectors and demographic groups, and the varied preferences of individuals 
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over the life course.  Time rights and financial facilities aim to provide the 
opportunities and capabilities for people to alter their working patterns to match their 
preferences, protected from impacts on their future employability and career, by 
decoupling periods of paid work from the periods in which the resultant income is 
received and used.  Incentives to reduce working time are also tailored to the purpose 
for which the individual is using the time outside of work.  What is novel is the 
explicit consideration of environmental goals alongside the social and economic, as a 
result of which incentives aim to encourage a general reduction in working time over 
the life course.  In addition, the instruments for influencing people’s behaviour 
extend beyond financial incentives to attempt to influence values, norms, and habits 
around work and consumption, and to provide more opportunities to pursue non-
material routes to wellbeing outside of paid work, including provision of courses in 
mindfulness, and activities in which “flow” experiences can be had.  These aim to 
raise awareness of the evidence regarding routes to happiness and actively encourage 




Table 2.3 A modified life course perspective for the design of working time reduction 
policy instruments 
Aims: 
 To balance and meet: 
o (macro) government environmental, social and economic policy goals; 
o (meso) industrial sector labour needs, and goals for particular demographic groups, and; 
o (micro) individual wellbeing and flourishing. 
 
Policy instruments: 
Opportunities and capabilities: 
 Provide individuals functional sovereignty of their own time:  
o Time rights to alter working patterns at different scales: hours per week, days per year, 
periods of career break, retirement age, etc. 
o Functional rights: protection against impacts on future employability and career (job and 
employment security). 
o Financial facilities: periods in paid work and of receipt of income decoupled, via saving and 
borrowing facilities. 
o Financial support and services in kind (e.g. childcare services) to facilitate desired patterns of 
work. 
Incentives: 
 Financial incentives (benefits, tax credits). 
 Level of time rights and (financial) incentives increased for periods outside of paid work which 
are: 
o Outside of individual control (e.g. unemployment, illness, disability). 
o Used for socially valuable or accepted reasons (e.g. childcare, retirement, lifelong learning, 
community participation, volunteering, personal and spiritual development). 
o Environmentally beneficial (either directly via reduced earnings and consumption, and/or 
indirectly via use of non-work time in environmental projects). 
 Diverse policy instruments to influence cultural and individual values, norms, habits, knowledge 
and behaviours regarding paid work, consumption and non-material routes to wellbeing. 
 Increased provision of structured activities which improve wellbeing and the environment, 
including mindfulness training, volunteering opportunities, and creative and other activities in 
which ‘flow’ can be experienced. 
Targeting: 
 Rights and support differentially provided by three pillars: state, sector/employer, and individual, 
i.e. collective and individual provisions, to share responsibilities and to adapt overall outcomes to 
different contexts. 
 Instruments to address employer costs, preferences and behaviours. 
 Policy instruments adjusted at these different levels so that the sum of individual behaviours 
aligns with macro and meso goals. 
2.4 Key points for the thesis and outstanding questions raised 
The two distinct literatures on working time – one from ecological economics, 
looking at the potential of reductions in paid work to reduce the environmental 
impacts of the economy whilst enhancing human wellbeing; the other from social 
policy analysing how work life balance policy can help reconcile individual working 
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preferences with macroeconomic and social goals – are found to share many 
similarities, to have some notable differences, but ultimately to contribute valuably to 
one another to provide an integrated approach to understanding the effects of 
working time on different goals, and on how to shape working time policy to 
reconcile these diverse goals.  To the author’s knowledge, attempts to integrate the 
perspectives have not been made before. 
 
The ecological economics literature adds to the social policy literature an 
understanding of the potential of working time policy to impact on environmental 
policy goals, providing a strong argument that these impacts are substantial enough 
to warrant consideration in the design and evaluation of such policies.  It also 
considers human wellbeing, drawing in evidence from positive psychology that 
questions the rationale for the normative assumption that work and consumption 
should be the central life goals of individuals, something that is rarely critiqued in the 
social policy literature except where it produces tensions between the needs of 
children for adequate parental care and goals to encourage parents to rapidly return to 
paid work.   
 
From the social policy literature, the life course approach provides a valuable 
framework for designing and analysing the effects of working time policy 
instruments, to see how they can reconcile diverse policy goals.  With modifications 
to incorporate some further considerations regarding behavioural psychology, it can 
help investigate how policy instruments could be designed in practice to achieve the 
“double dividend” (Jackson 2005a) of reduced environmental impacts and increasing 
wellbeing via working time reduction. 
 
Several outstanding questions nevertheless arise from this review which could make 
interesting research topics. Perhaps of foremost importance is the question of the 
environmental effects of working time change.  It is a central assumption in the 
literature reviewed that working time reduction would lead to substantial 
environmental benefits, as people work less and so earn and consume less.  Whilst 
this makes intuitive sense, apparently no work has been done to estimate the scale of 
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environmental effects of different scenarios of working time changes.  This fits with 
a criticism that has previously been levied at research on policy relating to 
sustainable consumption, that it has primarily been conceptual and policy-focussed, 
without grounding itself in empirical work (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den Bergh 
2004).  Without such empirical estimates however, it is harder to argue that 
environmental effects warrant consideration in the design of working time policy, or 
that working time reduction has a contribution to make in solving the environmental 
crises faced. 
 
A second outstanding question which follows on from this is, can working time 
policy instruments be designed to achieve environmental benefits and also meet 
social and economic goals, both overall and for different demographic groups and 
industrial sectors?  The modified life course perspective developed above provides a 
useful analytical framework with which to respond to this question. 
 
This then is the central topic of this thesis: what are the environmental implications 
of different changes in the paid working patterns of the population?  What 
contribution to environmental goals could working time reduction make?  And can 
tensions between diverse environmental, social and economic goals be reconciled by 
working time policy?  That is, can the individual, social and environmental optima be 
aligned, and the double dividend be achieved?  How?  
 
The next chapter looks at the conceptual approach and assumptions needed to 






Chapter 3 Analytical framework 
The central concern of this thesis is to estimate the size of change in greenhouse gas 
emissions that would arise under different patterns of paid working time.  How 
would emissions increase, or fall, if typical levels of paid work increased, or 
decreased?  Furthermore, what are the implications for policy which aims to 
influence paid working patterns?  This chapter elaborates this topic into three 
research hypotheses, and develops and critiques the analytical framework by which 
they will be tested. 
 
The analytical approach taken in this research is comparatively unusual in the study 
of working time, but is frequently adopted in environmental research, as described 
later in the chapter.  This thesis is interested in how current policy goals to increase 
participation rates will affect greenhouse gas emissions in the study countries of the 
UK and the Netherlands, and also in how substantial reductions in average paid 
working time among different demographic groups would reduce national emissions.  
Both of these topics relate to situations which are hypothetical, and have not 
occurred in practice.  Rather than studying the effects of past changes in working 
time using existing data, the analytical approach is rather different: first, based on 
current data, the relationship between household greenhouse emissions and its 
members’ working patterns is estimated; second, this relationship is used to estimate 
how different hypothetical changes in working patterns would affect emissions in the 
future.  The approach is common in research concerned with determining the 
environmental sustainability of different trends in the economy, in land use, in 
pollution levels, and so on, and which estimates the effects of different policy options 
for addressing environmental impacts that have been proposed but not (yet) 
implemented.  Such an approach allows the effects of different scenarios of change 
to be estimated, making it suitable for the research hypotheses in this thesis.  It also 
brings its own analytical challenges, which are discussed in this chapter. 
 
The chapter begins by elaborating the research hypotheses tested in the thesis in later 
chapters.  The rest of the chapter introduces the analytical approach to be taken. It 
first makes the case for the use of a household level analysis, then develops the 
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household model by which the relationship between paid working time and 
greenhouse gases can be statistically tested.  Next, it elaborates how the greenhouse 
gas effects of different scenarios of hypothetical change in the working patterns of 
the populations will be estimated, before going on to discuss the modelling 
assumptions in this approach.  The next section presents the rationale for looking in 
greater detail in the results at different demographic groups of the population, not 
just the population as a whole.  The chapter ends with a brief summary. 
3.1 Thesis aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on paid working time by 
investigating an assumption in the ecological economics research in the area, namely 
that: 
 
Patterns of paid work correlate with environmental impacts 
 
This draws on the intuitive, but apparently empirically untested, argument that 
reductions in paid working time lead to reduced environmental impacts, as people 
work less, earn less, and so consume less, that consumption being the driver of the 
activities which use resources, pollute, and damage the environment.   
 
This needs stating with more precision to be a testable hypothesis.  For parsimony, 
and because it is the most pressing environmental concern (see chapter 2, section 
2.1.1.1.), the thesis focuses on greenhouse gas emissions rather than all 
environmental impacts.  Meanwhile, it is appropriate to study this effect at the 
household level (the next section discusses why this is so).  With this in mind, the 
assumption above can be restated as the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Reductions in the paid working hours of household members 
will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions arising from that household’s 
consumption 
 
To be of policy interest, this effect really needs to be large enough to substantially 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and so to contribute to policy goals relating to 
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reducing emissions and climate change.  Hence, assuming hypothesis 1 is found to 
hold, a further assumption can be stated as: 
 
Changes in paid working hours will have large effects on levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Of course, the size of this effect on emissions would relate to the level of change 
in working time.  The thesis therefore considers specific scenarios of change in 
working time to assess their effects on emissions.  Two approaches are taken, 
leading to the two hypotheses below. 
 
Firstly, as discussed in chapter 2, working time policies already exist, but their 
environmental impacts are not considered in their design.  Governments have 
objectives for these policy instruments, and for the case study countries of the 
UK and the Netherlands, these objectives all relate to increasing the proportions 
of the population, and of specific demographic groups, who are in paid work, i.e. 
to increase total paid working time in the population.  The assumption above can 
thus be restated as: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Current UK and Dutch policy goals relating to paid work will 
substantially increase national greenhouse gas emissions 
 
A second approach is to start from the perspective in the ecological economics 
literature, that working time policy can be used to reduce paid work, and hence 
emissions. The hypothesis can thus again be restated: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Reductions in average paid working time will substantially 
reduce national greenhouse gas emissions 
 
These three hypotheses form the basis of the research in this thesis.  Hypothesis 1 is 




As well as these hypotheses, a parallel issue is considered in the discussion sections 
of these chapters.  Working time is subject to significant influence by policy, and, as 
we have seen in the last chapter, these policies already have a host of social and 
economic goals.  The addition of environmental goals further complicates such 
policies and their design. What are the compatibilities and tensions between these 
environmental, economic and social goals? How can working time policy 
instruments be designed to reduce tensions and maximise compatibility between the 
goals?   
 
To frame these discussions, it is worth considering certain assumptions about such 
policies, namely that there are deterministic relationships between policy 
instruments, working patterns and the achievement of policy goals.  These 
assumptions are implicit in both the working time reduction literature and the 
literature on work life balance policies.   
 
In short, it is argued that:  
1. Policy instruments can be designed and used to influence working patterns in 
predictable ways; 
2. Working patterns predictably alter the values of variables which policy seeks 
to change (such as levels of greenhouse gas emissions). 
 
This can be presented graphically, as in Figure 3.1 below. 
 






The hypotheses being tested relate to how working patterns affect greenhouse gas 
emissions (and so how they effect the policy goal of reducing these emissions).  The 
















working patterns that are being considered.  To frame the discussions, the modified 
life course perspective described in chapter 2 (section 2.3) is taken, as it represents a 
clear approach for analysing diverse policy instruments and diverse goals of policy at 
national level and for different industrial sectors, and for different demographic 
groups and individuals. 
3.2 Appropriate level of analysis 
The total effect on national greenhouse gas emissions of different working patterns is 
the topic of interest in this thesis.  However, the argument in the ecological 
economics literature that reducing paid working time reduces income, and thus 
expenditure, in turn reducing environmental impacts, is essentially a household level 
one, with the effect of individual choices around paid working time affecting 
household consumption and hence emissions.  Changes in total greenhouse gas 
emissions at the national level are then the sum of the changes arising from all 
households in the population.  
 
Many econometric studies of consumption patterns nevertheless use national level 
data in their analyses.  They take an idealised “representative agent” as the unit of 
analysis, a simulated individual whose characteristics match the average for the 
population being studied (as described in, for example, Deaton 1992, chapters 1 to 
4), creating someone who “is neither young nor old, … male nor female, and has a 
uniform and more or less constant number of perpetually youthful children, all of 
which can be ignored by the estimation” (Deaton 1992:138).  However, many of the 
modelling assumptions and exclusions of control variables that this approach allows 
may be “convenient for aggregate data” but are “nonsense at the micro level.  Age 
and family composition matter, as do a host of other possible variables such as race, 
education, place of residence, and occupation” (Deaton 1992:138).  Taking national 
averages loses a lot of the nuanced information available in nationally representative 
individual level data, such as that collected in panel surveys. Average data mask the 
complexities of distributions and correlations between variables which would in 
principle allow a detailed analysis of the determinants of emissions, and estimation 
of the effects of changing their values.  Individual level variables are thus relevant 
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for predicting consumption, so it makes sense to look at individual effects rather than 
approximating based on national-level means of population characteristics (Deaton 
1992:138).  Nationally representative panel data giving details of household 
members, their incomes and expenditures are readily available in the case study 




The literature reviewed in the previous chapter also shows how different 
demographic groups (such as households with children, and older workers) have 
different opportunities, capabilities, values, attitudes, habits, and behaviours.  As 
such, they could alter their consumption in different ways under different changes in 
working patterns, and be affected by, and respond to, working time policy 
instruments in substantially different ways.  Looking at micro data allows these 
things to be considered, allowing a look not just at overall effects of working pattern 
changes on greenhouse gas emissions, but at changes in different groups of the 
population, helping to inform the detailed structure of policy instruments (Atkinson 
2005:8). 
 
At the micro level, this research takes the household, rather than the individual, as 
the unit of analysis.  This follows other research on household behaviour, which find 
or assume that choices around consumption and working patterns are co-determined 
by the household members, particularly the head of household and partner (for 
example Becker 1981; Phipps and Burton 1998).  Analysing at the household rather 
than the individual level seems most appropriate for this research therefore. 
3.3 Measuring household greenhouse gas emissions 
In high income countries, the large majority of greenhouse gas emissions arise as a 
result of market activities (see chapter 2, section 2.1.1.1).  The production of each 
good and service leads to greenhouse gas emissions as part of the process of 
production, distribution and disposal of that product.  In estimating emissions from a 
particular country, two approaches are possible: either the emissions a country emits 
as a result of its production of market goods and services can be measured, or of its 
                                                 
17
 Details of the datasets used are presented in the next chapter. 
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consumption of such goods.  The latter assigns the impacts of producing and 
distributing different goods and services to the final consumer, who are considered to 
be the driver of production – without their act of buying a product, its production and 
associated environmental impacts would not occur (Hertwich 2005b; Satterthwaite 
2009)
18
.  As such, the actual geographic location where the emissions occur may not 
be within the country in which the consumer resides, in contrast to the production-
based approach.  In this consumption-based approach, emissions, wherever they 
arise, are attributed to the individual, household or government (public sector) that 
purchases the final product (Satterthwaite 2009; Hertwich and Peters 2009). 
  
The environmental benefits argued for working time reduction in the literature take 
the perspective that reduced working time reduces consumption, as households adjust 
their expenditure behaviour to be in line with their reduced income. It makes sense to 
use the consumption-based approach in this research therefore, as it is the 
household’s consumption activities rather than production activities that are being 
considered.  In contrast with production emissions, which are in decline in both the 
case study countries, consumption emissions have generally been on the increase, as 
the share of household consumption coming from imported products is increasing 
(e.g. see Druckman and Jackson 2009 for the UK).   
 
Consumption based, household level analyses can be used to explore and describe 
the patterns of consumption and resultant greenhouse gas emissions of households 
and different demographic groups, as described in more detail in the next section.  
The effect on a household’s emissions of different predictor variables can be 
modelled.  Based on these models, changes in emissions arising from different 
scenarios of change can be estimated (Hertwich 2005a:4675).  The approach is thus 
suitable for all the aims of this thesis. 
 
The measurement of consumption-based environmental impacts now has a well-
established literature, and methodology and data are becoming increasingly robust 
and standardised (Wiedmann 2009:219).  Methods either present aggregate data, 
                                                 
18
 Or, more accurately, future production of these goods and services would be reduced to be in line 
with levels of demand. 
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usually for nations, or break these totals down to the household level.  The latter 
approach is followed in this thesis.  Household level analyses use widely available 
household expenditure survey data, combined with environmental impact intensity 
data calculated by various authors (e.g. Vringer et al. 2010).  Household expenditure 
surveys provide data on household expenditure in many different categories of goods 
and services (e.g. shoes, tomatoes, electricity) combined with sociodemographic 
variables describing the household, for a representative sample of the population.  
The environmental impact intensity data meanwhile present the environmental 
impacts per unit price for different products, for the same categories of goods and 
services as found in the household expenditure survey.  Combining the two allows a 
household’s greenhouse gas emissions or other impacts to be calculated.  More 
details of the datasets used in this thesis are given in the next chapter. 
3.4 The choice of dependent variables 
The existing literature on household environmental impacts look at various 
environmental pressures, including greenhouse gas emissions, various other air 
pollutants, impacts on water bodies (such as acidification and eutrophication), and 
use of material, land, water and energy (Wiedmann 2009:212–3).  Analysing and 
presenting the results of these multiple dependent variables can be complicated. To 
some extent this issue is simplified in this thesis as it focuses on just one of these 
impacts, greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Using a household’s total greenhouse gas emissions as the dependent variable is 
clearly valuable, as it is this that is being studied.  However, as with other research 
on household environmental impacts, it is also useful to understand more about why 
greenhouse gas emissions are varying.  The level of expenditure of the household is 
clearly a major explanatory variable: the more a household buys, the higher its 
emissions.  But what a household buys is also important, as different products and 
services have substantially different emissions intensities, that is, the greenhouse gas 
emissions emitted per pound or euro spent on a product varies substantially.  
Although there is significant variation in the raw data and methods used in different 
studies, areas of high impact intensity are consistently found to be mobility 
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(automobile and air transport), food (meat, poultry, fish, and dairy followed by plant-
based food) and residential energy use in the house (heating, cooling, electrical 
appliances, and lighting), whilst services, covering things such as insurance, 
mortgages, hairdressing, education and healthcare, in particular have a comparatively 
low impact intensity (Tukker, Eder, and Suh 2006:183). 
 
Research also shows that the share of household expenditure going on different types 
of products varies with expenditure.  As total expenditure rises, spend in some 
product categories such as food and home energy use (electricity and gas, for heating 
and lighting) increase only slowly, whilst others such as recreation activities, 
transport, clothing and household effects increase more rapidly (Kok et al. 2003:53).  
Figure 3.2 shows how these variations in expenditure translate into changes in the 
share of total household energy use arising due to different consumption categories 
for the UK and the Netherlands. As most energy generation is still largely from fossil 
fuel combustion, this gives a fairly good indication of which product categories 
contribute most to a household’s emissions at a given income level.  Figure 3.3 
shows how this affects total energy use: as income and expenditure rise, total energy 
use increases too, primarily due to expansion in the categories of food, recreation and 
transport.  Total energy use (and by extrapolation greenhouse gas emissions) 
increases with expenditure, but not as rapidly as expenditure increases (Biesiot and 
Noorman 1999:374; Moll et al. 2005:269), as many of the largest increases in 
expenditure occur in categories with mostly low energy use and emissions intensities 
(e.g. housing, recreation).  In short, due to changes in the relative share of a 
household’s expenditure going on different categories of product at different 





Figure 3.2 Share of different product categories in the energy requirement of households 
with different incomes, in the Netherlands (left) and the UK (right) 
 
Source: Kok et al. (2003:55) 
 
Figure 3.3 Energy requirement of different household income groups in the Netherlands 
(left) and the UK (right) 
GJ = Gigajoules of energy 
 
Source: Kok et al. (2003:54) 
 
This shows that the effect of changes in the types of goods and services bought is 
also significant, that is, a household’s greenhouse gas emissions can vary 
substantially even controlling for total expenditure, based on the types of goods and 
services they purchase. 
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This fact presents an issue for this research regarding which dependent variables to 
analyse.  Using total greenhouse gas emissions alone loses rich data about how 
varying patterns of expenditure in different consumption categories contribute to the 
total.  However, disaggregating the results down into categories presents its own 
issues.  On the one hand, Nijdam et al (2005:166–7) conclude from their study that 
while environmental impacts calculated for large “domains” of consumption (such as 
clothing, housing, food, etc) can be considered fairly reliable, data and analytical 
limitations mean that results for particular products (such as tomatoes, or shoes) can 
only be seen as “indicative”.  Hence there is a limit to the extent to which 
consumption categories can be disaggregated and analysed whilst still producing 
valid conclusions about the associated environmental impacts.  The limits of sample 
sizes, in terms of the number of households in the datasets used, also limit analysis of 
consumption at the individual product level, as there are insufficient data. 
 
There are also practical problems with presenting results for many product categories 
and many socio-economic predictor variables: in effect, the output becomes a huge 
matrix of results that is difficult to present (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den Bergh 
2004:369). 
 
Compromised solutions in the literature vary.  Vringer and Blok (1995) present 
results for 13 categories.  Kalwij, Alessie, and Fontein (1998:571–3) meanwhile 
present graphs for six.  Druckman and Jackson (2010) present results for nine, but 
break four of those responsible for large shares of total emissions down further.  
While such attempts to rationalise the results presented can be criticised for being 
“ad hoc” (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den Bergh 2004:369), this is only the case if 
there is no rationale to the process.  Nijdam et al (2005), and Vringer et al (2003), for 
example, use seven categories in their research on the Netherlands on the grounds 
that these are compatible with Dutch government sustainable consumption strategies 
(Nijdam et al. 2005:149).  Keeping in mind the aims of the research can thus help 
determine an appropriate approach to presenting these complex results. 
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A simple approach is taken in this thesis, to focus purely on the factors of relevance 
to the research hypotheses.  Total greenhouse gas emissions is a dependent variable 
that should be analysed as it is the subject of the research hypotheses.  However, this 
is affected by both the level of total expenditure, and by the exact mix of different 
goods and services a household buys, i.e. the share of spend on different product 
categories, and within each category, on different types of product.  This mix, as we 
have seen, affects the ratio of the household’s total greenhouse gas emissions to its 
total expenditure, i.e. the intensity of emissions per pound or euro that it spends.  
Both of these factors could be expected to change if a household member alters his or 
her working hours.  A reduction in working hours, for example, could mean a 
reduced income and so a reduced expenditure.  It would also mean more time outside 
of paid work, so different behaviours that would affect what is bought, e.g. less 
money spent on travelling to work, more on home heating as the person is at home 
more, less on convenience foods as there is more time at home to cook, etc. 
 
Two variables can be used to capture the effects of changes in overall expenditure 
and in consumption patterns: 
 
Total expenditure, in monetary terms 
 
Household Emissions Intensity: an aggregate figure showing the household’s 
emissions per pound or euro spent, i.e. kg CO2e per £ or € 
 
Hence for the household: 
 
Total greenhouse gas emissions  
= total expenditure x Household Emissions Intensity 
 
In short, expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity (HEI) allow the effects on 
household greenhouse gas emissions of two different aspects of consumption to be 
investigated: firstly, total expenditure; and secondly, the effect of the mix of goods 
and services the household spends its money on.  Changes in either can alter a 
household’s total greenhouse gas emissions substantially.  Considering both these 
variables alongside greenhouse gas emissions in this thesis is helpful to understand 
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how working patterns and other predictor variables affect household emissions: that 
is, the extent to which changes in emissions are the result of changes in total 
expenditure or in the mix of goods and services bought (proxied by the HEI 
variable). 
3.5 Models and predictors of household consumption 
This section develops a functional model for testing hypothesis 1, that reductions in 
the paid working hours of household members will reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions arising from that household’s consumption. The model will allow the 
statistical significance of this relationship to be tested using household expenditure 
survey and product emissions intensity data, following the approach described above. 
 
This hypothesis is equivalent to stating that there are predictable changes in total 
household expenditure and/or in Household Emissions Intensity.  In short, for the 
hypothesis to hold, the household’s patterns of consumption of market goods need to 
change in predictable ways which are correlated with working patterns, either 
through total expenditure changes or changes in the relative proportions of that total 
expenditure that is spent on different categories of goods and service. 
 
To develop this model therefore, it is valuable to look at the literature on consumer 
behaviour to find significant variables which predict expenditure patterns, and to find 
models of how the variables relate to one another statistically.  The next section 
looks at models explaining how households determine their patterns of expenditure.  
Following that, the main variables for predicting both the total expenditure on goods 
and services, and the types of goods and services bought, are investigated.  The focus 
is on the working hours of household members and how this variable is moderated 
and mediated by other variables, particularly the relationship between working hours, 
income and expenditure.  Control variables are also considered.  As well as helping 
to improve model fit, the control variables selected also allow identification of 
different demographic groups which are likely to have different preferences, 
capabilities and opportunities to shape their work life balance, and different 
responses to policy instruments which aim to alter their paid working patterns.  The 
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final result is a model of household behaviour linking working patterns to final 
outcomes in terms of the household’s greenhouse gas emissions.  This model is used 
in chapter 5 to test hypothesis 1.   
3.5.1 Models of household consumption 
Fine and Leopold (1993:40–43), in their indepth book reviewing the consumer 
behaviour literature, note that work draws on a multitude of disciplines, from 
economics to psychology and sociology, although there is a lack of “grand theory” to 
integrate different strands into a coherent framework.  Indeed, they note Engel’s 
(1981:12) critical description of the field as “a fishing expedition throughout the 
social sciences”. 
 
They go further, highlighting strong incompatibilities between approaches, 
particularly the strong contrast between economic and psychological approaches to 
understanding consumer behaviour: 
 
“Neoclassical economics single-mindedly focuses on one essential principle – the 
maximisation of utility subject to price constraints.  Psychology rushes to the 
opposite extreme, embracing as many motivational factors (and constraints) as it 
can muster to explain the diversity of consumer behaviour” (Fine and Leopold 
1993:55) 
 
Existing economic theory of consumer behaviour “constructs a self-contained and 
narrow notion of consumer behaviour, both in terms of its objects of analysis and in 
terms of its associated causal factors” (Fine and Leopold 1993:49), showing a 
preference for simplicity of assumptions over realism (Mason 1998).  Models tend to 
focus only on income and prices, assuming that individuals or households are 
rational actors, in the sense that they will work and consume so as to maximise their 
utility following exogenous preferences, within their budget and other constraints 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den Bergh 2004:370).  The influential Life Cycle and 
Permanent Income Hypotheses (Johnson 1971:66), for example, theorise how a 
household will attempt to achieve a constant rate of expenditure or consumption over 
the life course using borrowing and saving to smooth out variables in income at 
different stages of life.  Some economic approaches do go further, and attempt to 
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consider “leisure” (a term used to cover all non-paid time regardless of the use to 
which it is put) as a source of utility as well as market goods, and estimate the 
optimum balance for the individual or members of a household between paid work 
and leisure (see Becker 1981 for a classic development of the economic model of the 
household, particularly chapters 1 and 2 which most relate to this discussion).   
 
Nevertheless, these models tend to “ignore behaviour other than individual utility 
maximisation and … refuse to explore the origins of (changing) preferences” (Fine 
and Leopold 1993:49), to the extent that many of the variables potentially explaining 
consumption behaviour are ignored in models using the “representative agent” 
described earlier.   
 
Preferences are by no means a black box that is constant over time, or which at least 
changes predictably, as assumed in such models.  Psychological approaches try to 
explain these preferences by incorporating more explanatory variables.  However, 
such approaches are also strongly critiqued by some: Fine and Leopold (1993:58–9) 
argue that the literature seeks to encompass ever more psychological factors and 
patterns of behaviour, resulting in “an eclectic agglomeration of hypotheses …, 
creating and investigating causal factors and corresponding concepts that are almost 
as numerous as the number of goods available for purchase.”  
 
A final issue that needs considering is how consumption decisions are made in 
houses with more than one family member, e.g. how do couples choose what and 
how much to buy?  Who earns money, who decides what goods are to be bought, 
who actually buys them, and who consumes them, are all distinct issues, and 
different models assume different ways in which they are decided upon.  Whilst 
Becker (1981) famously proposes that households have a common utility function, so 
that the source of income (and who spends it) is irrelevant as all income is put 
towards maximising this same utility function, other theoretical models, more 
supported by the empirical evidence, posit that different household members have 
different preferences and relative levels of negotiating power, at least in part 
determined by how much they earn, so that who earns money has an effect on how 
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the money is used (see, for example, Phipps and Burton 1996, 1998 for a review of 
models and empirical research).  
 
Certainly for this research, taking an abstract, consumption-maximising 
“representative agent” hardly seems an appropriate approach, given the importance 
of individual characteristics to wellbeing emphasised in the literature review.  At the 
same time, the diversity of models of consumer behaviour from the psychological 
perspective is unhelpful too.  For these reasons, it is considered prudent for this 
research to take a simple statistical approach to modelling household consumption 
behaviour, including predictor and control variables of interest in a linear model.  As 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den Bergh (2004:371) say, not considering existing 
theories of consumption, in terms of the interaction effects between different 
variables, means any analysis loses “a priori information, which may affect the 
accuracy and efficiency of one’s statistical estimates... If, however, the traditional 
assumptions were wrong in the first place, they would affect the quality of the 
estimates negatively anyway”.  Whether they are wrong or, in the case of the 
representative agent, merely inappropriate for micro level analysis, the simpler 
approach seems more appropriate. 
 
To this end, an approach similar to that take by Phipps and Burton (1998) is used as a 
starting point.  The next paragraphs describe this.  They refer to a household in which 
the head lives with a partner (a “couple household”)
19
, but single households can be 
modelled similarly. 
 
For a given product category, c, expenditure by the household on it, Ec, is taken to be 
a function of male income, Ym, and female income, Yf, controlling for a set of i other 
socio-economic characteristics, i. Hence: 
 
Ec = f(Ym+ Yf ¦ A)                 [1] 
 
Giving: Ec = ac + bc .Ym + cc .Yf + ic.Ai + ec            [2]
20
 
                                                 
19
 The equations refer to mixed-sex couples, but would apply equally to same-sex couples. 
20
 Adapted from Phipps and Burton (1998). 
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Equation [2] is a linear model, onto which data can be regressed, in which there are i 
different control variables, ac is a constant, bc, cc, and ic are constant beta values, 
and ec is an error term.  For single households, a single income variable, Yh, for the 
head of household is included in place of Ym and Yf. 
 
Total expenditure, c, can be seen to follow the same formula, being the sum of 
all Ec for all product categories, c, i.e.: 
 
  c = a + b .Ym + c .Yf + i.Ai + e    [3] 
 
Total greenhouse gas emissions and Household Emissions Intensity are taken in this 
research to follow the same model, as it is found in the following sections that many 
of the variables found to influence consumption behaviour affect both how much is 
spent (total expenditure) and what types of things are bought (which determines 
HEI), and hence also affect greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Hence:  D = a + b .Ym + c .Yf + i.Ai + e     [4] 
 
Where D is the dependent variable being modelled: total greenhouse gas emissions, 
total expenditure, or Household Emissions Intensity.   
 
Paid working time, a key variable for this research, is included in two places in the 
model.  It is included in the set of variables i. It is also included as a determinant 
of income for the male and female, Ym and Yf.  The way income and time are 
incorporated into the above model, along with the other independent variables i, 
is discussed more in the next section. 
3.5.2 Independent variables 
The sections below discuss a variety of variables that the consumption behaviour 
literature indicates influence both total expenditure and the types of products bought.   
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Income (Ym and Yf in the model) is, inevitably, of primary importance when 
estimating household expenditure, and is discussed first.   
 
Time use meanwhile is of primary interest for the hypotheses in this thesis, and is 
discussed next. 
 
The rest of the section discusses further key variables which are likely to be relevant, 
which are used to populate the above model [4] with the independent variables i.  
They are grouped into broad categories for simplicity of summarisation, but these 
categories are not intended to be a rigorous classification and have no bearing on 
how the variables are treated in the model.   
 
It is worth discussing the rationale by which variables are selected for the model.  
The primary function of the model is to allow estimations of the effects of changes in 
working patterns on household greenhouse gas emissions, in line with the hypotheses 
presented above.  A distinction needs to be made between such estimation (as I will 
call it here), and the prediction as discussed by, for example, Pedhazur (1997:195–
240), as criteria for selecting variables for the two approaches are quite distinct.  The 
aim of prediction is to develop a model for a given characteristic (the dependent 
variable) of one survey sample that has as high a model fit (adjusted R
2
) as can be 
achieved using other available variables, and using it to predict the values of this 
same characteristic in a separate sample.  This research by contrast uses the same 
sample and estimates the effects of hypothetical changes in the values of certain 
independent variables (i.e. working hours) on the dependent variable (greenhouse gas 
emissions, expenditure or Household Emissions Intensity).  For prediction, 
independent variables are best chosen based on some theoretical idea of why they 
should be of relevance, but this is not necessary: it is only necessary that they are 
empirically found to correlate with the dependent variable (Pedhazur 1997:195–8). 
The reason for the correlation is not important, nor necessarily even known or 
theorised upon.  For estimation meanwhile, it is necessary to be able to argue that the 
independent variables explain the value of the dependent variable, i.e. that changes in 
the value of the independent variable affect the value of the dependent variable.   
 89 
 
Selection of the variables discussed below employ a mix of these conditions.  
Working time is assumed to affect earned income, which then leads to a change in 
greenhouse emissions (by altering total expenditure and/or Household Emissions 
Intensity).  For the other variables in the model, the less stringent requirement that 
they correlate with greenhouse gas emissions is all that is required (i.e. that they are 
predictor variables, rather than explanatory variables, in the sense used by Pedhazur). 
3.5.2.1 Income and the ability to consume 
Income is found in studies to predict a high proportion of total household 
expenditure.  Elasticity is generally found to be less than one, that is, a doubling of 
(gross) income results in a less than doubling of expenditure, the remainder paid as 
an increasing percentage of income tax, or being saved or used to pay off debts. 
 
As already mentioned, the proportions of total expenditure going on different 
products and services varies substantially with income too: as income and 
expenditure increase, a smaller share of total expenditure goes on high impact 
intensity product categories (such as food, gas and electricity), as Figure 3.2 in 
section 3.4 showed earlier. 
 
The end result is that as income increases so too do total greenhouse gas emissions, 
but the elasticity is also less than one, both because expenditure increases more 
slowly than income, and because a greater share of expenditure goes on products 
with relatively lower emissions per unit price.   
 
Also mentioned earlier, there is evidence too that the sources of income are 
important for predicting expenditure.  Income from different household members 
might be used differently in terms of how much of it is spent or saved, and on what 
(Phipps and Burton 1998 find this, for example).  As well as who receives income, 
the nature of the income source may have an effect: earned income may be spent or 
saved differently from income from benefits payments, for example.  Means-tested 
benefits receipt could imply a greater propensity to save rather than spend the money 
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due to lower income security, or alternatively imply the contrary, a greater likelihood 
of spending the money rather than saving it, as it correlates with lower incomes and 
hence lower likely capability to save (Phipps and Burton 1998:603 include benefits 
receipt as “a potential indicator of economic stress”).  Either way, it may be spent 
differently to other forms of household income.  The number of income earners in 
the household meanwhile could be a significant indicator of income security and 
associated propensity to spend rather than save. 
 
In short, the literature suggests that total household income, who receives it, and the 
sources from which it comes, should be included as separate predictor variables, as it 
may be spent or saved at different rates, and on different goods and services. 
3.5.2.2 Paid and non-paid time 
Paid working time influences expenditure primarily through its influence on 
household income.  Gross earned income for an individual is, by definition, the 
multiple of paid working hours by hourly gross wage rate.  Household income is the 
sum of earned incomes, non-earned incomes, and benefits received by the household 
and its members. 
 
It can also affect types of expenditure.  Time pressure from long paid working hours 
increase the consumption of convenience goods and services intended to save time: 
restaurants, takeaways and processed food or pre-prepared meals, microwaves and 
dishwashers, home cleaning and childcare services (Coote et al. 2010:17).  This is as 
predicted by economic models of the household: market goods and services can act 
as substitutes for goods and services that the household could alternatively use its 
non-paid time to produce (Becker 1981). 
 
Time spent outside of paid work can also imply the need for different kinds of 
consumption of market goods: greater time spent on childcare for example can imply 
an increased need to spend on heating the home (as it is occupied for more of the 
day), but reduced need to spend on childcare services.  These effects have 
environmental consequences, as they change the relative levels of expenditure on 
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different goods and services, potentially altering Household Emissions Intensity.  As 
another example, a three month career break spent on a multi-stop flying trip around 
the world would result in much higher greenhouse gas emissions than the same 
length of break spent in a well-insulated home writing a novel and eating only locally 
produced and home cooked vegetarian foods, even if the amount of money spent is 
the same.  These environmental effects are fully captured by the model without 
including non-paid time use as a separate variable, as they are the greenhouse gas 
emissions arising from the consumption of market goods and services rather than 
from the time use per se. 
 
It is however possible that non-paid time uses have environmental impacts associated 
with them above and beyond those caused by any market goods and services 
consumed.  Non-paid work in particular potentially has positive environmental 
consequences: voluntary work in the community implies activities are performed 
which increase the wellbeing of others without the need for private material 
consumption; voluntary work with nature should in principle lead to direct positive 
benefits for the environment, assuming the projects worked upon are well designed. 
Activities in non-paid time could have negative impacts too: the time could, for 
example, be spent in gathering or harvesting resources available freely in the natural 
world, such as timber for firewood and local plants and animals for food.   
 
Data limitations mean that these environmental effects of non-paid time use must be 
ignored, and be considered to be negligible: there is seemingly no dataset which 
provides a statistically representative sample of a population with detailed data on 
both household expenditure and time use.  It would, anyway, be no simple feat to 
estimate the greenhouse gas emissions arising from, or offset by, such activities.  
Whilst these effects would be an interesting area of research, it is assumed in this 
thesis that households have no impacts on greenhouse gas emissions other than those 
associated with their consumption of goods and services from the market, i.e. that 
their time use, independent of its effects on levels and patterns of expenditure, is not 
a significant predictor variable of greenhouse gas emissions. 
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3.5.2.3 Gender 
The gender of the person spending money has a significant effect on patterns of 
expenditure (Phipps and Burton 1998), and thus can be expected to influence 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Men and women have historically, and continue to have, 
distinct social roles, group identities, and needs and preferences, evolving over time 
and co-created, reproduced and altered by individuals, cultural norms, mass media, 
marketing, and physical differences, which influence the goods they choose to 
consume from the market (Bocock 1993:95–108). 
 
Patterns of employment, income earning, and childcare are also strongly gendered.  
In couple households, Alessie, Crossley and Hildebrand (2006:4) find that “in most 
[European Community] countries, the share of household income provided by the 
female partner is a significant determinant of her share of household consumption”, 
that is, it influences the share of household expenditure she controls, thus having 
implications for the products bought, suggesting that subdividing household income 
based on whether it accrues to the man or woman of the couple would lead to an 
analytical model that explains more of a household’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
3.5.2.4 Household structure and the need to consume 
As well as the household’s ability to consume, which relates to its income, its need to 
consume is also likely to be an important factor affecting expenditure. 
 
The household’s need to spend is a complex issue, affected by its structure, such as 
the number of adults and children, and their ages, affecting both total expenditure 
and the types of things bought.  The need to spend does not increase proportionally 
with the numbers of family members however, as there are also large returns to scale 
from cohabiting (Alessie et al. 2006). 
 
Such cohabiting effects are environmentally significant, with significant differences 
in expenditure and energy requirements in the areas of transport, recreation 
(holidays), food, electricity, heating and household effects being observed between 
single-person and multi-person households (Biesiot and Noorman 1999:374). That 
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said, the same study also finds that once income is controlled for, “there appears to 
be no correlation between household size and total energy requirement” for 
households with two or more persons (Biesiot and Noorman 1999). This could 
possibly be because households with more than two persons typically consists of an 
adult couple, who provide the household’s income, and (child) dependents who do 
not: while the dependents may increase the need to spend, they do not increase 
income substantially (although child benefits do increase in line with the number of 
children), or ability to spend, so that total expenditure is constrained. 
 
The number of adults and children, and their age profile, within a household also 
affects decisions around time use for paid work and for care.  Care commonly needs 
to be provided for children and dependent parents or partners, either by the parents, 
other trusted adults, or through paid care services (either paid privately or state-
funded) (Kooreman and Wunderink 1997:141).  The presence of young children 
could thus be expected to create pressure on the one hand to increase expenditure, as 
there is a new life to support and nurture, and on the other to reduce expenditure, 
borrow more or save less, as the capacity of the household to spend time in paid 
work is reduced as there is a new demand on time also.  This is the “rush hour of 
life” referred to in the life course literature: time and financial pressures on the 
household both increase during this period.  Kooreman and Wunderink (1997) 
however note that the number of children is not a fully exogenous variable: adults 
have a large degree of control over the number of children to have.  The household’s 
finances can therefore, at least in principle, be planned over a longer term of many 
years to try to accommodate planned pregnancies and children (although other care 
responsibilities may be less predictable). 
3.5.2.5 Socioeconomic and cultural variables and preferences for consumption 
Various other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household and 
its members, such as age, education level, social class, employment 
status/occupation, ethnic origin, the type of home dwelling and tenure, rural or urban 
location, and area of the country are commonly controlled for in studies of household 
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consumption (e.g. Druckman and Jackson 2008a; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den 
Bergh 2004:372, 384–5; Phipps and Burton 1998:601).  
 
Whilst this is standard practice in social sciences, there are also theoretical reasons to 
expect these to influence both total expenditure and the types of goods and services 
bought.  Such variables might serve as proxy indicators of individual consumption 
preferences which are shaped by subjective factors and values not measured in 
household expenditure surveys. They could capture at least in part the formative 
values household members were exposed to in early childhood, their current relative 
affluence compared to peers, their degree of exposure to materialistic values and 
behaviours, and so on, which can shape their consumer attitudes and preferences 
(e.g. Bocock 1993:82–4, and see chapter 2, section 2.1.1.2).  Cultural and geographic 
variables in particular could also shape the types of food eaten, types of leisure 
activities, the amount of home heating required, the propensity to save, etc.  
Households in rural locations are also found to have generally higher emissions 
intensities, and so greenhouse gas emissions for a given level of expenditure, due to 
larger and harder to heat housing, and restricted access to gas as a, comparatively 
low emissions intensity, heating source (Thumim and White 2008:4).  
 
Whatever the underlying reasons, lifestyle and sociodemographic variables are 
indeed found to influence consumption patterns, and hence household greenhouse 
gas emissions (e.g. Baiocchi, Minx, and Hubacek 2010 find this for UK households), 
particularly for the categories of leisure and energy expenditure (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and van den Bergh 2004:385). Age and cohort effects are also found in consumption 
patterns. These effects are well known in the consumption literature, with a well-
observed “hump” in average expenditure levels across the lifecourse which peaks 
approximately in the 40s, even controlling for factors such as income level and the 
presence of children (Bullard and Feigenbaum 2007). 
3.5.2.6 Macro effects 
Many other, larger scale, factors can also affect individual decisions around 
consumption.  These include “economic development, technological change, 
 95 
institutions, landscapes, demographic distributions, education systems, 
communication systems, and cultures” (Michaelis 2000:75, 79), to name but a few.  
Macro level variables regarding the national and local economic climate, and general 
confidence about future economic and employment prospects, affect levels of 
household expenditure, with the continuing fallout of the 2008 financial crisis for 
example leading to reduced private spending (ONS 2010). 
 
Patterns of expenditure are shaped by the physical environment around, such as the 
availability, placement and labelling of products in shops (Thaler and Sunstein 2009; 
Jackson 2005b), and the design of physical infrastructure: a city designed to be 
navigable only by car compels its residents to commute to work, whilst the quality of 
public transport infrastructure shapes individual decisions regarding modes of 
transport, shaping levels of expenditure on car fuel or less damaging buses and trains.  
The increasing emphasis on mobility for work, the rise of dual earner households, 
and the increase in the relative cost of public transport, have seen the share of money 
spent on private travel and commuting increase too over time, an expense that can be 
seen as “locked in” rather than a luxury, i.e. driven by structural factors rather than 
individual preferences (Jackson and Papathanasopoulou 2008). Dominant values and 
messages in a society also have an effect: the pervasiveness of Western values and 
advertising promotes conspicuous consumption, even for those at the lowest end of 
the income scale (Mason 1998:141), and can be shaped further by media, 
government and corporate elites which control communication channels (Michaelis 
2000:81–82). 
 
For the purposes of my analysis, such macro-level variables can largely be 
considered as constant factors across all households in the datasets I use for each 
country, and can thus be excluded.  The exception to this is the geographic region, a 
variable which is available in the UK dataset and has been incorporated as a variable 
proxying for some of these macro level factors. 
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3.6 The final household model 
The final model of predictors of household greenhouse gas emissions can now be 
presented, based on equation [4] presented above in section 3.5.1, and populated with 
the independent variables just described.  The final model extends equation [4] in 
two ways.  Firstly, it splits income not just into male and female sources (in couple 
households), but by type of income too: earned, private non-earned and benefits.  
Income earned by other household members is also included as a further variable. 
 
Secondly, paid working time is then included as an explanatory variable of income. 
This is moderated by wage rate: by definition, working time multiplied by gross 
wage rate equals gross earned income.  As well as this indirect influence of working 
time on emissions, direct effects are also estimated by the model.   
 
For clearer presentation, the final household model is presented graphically in Figure 
3.4 below.  This “path model” (Pedhazur 1997:ch 18) shows the hypothetical 
relationships between the dependent variable and all the independent variables 
discussed in the previous section that are available in the datasets used in this thesis.  
The variables can all be included in a linear regression model based on equation [4].  
In addition to this, the working hours of the male and female are not only taken to 
influence emissions directly, but also indirectly, as in conjunction with wage rate 
they determine the male and female’s earned incomes.  Solid lines in the figure 
indicate the alternative routes, direct and indirect, by which working hours may 
affect the dependent variable, whilst yellow highlighted variables are all those that 
influence this relationship.  Note that, as male and female education level and age 
strongly correlate in couples living together, male data for these variables are used as 
proxies for both.  Employment status, although discussed above, is omitted from the 
model: including it would complicate the scenario modelling in later chapters as it 
would then require not just working hours changes but (uncertain) employment status 
changes to be modelled. 
 
This figure is for a household in which the head of household lives with his or her 
partner, as well as any number of other dependent children and (dependent or non-
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dependent) adults.  For a household in which the head of household does not live 
with a partner, the variables wage rate, working hours and earned and non-earned 
incomes for the partner are omitted. 
 
The same model is used for each dependent variable: total greenhouse gas emissions, 
expenditure, and Household Emissions Intensity.  It is assumed that the same 
predictor variables are all of potential significance to explaining these dependent 




Figure 3.4 Path model showing hypothesised relationships between the dependent 
variable, working time and other independent variables 
NB.  There are variations between the UK and the Netherlands in the precise set of variables that are 
used in the analyses in this thesis, due to differences in the available data.  In the UK, “Other sources 
of household income” in the figure is further subdivided into male non-earned income, female non-
earned income, male benefits, female benefits, and other sources.  In the Netherlands, the variable 
“Geographic region” is not available. 
 
The statistical predictive power of the model is tested in chapter 5, which tests 
hypothesis 1, that the working patterns of the household members predict the 
greenhouse gas emissions arising from household consumption. 
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3.7 Scenario modelling: Estimating the effects on national 
greenhouse gas emissions of hypothetical changes in working 
time 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 argue that increases or decreases in working time in the 
population will, respectively, increase or decrease emissions from households.  The 
thesis aims to test this by estimating the effects on greenhouse gas emissions of 
different scenarios of change in the working patterns of the population.  Estimated 
mean changes in household emissions are used to calculate the total change in 
national emissions that results, i.e. from the sum of all households. 
 
The use of such scenario analysis (Hertwich 2005b) to estimate the greenhouse gas 
effects of different paid working patterns in the population is a relatively uncommon 
use of such a methodology.  Scenario modelling allows the effects of different, 
alternative, courses of action, such as policy measures, to deal with (unsolved) 
problems, to be assessed, courses of action which have not necessarily yet been taken 
(Hertwich 2005b:4079).  The scenario modelling approach used in this thesis uses 
the regression model calculated in chapter 5 (as just described), which predicts 
household greenhouse gas emissions based on various independent variables.  Using 
the same datasets upon which the regression is fitted, the values of the working time 
variables in the datasets are altered for particular individuals in line with the scenario 
being modelled, and the effects on household emissions are calculated based on the 
regression model. 
 
A central advantage of such an approach for this research is that it allows an 
assumption of ceteris paribus to be made, that is, other variables (including macro-
level time-variant factors such as policy, cultural values, economic conditions, and so 
on) can be held constant as parameters of the model, and the effect on a dependent 
variable of altering one independent variable, in this case the working hours of 
certain members of the population, can be estimated (Lelkes and Sutherland 
2009:18–19; Sartori 1994:22).  Analyses of historical data often have difficulty in 
defending conclusions about the effect of one given independent variable on the 
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dependent variable being analysed, as there are multiple variables changing in non-
linear ways over time, with interaction effects that are difficult to analyse, and with 
uncertainty that all relevant independent variables have been validly measured and 
included in the analysis.  Careful selection of “most similar” cases so that most of 
these variables are similar across the cases can help (Sartori 1994:22), but predicting 
the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios allows these variables to be held constant, 
thus allowing simpler, more parsimonious modelling to be undertaken. A 
disadvantage is that this simplification decreases the realism of the model, although 
this is true of analyses of past events too and does not necessarily imply results are 
less accurate. Indeed, all models attempt to accurately explain or predict aspects of 
reality with the most parsimonious approach possible: that is, with the fewest 
explanatory variables and simplest model assumptions (Mulligan and Wainwright 
2004:8).  Parsimony is not purely for elegance of explanation, but also because 
increased model complexity frequently adds little if any predictive power, due to, for 
example, an increasing likelihood of cross-correlation between variables, and 
inaccuracy of the assumed relationships between variables (Mulligan and 
Wainwright 2004:16). 
 
The use of scenario modelling is common in environmental policy research, where 
many environmental problems remain unsolved, but where untried solutions exist 
(Hertwich 2005b:4679). Many ecological economics and environmental analyses use 
scenario modelling to model and predict the environmental sustainability of different 
scenarios of changing economic growth rates, technological developments, and 
population changes, among other things.  Major examples of this include reports 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on scenarios of future climate 
change (e.g. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2008), the Stern Review on 
the future economic effects of such climate change (Stern 2007), and WWF reports 
on how our global ecological footprint might change (e.g. WWF 2010:80–87). 
Spangenberg et al. (2002) and Victor (2008, 2011) meanwhile model scenarios of 
transition to sustainable economies in Germany and the Netherlands, as mentioned in 
chapter 2 (section 2.1.2).  However, these tend to focus on macro, national level, 
analysis rather than the micro, household level.  Of the research on household-level 
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environmental impacts, little goes beyond describing and explaining household 
impacts on to suggesting policy implications, modelling particular policy options, or 
evaluating existing policies (Kok, Benders, and Moll 2006; Hertwich 2005b:4679), 
largely because the work involved in developing the capacity for description and 
explanation has been in itself a major achievement and contribution. Hertwich 
(2005b:4680) identifies a small number of articles that do undertake modelling of 
hypothetical situations.  For example, Biesiot and Noorman (1999) estimate the 
environmental impacts of particular behavioural changes in household consumption.  
Lenzen and Dey (2002) model the greenhouse gas, energy and other effects of 
different changes in Australian diets and transport patterns, among other things. 
Druckamn and Jackson (2008b) meanwhile model the effect on carbon emissions if 
UK households changed to live on a minimum income considered necessary to 
flourish (also as mentioned in chapter 2). 
 
Neither is such scenario modelling very common in social policy research, which 
instead tends to evaluate existing policy instruments and their outcomes against a 
given set of criteria, such as stated policy goals or normative values.  There are some 
exceptions to this, and “micro-simulation models”, scenario models at the micro, 
individual, level, are becoming more commonly used for the assessment of, in 
particular, the income effects of social policy, something encouraged for example for 
the assessment of policy impacts on child poverty and social exclusion (EU Task-
Force on Child Poverty and Child Well-Being 2008:134).  Research in this area tends 
to focus on income distributions in populations.  Meyer, Bridgen, and Riedmüller 
(Meyer, Bridgen, and Riedmüller 2007) for example simulate the pensions received 
under different welfare state systems in the European Union based on models of 
welfare state rules.  The outcomes for different hypothetical individuals having 
specific “risk biographies”, that is, idealised career and lifecourse trajectories, are 
predicted. Work following a similar approach has been undertaken for child benefit 
receipt in selected EU countries (Bradshaw and Mayhew 2006).  The UK’s 
Department for Work and Pensions uses PENSIM2 and other dynamic micro-
simulation models to explore the impacts of different policy reform options on 
pension distributions (Emmerson, Reed, and Shephard 2004).  More closely related 
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to this thesis’ research, other work uses models (POLIMOD and EUROMOD) and 
household-level survey data to simulate effects on a dependent variable (household 
disposable income) under different hypothetical scenarios of changes in the tax and 
benefit system, both looking at aggregate effects and breaking down results by 
demographic group (Sefton, Hills, and Sutherland 2009; Sutherland 2009). Such 
models have been used to simulate the effects on specific policy goals (in this 
example, reducing poverty among the elderly) of policy instruments (here, a 
European Minimum Pension guarantee) which have not necessarily been proposed 
nor implemented by policymakers (e.g. Atkinson et al. 1999). 
 
Whilst scenario models are used in environmental research, and to some degree in 
social policy research, the precise use in this thesis to model the greenhouse gas 
effects of changes in working time appears to be an original contribution to the 
literature.   
3.8 Modelling assumptions 
Scenario modelling is a useful approach for this research.  As with all modelling, 
assumptions are made to make the models simpler and manageable, whilst 
nevertheless aiming to capture some of the characteristics of the reality being 
modelled, so as to be able to make useful conclusions about how things behave in the 
real world.  Assumptions relate to which variables to include in and omit from the 
model, and how those included relate to one another.  It is necessary to keep in mind 
that “[t]he key to successful modelling is to know which assumptions are likely to be 
wrong and to ensure that they are not important for the purpose for which the model 
is intended. … [A]ssumptions must be well understood and explicitly stated with 
reference to the conditions under which they are valid and … under which they are 
invalidated” (Mulligan and Wainwright 2004:15–16).  In particular, as the values of 
variables are being altered in the scenarios, within what boundaries do the 
assumptions of the model hold?  How far can the working times of household 
members be altered and the regression model still produce feasible results?  The 
model is also a static one: what are the implications of this for the scenario 
modelling?  This section discusses some key assumptions of the modelling.  
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Importantly, it is worth noting that appropriate design of policy instruments will 
influence whether the model assumptions hold or not: they can in principle be 
designed so that they ensure the assumptions hold and hence that the model’s 
outcomes occur. 
3.8.1 Household decision-making around work and spend 
The household model presented earlier ignores how household members decide their 
balance of paid working hours and expenditure.   Household expenditure and leisure 
time are to some extent substitutable goods, that is to say, increased expenditure can 
in principle compensate for reduced time outside of work (Bullard and Feigenbaum 
2007), as discussed earlier.  Hence the household’s members have to determine their 
own optimal balance between paid work (and thus income and ability to spend), and 
non-paid time, so as to maximise wellbeing.  As already discussed above and in 
chapter 2 (section 2.1.3.2), there are arguments why the optimal balance for society, 
the environment, and even for the household itself, may not be chosen.   
 
The model developed above assumes that the household (or rather, the individuals 
within it, by whatever means) has already made this decision, and its expenditure 
patterns, and the greenhouse gas implications of these, are analysed based on the paid 
working hours reported in the datasets.  This does not affect the results of regression 
analyses to fit the model and test the significance of different independent variables 
in predicting household emissions.  It does however have potential implications for 
the results of the scenario modelling.  The scenario modelling assumes that a 
household’s emissions can be predicted based on these regression results, so that if a 
household member changes his or her paid working patterns, the household 
emissions will alter as predicted by the model.  This assumes that the, unobserved, 
reasons behind a household’s working pattern changes in the scenarios have no effect 
on its emissions, affecting neither total expenditure levels not the patterns of goods 
and services bought (or more accurately, that the net effect across all households of 
these unobserved variables is negligible, i.e. is part of the error term).  Where policy 
instruments, in the scenarios, have led to these hypothetical working time changes, 
households may in reality behave differently to those that are observed in the datasets 
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as the policy environment and other conditions are different, and these may be 
predictors of household emissions.  This has had to be ignored in the modelling. 
 
Another issue is that wage rates are not independent of working hours: higher wage 
rates, associated with more senior jobs, are typically also associated with full time 
work.  Employers frequently report that they consider more senior, higher paid jobs 
to be incompatible with part time work (European Commission et al. 2005).  This 
relationship is partly countered by more senior workers being expected to work 
unpaid overtime (or feeling obliged to to progress their careers), so that the effective 
hourly wage rate including these unpaid hours is actually lower than the contractual 
rate (Schor 1999:142–143).  Actual normal working hours, including any unpaid 
overtime, is what is used as the predictor variable in this research.  Any correlation 
between this and wage rate is ignored in the model.  This does not affect regression 
estimates.  Rather, it again has relevance for the assumption that households reducing 
working time as a result of a policy instrument will behave the same as households 
observed in the datasets who already have shorter working hours.  Policy would 
likely need to ensure that working hours reductions do not affect real hourly wage 
rates. 
3.8.2 Delayed effects of working patterns on greenhouse gas emissions 
The model developed here is a static rather than dynamic one, meaning that feedback 
mechanisms over time are not included.  A key assumption in the model is thus that 
these delayed feedback mechanisms are not significant.  That is, values in given 
predictor or dependent variables in the model at point t in time do not significantly 
alter the other predictor variable values at a later point in time, t+i.  This is either 
because there is no significant effect, or because other factors (such as policy design) 
precisely counter any effect that arises. This is also assumed in other static models 
such as EUROMOD (Atkinson 2005:7).  This section looks at two mechanisms by 
which significant delayed effects of working time on consumption emissions can be 
expected to arise, that is where working time reduction at one point in time may 
affect emissions in the future, not just in the present period.  It looks at the potential 
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of policy and other factors to counter them so that the model assumption that these 
effects are not significant can be held. 
 
The first mechanism relates to how a household balances income between 
expenditure now and saving for the future.  Current rates of expenditure are likely to 
be affected by the household’s level of capital: its financial capital, in terms of debts 
or savings; and its physical capital, in terms of its durable goods, large items that 
need only infrequent replacement, such as white goods, televisions, cars, etc, that 
provide utility over an extended period of time, in turn affected by past levels of 
income.  The expectations of the household members about their future income and 
future needs to spend (e.g. if they are planning a child or to buy or renovate a house) 
also potentially affect the current balance between expenditure and saving.  
Similarly, the variables described above which affect expenditure will also affect 
savings rates, as saving is the remainder of net income minus expenditure (hence the 
finding that many of the same variables described above also predict household 
saving rates: Harris, Loundes, and Webster 2002). The life-cycle and permanent 
income hypotheses, the respective work of Modigliani, Brumberg and Ando, and 
Friedman, essentially argue that an individual, or household, will attempt to smooth 
his or her utility over time, to provide a constant utility from consumption (from 
expenditure and from the household’s existing physical capital) over time such that 
their long term expenditure matches their long term income (Johnson 1971:66–8).  
There are various problems with this idea in practice; for example, there is a very 
high level of uncertainty about future incomes, whilst both the need to spend and 
people’s preferences vary with time, also, to a significant extent, unpredictably.  The 
access of households to debt facilities may be constrained by various factors so that 
they cannot borrow optimally.  Savings rates by individuals/households are found to 
be lower if those involved are financially optimistic, a characteristic which is not 
determined by how accurate their past financial forecasts have been (Brown and 
Taylor 2006; Harris et al. 2002).  It is also questionable the degree to which people 
plan, and how: recent literature suggests savings behaviour, as with consumption 
behaviour, is shaped by socio-cultural values and wider norms and conditions, whilst 
it seems individuals consider and plan for the short and long term, and for different 
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reasons, in different ways and to different degrees (Alessie et al. 2006).  Poverty, job 
loss, past failures with plans, and the presence of children all inhibit people’s 
planning behaviour (Anderson et al. 2002, 2005).  
 
Regardless of the degree to which the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses 
hold, households on low incomes are found to typically save less than those on high 
incomes, so that the working time reduction scenarios modelled are likely to result in 
average savings rates falling, depressing (future) expenditure further than predicted 
by the models.  This likely means that the greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
predicted in chapter 7 are also underestimates as some reductions in emissions in the 
future would occur which are not included in the model, and similarly, the emissions 
increases predicted in chapter 6 are also likely to be underestimates.   
 
The second delayed effect of working time reduction is that such a reduction made at 
one point in time may affect future career trajectories and employability.  Working 
time at time t can be expected to affect both working time and wage rate at a later 
time, t + i, as a period of reduced or no employment impacts on the chances of re-
entry to the labour market and the prospects for the type of job found, or of receiving 
promotion.  A career break or period of reduced working time is likely to result in 
not just immediate reductions in expenditure and greenhouse gas emissions therefore, 
but also delayed reductions, as future income is also reduced. 
 
The assumption that there is no effect on future working time is not a critical one, as 
values for this variable are determined exogenously from the model as a 
characteristic of the scenarios.  However, the effect on future wage rate is important.  
Research supports the idea that career breaks, including those supported by policy, 
such as maternity leave, can and frequently do result in negative career impacts later 
in time, including permanent exit from the labour market (at least in a full time, 
skilled job) (O’Reilly and Bothfeld 2002) and reduced earning potential (wage rates), 
in part due to human capital depreciation (skills becoming forgotten or obsolete) and 




Although such delayed effects of a period of reduced working time could lead to 
significant effects on greenhouse gas emissions, they have not been included in the 
modelling.  Building a model which accurately predicts such complex dynamic 
interacting effects is unlikely, and data to fit it to are not available.  Moreover, policy 
instruments could again in principle be designed and implemented to counter such 
delayed effects, by minimising the long term career impacts of working time 
reduction: this is one of the central concerns of life course policy, to prevent a career 
break turning into long-term exit from, or disadvantage in, the labour market.  Policy 
instruments in the Netherlands already aim to ensure part-time workers have the 
same rights as full-time workers (Fouarge and Baaijens 2004:3).  Other policies have 
also had some success in overcoming barriers to men’s use of paternal leave, such as 
a father-only “quota” in parental leave entitlement in Nordic countries, which has 
seen men’s takeup rates increase from 6% to 80% (Smith and Williams 2007:189).  
Wide-scale reductions in working time would also normalise such working patterns, 
and thus preclude discrimination against, and the concerns about career impacts of, 
individuals based on the decision to reduce working time.   
 
If policy instruments were not able to fully counter these delayed effects, the result 
would be that total reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from a given reduction in 
working time would be greater that what is predicted in this thesis, although there 
might also be negative impacts on households due, for example, to reduced job 
security. 
3.8.3 Systemic effects 
As well as delayed effects, there are also wider effects on other parts of the economy, 
in particular, the tax and benefits system and public sector finances, which are not 
modelled.  Cuts in working time imply drops in tax revenue from income tax if no 
other changes are made, potentially problematic for welfare state sustainability, 
especially if the highest income groups (and highest income tax contributors) are 
encouraged to cut income the most.  Again, policy can respond to this issue.  Cuts in 
private expenditure via working time reduction policy do not necessarily imply cuts 
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in public expenditure, but a big question becomes how to adjust the tax system in a 
politically acceptable way so as to maintain the welfare state’s core functions 
(including redistributive) even without the GDP growth upon which it is currently 
dependent (Gough 2010).  This is especially pertinent if the likely future expansion 
of climate change mitigation, and other environmental, expenditure by the state in 
future is not to compete with and undermine the welfare state (Marden and Gough 
2011). In short, the modelling approach used throws up implications for public sector 
finances that are outside the scope of the thesis to consider in detail, but which would 
require policy instruments to address. 
 
Another systemic effect relates to changing product prices arising from reduced 
demand in the economy.  Reducing demand would depress prices, even globally due 
to the level of global economic integration, so that “rich world frugality” could 
stimulate increased consumption and hence environmental impacts elsewhere in the 
world (Alcott 2008).  In principle, this effect on prices would be cancelled out by 
concurrent reductions in production as people work less, so that both product demand 
and supply fall in conjunction.  In practice, the result would be more complex, 
particularly as the areas of reduced demand would not match areas of reduced 
supply.  Similarly, labour wage rates could be affected by falling labour supply, in 
principle being driven upwards as supply reduces relative to demand. 
 
All these systemic effects are complex and by no means unimportant, and limit the 
reliability of using the linear modelling approach in this thesis for modelling radical 
changes in working patterns.  The response taken in this research is to model 
working time changes that are relatively modest.  Although by no means 
insignificant, they are substantially smaller than the working time reductions 
proposed by Coote et al (2010) for example, or which were envisaged for us nearly a 
century ago (Keynes 1930). 
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3.9 Selection of particular demographic groups for more detailed 
analysis 
Households with different opportunities, capabilities, preferences and strategies with 
respect to their working patterns and consumption are likely to respond to, and be 
affected by, working time policy instruments in different ways.  They might change 
their working time in different ways, with consequences for the environmental 
outcomes in terms of the changes in their greenhouse gas emissions.  Breaking down 
the population into these separate groups would be of value, as it makes it possible to 
see the contribution of different demographic groups to the total change in emissions 
that is predicted, and to look at income and expenditure impacts on different groups.  
This is helpful to inform policy proposals based on the research results, which may 
differ according to the group to which the policies apply to ensure that the diverse 
environmental, social and economic goals of working time policy can be reconciled 
across the population.  Policy can then, for example, target those demographic 
groups responsible for the highest shares of total national emissions (Druckman and 
Jackson 2009). 
 
The same issue described above for dependent variables applies here: the more the 
population is broken down into different groups for separate consideration, the more 
complex are the results needing to be presented and interpreted.  Equally, the more 
the population is broken down in this way, the less reliable are the results upon 
which conclusions are based, not least because they are estimated based on 
increasingly small survey sample sizes.  As such, the population is broken down for 
this research into only a limited number of groups which are likely to make the 
results more useful for policy analysis but keep results manageable.  The population 
is broken down against the following variables, with the rationale described below: 
household income band; whether the head of household lives with a partner or not 
(“couple” or “single” households); whether dependent children live with the head of 
household or not; and the age of the head of household.  Note that the terms couple 
and single are here used only to refer to whether the head of household lives with a 
partner or not: there may be other household members present, such as dependent 
children, and other adults. 
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Income band is likely to be of paramount importance.  From the environmental 
perspective, a given reduction in working hours is likely to have substantially 
different implications for greenhouse gas emissions depending on the reduction in 
earned income it implies (in turn depending on the wage rate of the person reducing 
their working hours).  From the household’s perspective too, low income households 
will tend to have much more limited capabilities to reduce working time, and hence 
further reduce earned income, without unacceptable impacts on material wellbeing.  
A reduction in greenhouse gas emissions due to reduced working time in a low 
income group might thus not occur in practice, as they are unable to reduce their 
working time in the manner assumed in the scenarios.  Breaking down results by 
income can allow the policy implications of this to be considered. 
 
Of the other demographic groups being considered, couple and single households 
inevitably have different conditions from one another that would make their work 
and expenditure patterns different: different returns to scale of consumption; 
different total time availability; different income security; and so on.  Whether the 
head of household lives with a partner or not fundamentally alters the opportunities, 
capabilities and preferences of the household to alter its working patterns, as couples 
have two potential sources of income, and “linked lives” (Schippers 2004), 
collectively deciding on and negotiating work life balance arrangements.  They also 
require different models to predict their greenhouse gas emissions in this research, as 
discussed above. 
 
The presence of children, and the age of the head of household, are also important, as 
these factors alter income and working time behaviours and opportunities.  Existing 
working time policy also focuses particularly on two groups: those with children, and 
older workers (aged over 50 and below retirement age).  For the former, a range of 
policy instruments allow and support parental leave, provide childcare opportunities 
with different degrees of financial support, and so on.  For older workers, policies 
provide different opportunities for pre-retirement and encouragement and support to 
remain in the labour market. Disaggregating the population by these variables will 
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help tailor policy advice to these groups.  Households above retirement age are 
excluded from analysis as they are generally not in work, and so not affected by 
working time policy. 
Clearly, it is possible to disaggregate the population along other lines that would 
provide policy-relevant results.  Current policies target other groups not mentioned 
here: the incapacitated, ethnic minorities, the long term unemployed, low skilled and 
others considered to have too low employment rates (see, for example, Department 
for Work and Pensions 2007:8).  Gender is also a key consideration, but as most 
households consist of mixed sex couples, it is not possible to disaggregate 
households by gender.  Gender effects within households are however considered. 
Those of different education level are also likely to have different capabilities to 
make use of working time reduction policy: for example, “the well educated are 
seeing rapid income growth and are under constant time pressure because of demand 
for their services, while the less-educated see falling wages and are working harder 
to maintain income” (Michaelis 2000:79). 
 
Nonetheless, with the focus of this research being on the environmental implications 
of working time policy, it makes sense to identify groups which represent major 
contributors to total national emissions which might also require differing 
consideration by working time policy to meet other policy goals.  Breaking the 
population down by single and couple households, age band, presence of children 
and income band should contribute to that aim in a way that keeps the results 
manageable for analysis. 
3.10 Summary 
Reductions in paid working time have been argued to be one part of a solution to 
reducing the environmental impacts of high income societies, in a manner potentially 
compatible with other social and economic goals such as increasing wellbeing and 
reducing poverty.  Thus far, however, there has been no known attempt to quantify 
the contribution working time reductions could make to such environmental goals.  
This thesis seeks to address this issue and thus contribute to the literature. 
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To that end, this chapter has developed a framework for the analyses in this thesis.  
Testable hypotheses have been set out regarding the relationship between working 
patterns and environmental impacts, focusing on greenhouse gas emissions from 
household consumption. 
 
As paid working time is an individual-level variable, whilst consumption expenditure 
is co-decided primarily at the household level, a household level analysis is 
indicated.  National-level emissions can then be extrapolated from household-level 
means. 
 
Methods of measuring the greenhouse gases arising due to household consumption 
are well established.  An analytical model was presented of the predictors of 
household greenhouse gas emissions, drawing on the literature on the consumption 
behaviour of households.  Doubts regarding the validity of complex assumptions 
regarding consumption behaviour require that this be a comparatively simple model. 
 
Once fitted to actual data, this model can be used to estimate the changes in 
emissions due to different scenarios of change in paid working patterns of the study 
populations.  The scenarios to be considered relate to the research hypotheses, and 
will be defined so that it can be argued that they stay within the boundaries of the 
model’s validity to test. They relate firstly to testing the environmental implications 
of existing government goals regarding paid working patterns in the population, 
which are to increase total work by increasing labour market participation rates; and 
secondly to exploring the greenhouse gas reductions that could be achieved using 
policy to reduce average working time. 
 
As long as the scenarios stay within certain boundaries, the assumptions within the 
model are unlikely to substantively affect the validity of the results.  Additional 
policy instruments could be used to deal with time-delayed effects of working time 
reduction that are not modelled.  The possible shape of these instruments is discussed 
more in the results chapters.  
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Chapter 4 Context of the research: Data preparation and 
existing patterns of household greenhouse gas 
emissions in the UK and the Netherlands 
The argument that changes in paid working patterns in a population will affect their 
consumption, and so environmental impacts, has a general applicability to all 
economies.  The further contention that reducing working time is a desirable route to 
take in tackling environmental issues, and could even bring wellbeing benefits along 
with it, focuses primarily on high income countries where there is strong evidence 
that consumption levels are environmentally unsustainable (certainly if they were to 
be replicated across the rest of the world too), and further evidence that these levels 
are doing relatively little to improve levels of happiness, as chapter 2 (section 
2.1.1.2) described.  What then is the rationale for choosing the UK and the 
Netherlands to test these arguments and assess the policy implications?  How do 
patterns of emissions look in these two countries?  This chapter responds to these 
questions. 
 
The chapter introduces the two study countries, and the time period in which the 
baseline data is drawn (the early 2000s), discussing the reasons behind their selection 
for study in this work.  It goes on to introduce the datasets used, and details their 
preparation for analysis.  The chapter then draws on these data to take a first look at 
the patterns of greenhouse gas emissions in the two countries. This provides a view 
of how the dependent variables introduced in the last chapter (household greenhouse 
gas emissions, total expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity) relate to one 
another, and presents how emissions vary between different demographic groups 
(such as parents with dependent children, and older workers) and by income in the 
populations, of particular relevance to working time policy, and hence to this 
research.  This gives an indication of the scale of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions necessary in the two countries, and provides context to the chapters which 
follow.  The chapter ends with a brief summary. 
 
 114 
4.1 Study location and period 
4.1.1 Choice of countries: the UK and the Netherlands 
The choice of the UK and the Netherlands as the case study countries for this 
research is based on their value in contributing to the research aims. The use of two 
case study countries provides “data triangulation” (Fielding and Fielding 1986:25) so 
that the validity of the research hypotheses can be tested in different contexts, which 
in turn provides some indication of their generalisability (Sartori 1994:15, 23).  The 
countries selected need to meet certain conditions as the arguments regarding 
working time reduction (as presented in chapter 2), which underpin the hypotheses 
being tested in this research, relate only to a certain class of country.  The argument 
discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.1) that reducing paid working time, and hence 
income in proportion, could be used as an approach to reducing household 
greenhouse gas emissions is made with a focus on high income, high consuming 
countries, in which it is argued such reductions in work, income, and so expenditure 
would not necessarily impact on wellbeing and could well even improve it, as basic 
material needs could still be comfortably met (by most people) and they would have 
more time available to pursue other, non-material, routes to wellbeing.  High income 
(and hence high emitting) countries are required for the research therefore.  A high 
level of variation in paid working patterns would also be helpful as it makes the 
testing of the thesis’ hypotheses easier, by allowing the model of how household 
emissions vary with working hours to be fitted to data such that it holds across a 
range of working patterns.  The UK and the Netherlands fit well in these respects. 
The Netherlands has by far the highest incidence of part time work in the EU, and the 
UK, historically in a more distant second place, has increasing levels too (Fouarge 
and Baaijens 2004:3; Inman 2010). The Dutch experience is unusual in that part time 
jobs are frequently of high quality too, compared to the often marginal nature of 
them in many countries, reflecting how employers there have increasingly seen the 
organisational advantages of part time work too (Fouarge and Baaijens 2004). Part 
time work is also unusually common among women, leading it to be described as a 




Case selection also requires consideration as to which characteristics are and are not 
similar, and which should and should not be similar for the proposes of the research 
(Sartori 1994:17).  Taking a “most similar” approach allows many possible 
explanatory variables to be excluded (as they are the same in both cases), reducing 
the complexity of analysing the reasons for differences in a dependent variable 
(although of course there still remain many variables which do differ) (Przeworski 
and Teune 1970:32; Mackic and Marsh 1995:178–179). The UK and the Netherlands 
are quite suitable countries to compare in this respect.  They are similar in relation to 
paid work in several ways.  Income levels are high and similar, as are education and 
skill levels in the workforce.  They both have high variation in paid working hours in 
their populations, with substantial shares of part time workers.  Participation rates in 
the labour market are high and increasing, for both men and women, and policy goals 
are to maintain that increase. The once strong support in both countries for full-time 
caregiving by women has firmly given way to the adult worker model, or 
“employment for all” (Orloff 2006:230). They are addressing similar demographic 
and cultural issues surrounding paid labour, including retirement ages and pension 
sustainability in the light of an ageing workforce, gender equality concerns around 
childcare and paid work, and so on.  Both being members of the EU means a wide 
variety of policy instruments are similar between the two countries.  This all makes 
the two countries suitable choices for comparison. 
 
At the same time, they also make interesting cases for the discursive elements of this 
research in which the implications of the empirical results for working time policy 
are discussed.  For this element, countries with innovative working time policies 
would be interesting.  From this policy perspective, two countries in particular have 
strong, innovative policy instruments that allow working time reduction (reduced 
weekly working hours, or periods of career break) for any reason.  The Netherlands 
is one of these.  Belgium is the other.  Their policies are discussed later in chapter 7, 
which focuses on policies for working time reduction, their effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions, and the implications of this research for their design.  Belgium however 
apparently lacks the product emissions intensity data required to test the research 
hypotheses of this thesis, so cannot be used as one of the case study countries.   The 
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Dutch policies explicitly follow the life course perspective discussed in chapter 2, 
making it particularly interesting for this research.  The UK makes an interesting 
comparator to the Netherlands from this policy perspective because, despite also 
having high levels of part time work, its working time policies are substantially less 
developed overall (as presented in chapter 7), as would be expected in a liberal 
welfare state model such as the UK’s (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Smith and 
Williams 2007).  There are, also, notable differences in paid working patterns, as 
Table 4.1 demonstrates: in both countries, women (particularly mothers) are far more 
likely than men to be working part time, but in the Netherlands the level of part time 
work for both genders was until recently far higher than the UK’s (whose own levels 
are already rather higher than most European countries’).  The Netherlands has been 
described as the “first part time economy in the world” (Visser 2002), with high 
levels of employee autonomy and strong support from direct supervisors and co-
workers for adopting (part time) working patterns that meet employee work life 
balance preferences contributing strongly to this (den Dulk 2008:143).  The UK’s 
male and female rates are, slowly, converging, whilst in the Netherlands there is 
divergence.  There are thus quite interesting differences between the two cases with 
respect to working patterns and working time policy instruments. 
 
Table 4.1 Part time employment as a percentage of total employment, by gender 
 Men Women 
 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 
UK 4 8 10 45 44 43 
Netherlands 14 17 23 58 67 75 
Source: den Dulk (2008:135) 
 
The two countries thus make quite interesting comparison cases.  They are countries 
to which the arguments regarding working time reduction should in theory apply, and 
hence for which the research hypotheses would be expected to hold, and are similar 
in many respects, allowing many possible explanatory variables to be controlled for.  
The use of two countries helps to give an indication of the robustness of the research 
results to different conditions. Inasmuch as they can be considered representative of 
high income, high consuming countries, then the thesis’ results and discussions can 
tentatively be considered generalisable to other such countries, with due 
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consideration of how similar or different they are from the UK and the Netherlands 
(Bechhofer and Paterson 2000:37–39).  At the same time, the quite different national 
working time policies allow an exploration of what the results imply for policy 
advice relevant to quite different national policy contexts. 
4.1.2 Choice of survey years 
The research uses data from the year 2004-5 for the UK, and 2000 for the 
Netherlands.  The choice of survey years was informed by the availability of product 
emissions intensity data: the most recent available emissions data (at the time of 
analysis) were selected for both countries.  Choosing the most recent year possible 
should help increase the relevance of results to the current policy context.  As 
methods for calculation of these data are in constant development, the most recent 
data are also likely to provide the most robust figures, improving the reliability of the 
results presented in this thesis.  
 
Using different survey years for the two countries could pose problems with 
comparability between the two countries.  Two options would have been available to 
use the same survey year.  Firstly, 2000 data for the UK could have been used.  
However, as this is a rapidly developing field, the 2004-5 data would be more 
methodologically advanced and likely be more accurate as a result.  The other 
alternative would be to convert the 2000 Dutch product emissions intensity data to 
2004 values by adjusting for price inflation, so that they could then be combined with 
the 2004 Dutch household expenditure survey
21
 data, and have results for both 
countries for the same year.  However, the 2004 Dutch household expenditure survey 
data omits key independent variables essential for the data analyses, which are 
present in the 2000 dataset: gross household and individual incomes, and the working 
hours of household members. At the same time, converting the product emissions 
intensity data based solely on inflation figures would have been methodologically too 
simplistic, ignoring changes in underlying production technologies, sources of 
imports, and resource prices that could also affect intensities from year to year.  
                                                 
21
 Household expenditure survey datasets are one of the main data sources used in this thesis, and are 
described in the next section. 
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Dutch Consumer Price Index inflation figures, which would be needed to convert the 
product emissions intensities, follow a categorisation of products and services highly 
different from that used in the Dutch household expenditure survey dataset used, and 
with poor comparability, so that using these figures would also have introduced 
errors. 
 
It was decided in the end that the four year difference in survey year between the UK 
and the Netherlands is unlikely to substantially alter either the results or their 
comparability between the two countries, which can anyway only be descriptive due 
to the differences in the secondary data being used.  The reduced comparability 
between the UK and the Netherlands was considered to be insignificant, as the 
research is already using distinct, unstandardised household expenditure survey data 
for the two countries, and product emissions intensity data produced using different 
raw data and methods.   
4.2 Data used in the research 
4.2.1 Dataset choices 
Certain aspects of the research questions largely determine the datasets that are 
required for this research, as discussed in the Analytical Framework chapter (chapter 
3).  The greenhouse gas emissions of a nationally representative sample of 
households is needed, along with other variables (including the working hours of the 
household members) to allow the predictors of these emissions to be studied, and the 
emissions of different demographic groups to be investigated.  The Analytical 
Framework already mentioned an existing body of research which studies the 
environmental impacts of households in this way.  The methodology used combines 
household expenditure survey data with data on product emissions intensities, and is 
considered to be “firmly established” (Reinders, Vringer, and Blok 2003:140).
22
  A 
range of reasons means it is sensible in this thesis to follow and build on this 
                                                 
22
 For a description of the history and development of these methods for the analysis of household 
emissions and other environmental impacts, and of the variations in methods and data between 
different studies, see the literature reviews of Hertwich (2005b), Kok, Benders, and Moll (2006) and 
Wiedmann (2009).  
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research.  Firstly, this existing research represents the most robust estimates of 
household greenhouse gas emissions that currently exist, the product of laborious 
data collection and development of novel methods.  There is little added value in 
attempting to “reinvent the wheel” by repeating any of this work, indeed the results 
would likely be substantially less robust.  Secondly, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to do so.  Finally, following the same approach means results from this 
research build on and contribute to existing work. 
 
A final dataset is needed to convert household level emissions results to the national 
level in a way that produces cross-nationally comparable emissions totals.  The 
method by which this is done is discussed below, in section 4.3.3.  The method 
requires a secondary dataset of cross-nationally comparable national greenhouse gas 
emissions, showing total national emissions from households for the UK and the 
Netherlands. 
   
Three datasets are thus required for this research: household expenditure survey 
dataset, data on the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of products, and the cross 
nationally comparable total household emissions.  Suitable datasets are described in 
the next three sections. 
4.2.2 Household expenditure survey datasets 
Household expenditure surveys are conducted in all the EU Member States.  In most 
countries, including the UK and the Netherlands, the data are collected annually.  
Data are collected from a sample of households, with the sampling method 
dependent on the country. The sample is intended to be representative of the national 
population living in private households, but excludes collective households and 
institutional accommodation such as “old persons’ homes, hospitals, hostels, 
boarding houses, prisons, military barracks” and so on.  Homeless people are also 
excluded. Data cover all expenditure of household members over a defined period, 
usually collected via a diary kept by the participants. Various socio-demographic and 
income variables are also usually collected, via interviews with the household 




These data allow different categories of household, that is, different demographic 
groups, to be identified (based on, for example, income band, age of the head of 
household, the presence of children, or social class), various aspects of their typical 
(mean) living conditions to be investigated, and so on. The data collected are also 
used to weight various macroeconomic indicators such as Consumer Price Indices 
and national accounts (European Communities 2003:9).  There is some attempt to 
harmonise data outputs (as opposed to data collection methods and survey questions) 
across the EU (European Communities 2003:7–11; Eurostat 2005b:302), although 
only national datasets are available for research use (at the discretion of each 
Member State); the harmonised data are not available.  This is not a problem for this 
research, as both the UK and the Netherlands make their data available for research, 
and indeed the product emissions intensity data with which they are combined in this 
research are designed to be used with these national datasets rather than the EU 
harmonised data (in particular, the UK and the Netherlands use different categories 
of product and service into which to group items of expenditure, to which the product 
emissions intensity data are tailored in the two countries). 
 
The UK and the Netherlands collect the data for their household expenditure surveys 
as part of larger annual household surveys: the Expenditure and Food Survey in the 
UK, and the Budget Survey in the Netherlands.  For simplicity, these datasets are 
generally both referred to as household expenditure surveys throughout the thesis. 
 
The next two sections described some of the characteristics of the UK and Dutch 
datasets such as their sample size, response rate and collection methods.
23
 
4.2.2.1 The UK Expenditure and Food Survey 
The UK Expenditure and Food Survey was conducted from 2001 to 2007.  It was 
formed through the merging of two earlier surveys, the Family Expenditure Survey 
(which ran from 1961-2001) and the National Food Survey (1974-2000).  In 2008 it 
                                                 
23
 Details of particular variables and how they are operationalised for use in this research follow in 
sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
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was again renamed as the Living Costs and Food Survey, becoming one module of 
the larger Integrated Household Survey (Economic and Social Data Service 2010a).  
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) manages and primarily funds the survey, 
with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs funding the food data.  
 
As well as the national accounts and other purposes described earlier, the data can be 
used to investigate nutrition and eating habits, and is freely available for academic 
research (Economic and Social Data Service 2010b). ONS produces an annual report 
summarising household expenditure and income patterns in the data, dividing 
households into different demographic groups (e.g. by income, age, composition, 
geographic region) and describing trends (see ONS 2006c for the report based on the 
2004-5 dataset used in this research). 
 
The data are provided to researchers as a complex set of six separate files, variously 
containing raw data (e.g. individual questionnaire responses) and derived variables 
(such as household expenditure by product type), and coded at the household or the 
individual level.  User guides provide some guidance as to the contents of the files 
and how they can be used
24
.  Very helpful email support is also available. 
 
Survey data are released as datasets spanning 12 months, effectively making the 
survey repeat cross-sectional in nature, although the data are collected continuously 
so that seasonal variations in spending and other patterns are averaged out.  A “multi-
stage stratified random sample with clustering” is taken of households, selected from 
the Post Office’s list of addresses.  Of 11,053 eligible addresses selected for the 
2004-5 period, 6,265 responded sufficiently fully to be included in the dataset (a 57% 
response rate, similar to other years). Northern Irish households were deliberately 
oversampled to provide sufficient cases for separate analysis, with 533 of a sample of 
1,032 responding (52%) (ONS 2006a:part 4). 
 
Data collected is via a questionnaire and a diary.  Interviewers conduct face to face 
interviews with all the household members aged 16 or over, to collect details of 
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income and household variables such as household composition, regular bills, etc.  
All individuals aged 16 or over are also asked to keep a diary of expenditure for two 
weeks
25
, and many children aged 7 to 15 are asked to keep a simplified version, the 
results of which are used to derive mean weekly expenditure on different product 
categories for each individual and for the household overall.  More details of the 
survey design and process are found in ONS (2006a:part 4). 
4.2.2.2 The Dutch Budget Survey 
The Dutch Budget Survey (budgetonderzoek) began in 1978 and is conducted 
annually, with waves covering a calendar year.  The data covers household 
expenditure, income and other socio-demographic variables. It is used to inform 
national statistics on consumer price indices and so on, and is also available for 
academic research purposes on request from Statistics Netherlands, the body which 
carries out the data collection. 
 
Data are provided in one dataset providing household level data (one case per 
household), with key individual level variables provided for each household member 
(numbered 1 through to 6) given in separate variables for each person in the 
household.
26
  Data, and the user guides provided with them, are available mostly in 
Dutch only, although email support is available in English for non-Dutch speakers 
too.   
 
Households are sampled “from all Dutch households”, excluding people in 
institutions and care homes.  Households are contacted from the address file using 
cluster sampling (firstly, 250 municipalities are selected, from within each of which 
households are randomly sampled).  For households containing self-employed 
people, further participants are also selected from reference to a general business 
register (this is to increase the number of respondents who are self-employed, who 
have a lower response rate, as described below).  Until 1999, the sample also 
included households that previously participated (hence it was a longitudinal study 
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 A sample of the diary can be seen in Rafferty and ESDS Government (2009:46–7). 
26
 Households with more than 6 individuals are anonymised, so that data for the 7
th




with fresh sampling for attrition).  From 2000 onwards (and hence for the data used 
in this research), previous participants were not asked again to participate.  The 
sampling has thus been repeat cross-sectional since 2000.   
 
The sample size was increased to 2400 (from 2000) for the year 2000 survey and 
onwards.  This is the number of households which actually respond.  The response 
rate is low, at 25% of households contacted (and only 10% for self employed 
households).  This issue is discussed in 4.2.2.3 below. 
 
Data collection consists of a questionnaire of income, socio-demographic and regular 
expense questions.  Data on all expenditures are recorded in a diary over 10 days.  
Additionally, data on all expenses over 15.87 euro are supposed to be kept for an 
entire year, including expenditure whilst on any holidays.   
 
More details are found in CBS (2002) (in English), and in much greater detail for the 
2000 survey used in this research in CBS (2000) (in Dutch, accompanying the 
datasets). 
4.2.2.3 Common data issues 
Eurostat note that the “high incidence of non-response is a common and major 
problem” in household expenditure surveys.  The problem is particularly severe for 
the Netherlands (and Belgium), likely because of the high demand placed on 
participating households, i.e. the need to record expenditure data for an entire year in 
the Dutch case (Eurostat 1997:20). 
 
Low response rates raise questions about the representativeness of these datasets of 
the populations from which they are sampled.  To address this issue, weighting 
variables are provided in both the UK and Dutch datasets that are intended to adjust 
results obtained from the sample of respondents so that they are representative of 
their respective populations.  The weights are calculated based on comparison of the 
samples with their respective national populations.  The UK weighting variable 
adjusts for non-response bias and for population totals, so that weighted totals from 
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the survey match national totals along lines of geographic region, age band and sex.  
The variable for the 2004-5 wave is calculated in comparison with the results from a 
mix of the 1991 and 2001 censuses (ONS 2006c:198–9). The Dutch data meanwhile 
are weighted to match the values of several variables in the survey, namely 
“household income, size of the household, sex (in one-person households), socio-
economic category of the main breadwinner, [and] whether the occupant rents or 
owns the house” with the characteristics of the population as described in several 
other datasets
27
 (CBS 2002:§ 3.3). 
 
Selection biases may still remain along lines of other variables (CBS 2002:§ 3.3), 
and there are no variables in either dataset to control for the non-random sampling 
methods.  However, the use of the survey data in official national statistics (such as 
the Consumer Price Indices) and other research described earlier is taken to indicate 
that the data are sufficiently representative of their respective national populations to 
be used as such in this research. 
 
Differences in the income and expenditure data are also substantial and a potential 
issue.  As noted by ONS (2006c:171–2), it is not intended that the data provide a 
“balance sheet” for the household.  Income and expenditure do not equal one 
another, not least because they refer to different periods: income is asked for in the 
questionnaire as an average over the previous months, whilst expenditure is recorded 
over a specified period following the questionnaire.  Neither necessarily includes all 
sources of income or expenditure, for various reasons (Dunn and Gibbins 2007:176–
9).  Households can also “smooth” their expenditure: saving or borrowing so that 
income and expenditure only come closer to matching over the longer term.  In 
addition to these reasons, Deaton (1992:138) notes that “[n]o one who has looked at 
the year-to-year variation in reported consumption and income in a microeconomic 
data set comes away without being convinced that much of the variation is 
measurement error”.  Again, apart from for specific situations described below, the 
effect of such measurement error on results in this thesis must largely be considered 
negligible. 
                                                 
27
 The Income Survey, the Household Survey and the Housing Demand Survey. 
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4.2.3 Data on the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of products 
The household expenditure survey data described above is combined with data on the 
greenhouse gas emissions intensity of products.  This is a measure of the level of the 
emissions that arise in the production and distribution of a product or service.  The 
measure is given in terms of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of market value of 
the product, kg CO2e per pound or euro.  Hence, the figures given are intensities.  
Although these data exist for other environmental impacts too, this thesis is focusing 
on greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
As these data are affected by economic and structural factors, they are specific to 
particular countries and time points.  Robust data are available for far fewer countries 
than are household expenditure surveys.  Both the Netherlands and the UK however 
have ongoing and long-established research developing these data.  The availability 
of these data was also a consideration in the choice of case study countries.  In the 
Netherlands, various academics including Vringer, Blok, Kok, Nijdam and others 
have worked both separately and together to develop the methodology and produce 
robust figures (see, for example, Vringer and Blok 1995; Kok et al. 2003; Nijdam et 
al. 2005; Vringer et al. 2010).  In the UK, researchers at the Stockholm Environment 
Institute-York have similarly worked on producing these data for the UK as part of 
the wider work of Footprint Analysis (Wiedmann and Barrett 2005; Stockholm 
Environment Institute-York 2010).  These data are use in their REAP (Resources and 
Energy Analysis Programme) software, which can be used to model the 
environmental effects of different policy options at local, regional or national (UK) 
levels in areas such as energy, transport, food, housing and planning.   
 
Data for both UK and Dutch product emissions intensities were calculated using 
“hybrid” methodologies.  More details of methods for calculating these data are 
given in Appendix 1.  The data provide greenhouse gas emissions per unit price for 
the same categories of product and service as are used in the classification systems of 
the UK and Dutch household expenditure surveys.  The data are thus tailored to and 
compatible with these surveys, allowing them to be combined with these data and 
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hence used to calculate the greenhouse gas emissions of the households in the survey 
samples.  
 
The product greenhouse gas emissions intensity data used in this thesis were 
calculated by the research groups described above.  For the UK, data are those 
calculated by researchers at the Stockholm Environment Institute-York, and are for 
the year 2004.  The Dutch data were calculated by Vringer and colleagues, as 
described in Vringer et al. (2010), and are for the year 2000.   
 
The product emissions intensities, i.e. the greenhouse gas emissions per pound or 
euro of market price, vary substantially between different products categories in both 
datasets.  Two factors affect the emissions intensities of a product (such as a pair of 
shoes, for example).  Firstly, the more greenhouse gases that are emitted during 
production and distribution per pair of shoes, the higher their emissions intensity.  
Secondly, the higher the price at which the pair of shoes is sold, the lower the 
emissions intensity (as the emissions per unit price is lower the higher the total 
price).  Emissions intensities are thus affected by manufacturing and distribution 
methods, including the amount of fossil fuel energy used, and by market prices for 
the product in question. 
 
In the Dutch data, emissions intensities are calculated for all 365 product categories 
used in the Dutch household expenditure survey.  Values vary from a low of 0.1kg 
CO2e per euro (for wages for domestic servants) to a high of 13.3kg CO2e per euro 
(for matches and candles), although the next highest category, natural gas, has a 
value less than half this, at 6.5kg CO2e per euro.  Highest values are generally for 
direct energy use (petrol, electricity, solid and liquid fuels and natural gas have 
values between 4.7kg and 6.5kg CO2e per euro).  Food products have values varying 
from around 1.8kg up to 5.5kg CO2e per euro, with fish and dairy products at the 
higher end of the range, and impacts from rice particularly high at 5.3kg CO2e per 
euro. Meat is, unusually for such data, at the lower end of the range for food. Most 
foods have impacts around 1.5-2kg CO2e per euro.  Services mostly fall at the low 
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end of the overall range of intensities, whilst clothing and other material purchases 
are typically spread around the 1.0kg CO2e per euro mark. 
 
The UK data includes values for 54 different products and services
28
, representing 
larger product categories than those used in the Dutch data.  Patterns for the UK are 
similar to the Dutch data, with figures ranging from approximately 0.1kg CO2e per 
pound (for house rental and mortgages) to over 6kg CO2e per pound (for electricity, 
gas and other fuels).
29
  A notable difference to the Dutch data is that meat products 
are reported to have the highest emissions intensities among foods.  The highest 
emissions intensity products, electricity, gas and other fuels, have emissions 
intensities which are nearly double the next highest values (water and air transport). 
 
One issue with these data is that all products within a given product category are 
taken to have the same product emissions intensity, whilst in reality they may vary 
greatly.  A 50% sale will double a product’s emissions intensity, for example.  More 
importantly, luxury goods in a given product category, hand made rather than mass-
produced, may have substantially lower emissions intensities, selling for a high per 
unit price with little difference in per unit emissions compared to mass-produced 
versions.  As these are more likely to be bought by higher income earning 
households, this suggests results may systematically overestimate high income 
household emissions and underestimate low income emissions (Vringer and Blok 
1995; Hertwich 2005b:4679). 
4.2.4 Data on national total emissions from households 
Cross-nationally comparable data on total emissions from Dutch and UK households 
are the final data required for this research.  Although various studies have included 
emissions from both countries as part of comparative studies, only one was found by 
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 The nine categories of food for which intensities are calculated also have separate values for organic 
and non-organic foods, but food is not disaggregated in this way in the Expenditure and Food Survey.  
As such, overall figures for these categories are calculated by combining the organic and non-organic 
emissions intensities weighted according to the relative market shares of organic and non-organic 
foods in each category.  Market share data were also supplied to the author by Stockholm 
Environment Institute-York. 
29




the author which uses multi-region input-output (MRIO) methods and data (as 
discussed in Appendix 1 in relation to the product emissions intensity data discussed 
above), and which also disaggregates national totals to provide total emissions from 
household consumption (the public sector and investments are the other components 
of total national emissions presented by the dataset). This is the Carbon Footprint of 
Nations project (www.carbonfootprintofnations.com, and see Hertwich and Peters 
2009).  The website provides access to the calculated data for all nations, including 
the UK and the Netherlands, whilst Hertwich and Peters (2009) describe the methods 
in more detail and discuss the results.  The study uses input-output tables for 72 
countries and a further 15 aggregated regions drawn from the Global Trade Analysis 
Project, combined with carbon dioxide emissions also from the same project, and 
non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions from other sources, calibrated and supplemented 
by the authors, where possible, with national and other more accurate emissions data 
(ibid.).  Based on the MRIO methods and data used, the results can thus be expected 
to be the most robust cross-nationally comparable set of data on national emissions 
and emissions from household consumption available, and so represent a suitable 
dataset to draw on in this research.  
4.3 Data preparation 
The UK and Dutch datasets required differing degrees of data preparation before use.  
The final dataset needs to have the household as the unit of analysis (i.e. one case 
entry per household, rather than per individual), and to have the dependent and 
independent variables operationalised.  Various checks of data validity are also 
required.  The process of preparing the data also included substantial cross-checks 
and verification to ensure errors in recoding were spotted and corrected.  All initial 
data preparation and testing was performed in SPSS 14.0.1 for Windows, using 
syntax developed by the author.  The syntax included extensive testing and 
debugging to minimise the risk of calculation errors. The detailed procedures 
performed, and their purpose, were also recorded in a “diary” to have a record of 




Specific details of the preparation of the dependent and independent variables are 
given below. 
4.3.1 Dependent variables 
Three dependent variables are used in the thesis: household expenditure (expressed 
as pounds or euro per year); household greenhouse gas emissions (kg of carbon 
dioxide, or equivalent, emissions per year); and Household Emissions Intensity 
(greenhouse gas emissions per pound or euro spent by the household).  The rationale 
for analysing these variables is discussed in the previous chapter.  The preparation of 
these variables is described below, noting particular issues with the data used. 
4.3.1.1 Household expenditure 
For the purposes of this research, household expenditure is used as a dependent 
variable, here meaning the total expenditure by the household per year (in pounds 
Sterling or euro per year).  For both the UK and the Netherlands, the household 




The datasets also subdivide household expenditure into more detailed product 
categories.  A complete list of these categories is available in ONS (2006b) for the 
UK and CBS (2000) for the Netherlands.
31
  The final data supplied to Eurostat from 
these surveys are converted into the international standard COICOP
32
 categorisation 
of products and services, but neither the UK nor the Netherlands follow this standard 
in the initial data collection (the UK largely follows it but has various modifications), 
and it is not standardised in the datasets provided for analysis. 
 
To validate the total expenditure variable supplied in the datasets, one can also sum 
the expenditures on each individual product category to ensure that the totals match. 
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 For the UK, the provided data give a weekly expenditure, which I convert to annual.  For the 
Netherlands, the dataset gives figures in Dutch Guilder, which I convert to euro based on the 
currencies’ official fixed exchange rate, Dfl 1: €2.20371. 
31
 In Dutch. An English-language table for the codes was also helpfully provided to the author by 
Kees Vringer (2009, pers. comm.). 
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There is commonly some underreporting of purchases of infrequently bought goods 
(such as large items: white goods, furniture, cars, etc), as there is a strong likelihood 
that none are bought in the data collection period (although this is less problematic in 
the Dutch data given that it is collected for a full year). 
4.3.1.2 Household greenhouse gas emissions 
Household greenhouse gases emissions are calculated by the author as another 




A household’s total greenhouse gas emissions are a product of the individual 
emissions arising from each item that it purchases.  That is, the emissions arising due 
to the production and distribution of that item are attributed to the household which 
purchases it. To calculate the greenhouse gas emissions of a household in the 
household expenditure surveys, the product emissions intensity data described above 
are matched with the equivalent category of expenditure in the expenditure survey 
datasets.  As, in both countries, the categories used in the emissions intensity data are 
designed to match the expenditure survey categories of expenditure, this is not a 
complex procedure (although there are some minor complications for the UK due to 
the fact that the two datasets do not follow the same categorisation of products fully).  
Greenhouse gas emissions can thus be calculated for each household for expenditure 
in each product category. For example, in the UK, for the category of clothing 
(COICOP code 3.1), expenditure is given in the expenditure survey by variable 
FS31.  The greenhouse gas emissions associated with that are calculated and stored 
in a new variable, GHG_FS31. The total greenhouse gas emissions of each 
household are then calculated by summing the emissions from each of these product 
categories.  
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 Tonnes rather than kg are used for presenting total national emissions from all households.  CO2e 
refers to “carbon dioxide equivalent”, a standardised unit for equivalising emissions of different 
climate changing gases, described in chapter 2, footnote 5. 
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The calculated greenhouse gas emissions are affected by the same issues of 
underreporting that affects the expenditure data upon which they are based.  An 
additional issue is that the greenhouse gas emissions figures calculated are estimates 
of the actual household emissions, as opposed to household expenditure figures, 
which, excepting measurement errors, are in principle what the household actually 
spent.  The figures are estimates of actual emissions for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
product emissions intensity data are average emissions per pound or euro spent on a 
particular category of product: they do not go down to the level of individual 
products, nor take into account sale prices on items a particular household bought, 
which could lead to systematic errors in the emissions estimates for particular 
demographic groups as described above.  
 
Secondly, even if this could be taken account of, the issue remains that it is not 
possible, in reality, to “correctly” calculate the emissions arising as a result of 
producing and distributing any given product.  Certain decisions have to be made in 
the calculations of product emissions intensities about where emissions are allocated 
to, and about the production efficiencies of other countries’ economies based on data 
that is quite aggregated (Vringer et al. 2010).   
 
Despite these provisos, the greenhouse gas emissions variable provides the best 
available estimate of the greenhouse gas costs of a household’s consumption 
behaviour.  It is widely used in other studies, as has already been described, and still 
enables what seem to be reasonable estimates to be made of the greenhouse gas 
emissions of different households and demographic groups. 
4.3.1.3 Household Emissions Intensity 
The third dependent variable used in the research is Household Emissions Intensity.  
Household Emissions Intensity is a measure of the household’s greenhouse gas 
emissions per pound or euro that it spends.  It is measured in kg CO2e per pound/euro 
(as with product emissions intensities).  Household Emissions Intensity is calculated 
for each household simply by dividing its total greenhouse gas emissions by its total 
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expenditure for a given period.  The accuracy of the variable is thus dependent on the 
accuracy of the two variables from which it is derived. 
4.3.2 Independent variables 
Chapter 3, section 3.5.2 presented the variables which the consumer behaviour 
literature suggests could influence household greenhouse gases, expenditure and 
Household Emissions Intensity.  Where they are available in, or can be derived from, 
the data used here, they are included as independent variables in the analyses in this 
thesis.  This section details the process of preparing these independent variables, as 
inevitably the data available is not always in the format required.  Chapter 3 
mentioned other variables which could have added to model fit but which are not 
available in the datasets; they are not recapped here. 
 
The household expenditure surveys used do collect a wide range of variables about 
the household and its members in addition to their expenditure patterns.  By selecting 
the survey years discussed earlier (2004-5 for the UK, 2000 for the Netherlands), 
both countries’ datasets include the variables required to test the research hypotheses, 
namely the working hours and earned incomes of members of the household.  
Further variables are also present that are useful to enrich the results and the 
discussion of their implications for policy.  Where the variables pertain to individuals 
within the household (e.g. working hours, income), they are included in the model 
only for the head of household and, if present, his or her partner.  It is an assumption 
of the model that variations in these characteristics for other household members 
contribute only a small amount to model variability and so are omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. 
 
Note that there is a common procedure applied to all individual-level variables: for 
couple households, variables were recoded for the male and for the female, which in 
this research are considered joint heads of household. This differs from the approach 
taken in the datasets, which define a head of household (in the UK, the Household 
Reference Person; in the Netherlands, the main breadwinner, hoofdkostwinner) based 
on gender neutral criteria such as who is the principle income earner or house owner.  
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Existing research finds that different sources of income affect the dependent 
variables above in different ways.  In households with a male and female couple 
living together, income is found to have different effects depending on whether the 
male or female, or another household member, receives the money, and on whether 
the income is earned through paid work or received as benefits (see section 3.5.2.1). 
 
For this research, model explanatory power will therefore likely be improved if these 
variables are included in the model, instead of using one variable for total household 
income, which would be an alternative approach. The household’s total income is 
therefore disaggregated into several variables.  For both the UK and the Netherlands, 
male and female earned incomes are included as separate variables.  For the 
Netherlands, a third variable then represents all other sources of household income.  
It is not possible in the Netherlands to disaggregate the data any further: the three 
variables combined equal total household income.  For the UK, this is possible, and 
“all other sources of household income” is further subdivided into the following 
variables: male non-earned private income (e.g. pension income, share dividends, 
interest on savings, property rental income), male income from benefits, female non-
earned private income, female income from benefits, and income from other sources 
(which is primarily from other household members).  Table 4.2 below summarises 
the income variables used for the UK and the Netherlands for couple and single 
households: note that “income from other sources” in the Netherlands includes 
income that is split into several variables in the UK (five in couple households, three 
in single households).  
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 In same-sex households, variables for the individual defined in the survey as the head of household 
are classed as the male variables, for their partner, the female variables.  These households are 
however excluded from regression analyses for couple households (in chapter 5) as they would affect 




Table 4.2 Gross income variables used in analyses: couple and single households 
Couple households 
UK income variables Dutch income variables 
Male earned income Male earned income 
Female earned income Female earned income 
Male non-earned private income  
Male income from benefits  
Female non-earned private income  
Female income from benefits  
Income from other sources Income from other sources 
Sum of above equals total household income Sum of above equals total household income 
 
Single households 
UK income variables Dutch income variables 
Head of household earned income Head of household earned income 
Head of household non-earned private income  
Head of household income from benefits  
Income from other sources Income from other sources 
Sum of above equals total household income Sum of above equals total household income 
 
The income variables used are gross (before tax deductions).  Gross income is used 
in this research for several reasons.  Primarily this is because this research uses 
scenario models, in which hypothetical reductions in the working hours of particular 
household members are modelled.  The effect of a 20% reduction in working hours 
(for example) would be a 20% reduction in gross earned income.  Using net income 
would entail that both the UK and Dutch income tax systems need to be accurately 
modelled, something that would be prohibitively complex for the research, especially 
as there would not be any clear benefits for the conclusions reached.  A further 
reason gross income is used is more practical: while the Dutch dataset provides gross 
and net income for the household as a whole, for individual household members only 
gross income figures are provided. This means gross income must be used for the 
Dutch analyses, and so for comparability the same is used for the UK. 
 
As well as gross income, which is used in the modelling in the subsequent chapters, 
equivalised income is also used to present some results throughout the thesis.  
Equivalised income takes account of the argument that the more people that live in a 
household, the less money is needed per capita to reach a certain level of material 
affluence.  This is based on the assumption that a certain proportion of household 
expenditure is on goods and services whose utility can be shared by the household 
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members (such as heating, living space, economies of scale in food purchasing, etc), 
and also that children need fewer resources than adults. This equivalised income is 
also calculated by the author for use in the research, using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale developed by Hagenaars, de Vos and Zaidi (1994).  Under this 
scale, household income is divided by an “equivalence factor”, which is the sum of 
the values from the following: the first adult in the household has a value of 1; 
subsequent adults (aged 14 or over) have a value of 0.5; children (13 and under) have 
a value of 0.3. The equivalised income is essentially an attempt, albeit approximate, 
to compare households with equivalent living standards, measured as an equivalised 
per capita income.  However, many different equivalence scales exist, and for all of 
them the weighting of different household members is essentially arbitrary, with the 
potential to over- or under-estimate living standards in different countries or for 
particular demographic groups.  The modified OECD scale is used in this research as 
it is the standard scale used in EU income studies, including other work on the 
household expenditure data used in this research (Chanfreau and Burchardt 2008; 
Dunn and Gibbins 2007).  Equivalised income is not however used in the regression 
models because both the total expenditure and total greenhouse gas emissions from  a 
household, the two main dependent variables analysed in the models, are expected to 
correlate linearly with its total income, without equivalising it for the number of 
household members, following the model of the household developed in chapter 3, 
section 3.5.1, itself drawing on the approach of Phipps and Burton (1998). 
 
Income data may suffer from underreporting by some groups.  This can especially be 
the case for the self-employed, for whom even knowing what constitutes income may 
be difficult (Deaton 1992:139), and for the lowest (reported) income households.  No 
adjustments are made for this issue in the analyses in this research.  The implication 
is that the results in this research are less accurate for households with the lowest 
incomes than for other groups.  However, this issue has little effect on the 
conclusions drawn in the thesis: in terms of their greenhouse gas emissions, these 
households still contribute less than other households, and changes in their working 
patterns have the least effect on national emissions in the scenarios modelled in 
chapters 6 and 7.  In terms of the policy implications discussed too, these are still 
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likely to be the households with the fewest capabilities to make use of the 
opportunities provided by policy to reduce their working hours or take career breaks, 
as their income is still the lowest and least secure. The overall impact of the 
underreporting issue is therefore likely to be negligible.  
4.3.2.2 Paid working time 
In both countries, variables are included in the data for the usual paid working hours 
of household members. 
 
In the UK dataset, four working hours variables are included. Three are for 
employees, being usual working hours (excluding breaks and overtime), hours of 
paid overtime usually worked, and hours of unpaid overtime usually worked.  For 
self-employed people, one variable is included for usual working hours, with no 
separate variables for overtime (which is arguably not considered a meaningful 
concept in this context).  In no cases are there simultaneously non-zero values for the 
employed and self-employed working hours variables, i.e. if an individual has hours 
as an employee recorded, the value for self-employed hours is always zero, and vice 
versa.  As type of employment is not considered in the research, the variables were 
summed into one for each individual included in the models. This creates a variable 
showing the individual’s total working hours, regardless of whether they are from 
employment or self-employment, or whether they are normal hours, paid overtime, 
or unpaid overtime.  This also increases comparability with the Dutch variables, 
discussed next. 
 
In the Dutch data, only one variable is included for working hours for each 
household member, being the average working hours per week of the individual in 
all forms of employment or self-employment.  Use of the variable is complicated by 
the fact that all values below 13 hours per week are coded as zero, apparently 
because this is considered as not employed by the definitions of Dutch 
unemployment benefit rules.  Values over 97 hours per week are also anonymised, 
coded as 98 hours.  Although this in principle means the variable cannot be used as a 
continuous one, in practice it was found that using it as a continuous variable had 
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little effect on regression model results (as compared to recoding it as a set of 
dummy variables representing a categorical variable).  Chapter 5, in which the 
regression models are fitted, discusses this issue in more detail. 
 
These working time variables are inevitably estimates of what individuals actually 
work.  Not everyone has regular work, or fixed, regular hours, especially when it 
comes to overtime and for the self-employed.  The variables also make no 
consideration of differences in annual holiday leave entitlements, which are relevant 
for this research as leave effectively reduces the average hours per week worked over 
the year.  Nevertheless, these variables are the best estimates of people’s average 
weekly working time that can be made based on the data available. 
4.3.2.3 Hourly wage rate 
No wage rate variable is provided in the datasets, but it can be easily derived from 
the data on working hours and income.  The gross wage rate of individuals is, by 
definition in this research, the individual’s total gross earned income divided by the 
usual working hours.  This provides a variable that is a reflection of the actual hourly 
wage rate of the individual.  This may differ from what would be present in their 
employment contract, as this may exclude overtime either paid at a higher rate or 
unpaid, or instead be an annual amount not closely connected to hours worked.   
4.3.2.4 Other independent variables 
Various other variables are included in the modelling in this research that are likely 
to increase model fit, and which are useful for identifying different demographic 
groups whom are likely to make different work life balance decisions.  The variables 
included are discussed in the previous chapter in sections 3.5.2.3. to 3.5.2.6.  Here, 
their operationalisation from the available data is discussed. 
 
Firstly, various “household structure” variables are included; that is, variables 
describing the numbers and ages of household members. The number of adults is 
included, a variable which includes all individuals aged 18 or over, including the 
head of household and partner, if present.  The numbers of children are also included.  
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As there is evidence that the age of children is important, both for patterns of 
expenditure (as it effects their material needs), and for work life balance decisions, 
three variables capture the numbers of children aged under 2, aged 2 to 4, and aged 5 
to 17.  These age bands were chosen as these variables are already presented in the 
UK dataset and can be easily derived from the Dutch data. 
 
The age and education level of the head of household were also included.  For couple 
households, as there is a high correlation between values for male and female, the 
male data were chosen as a proxy for the couple.  An alternative would have been to 
calculate average values for the male and female, but for education level, a 
categorical variable, this is problematic.  Age is included as age in years, data that 
are provided in both countries’ datasets.  Data on education level are not comparable 
between the UK and Dutch datasets, but nevertheless are included as control 
variables.  For the UK, the variable is a numeric one representing the age at which 
the individual left full time education.  For the Netherlands, a complex categorical 
variable representing educational attainment level and subject area is provided 
(following the SOI-1998 classification; see Moens 1999 for details of it).  This is 
simplified and recoded by the author into a categorical variable showing the highest 
education “level” attained, dummy variables for which are used in the analyses. 
 
The number of people economically active, or number of income earners, in the 
household is also included, i.e. the numbers engaged in paid employment or self-
employment.  These variables are present in the datasets.  
 
A household “class” variable was included.  In both countries, this variable is 
categorical, and relates to the type of occupation of the head of household (the 
Household Reference Person in the UK, and the main breadwinner in the 
Netherlands).  For the UK, a version of the National Statistics’ standard Socio-
economic Classification is used, as provided in the dataset.  For the Netherlands, the 
most comparable variable was selected, being the nature of the work of the main 
breadwinner.  The variables are not however directly comparable between the two 
countries, with more categories in the UK variable than the Dutch one, but for both 
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they broadly range from lower, manual and unskilled work, to higher, professional, 
skilled work.  The UK also includes students as a separate category. For both 
countries, dummy variables were prepared by the author from these variables for use 
in the analyses. 
 
The physical size of the household was included.  Various variables could have been 
used to describe this for the UK, however for maximum comparability number of 
rooms was used for both countries.  For the UK, the variable was described as the 
number of rooms occupied, whilst for the Netherlands the variable was the number 
of rooms in the dwelling.  As this Dutch variable is top-coded at 6 (i.e. values of 6 or 
higher are all recorded as 6 for the purposes of respondent anonymity), dummies for 
both countries were prepared for 3, 4, 5, and 6 or more rooms, with 1 and 2 rooms set 
as a reference value. 
 
Finally, the geographic region of the household was included in the UK analyses.  
The dataset includes a variable placing households within 12 broad “government 
regions” of the country.  This is the most detailed geographic data available, but is 
still clearly fairly crude.  Dummy variables were prepared by the author from the 
categorical variable provided in the dataset.  No geographic information is supplied 
in the Dutch data, so there is no equivalent used in the Dutch analyses. 
4.3.3 Estimating national emissions based on sample means 
The greenhouse gas emissions variable can be used to calculate mean emissions from 
households, or from particular demographic groups (such as households with 
dependent children, for example). 
 
Total national emissions from all households are also discussed in the thesis, as are 
total emissions from all households in particular demographic groups. In principle, 
totals can be calculated simply by multiplying the mean household greenhouse gas 
emissions in the survey data by the number of households in the country.  This latter 
figure can be easily calculated based on Eurostat data on the national population, 
divided by mean household size.  In practice, results calculated in this way differ 
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substantially from other estimates of national greenhouse gas emissions from 
households.  Product emissions intensity data, and resultant estimates of household 
emissions, are intended primarily for micro-level research.  They provide an accurate 
way to compare relative emissions levels between products or demographic groups, 
but are not intended for calculating national estimates, as small measurement errors 
and rounding of figures multiply up into substantial errors.  This in part reflects 
differences in household expenditure calculated in this way or estimated at the 
national level (see, for example, Buiten 1994 for a discussion of why mean 
household expenditure calculated from household expenditure survey data cannot be 
used to infer total national expenditure accurately).  
 
Instead, to produce meaningful estimates of national level total greenhouse gas 
emissions from private households, the household level data calculated in this thesis 
are calibrated against secondary estimates of national total emissions from 
households, following the approach taken by Vringer et al (2010).  In short, the 
national total emissions from households, calculated as part of the Carbon Footprint 
of Nations project, as described above in section 4.2.4, are used.  This are then 
divided by the mean emissions per household calculated in this thesis based on the 
household expenditure survey and product emissions intensity data. This provides a 
multiplication factor for both the UK and the Netherlands which can be used to 
convert estimates of mean household emissions into national totals.   
 
A small issue with this approach is that the national level data from the Carbon 
Footprint of Nations project refer to the year 2001, whilst the household level data 
refer to 2004-5 and 2000 (for the UK and the Netherlands, respectively).  The 
national results from the Carbon Footprint of Nations project are used because they 
represent among the most comparable cross-national data on household emissions 
available
35
.  This comparability is useful for comparing results between the UK and 
the Netherlands in this research.  This difference in survey years is unlikely to affect 
results substantially.  Consumption and emissions levels will not have changed much 
                                                 
35
 Other comparative research which includes both the Netherlands and the UK either use product 
emissions intensities from one of the study countries as proxies for another, or only include CO2 and 
not other greenhouse gases (e.g. Kerkhof, Benders, and Moll 2009). 
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over the short periods involved.  Additionally, the primary value of the household 
level results is to allow changes in emissions between different scenarios to be 
calculated, and to compare differences between demographic groups, and these 
relative changes and differences are unlikely to have changed much either over such 
a short timeframe. 
4.3.4 Validity of data comparison within and between countries 
The differences between the UK and Dutch raw household expenditure data and, 
particularly, product emissions intensity data, in terms of raw data sources and 
methods used to calculate the figures
36
, also have some effects on which results can 
be validly compared between countries in this research.  The principle proviso is that 
mean greenhouse gas emissions figures cannot be reliably compared between the UK 
and the Netherlands: the mean household figures are approximate and may be 
systematically under or overestimated comparing the UK and the Netherlands, and 
indeed with other studies using different data and methods.  Hence, comparing the 
mean household tonnage emissions results between the UK and the Netherlands in 
this research would not be valid.  What are more reliable are the following: firstly, at 
the household level, the percentage differences in emissions between types of 
household (demographic groups) within-country; secondly, the percentage change in 
household emissions between the different scenarios of changing working patterns, 
both within and between countries; and finally, at the national level, the tonnage 
greenhouse gas emissions, and the tonnage and percentage change in these emissions 
under the different scenarios, can be reliably compared within and between countries, 
as they are calibrated to a cross-national comparative dataset that can be considered 
one of the most robust available.  
 
With respect to the mean household emissions calculated in this research, the figures 
for the Netherlands do nevertheless compare well with other published sources, 
which use the same datasets.  Vringer et al. (2010), for example, calculates mean 
household emissions of 28.4 tonnes CO2e per annum in the year 2000, similar to that 
calculated in this research, as presented below in Table 4.5.  UK figures published 
                                                 
36
 These differences were discussed above in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. 
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elsewhere are somewhat higher than those presented here, e.g. Druckman and 
Jackson (2008b:14), using different data and methods to those used here (as 
described above in section 4.2.3), estimate household mean emissions to be 26 
tonnes CO2e per annum in 2004, some 29% higher than the result here, also as shown 
in Table 4.5.  Gough et al (2011:9) calculate mean figures for 2006 for the UK that 
are even higher, 28.9 tonnes CO2e per annum, some 43% higher than the results in 
this research.  While they use similar data drawing on the same datasets, but the 
following year’s wave, they use a substantially different method of calculation, and 
acknowledge that their results are rather high compared to other work (ibid.).  These 
differences highlight the necessity to take household mean tonnage emissions in this 
research as indicative, and rely only on those results outlined in the previous 
paragraph.  
4.4 A first look at the data: Patterns of greenhouse gas emissions 
from households 
In both the UK and the Netherlands, households contribute the major share of total 
national greenhouse gas emissions.   The Carbon Footprint of Nations project 
estimates that, in 2001, UK household consumption emissions were 694.6 millions 
tonnes CO2e, 76.1% of the national total.  For the Netherlands, households accounted 
for emissions of 175.1 millions tonnes, 65.5% of the national total 
(www.carbonfootprintofnations.com, and see Hertwich and Peters 2009).  The 
remainder of emissions arises from government activities and capital investment.  
 
It would provide useful context to the research in this thesis to take a more detailed 
look at these household emissions.  This section first looks at how a household’s 
greenhouse gas emissions are affected by its total expenditure and by its Household 
Emissions Intensity, hence looking at how the three dependent variables interrelate.
37
  
It continues with an overview of how emissions vary between different demographic 
groups which are frequently distinguished and treated differently by work life 
                                                 
37
 Some basic distributional data for the dependent variables (mean, median, skew and kurtosis) are 
provided in Appendix 2 for reference.  Greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure are highly skewed 
and kurtic, particularly in the UK, with a long tail of high spending, high emitting households.  
Household Emissions Intensity is more normally distributed. 
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balance policy, to gain a first understanding of how policies to influence working 
patterns might in turn affect emissions. 
 
A household’s greenhouse gas emissions correlate quite strongly with total 
expenditure, as can be seen in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 below.  75% of the variance 
in UK household greenhouse gas emissions, and 86% of variance in Dutch household 
emissions, can be predicted using expenditure alone.
38
  However, there is also clearly 
substantial variation in household emissions at any given level of expenditure.  This 
variation is what is captured in the variable Household Emissions Intensity (recall 
that total household expenditure x Household Emissions Intensity = total household 
greenhouse gas emissions), and is the result of differences in the types of goods and 
services that households buy.  A household with a relatively high level of emissions 
for its level of expenditure might spend more on heating the home, on vehicle fuel 
(for private travel), on flights, and on meat and dairy products, for example, whilst 
another household with the same expenditure level but relatively low levels of 
emissions might spend less on these, preferring to have a cooler or more insulated 
home, travelling by public transport, bicycle or on foot, eating a vegetarian diet, but 
spending more instead on the mortgage, on IT equipment and clothing, and on goods 
for cultural activities. 
 
Table 4.3 below shows the correlations between pairs of the three dependent 
variables for the UK and for the Netherlands, respectively, tested using Spearman’s 
rho tests. In keeping with the result mentioned above, strong correlations are found 
between household greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure in both countries, with 
Spearman’s rho test correlations of 0.902 in the UK and 0.952 in the Netherlands. 
There is also negative correlation between expenditure and Household Emissions 
Intensity in the UK, i.e. HEI falls as expenditure increases.  Negative correlation is to 
be expected, considering that both are also clearly correlated to income, as is seen in 
the next chapter (expenditure being positively correlated with income, and HEI 
                                                 
38
 This is based on the adjusted R
2
 calculated using OLS linear regression of the natural logs of the 
variables, to regress household greenhouse gas emissions onto household total expenditure.  As total 
emissions = expenditure x Household Emissions Intensity (HEI), taking the natural log of the 
variables allows a linear regression to be performed and the relative importance of the two 
independent variables to be estimated (as ln emissions = ln expenditure + ln HEI). 
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negatively correlated with it).  Negative correlation between these two variables is 
found for the Netherlands too, but the result is not significant.  Household emissions 
correlate with HEI positively in the Netherlands, as would be expected (a higher HEI 
means higher emissions for a given level of expenditure).  The correlation is not 
strong enough to be significant in the UK however, so the negative correlation 
reported in the table is not reliable. 
 
Table 4.3 Correlations between the dependent variables household greenhouse gas 
emissions, household total expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity for UK 
households, 2004-5, and Dutch households, 2000 
 UK Netherlands 
    Annual greenhouse gas emissions  
    (tonnes CO2e per annum) 
X  Total annual expenditure 
    (£/€ per annum) 
0.902* 0.952* 
    Total annual expenditure 
    (£/€ per annum) 
X  Household Emissions Intensity 
    (kg CO2e per £/€ expenditure) 
-0.411* -0.040 
    Annual greenhouse gas emissions  
    (tonnes CO2e per annum) 
X  Household Emissions Intensity 
    (kg CO2e per £/€ expenditure) 
-0.022 0.240* 
* Significant at above the 0.1% level. 
NB. Results show Spearman’s rho correlations, two-tailed, cases excluded pairwise. 0 = no 
correlation; 1 = perfect correlation. 
 
The fact described earlier that Household Emissions Intensity varies substantially 
between households means that there is value for this research in analysing 
greenhouse gas emissions, rather than taking a simpler approach of using expenditure 
as a proxy for the emissions of a household.  At the same time, the strong correlation 
between expenditure and emissions adds weight to the theoretical argument that 
changes in working patterns will predictably alter greenhouse gas emissions.  This is 
because the link between expenditure and emissions is one of the important 
assumptions underlying this hypothesis, which argues that: 
 Reduction in paid working time  Reduction in income  Reduction in 
expenditure  Reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
39
  
                                                 
39
 Where the arrows indicate the direction of the theorised relationship.  This argument was described 
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Figure 4.1 Scatter graph of UK household greenhouse gas emissions against expenditure, 
2004-5 





















NB.  Cases with emissions above 150,000kg CO2e per annum or expenditure above £200,000 per 
annum are excluded from the figure. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 4.2 Scatter graph of Dutch household greenhouse gas emissions against 
expenditure, 2000 




















NB.  Cases with emissions above 150,000kg CO2e per annum or expenditure above €100,000 per 
annum are excluded from the figure. 




How do patterns of emissions vary by demographic group? Working time policies 
generally do not (only) have a goal for the whole population, but rather target 
specific demographic groups with distinct goals.  Variables such as whether the 
occupants are a single or a couple, whether they have children, and their age band, 
determine what working time policies a household will be subject to, and how it 
might respond to them.  It is instructive, therefore, to divide the population along 
these lines to get an understanding of the contribution different groups make to 
national emissions.  Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 below do just that, and show total 
household emissions from the UK and Dutch populations, disaggregated by age and 
household type.  Household type contains four categories, defined by whether it is a 
couple or single household and whether there are dependent children (aged 0 to 17) 
present or not.   Note that these households may also include other household 
members (e.g. adult children still resident, parents of the head of household and 
partner, more distant relatives or unrelated residents).  Age refers to the age of the 




The figures show how different demographic groups contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions in the two countries.  This gives some indication of the importance of 
considering these emissions in the design of working time policies which target these 
different groups.  As an example, a policy which aims to increase the participation 
rate of single parents may, or may not, have a big effect on the social goal of 
reducing child poverty but, regardless, as this group’s total level of greenhouse 
emissions is small (as the figures show), it is unlikely to have a large impact on 
national greenhouse gas emissions.  As such, it could be argued that it is less 
important to consider this environmental effect in the design of such policies for 
single parents.  For other groups of the population, such as couple households, or 
older worker households, their total emissions are much larger and so arguably 
demand greater consideration in policy design. 
 
                                                 
40
 In couple households which are a same-sex couple, age also refers to that of the head of household. 
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Working time policies by definition affect only those households of working age 
(although they can, of course, alter what working age actually is, by changing the 
retirement age for example).  Based on current retirement ages, in the graphs below 
those of working age are approximately those in which the head of household is up to 
64 years of age.
41
 It can be seen that two groups most targeted by working time 
policies – households with children (via policies on parental leave and working time 
flexibility), and older worker (age 50 to 64) households (via retirement and other 
older worker employment policies) – constitute a large proportion of the total 
greenhouse gas emissions arising from working age households.  Working time 
policy could in theory therefore have a very large effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
  
                                                 
41
 For couple households, those where the male is aged 65 or over are still classed as working age in 
this thesis if the female is below retirement age (below 60 in UK, below 65 in the Netherlands).  As 
such, some households in the graphs in age bands 65 and over are of working age based on the 
definition used in this thesis. This only applies to a small percentage of the households and does not 




Figure 4.3 Total annual greenhouse gas emissions from UK households, by age and 
demographic group (household type), 2004-5 























Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 4.4 Total annual greenhouse gas emissions from Dutch households, by age and 
demographic group (household type), 2000 
























Table 4.4 provides further details of the contribution of different demographic groups 
to greenhouse gas emissions, and what shares of the population they represent.   
 
Working age households account for 82% (UK) and 88% (NL) of all household 
emissions, the large majority. In both countries, they also represent approximately 
60% of national emissions from all sources (i.e. including public sector and 
investment emissions too).   
 
Within working age households, the big demographic groups which working time 
policies tend to target represent a large share of total emissions, as the graphs above 
also indicated.  Households with children constitute about 45% of working age 
household emissions in both countries. Households containing at least one older 
worker (between 50 and official retirement age) out of the head of household and 
partner (if there is one) account for 39% (UK) and 32% (NL) of such emissions.  
Altering their working patterns, which current working time policies aim to do, could 
therefore have substantial effects on national total emissions.  On the other hand, as 
suggested earlier, single households with children account for just 5-6% of total 
emissions, so working time policies targeting this demographic group are unlikely to 
have a large effect on national emissions. 
 
Two other things are apparent from the table.  One is that the distributions of 
emissions and of the working age population between demographic groups are very 
similar between the two countries.  This aids with comparisons between them in 
subsequent chapters: as the baseline situation is so similar, certain demographic 
characteristics can be discounted when analysing the source of differences. 
 
The tables also show that the share of emissions from a particular demographic group 
matches quite closely the share of the working age population that it represents.  
Emissions are not so affected by the presence of dependents meanwhile – the 




Table 4.4 Greenhouse gas emissions data and population distributions for different demographic groups, for the UK (2004-5) and the Netherlands 
(2000) 
Demographic group 
Total emissions from all 
households (millions 
tonnes CO2e per year) 
Share of total national 
emissions from all 
sources 
Share of emissions from 
all working age 
households* 
Proportion of total 
number of working age 
households 
Proportion of all working 
age individuals in sample 






76% 66% - - - - 100% 100% 
Working age households 
All working age* 
households 





(88% of all 
household 
emissions) 
100% 100% 98% 100% 
 
Of which:         
All couple** households 450 122 49% 46% 79% 79% 67% 66% 76% 79% 
Couples with children 215 62 24% 23% 38% 40% 31% 31% 35% 38% 
Couples without children 235 60 26% 23% 41% 39% 36% 34% 41% 41% 
All single** households 117 33 13% 12% 21% 21% 33% 34% 22% 21% 
All single with children 37 7 4% 3% 6% 5% 9% 6% 6% 4% 
All single without children 80 25 9% 10% 14% 16% 24% 29% 16% 17% 
Older** households 220 49 24% 18% 39% 32% 36% 31% 37% 32% 
Older couple households 187 40 21% 15% 33% 26% 27% 22% 31% 26% 
Older single households 33 8 4% 3% 6% 5% 9% 9% 6% 6% 
* Working age households defined as: of the head of household and, if present, partner, at least one below official retirement age, signifying aged up to 64 for 
male, and aged up to 59 (UK) or 64 (Netherlands) for female. 
** Couple household: head of household lives with partner, and other individuals may also be resident in household. 
 Single household: head of household not living with partner, but other individuals may be resident in household.  
 Older household: at least one of head of household or, if present, partner, is of older working age (age between 50 and official retirement age). 
 
NB. Rounding may mean the sum of results in the table for different demographic groups do not match the totals for all working age households exactly. 
Source: Author’s own calculations; except total emissions from all households in UK/Netherlands, which are as per www.carbonfootprintofnations.com; see also 
Hertwich and Peters (2009).  See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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Table 4.5 below shows mean emissions per household and per capita, given for 
different demographic groups.  In both countries, mean emissions per household are 
substantially higher in couple as opposed to single households. However, if 
emissions per capita are looked at, it can be seen that per capita, emissions are 
actually quite unaffected by whether the household is a couple or single one.   
 
The effect of being an older household on overall and per capita emissions seems to 
be negligible. The effect of dependents meanwhile can be seen through comparison 
of households with and without children: households with children produce 
somewhat higher emissions, but taken per capita, households with children actually 
have much lower emissions than those without children.  Again, this is consistent 
with the presence of dependent children increasing the need to spend but not the 
ability to do so – when a household has a child, expenditure (and so emissions) per 
capita fall whilst the household’s total emissions remain similar, as total expenditure 





Table 4.5 Mean annual greenhouse gas emissions per household and per capita, and 
mean household sizes, in the UK (2004-5) and the Netherlands (2000), by demographic 
group 
 Mean emissions per 
household (tonnes 
CO2e per year) 
Mean emissions per 
capita (tonnes CO2e 
per year) 
Mean household size 
(all residents) 
Demographic group UK NL UK NL UK NL 
All households 
All households 20.2 29.1 9.3 12.8 2.387 2.274 
Working age households 
All working age* 
households 
22.6 31.2 8.4 12.6 2.700 2.466 
Of which:       
All couple** households 26.6 37.5 8.4 12.2 3.159 3.063 
Couples with children 27.5 39.9 6.8 9.8 4.056 4.054 
Couples without children 25.9 35.3 10.9 16.3 2.383 2.167 
All single** households 14.2 19.1 8.1 14.4 1.761 1.328 
All single with children 16.1 25.3 5.7 9.1 2.820 2.782 
All single without 
children 
13.5 17.9 10.0 17.1 1.354 1.042 
Older** households 24.4 31.6 10.2 15.6 2.383 2.031 
Older couple households 28.0 36.8 10.3 15.4 2.714 2.388 
Older single households 14.0 19.0 9.7 16.5 1.434 1.149 
* Working age households defined as: of the head of household and, if present, partner, at least 
one below official retirement age, signifying aged up to 64 for male, and aged up to 59 (UK) or 64 
(Netherlands) for female. 
** Couple household: head of household lives with partner, and other individuals may also be 
resident in household; single household: head of household not living with partner, but other 
individuals may be resident in household; older household: at least one of head of household or, if 
present, partner, is of older working age (age between 50 and official retirement age). 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Different demographic groups are likely to have differing opportunities, capabilities 
and indeed preferences for working time.  The implication for policy targeting is that 
certain groups may be harder to influence than others.  To identify, for example, 
couple households, or households with children, as the major source of national 
emissions is not to show that they are the ideal group to target with working time 
policy to achieve reductions in emissions.  The household’s situation is of 
importance for targeting.  As seen above, for example, households with children 
already have substantially lower emissions per capita (and consumption per capita) 





One other factor, aside from the presence of children, that is clearly likely to affect 
how household members respond to working time policy, is the household’s level of 
income.  The household’s current level of income will likely affect its preferences 
and capabilities to alter working hours, as this would have effects on their income.  
To look at this issue, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 present per capita emissions against 
equivalised income
42
 for different household sizes.  
 
The two figures show the results that would be expected: the higher the number of 
people in the household, the lower the emissions at any given equivalised level of per 
capita income.  In short, individuals in shared households reach the same level of 
material comfort with less consumption, and so lower greenhouse gas emissions.
43
 
This tentatively suggests that people in shared households might be more willing to 
reduce their working hours than those living singly, as they need less money to reach 
a certain level of material affluence. 
 
The level of (equivalised) income is also likely to be important, with higher income 
households more likely to feel able to reduce working time than lower income, and, 
conversely, lower income households more likely to wish to increase working time 
and/or labour market participation to earn more money, affecting their willingness to 
take up different types of opportunities offered by policies.  Policy to reduce working 
time might therefore be utilised more by higher income households.  This raises 
issues of justice on the one hand, as it presents the possibility of a new inequality in 
free time arising, with more affluent households better able to afford time out of paid 
work (Schor 1999:150–152).  On the other hand, high income households are also 
the high spending ones, and so the biggest source of greenhouse gas emissions: from 
the environmental perspective, this makes them a priority group to target to reduce 
their paid work, income, and consumption, if working time reduction policy is used 
to reduce consumption.  
  
                                                 
42
 Equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale described above in section 4.3.2.1. 
43
 Note that, due to UK and Dutch living patterns, households with one and two occupants are 
predominantly comprised, respectively, of single and couple households without children.  Higher 
household sizes are predominantly couple households with children.  The graphs therefore also show 




Figure 4.5 Total annual greenhouse gas emissions per person against equivalised annual 























Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 4.6 Total annual greenhouse gas emissions per person against equivalised annual 
























The UK and the Netherlands represent two highly suitable countries for testing some 
outstanding issues relating to the environmental benefits of working time reduction.  
The high level of variation in the current working patterns of the two populations, 
combined with suitable household expenditure survey and product greenhouse gas 
emissions intensity data, make them suitable for testing the hypothesis that 
differences in paid working hours affect household greenhouse gas emissions.  These 
data allow investigation of mean emissions per household, either for a sample 
representative of the national populations, or for particular demographic groups 
within the population.  These results, combined with data on total emissions from all 
households in the two countries, also allow investigation of the contribution to 
national emissions made by different demographic groups.  Whilst there are 
difficulties of reliability with the data used for several different reasons (low 
response rates, underreporting, measurement error, issues in principle with allocating 
greenhouse gas emissions to households, etc.), data are robust enough to inform a 
substantial body of existing literature, and in the absence of more reliable data, these 
issues must simply be kept in mind when analysing the research results. 
 
Households are a major source of national greenhouse gas emissions in both the UK 
and the Netherlands.  Household emissions are strongly related to their total 
expenditure, although variation in emissions at any given expenditure level 
(measured by the variable Household Emissions Intensity) is still substantial.  The 
implication is that working time policies, inasmuch as they actually manage to affect 
working time (and hence income, and hence expenditure), could have big 
environmental effects.  If working time policy were to be used to reduce working 
time in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, then which demographic groups to 
target would need to be considered: whilst households with children and older 
workers constitute the majority of greenhouse gas emissions among the working age 
population, the former group might be constrained from reducing working time and 
income by the higher financial demands of having dependent children to care for.  
High income households meanwhile are likely to be able to reduce their working 
time more easily than otherwise equivalent lower income households. As they also 
 
 156 
represent the bigger source of total emissions due to their higher consumption levels, 
this suggests they may be an ideal group to target with policies to encourage reduced 
working time.  There is a justice issue associated with such targeting however, as it 
could lead to increasing inequality in work life balance, with only those on higher 
wage rates able to afford more time outside of paid work. 
 
The effects of working time policy on greenhouse gas emissions is dependent on 
there being a predictable relationship between the working hours of household 
members and the household’s greenhouse gas emissions.  The presence of this 
relationship is the subject of the next chapter, which tests the hypothesis that 




Chapter 5 The greenhouse gas emissions of households in 
the UK and the Netherlands: the effects of 
working hours and earnings 
The measurement of the greenhouse gas emissions, and environmental impacts more 
generally, arising as a result of a household’s consumption patterns now has a well 
established methodology and body of literature, reviewed in chapter 3 (section 3.3).  
Household consumption, both in terms of the total expenditure and the types of 
product categories on which it spends that total, affect the household’s emissions, as 
different types of product lead to different amounts of greenhouse gas emissions per 
unit value in their production and distribution.  The methodology used in these 
studies allows the estimation of emissions from a sample of households 
representative of their national population, as it makes use of household expenditure 
survey data that is regularly collected in many countries.  The range of 
sociodemographic variables collected in such surveys also allows some of the 
determinants of a household’s emissions to be tested, and statistically significant 
correlates with emissions to be revealed.  To date however, no research has 
established the correlation between paid working time, the explanatory variable of 
interest in this research, and greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
This chapter tests this relationship, drawing on the model of the household developed 
in chapter 3 (section 3.5).  Formally, it tests the hypothesis that: 
 
Reductions in the paid working hours of household members will reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions arising from that household’s consumption 
 
(hypothesis 1, as described in chapter 3, section 3.1).  The main mechanism by which 
this effect occurs is through the effect reducing paid working time has in reducing 
income, in turn reducing expenditure/consumption, and so emissions.  The strength 
of this relationship is tested using household expenditure survey and product 
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emissions intensity data for the UK and the Netherlands, analysed using regression 
modelling. 
 
The first section of this chapter recaps the relevant theory and analytical framework 
that were presented in chapters 2 and 3.  Following this, the research design is 
presented, recapping on the data used, and describing the sample selection and 
statistical method used to test the hypothesis. The next sections present the results for 
the predictors of household greenhouse gas emissions, and then for the predictors of 
household expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity, the two other dependent 
variables which influence emissions.  The results in the body of the chapter focus on 
couple households (i.e. those in which the head of household lives with a partner and 
any number of other children and adults), as these contain the majority of the 
population and produce the majority of greenhouse gas emissions (see chapter 4, 
section 4.3.4).  Regression model results for single households are presented in 
Appendix 3: although not discussed in this chapter, they are used in the scenario 
modelling in chapters 6 and 7. A discussion of the results follows, before a summary 
of the chapter’s findings and their relevance to the thesis aims. 
5.1 Summary of theory and analytical framework 
Various authors have proposed working time reduction as a way to decrease levels of 
resource consumption in rich countries to help them become more environmentally 
sustainable (e.g. Jackson 2005a; Robinson 2006; Schor 1995; Speth et al. 2007).  
Chapter 2 discussed the literature on this proposal and the rationale behind it in detail 
(section 2.1).  In short, the proposal assumes a deterministic relationship between 
working time and environmental impacts: at the individual or household level, 
reduced working time leads, primarily through reduced income, to reduced 
expenditure (consumption), which in turn therefore requires fewer natural resources 
to be used and pollution to be generated, i.e. reduced environmental impacts. This 
chain of influence between working time and environmental impacts is supported by 
evidence, at least for the case of greenhouse gas emissions.  Working hours affect a 
person’s earned income (by definition in this thesis, working hours, along with gross 
hourly wage rate, fully determine gross earned income).  The influence of income on 
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expenditure is already well established in the literature (e.g. Phipps and Burton 
1998).  Chapter 4 meanwhile demonstrated that total expenditure by a household is a 
major determinant of its emissions (section 4.4).  However, the size of this effect of 
working time on household emissions is apparently untested to date, and addressing 
this gap is the origin of the research hypotheses of this thesis (presented in chapter 3, 
section 3.1). 
 
This chapter tests the first hypothesis of the thesis, as just described above.  The 
household model used to test this hypothesis was developed in chapter 3 (section 
3.5): with reference to the consumer behaviour literature, the relationship between 
working patterns and household greenhouse gas emissions was elaborated into a 
functional model of the household.  Figure 3.4 there presents the model graphically 
for couple households.  This was also expressed as an equation, which to recap is the 
following: 
 
G = a + b .Ym + c .Yf + i.Ai + e  
 
Where: G is total greenhouse gas emissions; Ym is male income; Yf is female
44
 
income; i is a set of i different other independent variables, Ai; a is a constant; b, 
c, and i are constant beta values; and e is an error term.   
 
The Analytical Framework also discussed that not just total expenditure, but also the 
mix of products a household spends this money on, can both affect emissions.  This 
is because different products and services lead to different levels of emissions per 
pound/euro spent on them, as the production methods and resources needed to 
produce each unit, and the unit market price, both vary.  Meat and meat products, air 
transport, direct heating and lighting of homes, and vehicle fuel, for example, all 
produce high levels of emissions per pound/euro spent on them, whilst many services 
have much lower emissions per pound/euro spent on them (see Analytical 
Framework, chapter 3).  As such, a change in the precise mix of goods and services 
bought by the household can significantly alter its emissions even if its total 
                                                 
44
 Where either the male or the female is the head of household, and the other is his/her partner. 
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monetary expenditure is unchanged.  In chapter 3, the variable Household Emissions 
Impact was developed to capture this effect, which is a measure of the average 
greenhouse gas emissions per pound/euro spent by a given household, calculated by 




Total household greenhouse gas emissions 
= Total household expenditure x Household Emissions Intensity 
 
Expenditure and HEI were both found in the Analytical Framework to be affected by 
similar predictor variables as for total greenhouse gas emissions.  Chapter 4 found 
them both to be significant contributors to variation in household emissions, although 
total expenditure is the most important predictor.  Both are thus also tested in this 
chapter to increase understanding of the mechanisms by which working patterns 
affect emissions, through affecting total expenditure and by altering the mix of 
products bought. 
5.2 Research design 
Chapter 4 described the case study locations (the UK and the Netherlands) and 
periods (2004-5, and 2000, respectively) selected for testing the research hypotheses, 
and the rationale for these choices.  The arguments in favour of working time 
reduction for environmental ends relate to high income countries, so the UK and the 
Netherlands are suitable in this respect.  The substantial variation in working time 
within their populations helps fit the model of household emissions such that it holds 
across a range of working conditions.  As countries to compare, they are interesting 
as there was in the period of study a great difference between the mean working 
hours of their populations, and also was and still is substantially different policy 
support for working time flexibility.  How the results are affected by these factors, 
and the implications for policy proposals based on the results, can be investigated to 
see how generalisable the research conclusions might be. 
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5.2.1 Data used 
The data used in this research, and its preparation for use, was described in the last 
chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.3).  Data from the 2004-5 UK Expenditure and Food 
Survey, and the 2000 Dutch budgetonderzoek are used, which provide nationally 
representative samples of the two country populations, and provide data on 
expenditure on different products by the households.  The survey data are combined 
with data on the greenhouse gas emissions arising per pound/euro spent on the same 
categories of product.  Combined, the data allow an estimate of the greenhouse gas 
emissions arising as a result of household consumption to be made for each 
household in the UK and Dutch datasets. 
5.2.2 Sample selection and sizes 
Households with at least one working age adult out of the head of household and 
partner (if present) are selected for analysis.  In the UK, retirement age in the study 
period was 65 for men, and 60 for women, so that households including a man aged 
64 or below and/or a woman aged 59 or below as the head of household or partner 
are included.  For the Netherlands, retirement age was and is 65 for both men and 
women, so that the sample selected is not strictly comparable to the UK sample. 
 
All other households, in which the head of household and partner (if present) are 
over retirement age are excluded from analysis.  Even if still in paid work, they have 
different work life balance opportunities afforded them by policy (i.e. retirement 
rights).  They were thus excluded from analyses as the principle aim is to consider 
the implications of results for working time policy for the majority of people that it 
will affect (i.e. those of working age). 
 
The resultant samples, weighted using the weighting variables in the datasets, are 
representative of UK and Dutch households in which the head of household or 
partner is of working age.  This is approximately equivalent to including all working 
age adults and their dependents, as there are few households in which both the head 
of household and partner are over retirement age but in which there is another adult 




In addition, for regressions performed for couple households, same-sex couples are 
excluded from the analyses, so that gender differences in effects of male and female 
working hours and incomes on the dependent variables can be calculated.  Same-sex 
couple households are included in other results, e.g. those showing mean household 
emissions data. 
5.2.3 Selecting an appropriate analytical method 
The household model being used to test the hypotheses in this chapter assumes linear 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables.  This would typically 
imply that a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression could be used to test the 
relationship between the variables.  In this case, this is problematic however, as one 
of the modelling assumptions of OLS regression, that values for the dependent 
variable are normally distributed, is violated: distributions of the dependent variables 
greenhouse gas emissions, and total expenditure, are both highly skewed, especially 
in the UK dataset.  Violating this assumption is not necessarily problematic for the 
robustness of the results, but in this case, when simple OLS regressions were 
performed, diagnostic tests of the results showed that there were problems.
45
  Whilst 
this would not affect the validity of the beta values and model fit (adjusted R
2
) 
reported by simple OLS regression, it means that the calculated confidence intervals 
for the beta values, and hence statistical significance of correlations between 
variables, are overestimated (that is, results are less significant than reported).   
 
Bootstrap analysis was used in this chapter to address these issues.
46
  Bootstrap 
analysis is a statistical approach to calculating confidence intervals and other model 
                                                 
45
 The diagnostic tests used were: analysing the distribution of the regression residuals (the error term 
values), which should be normally distributed but were not; and various tests which revealed outlying 
cases in the residual terms (i.e. highly inaccurate estimates of the values of the dependent variable in 
some cases) as revealed by expected and actual residuals plots, Mahalanobis distances, leverage 
statistics, and Cook’s distances. See de Vaus  (2002:93–95) for detailed descriptions of these tests. 
46
 Often when a variable is not normally distributed the log of it, or some other power, which is 
normally distributed, is used instead in the simple OLS regression.  However, this would not be 
appropriate in this situation as taking the natural log of these dependent variables would alter the 
model so that it does not represent the theorised relationships between the variables, i.e. the model 
theorises that greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure are both proportional to income, not to the 
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parameters which can be used on nonparametric data, i.e. where the pattern of 
distribution of the variables does not follow a simple distribution such as a normal 
one, as is the case for the data being analysed here (Bollen and Stine 1990:118).  The 
approach uses substantial computing power to produce statistically significant results 
with the minimum of theoretical modelling assumptions (Efron and Gong 
1983:36,47).  The approach calculates a model’s confidence intervals using many 
different subsamples of the data being used (1500 subsamples are used in this 
research), and produces results of similar or better accuracy than other valid 
approaches, with less dependence on sometimes untestable assumptions about the 
distribution of the data, and often less effort (Bollen and Stine 1990:118; Efron and 
Tibshirani 1986:57).  For a sample size n, each subsample also has n cases, but each 
case is selected into the subsample a random number of times (so that some are not 
included, whilst others are included 2 or more times) (Efron and Gong 1983:37).  
The results of the analyses of all the subsamples are then automatically compared: 
beta values, confidence intervals and model fit will vary marginally for each, but as 
the number of subsamples increases, the variation in the values for each of these 
variables will converge on what they should actually be.  Beta values and model fit 
results will be unchanged from those reported by a simple OLS regression, but the 
difference is that the confidence intervals reported for the beta values will be closer 
to the correct values despite the non-normal distribution of the dependent variables.  
Confidence intervals will usually be wider than reported by simple OLS regression, 
that is, the results are less likely, but more accurately, to be reported as statistically 
significant.   
 
The working hours and income variables are also non-normally distributed in the 
datasets, having high numbers of zero values and several extreme outlier cases.  
Whilst this should in theory not matter for the robustness of results even if simple 
OLS regression were being used, the use of bootstrap analysis is preferable as this 
method also addresses the potential problems of multivariate non-normality which 
this could result in. 
                                                                                                                                          
exponential of income.  An alternative, equally appropriate, approach, used by Phipps and Burton 
(1998) for example, would be to use White’s procedure (White 1980).  
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5.2.4 Differences in the predictor variables between the UK and the 
Netherlands 
There are two differences in the predictor variables available between the UK and 
Dutch datasets, as detailed in chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.4.  The first 
difference relates to the income variables.  Aside from male and female earned 
incomes (in couple households) and head of household earned income (in single 
households), all other sources of income are also included in regressions.  In the 
Netherlands, data limitations mean that these other sources are all included in one 
variable.  In the UK model by contrast, they are further subdivided into the following 
components: 
 Male private non-earned income from investments, pensions and other 
sources 
 Female private non-earned income from investments, pensions and other 
sources 
 Male income from Social Security benefits 
 Female income from Social Security benefits 
 Income from sources other than the male and female heads of household 
 
The second difference is that the variable “geographic region” is not present in the 
Dutch dataset so is not included in regressions for the Netherlands.   
5.2.5 Details of fitting the models 
For each country, for both working age single and couple households, and for each 
dependent variable in turn, simple OLS regression analyses are initially performed 
using SPSS version 14 to diagnose the models.   
 
Following Glynn (2004), appropriate weights are calculated and used in analyses for 
any subsample of the full survey sample of households being used. To do this, the 
weight variables in the dataset are adjusted to be appropriate for the subsample being 
analysed: for each sample or subsample the mean value of the weight should be 1 




Producing the final regression models is an iterative process in which variables 
hypothesised to be significant predictors of the dependent variable may be dropped 
from the model for two principle reasons: either they are found to not contribute 
significantly to model fit, i.e. do not increase adjusted R
2
 by a statistically significant 
amount; or they have excessively high multicollinearity, that is, they are overly 
correlated with one or more of the other predictor variables such that the variables 
are not really independent of each another (Tacq 1997:162).  In SPSS, the 
contribution to model fit is reported so that those variables not adding to it 
statistically significantly can be identified, whilst high multicollinearity between 
predictor variables can also be detected based on Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) 
results, which test for this (de Vaus 2002:345): values over 10 are generally 
considered too high, and this was the threshold used in this research to determine 
which variables to exclude from the models. 
 
The initial model, including all the independent variables that may be significant, is 
run separately for each of the dependent variables, and for single and couple 
households.  There are various approaches to determining the order in which the 
independent variables are added and removed from a regression model to produce a 
final model to be used for predictive purposes.  The final choice is based on what is 
“best” for the research in question, but there is no clear way to determine the 
meaning of “best”, and different methods of variable selection lead to different 
outcomes (Pedhazur 1997:211–225).  Variables were added in to the model using the 
blockwise approach with stepwise selection, that is, several OLS regressions are run 
with more of the variables added each time in “blocks”, each block consisting of one 
or more independent variables, as described by Pedhazur (1997:227–30).  The 
variables theoretically most important to the study, i.e. male and female working 
hours, and male and female earned incomes, are entered into the model first.  
Following these, other income sources are added in this order: variables for the 
number of adults and children in the household; number of rooms occupied (a 
dummy variable); number of persons economically active; male age; male education 
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level dummy variables; household class dummies; and, for the UK, geographic 
region dummies.   
 
Model diagnostics are used to see if any variables should be removed from the 
model.  In all the models, the house size (number of rooms) dummy variables have 
extremely high VIF values (between 25 and 60), and so are removed.  The only other 
variable that is removed is number of people economically active.  This variable has 
a high VIF value only in some models, but in no model is it a statistically significant 
explanatory variable, and in almost no model does it add significantly to the model’s 
explanatory power (adjusted R
2
) once other variables are included.  Although it could 
be argued that it could still be left in the model, it is removed, as it would also 
present additional issues in the scenario modelling to follow (as it is partly dependent 
on the working hours of the male and female). 
 
As all other variables added significantly to model fit in the order in which they were 
added, they are left in.   
 
The final model for each of the dependent variables is thus as presented in the path 
model in chapter 3, Figure 3.4, with the removal of the house size and the number of 
people economically active variables.   
 
Once the final model was determined using SPSS (i.e. once the variables to include 
were determined), the final calculation of the model confidence intervals using 
bootstrap analysis was performed in Stata version IC 11.0 for Windows (32 bit).  It 
was not appropriate to use the Stata command bootstrap as this is unable to include a 
weighting variable that is required.  Instead, the open source modules bsweights (see 
Kolenikov 2008) and bs4rw (see Pitblado n.d.) are used.  Kolenikov (2010) gives 
details of the use of these commands.
47
  1500 replications of the analysis were run to 
calculate the confidence intervals.  The bsweights module calculates weights to be 
included in the analysis: weights must be recalculated for each of the replications of 
                                                 
47
 Bootstrap analysis options were updated with Stata release 11.1: the variance estimation methods 
introduced in this version are equivalent to the ones used in this research, only the syntax differs (see 
editor’s comments in Kolenikov 2010). 
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the analysis to take account of the cases omitted in each replication.  As no variables 
are included in the datasets to allow account to be taken of the cluster sampling in the 
surveys, a simple random sample had to be assumed.  The effect of this on results in 
the research is generally small (ONS 2006c:175–6).  The weight estimates were 
balanced (see Graham et al. 1990 for an explanation of balancing bootstrap weights).  
Once weights are calculated, regressions are run using the new weights and the 
bs4rw command. 
 
The outputs of this process are, for each model, estimates of the model fit (adjusted 
R
2
) and, for each independent variable, beta coefficients and estimates of the 95% 
confidence intervals.  Where the upper and lower values of the 95% confidence 
intervals are both of the same sign (both positive or both negative), then there is a 
statistically significant correlation (at the 5% level) between the dependent and 
independent variables in question.  The final model results are presented and 
discussed in the results sections which follow. 
5.2.6 Robustness testing 
Regressions were also performed using categorical variables instead of continuous 
variables for working hours.  This was to assess the impact on results of the issues 
with the working hours variables described earlier, i.e. the non-normal distribution 
due to high numbers of cases working zero hours, as well as the coding in the Dutch 
dataset of all those working 12 hours or less per week as 0, meaning the variable is 
not truly continuous.
48
  Boundaries for the categories are presented in Table 5.1 
below. 
 
Results using the continuous and categorical variables were similar for both 
countries, in terms of model fit and the beta values of the other independent 
variables.
49
  This indicates that using the continuous variables, despite their 
                                                 
48
 In the majority of cases in the Dutch data, working hours are coded as 0 because the individual 
works 0 hours, but among households selected for analysis, 3.5% of males and 13% of females have 
working hours coded as 0 but have earned income greater than 0, indicating that they are in fact 
working. 
49
 Results for the regressions using the categorical variables are not presented in the thesis. 
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limitations, is valid and produces robust results.  This is important as it is the 
continuous variables that are adjusted to simulate different scenarios of changes to 
working patterns in the subsequent results chapters.  Estimates of their effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions, as calculated in the regression models, need to be accurate 
therefore. 
 
Table 5.1 Categories of working hours used in UK and Dutch regression analyses 
UK Netherlands 
0 hours* 0 to 12* 
0.1 to 12  
Both 
12.1 to 24 
24.1 to 35 
35.1 to 42 
42.1 to 48 
48.1 to 56 
56.1+ 
* Used as the reference value for dummy variables representing these categories. 
5.3 Results 
The results presented in the following sections focus on working age households, as 
these are the target of working time policies.  Working age households are taken to 
be households in which at least one of the head of household or their partner (if 
present) is of working age (in the UK, below 65 for men, and below 60 for women; 
in the Netherlands, below 65 for men and women).  Some initial descriptive statistics 
are followed by regression models, presenting how each of the three dependent 
variables, greenhouse gas emissions, expenditure, and Household Emissions 
Intensity are correlated with working time and the other independent variables, 
following the model developed and presented in chapter 3. 
Variation in household greenhouse gas emissions, expenditure, and Household 
Emissions Intensity with income: Descriptive statistics Some initial descriptive 
statistics serve to indicate the relationship between household income and 
greenhouse gas emissions, expenditure, and Household Emissions Intensity.  For UK 
and Dutch working age households, the data
50
 indicate that household emissions 
increase with income (see Figure 5.1).  This is as would be expected: household 
                                                 
50
 Data as discussed in the research design section above. 
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emissions increase with expenditure (see chapter 4), and expenditure also increases 
with income (Figure 5.2, and, for example, Phipps and Burton 1998).   
 
In contrast, Household Emissions Intensity
51
 (HEI) can be seen to fall slightly with 
income (Figure 5.3). The fact that HEI falls with income indicates that households 
with higher incomes spend a greater proportion of their total expenditure on products 
with lower emissions intensities (greenhouse gas emissions per pound or euro spent 
on them), than do households with lower income, consistent with other research 
(Biesiot and Noorman 1999:374; Moll et al. 2005:269).  This indicates that a 
household’s greenhouse gas emissions do not rise as rapidly as increases in 
expenditure: a doubling in expenditure leads to less than a doubling in emissions, so 
that the elasticity is less than 1. 
 
The figures also suggest that households in which the head of household lives 
without a partner and without children have lower emissions for a given income than 
do other household types, primarily down to lower expenditure rather than lower 
HEI. 
 
Such figures can only suggest at relationships between variables however.  
Regression analysis is required to reveal which relationships are significant 
controlling for other variables, and the strength of such relationships.  The next 
sections present the results of regressions on the dependent variables for the two 
countries. 
  
                                                 
51
 The measure of household emissions per unit expenditure, which is affected by the precise share of 




Figure 5.1 Total annual greenhouse gas emissions against gross annual household 
income, by demographic group, for working age households in the UK and the 
Netherlands 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 5.2 Total annual expenditure against gross annual household income, by 
demographic group, for working age households in the UK and the Netherlands 
 





Figure 5.3 Household Emissions Intensity against gross annual household income, by 
demographic group, for working age households in the UK and the Netherlands 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
5.3.1 Predictors of household greenhouse gas emissions 
This section presents results of the bootstrap regression analyses used to calculate the 
relationship between working time and greenhouse gas emissions for working age 
households.  Section 5.3.1.1 presents results for the UK, while 5.3.1.2 presents 
results for the Netherlands.
52
  The following two chapters use the regression results 
presented here to estimate the changes in household greenhouse gas emissions that 
would occur if different policy outcomes of altered working patterns were achieved. 
 
The results presented are for households in which the head of household lives with 
their partner (“couple households”).  These households represent the living 
arrangement for the majority of adults in both countries, and such households are the 
source of the majority of greenhouse gas emissions from consumption (see chapter 
4).
53
  As the primary research interest is in the effect of working patterns on 
                                                 
52
 Only the final models are presented, which exclude certain variables as described earlier in the 
chapter. 
53
 Results for single households are presented in Appendix 3. They are used in the scenario modelling 
in the next two chapters but are not discussed further here. 
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emissions, only working age households are included.  Only the effect of working 
hours of the head of household and partner are considered.  The presence and income 
of other household members are controlled for, but their working patterns are not 
included as to do so would greatly increase the complexity of the model.
54
  Finally, 
only households in which the head of household and their partner are of the opposite 
sex are included. This enables gender differences in the effect of their separate 
incomes and working patterns to be modelled. 
 
Note that, in the tables of results presented, the unstandardised beta coefficients 
represent the extra kilograms of CO2e emissions arising per year from a household 
per unit increase (or decrease for negative coefficients) in the predictor variable. As 
the units of the predictor variables vary, as do the strengths of their correlations with 
greenhouse gas emissions, then the magnitudes of the beta values vary substantially 
between variables too. 
5.3.1.1 Results for the UK 
The regression model for household greenhouse gas emissions for UK working age 
households is presented in Table 5.2 below.  The model has a high level of fit, 




The results indicate that male and female working hours have no statistically 
significant direct correlation with greenhouse gas emissions in the UK.  Earned 
income meanwhile has a significant impact on emissions, as would be expected: 
household emissions increase by 0.20kg CO2e per pound of earned income, and there 
is little difference whether the male or female earns it.  Non-earned income sources 
meanwhile have a much higher impact per pound spent than earned income (of those 
with a statistically significant effect on emissions): 0.45kg CO2e per pound for male 
private non-earned income, and 0.31kg CO2e per pound of female benefits. This 
could be due to differences in the propensity to spend or save the different sources of 
                                                 
54
 In the majority of cases, such additional working age adults are either adult children of the head of 
household and partner, still in full time education, or dependent parents of the head of household and 
partner, so not in work. 
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income, or also differences in the types of goods and services bought with the 
different sources. 
 
Other results follow what would be expected from theory.  The number of 
individuals in the household correlates with emissions even controlling for income: 
each adult over and above the two that comprise the heads of household (which may 
be adult children, other relatives, or unrelated) increases emissions by nearly 2,800kg 
CO2e per year, and each older child by 2,200kg.  This is a feasible result, as the 
number of individuals increases the need to spend regardless of household income, 
and likely also leads to changes in the types of goods and services bought. 
 
Of the other control variables, household age
55
 increases emissions, by 192kg CO2e 
per annum per year of age.  Highest educational attainment has no statistically 
significant effect on emissions, controlling for income.  Class variables present an 
unclear picture: the variables suggest that emissions from higher professional classes 
and small employers are higher than the reference of routine workers, but other 
classes have no significant effect.  Finally, geographic region indicates that 
households in regions other than the reference category (London) tend to have higher 
emissions, in the order of several thousand kilograms CO2e per year. 
  
                                                 
55
 Household age and highest educational attainment are represented by the male characteristics in the 
models for both countries, as there is high correlation between the male and female values of both: see 




Table 5.2 Regression estimates for household total annual greenhouse gas emissions, for 
UK working age couple households 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.313 
Weighted, n= 3,289 (of which 1 case excluded due to missing data) 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
26,615 kg CO2e per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per annum 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) -5044.66 3928.90 -12745.16 2655.84 
Variables regarding head of household & partner: 
Male usual weekly hours (inc overtime), for 
employed or self employed 
-3.87 34.79 -72.06 64.33 
Female usual weekly hours (inc overtime), 
for employed or self employed 
1.82 31.54 -60.00 63.63 
Male gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, £ 
0.20 0.06 0.09 0.32 
Female gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, £ 
0.20 0.05 0.10 0.30 
Male gross annual private non-earned 
income from investments, pensions and 
other, £ 
0.45 0.06 0.34 0.57 
Female gross annual private non-earned 
income from investments, pensions and 
other, £ 
0.14 0.13 -0.13 0.40 
Male gross annual income from Social 
Security benefits, £ 
-0.05 0.11 -0.26 0.15 
Female gross annual income from Social 
Security benefits, £ 
0.31 0.14 0.04 0.58 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household and 
partner, £ 
0.22 0.07 0.09 0.35 
Number of adults 2765.91 839.54 1120.45 4411.38 
Number of children - age under 2 1440.01 805.36 -138.48 3018.49 
Number of children - age 2 and under 5 642.27 685.54 -701.38 1985.91 
Number of children - age 5 and under 18 2198.11 328.66 1553.94 2842.28 
 




Table 5.2 continued. 
 Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per annum 




      B Std. Error 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 191.55 24.99 142.57 240.53 
Age male left full time education 109.27 140.95 -166.99 385.53 
Household class: 
(Reference value: routine worker) 
    
Higher Professionals 3259.17 1558.85 203.89 6314.45 
Intermediate -639.49 990.36 -2580.56 1301.59 
Large Employers & Higher Managerial 4237.87 2012.40 293.63 8182.11 
Lower Managerial & Professionals 3446.07 1014.26 1458.15 5433.98 
Lower Supervisory & Technical 535.49 890.59 -1210.04 2281.02 
Never Worked and Long-Term Unemployed -2018.40 1577.44 -5110.13 1073.33 
Semi-Routine 415.84 926.29 -1399.66 2231.33 
Small Employers and Own Account Workers 3834.97 1085.67 1707.10 5962.84 
Students -2080.03 3734.39 -9399.30 5239.25 
Not classifiable for other reasons -817.29 1190.35 -3150.33 1515.75 
Occupation not stated 1043.80 2888.87 -4618.27 6705.88 
Government region of residence: 
(Reference value: London) 
    
Eastern 1656.11 1153.72 -605.13 3917.36 
East Midlands 2204.36 1156.56 -62.46 4471.17 
Northern Ireland 6311.06 1291.42 3779.93 8842.20 
North East 2884.91 1339.60 259.34 5510.47 
North West and Merseyside 3097.02 1121.94 898.06 5295.98 
Scotland 2257.20 1113.44 74.90 4439.50 
South East 1494.39 1139.96 -739.89 3728.67 
South West 2716.15 1065.56 627.70 4804.60 
Wales 1005.64 1060.31 -1072.53 3083.81 
West Midlands 1114.17 1097.50 -1036.89 3265.23 
Yorkshire and the Humber 3849.05 1241.63 1415.49 6282.61 
 
5.3.1.2 Results for the Netherlands 
Table 5.3 below presents the regression results for Dutch working age households.  







In contrast to the UK data, there is a significant positive
56
 correlation of both male 
and female working hours with emissions, even controlling for earned income, of 
64kg CO2e per year per hour worked each week for women, and 106kg for men. 
 
As with the UK, the results show little difference in the impact on emissions of 
earned income from the male and the female: both lead to very similar increases in 
household emissions, of around 0.32-0.34kg per euro.  Unlike the UK results, income 
sources other than wages have lower impacts than earned income in the Netherlands.   
 
As in the UK, emissions increase with the number of individuals in the household, 
even controlling for income: each adult additional to the head of household and 
partner increases emissions by about 3,100kg, and each older child by 2,600kg.  The 
effect of younger children is also statistically significant in the Netherlands (unlike in 
the UK): a baby aged 0 to 1 leads to about 1,300kg of extra emissions per year, and a 
child aged 2 to 5 to nearly 3,000kg per year. 
 
Household age increases emissions by almost 180kg CO2e per annum per year of age, 
very similar to the UK.  Highest educational attainment has a statistically significant 
effect too, unlike in the UK data, with emissions being higher the higher the 
education level.  The effect in the Netherlands is surprisingly large, with the highest 
educational attainment increasing emissions by 7,000kg per annum compared to the 
reference value of no educational qualifications.  These effects are likely countered 
by the class variables, which compared to the reference value of not working are 
negative to a similar magnitude, reducing emissions by between 4,600 and 8,200kg 
per annum, the effect being larger the higher the class. 
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 The terms positive and negative in the context of the models are used to signify that the independent 
variable and dependent variable positively or negatively correlate, rather than to indicate that the 
impact on emissions is positive or negative in the sense of a normative assessment of the effect it has 
on the environment. Hence a positive effect on the dependent variable (in this case, greenhouse gas 






Table 5.3 Regression estimates for household total annual greenhouse gas emissions,  
for Dutch working age couple households 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.452 
Weighted, n= 1,626 (of which 17 cases excluded due to missing data) 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
37,510 kg CO2e per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per annum 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 2946.24 2199.65 -1365.00 7257.48 
Variables regarding head of household & partner: 
Male usual weekly hours 105.59 24.02 58.52 152.67 
Female usual weekly hours 63.77 28.48 7.96 119.58 
Male gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, € 
0.34 0.04 0.27 0.41 
Female gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, € 
0.32 0.05 0.23 0.41 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household and 
partner’s earned income, € 
0.21 0.03 0.15 0.27 
Number of adults 3099.27 711.62 1704.51 4494.03 
Number of children - age under 2 1275.84 552.39 193.17 2358.51 
Number of children - aged 2 and under 5 2964.74 530.18 1925.61 4003.88 
Number of children - aged 5 and under 18 2607.70 257.00 2103.99 3111.40 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 177.76 28.30 122.29 233.23 
Male education level: 
(Reference value: no educational 
qualifications) 
    
Highest educational attainment: level 3 1801.98 914.60 9.39 3594.57 
Highest educational attainment: level 4 3478.68 881.08 1751.79 5205.56 
Highest educational attainment: level 5 6575.69 1096.30 4426.98 8724.41 
Highest educational attainment: level 6 7025.26 1499.21 4086.87 9963.66 
Highest educational attainment: unknown 6056.29 2886.93 398.00 11714.57 
Household class: 
(Reference value: unemployed) 
    
Elementary -5591.72 1558.16 -8645.66 -2537.78 
Lower -4596.47 1417.09 -7373.92 -1819.02 
Middle -5508.56 1420.52 -8292.73 -2724.39 
Higher -8199.45 1599.55 -11334.51 -5064.39 
Academic -8709.77 2190.70 -13003.46 -4416.07 
Unknown -8332.34 4850.89 -17839.90 1175.22 
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5.3.2 Predictors of household expenditure and Household Emissions 
Intensity 
The models above conflate the two effects on total emissions of changes in total 
expenditure and in what is bought, into the one dependent variable. 
 
The two independent effects are represented by total expenditure and by Household 
Emissions Intensity (HEI) respectively, where:  
 
Total household greenhouse gas emissions 
 = total household expenditure x Household Emissions Intensity 
 
The independent variables act on these variables in different ways, as the graphs at 
the start of the previous section suggest.  Understanding the predictors of household 
expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity separately gives a better indication 
of how total emissions are affected by the independent variables, useful for 
considering how changes in working patterns might affect emissions.   
 
The next two subsections below show these regression results, first for the UK, then 
for the Netherlands.  Again, households are taken in which there is a partner of the 
opposite sex living with the head of household, at least one of which is of working 




The results indicate how the two factors interact to lead to the relationship already 
presented above between the independent variables and total greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
5.3.2.1 Results for the UK 
Starting with the UK, Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 below show the regression results for 
models of annual household expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity, 
respectively.  Working hours have a significant (negative) correlation with HEI, but 
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 Regressions results for single households are presented in Appendix 3 for the dependent variable 
expenditure, as these results are used in the scenario modelling in the following two chapters. 
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not with expenditure, which translates into no overall significant correlation with 
total emissions.  With the exception of female income from benefits, the same 
income variables that correlate with increased emissions also correlate with increased 
expenditure. Other sources of income have no statistically significant effect on HEI 
(at the 5% level).  There are differences in the strengths of correlation between male 
and female income variables on the dependent variables, but in no cases are these 
differences statistically significant, so no conclusions can be drawn about the gender 
differences in effects. 
 
The number of adults and of children (except those aged 2 to 5 years) in UK 
households substantially increase expenditure independent of income.  Babies and 
toddlers (aged under 2) are the only ones which significantly alter HEI, reducing it 
substantially, suggesting a substantial change in spending patterns.  Regarding male 
age, the substantial increase in total emissions observed per year of age can be seen 
to result from increases in HEI rather than in expenditure, hence this is the result in 
differences in what is bought with age (or cohort), with a shift to higher emissions 
intensity products with age.  The correlation of certain occupations with increased 
emissions compared to the reference category of routine worker is explainable by 
corresponding increases in expenditure, rather than HEI, whilst for geographic 
regions, the higher impacts of many regions compared to the reference category 






Table 5.4 Regression estimates for total annual household expenditure, for UK working 
age couple households 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.328 
Weighted, n= 3,289 (of which 1 case excluded due to missing data) 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 




Unit: £ per annum per 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 3809.445 6258.578 -8457.142 16076.03 
Variables regarding head of household & partner: 
Male usual weekly hours (inc overtime), for 
employed or self employed 
-42.32 68.22 -176.03 91.38 
Female usual weekly hours (inc overtime), 
for employed or self employed 
-25.98 54.83 -133.44 81.49 
Male gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, £ 
0.34 0.10 0.14 0.53 
Female gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, £ 
0.51 0.13 0.25 0.77 
Male gross annual private non-earned 
income from investments, pensions and 
other, £ 
0.56 0.11 0.34 0.78 
Female gross annual private non-earned 
income from investments, pensions and 
other, £ 
0.37 0.25 -0.13 0.86 
Male gross annual income from Social 
Security benefits, £ 
-0.15 0.19 -0.51 0.22 
Female gross annual income from Social 
Security benefits, £ 
0.22 0.18 -0.13 0.57 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household and 
partner, £ 
0.31 0.09 0.13 0.49 
Number of adults 2616.22 1065.04 528.78 4703.66 
Number of children - age under 2 3362.44 1180.96 1047.80 5677.09 
Number of children - age 2 and under 5 1489.22 982.52 -436.49 3414.94 
Number of children - age 5 and under 18 3325.77 625.53 2099.75 4551.78 
 




Table 5.4 continued. 
Mean value of dependent variable: 




Unit: £ per annum per 




      B Std. Error 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 44.04 40.17 -34.69 122.78 
Age male left full time education 207.52 229.76 -242.81 657.84 
Household class: 
(Reference value: routine worker) 
    
Higher Professionals 3762.46 2494.11 -1125.91 8650.82 
Intermediate -1746.47 1466.83 -4621.41 1128.47 
Large Employers & Higher Managerial 8719.67 3931.88 1013.32 16426.02 
Lower Managerial & Professionals 3872.77 1638.44 661.49 7084.05 
Lower Supervisory & Technical -422.58 1168.77 -2713.34 1868.17 
Never Worked and Long-Term Unemployed -3542.91 2135.93 -7729.25 643.43 
Semi-Routine -618.21 1206.18 -2982.28 1745.86 
Small Employers and Own Account Workers 5165.31 1583.19 2062.31 8268.31 
Students -2241.81 4813.50 -11676.09 7192.47 
Not classifiable for other reasons -404.59 1844.29 -4019.34 3210.15 
Occupation not stated -368.39 3552.00 -7330.18 6593.39 
Government region of residence: 
(Reference value: London) 
    
Eastern 2333.42 2962.26 -3472.51 8139.35 
East Midlands 417.25 1870.22 -3248.31 4082.82 
Northern Ireland 31.15 1710.56 -3321.49 3383.79 
North East 765.27 1964.61 -3085.29 4615.84 
North West and Merseyside 1160.54 1702.37 -2176.06 4497.12 
Scotland -967.90 1663.67 -4228.63 2292.84 
South East 759.63 1757.54 -2685.09 4204.35 
South West 1494.53 1761.57 -1958.08 4947.15 
Wales -2749.82 1693.95 -6069.91 570.26 
West Midlands -987.22 1787.95 -4491.54 2517.09 










 = 0.261 
Weighted, n= 3,289 (of which 1 case excluded due to missing data) 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
0.799 kg CO2e per £ 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per £ per 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 0.614 0.041 0.534 0.694 
Variables regarding head of household & partner: 
Male usual weekly hours (inc overtime), for 
employed or self employed 
-6.10E-04 2.76E-04 -1.15E-03 -6.85E-05 
Female usual weekly hours (inc overtime), 
for employed or self employed 
-1.04E-03 3.03E-04 -1.64E-03 -4.48E-04 
Male gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, £ 
-6.95E-07 2.28E-07 -1.14E-06 -2.48E-07 
Female gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, £ 
-1.54E-06 3.77E-07 -2.28E-06 -8.06E-07 
Male gross annual private non-earned 
income from investments, pensions and 
other, £ 
-1.18E-06 6.10E-07 -2.38E-06 1.31E-08 
Female gross annual private non-earned 
income from investments, pensions and 
other, £ 
-4.22E-07 1.58E-06 -3.52E-06 2.68E-06 
Male gross annual income from Social 
Security benefits, £ 
1.85E-06 2.13E-06 -2.33E-06 6.03E-06 
Female gross annual income from Social 
Security benefits, £ 
2.89E-06 1.85E-06 -7.43E-07 6.52E-06 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household and 
partner, £ 
-8.08E-07 6.94E-07 -2.17E-06 5.52E-07 
Number of adults 0.006 0.010 -0.013 0.025 
Number of children - age under 2 -0.025 0.011 -0.046 -3.25E-03 
Number of children - age 2 and under 5 -0.014 0.009 -0.031 3.25E-03 
Number of children - age 5 and under 18 -4.02E-03 3.97E-03 -1.18E-02 3.76E-03 
 




Table 5.5 continued. 
 Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per £ per 




      B Std. Error 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 5.86E-03 3.91E-04 5.09E-03 6.63E-03 
Age male left full time education -2.33E-03 1.11E-03 -4.50E-03 -1.61E-04 
Household class: 
(Reference value: routine worker) 
    
Higher Professionals -0.014 0.016 -0.044 0.017 
Intermediate -3.22E-03 0.017 -0.037 0.031 
Large Employers & Higher Managerial -0.045 0.017 -0.079 -0.011 
Lower Managerial & Professionals -0.019 0.013 -0.044 6.36E-03 
Lower Supervisory & Technical 0.014 0.015 -0.015 0.042 
Never Worked and Long-Term Unemployed 0.020 0.038 -0.055 0.094 
Semi-Routine 0.043 0.016 0.011 0.075 
Small Employers and Own Account Workers -6.07E-03 0.015 -0.036 0.024 
Students -0.054 0.039 -0.131 0.023 
Not classifiable for other reasons -7.62E-03 0.020 -0.047 0.032 
Occupation not stated -4.73E-04 0.050 -0.098 0.098 
Government region of residence: 
(Reference value: London) 
    
Eastern 0.016 0.015 -0.014 0.046 
East Midlands 0.049 0.016 0.018 0.080 
Northern Ireland 0.174 0.019 0.137 0.211 
North East 0.059 0.021 0.018 0.100 
North West and Merseyside 0.049 0.015 0.020 0.078 
Scotland 0.071 0.016 0.040 0.103 
South East 0.009 0.014 -0.019 0.037 
South West 0.028 0.016 -3.37E-03 0.058 
Wales 0.095 0.018 0.060 0.130 
West Midlands 0.060 0.016 0.028 0.092 




5.3.2.2 Results for the Netherlands 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 below show the regression results for the same two 
dependent variables, household expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity, for 
the Netherlands.   
 
For the Netherlands, all independent variables contributed significantly to the model 
for total greenhouse gas emissions, and all except the class variables had a positive 
correlation.  Changes in expenditure explain much of this result, as can be seen from 
the model for the dependent variable expenditure in Table 5.6, which is similar to 
that for total emissions: all independent variables, with the exception of children 
aged under 2, contribute significantly to the model, and the direction and relative 
sizes of the coefficients generally follow proportionally those for total emissions.  
Variation in HEI does still have a significant effect on total emissions in the 
Netherlands too, falling with income and higher education levels, and increasing with 





Table 5.6 Regression estimates for total annual household expenditure, for Dutch 
working age couple households 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.499 
Weighted, n= 1,626 (of which 17 cases excluded due to missing data) 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
€31,440 per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: € per annum per 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 3489.87 1865.11 -165.67 7145.42 
Variables regarding head of household & partner: 
Male usual weekly hours 87.01 20.79 46.26 127.76 
Female usual weekly hours 68.84 23.58 22.62 115.06 
Male gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, € 
0.37 0.04 0.29 0.45 
Female gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, € 
0.32 0.04 0.25 0.40 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household and 
partner’s earned income, € 
0.23 0.03 0.17 0.29 
Number of adults 1709.61 624.44 485.73 2933.49 
Number of children - age under 2 408.37 494.27 -560.38 1377.12 
Number of children - aged 2 and under 5 2250.30 439.51 1388.88 3111.72 
Number of children - aged 5 and under 18 1437.87 220.18 1006.33 1869.42 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 119.49 25.02 70.46 168.53 
Male education level: 
(Reference value: no educational 
qualifications) 
    
Highest educational attainment: level 3 1692.90 800.47 124.01 3261.80 
Highest educational attainment: level 4 3153.54 765.79 1652.62 4654.45 
Highest educational attainment: level 5 6788.08 979.76 4867.78 8708.38 
Highest educational attainment: level 6 8192.96 1376.92 5494.25 10891.67 
Highest educational attainment: unknown 7154.63 2622.54 2014.55 12294.70 
Household class: 
(Reference value: unemployed) 
    
Elementary -6902.11 1443.58 -9731.47 -4072.75 
Lower -5456.16 1345.41 -8093.10 -2819.21 
Middle -6154.69 1377.18 -8853.91 -3455.46 
Higher -8332.50 1620.61 -11508.83 -5156.17 
Academic -10022.58 2310.88 -14551.82 -5493.34 








 = 0.145 
Weighted, n= 1,626 (of which 17 cases excluded due to missing data) 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
1.218 kg CO2e per € 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per € per 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 1.183 0.037 1.110 1.255 
Variables regarding head of household & partner: 
Male usual weekly hours 4.33E-04 3.59E-04 -2.70E-04 1.14E-03 
Female usual weekly hours -4.37E-04 3.81E-04 -1.18E-03 3.09E-04 
Male gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, € 
-1.69E-06 2.94E-07 -2.27E-06 -1.11E-06 
Female gross annual income from 
employment and self-employment, € 
-1.95E-06 4.64E-07 -2.86E-06 -1.04E-06 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household and 
partner’s earned income, € 
-1.58E-06 3.04E-07 -2.18E-06 -9.87E-07 
Number of adults 0.025 9.18E-03 0.007 0.043 
Number of children - age under 2 0.032 0.011 0.011 0.053 
Number of children - aged 2 and under 5 0.017 8.66E-03 0.000 0.034 
Number of children - aged 5 and under 18 0.024 3.92E-03 0.016 0.032 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 0.002 5.31E-04 0.001 0.003 
Male education level: 
(Reference value: no educational 
qualifications) 
    
Highest educational attainment: level 3 -0.026 0.017 -0.059 0.006 
Highest educational attainment: level 4 -0.037 0.016 -0.069 -0.006 
Highest educational attainment: level 5 -0.072 0.018 -0.107 -0.036 
Highest educational attainment: level 6 -0.077 0.023 -0.122 -0.033 
Highest educational attainment: unknown -0.084 0.035 -0.153 -0.016 
Household class: 
(Reference value: unemployed) 
    
Elementary 0.060 0.026 0.009 0.111 
Lower 0.014 0.020 -0.026 0.054 
Middle 7.87E-03 0.019 -0.029 0.045 
Higher -0.011 0.020 -0.051 0.028 
Academic 1.26E-03 0.026 -0.051 0.053 




This chapter provides an understanding of the significant relationship between the 
working patterns of household members and their household’s greenhouse emissions.  
The hypothesis tested in this chapter is found to hold, namely that reductions in the 
working times of household members lead to reductions in the greenhouse gas 
emissions from that household’s consumption.  This is tested using cross-sectional 
data of nationally representative samples of UK and Dutch households.  The 
regression models tested predict a high level of variance in household greenhouse 
gas emissions in both countries. 
 
As expected based on the consumption behaviour literature reviewed in chapter 3, 
the principle effect of working time on emissions is not direct, but rather is mediated 
by earned income: reducing working hours reduces income, which in turn reduces 
emissions.  Gross earned income is the main predictor of household emissions in 
both countries.  Each extra pound earned in the UK by the analysed households adds 
0.2kg to household greenhouse gas emissions, and each extra euro 0.32-0.34kg to 
Dutch household emissions.  In both countries working hours are a big determinant 
of this earned income, so that working hours have a strong indirect effect on 
emissions.   
 
Independently of their effect on income, male and female working hours only have 
statistically significant effects on emissions in the Netherlands: here, each extra hour 
worked per week correlates with increased annual household emissions of 106kg 
CO2e for male working hours, and 64kg for female, even controlling for income.  
This is an interesting result, and the regression models for the Netherlands indicate 
that the reason is that total household expenditure is also significantly correlated to 
both male and female working hours, controlling for income.  Changes in Household 
Emissions Intensity relating to working hours are not statistically significant.  These 
results indicate that among Dutch households, those working shorter hours tend to 
spend less of their income, even controlling for earned income. This could be 
because they save more, perhaps because they consider their economic position to be 
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less secure.  Further research, such as qualitative interviews, would be needed to 
uncover more about the reasons for this result.  
 
Whilst male and female working hours have no significant effect on emissions in the 
UK, they do have a statistically significant correlation with Household Emissions 
Intensity, which falls with longer hours even controlling for income. With a larger 
dataset, this result might translate into a significant effect on emissions.  Unlike with 
the Netherlands however, this means that households working longer hours tend to 
buy different kinds of goods and services than those working shorter hours.  Again, 
without further research, outside the scope and aims of this thesis, what these 
changes might be, and the underlying reasons, cannot be identified.  While these 
results are interesting in that they indicate that changes in household consumption 
patterns occur with changes in working hours that are not purely the result of effects 
on household income, the substantive size of these effects on emissions is small 
compared to the effects of working hours change on income, and hence expenditure.  
 
Returning to the results for greenhouse gas emissions, the structure of the household 
also has a significant effect on emissions: as expected, the age of the head of 
household, and the number of household members of different age bands (other 
adults, and children of different ages), all generally affect emissions, with each extra 
household member corresponding with increased emissions of between 1,300kg and 
3,100kg per year, and each year of age of the male head of household predicting an 
extra 180-190kg of annual CO2e.  The results are strikingly similar between the UK 
and the Netherlands, and indicate that the demographic group of the household is an 
important predictor of emissions.  The implications of the results for the other 
sociodemographic variables included (education level, social class and, for the UK, 
geographic region) are harder to determine, but they again indicate that these factors 
can in many cases explain some degree of the household’s emissions even 
controlling for the other variables discussed above.  
 
The models show that there is little substantive difference between emissions arising 
per hour worked or per unit of income earned from either male or female work (what 
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differences that there are between beta values in the equivalent male and female 
variables are not statistically significant).  This indicates that a household in which 
the combined income from the male and female is x and the combined working hours 
are y will have similar emissions levels regardless of the distribution of income and 
work between the male and female.  The principle exception to this is with working 
hours in the Netherlands, where the direct effect of an hour worked is somewhat 
higher for the male than for the female.  In this case, the difference between a male 
and female full time worker (40 hours per week) is around 1,700kg per year, 
controlling for income effects, roughly 6% of an average household’s total 
emissions.  The effect is thus substantively small and, again, is not statistically 
significant. In short, increasing gender equality in paid working patterns should, 
controlling for income effects, have no significant effects on household greenhouse 
gas emissions, signifying that there are no tensions between the policy goals of 
reduced emissions and increased gender equality in work and care. 
 
The results for total expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity (HEI) provide 
some further understanding of the results for greenhouse gas emissions.  Expenditure 
increases with income, but at a slower rate in all the models: a doubling of gross 
earned income correlates with an expenditure increase of 32-51%,
58
 depending on 
who earns the money (the male or female) and country.  This can be explained by 
increasing income tax and falling benefits with increasing earned income (effects 
which are not modelled), the underreporting of income at low income levels, and 
consumption smoothing by the household, i.e. increasing saving and reduced 
borrowing at higher earned incomes.  HEI meanwhile falls with income.  The 
combination of these factors explain why emissions do not increase as fast as income 
(a doubling of earned income less than doubles emissions), and is equivalent to the 
results of other research showing that emissions have an elasticity with income of 
below 1 (Biesiot and Noorman 1999:374; Moll et al. 2005:269).   
 
Comparing the UK and the Netherlands, expenditure is predicted by a greater range 
of variables for the Netherlands than for the UK, where working hours, non-earned 
                                                 
58
 Based on the statistically significant results only. 
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income sources, age, education level and most class variables are not significant 
predictor variables.  Dutch Household Emissions Intensity falls with income with the 
same order of magnitude as for the UK, and the correlation is similar regardless of 
the source of income, although the correlation with female earned income is the most 
strongly negative, as with the UK model.  Interestingly for HEI, working time 
variables are only significant explanatory factors for the UK (although this does not 
translate into a significant effect in the models for total emissions). 
 
The result that working time is a strong determinant of household greenhouse gas 
emissions is significant for the thesis.  Reducing working time can thus be expected 
to reduce emissions, primarily because it leads to reduced income and hence reduced 
expenditure, an effect only slightly offset by the likely increase in Household 
Emissions Intensity.   
 
From the policy perspective, policy instruments affecting working time can then be 
expected to affect greenhouse gas emissions, as argued by other authors (see chapter 
2, section 2.1).  The expenditure results are consistent with the work of other authors 
showing that savings rates increase with income, and with different demographic 
groups saving and borrowing to different degrees.  This also needs consideration in 
policy design because of the differing levels of delayed effects on emissions that this 
implies, as discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.8.2). 
 
Finally, the results are also useful for the scenario modelling in the subsequent two 
chapters.  The generally high model fits for greenhouse gas emissions indicate that 
the effect of working time changes on emissions can be estimated with a substantial 
degree of certainty based on just a few readily available variables; it is not necessary 
to estimate the detailed changes in expenditure levels and Household Emissions 
Intensity of the household.  This allows simpler modelling of emissions changes 
under different scenarios of working time changes in the following chapters.  Results 
also show different demographic groups, such as those with or without children, and 
based on age band, also (in most cases) have significantly different emissions levels 
even controlling for working time and income.  This is a further reason to consider 
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them separately in the scenario models in the following two chapters (in addition to 
the potential for them to respond differently to policy instruments).   
5.5 Summary 
This chapter tests the hypothesis that reducing the working time of household 
members reduces household greenhouse gas emissions, and finds it to hold in both 
the UK and the Netherlands for representative samples of the working age 
populations drawn from household expenditure surveys.   Although consumption 
behaviour is complex and likely to be driven by a multitude of personal 
characteristics and situational factors exogenous to the models developed in this 
chapter, the regression models estimating household emissions nevertheless have 
high levels of fit.  The results indicate that working patterns and income exert strong 
effects on household emissions in the UK and the Netherlands.  Working hours affect 
emissions via their effect on income but, controlling for income, only directly affect 
emissions in the Netherlands, and then only to a small degree.  Other 
sociodemographic variables (presence of children of different ages, age band, 
education level, class, and geographic location) also predict some level of emissions 
in most cases.  Models of household expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity 
indicate that expenditure increases with income but with an elasticity of substantially 
less than 1 (i.e. a doubling of income less than doubles expenditure), whilst HEI 
decreases with income, helping to explain the result that emissions do not increase as 
rapidly as income.  
 
The results indicate that working time changes are likely to affect greenhouse gas 
emissions.  This has implications for working time policy design too, as such policies 
are thus also likely to have emissions effects.  The model developed of household 
emissions is both parsimonious but also explains a high level of variance in 
household greenhouse gas emissions.  The regression results in this chapter are thus 
quite suitable for use in the scenario modelling in the following two chapters, in 
which the effects on greenhouse gas emissions of different hypothetical changes in 
the working patterns of the UK and Dutch populations are estimated.  These chapters 
examine the substantive size of greenhouse gas emissions changes under different 
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changes in working patterns, and from that, the implications of such effects for the 
design of working time policy are discussed. 
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Chapter 6 The greenhouse gas implications of UK and 
Dutch policies to increase labour market 
participation 
The previous chapter provided empirical support for the argument that changes to 
levels of paid work in the household change the household’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, primarily by affecting its total income, which then influences expenditure.  
However, the household model does not provide a clear understanding of the 
substantive size of these effects.  What level of emissions changes could be expected 
under different scenarios of change in the working patterns of households and the 
population as a whole? 
 
This chapter and the next address this question for two situations.  The next chapter 
examines the potential of substantial working time reduction to contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals. 
 
This chapter takes the opposite approach, and assesses the greenhouse gas 
implications of current government objectives relating to working time.  There are 
diverse policy instruments in place to support periods of reduced working time over 
the working life course, for maternity leave, paternity leave (to a much more limited 
extent), sickness, disability and, in the Netherlands, more generally for any purpose.  
However, the only working time policies in the UK and the Netherlands for which 
there are clearly defined, measurable objectives are those relating to increasing 
labour market participation rates.  As such, measurable objectives in the two 
countries are actually to increase total paid working time in the population, by 
moving more people who are currently not working into paid work.  The ecological 
economics literature, and the household model tested in the last chapter, indicate that 
this will increase greenhouse gas emissions, but by how much?  What are the 




This chapter estimates the effect on emissions of attaining the UK and Dutch goals 
for increased labour market participation rates among the working age population.  
Formally, it tests the hypothesis that: 
 
Current UK and Dutch policy goals relating to paid work will substantially 
increase national greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Earlier chapters have reviewed in detail the route by which working patterns affect 
emissions so this is not recapped here.  Instead, this chapter begins by giving details 
of the intended aims of working time policies in the UK and the Netherlands, both 
their social and economic goals, and particular objectives for labour market 
participation rates.  The following section details the modelling approach by which 
the greenhouse gas effects of these participation rate objectives are estimated.  Next, 
the results of the analysis are presented.  These results are then discussed, critically 
looking at the modelling assumptions and at the implications for designing working 
time policy capable of reconciling environmental, social and economic goals.  In 
particular, the modelling follows the official policy aims, in that it assumes people 
who move into paid work will achieve wage rates and employment opportunities 
equivalent to a similar individual who already has a job.  There is a real risk however 
of the newly employed only obtaining marginal, low paid work, especially if they 
lack the skills required by employers or face multiple barriers to securing good jobs. 
The discussion therefore considers the implications for the modelling if this 
assumption is not met.  A final section summarises the chapter. 
6.1 Working time policy aims in the UK and the Netherlands 
Working time policies in the UK and the Netherlands, as in other countries, are 
designed to meet social and economic goals, whilst their effects on environmental 
goals are not considered (see chapter 2).  Key social goals relate to increasing the 
labour market participation of certain groups considered to be socially 
disadvantaged, to increase their material affluence, reduce poverty and social 
exclusion, and to increasing opportunities and capabilities to transition, temporarily, 
out of the labour market or reduce working hours for specific reasons, such as for 
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childcare (Knijn et al. 2007; Freud 2007; Esping-Andersen 2002).  Economic goals 
include the reduction of state expenditure on benefits payments for disadvantaged 
groups and increased revenue from income taxes, increasing labour market supply to 
match predicted future demand, and increasing labour market skills and flexibility 
and hence wider economic competitiveness and growth (Knijn et al. 2007; 
Committee on Labour Market Participation 2008; European Commission 2010). 
Chapter 2 discussed these goals, and the underlying values and types of policy 
instrument used to achieve them, in detail (section 2.2). 
 
Table 6.1 shows all demographic groups which are highlighted in UK, Dutch and EU 
policy documents with explicit, measurable working time policy objectives.  These 
all relate to participation rates in paid employment, and include everything current up 
to early 2010.
59
  In both countries, national objectives exceed EU-level objectives 
laid down in the Lisbon Strategy; in fact, latest participation rates already exceed EU 
objectives. Note that UK and EU objectives are expressed in terms of the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) definition of employment (at least one hour of work in the week 
of survey
60
), whilst Dutch objectives are expressed in terms of a more stringent 
national definition (at least 13 hours of work per week).  UK objectives are 
sometimes expressed in terms of numbers employed rather than participation rates.  
The equivalent LFS-definition participation rates are estimated in the table for these 
objectives. 
 
In many instances, whilst government documents identify that it would be beneficial 
to increase the labour market participation rates of particular demographic groups, 
and policy instruments have been set up to achieve this, no specific policy objective 
has been set.  For example, UK policies explicitly target lone parents, the long-term 
unemployed, the sick and disabled, ethnic minorities, particularly women of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, young people, older people, and those in cities 
                                                 
59
 Policy changes following the changes in government in both the UK and the Netherlands after 
general elections in mid 2010, as well as revision of the Lisbon Strategy following the end of the 
period it covered in that year, are not considered in this chapter. 
60
 “Employed persons are persons aged 15 and over who performed work, even for just one hour per 
week, for pay, profit or family gain during the reference week or were not at work but had a job or 
business from which they were temporarily absent because of, for instance, illness, holidays, industrial 
dispute, and education or training” (Eurostat 2009). 
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(where unemployment rates are higher) (Department for Work and Pensions 2007:8) 
to increase their labour market participation, but set no measurable participation rate 
objectives for most of these groups.  In the Netherlands, the situation is similar: 
among women, for example, low average working hours is seen as a problem, but 
despite the notional aim to “increase labour participation among women in terms of 
hours worked” for the 1.5 million women working less than 25 hours per week, there 
is no measurable objective set out for what to increase it to (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 2008:61; Committee on Labour Market Participation 2008:6). 
 
Table 6.1 Policy objectives for participation rates in paid employment, by target 




Net participation rate objectives (in paid work, Labour Force Survey definition) 




80% employment 85%, LFS definition* 
(80%, by 2016, gross 
participation, including 
jobseekers, Dutch definition) 
70% by 2010 







(Extra 1 million employed 
by 2015) 
67%, LFS definition* 
(45% of 55-64 year olds, by 
2010, net participation actually 
in work, Dutch definition) 
50% by 2010 
(EU definition) 
Lone parents 72.4%* 




No specific objective, large 
municipality-level differences in 
decisions re. lone parent work 
obligations 
No specific objective 
Women No specific objective 65% in 2010 (net participation, 
actually in work, Dutch 
definition) 
60% by 2010 
* LFS definition participation rates are author’s own calculations based on stated objectives 
expressed as numbers of people in UK and by Dutch definitions of employment in the Netherlands: 
see section 6.2.5 for details of their calculation. 
 
Sources: HM Government (2008:28) for the UK 
 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2008:11,57) for the Netherlands 
 European Commission (2010:15) for EU Lisbon Strategy 
                                                 
61
 Knijn et al. (2007:646) mention an objective of 70% lone parent employment by 2010, but no 
source reference is provided. 
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6.2 Research design 
6.2.1 Data used 
As throughout this thesis, the principle data sources used for calculating household 
level results in this chapter are household expenditure survey datasets and product 
emissions intensity data, as detailed in chapter 4 (section 4.2).  For the UK, the 2004-
5 Expenditure and Food Survey, and environmental data from the Stockholm 
Environment Institute-York, are used.  For the Netherlands, the 2000 
budgetonderzoek survey is used along with environmental data from Vringer et al 
(2010).  Results from the expenditure survey samples are extrapolated to produce 
estimates at the national level using the approach described in section 4.3.3 of 
chapter 4, drawing on national greenhouse gas emissions estimates produced by the 
Carbon Footprint of Nations project (see section 4.2.4 for details of this dataset).   
 
In addition, data on participation rates and population sizes used in this chapter are 
drawn from the Labour Force Survey (Eurostat 2010). Aggregate data from the LFS 
are available online for EU member states, presenting a range of population and 
labour market statistics by year.  Data were accessed by demographic group and year 
for the participation rate and population size variables required in this chapter for the 
UK and the Netherlands. 
6.2.2 Modelling the effects of meeting working time policy objectives 
The UK and Dutch policy objectives described above lay out specific increases in 
participation rates in the populations which, with certain assumptions, can be 
precisely quantified as changes in paid working hours for particular demographic 
groups.  How these aspired-to working patterns differ from a particular baseline 
situation such as that observed in the household expenditure survey datasets can also 
then be determined.  As the data described above, and the regression model results in 
chapter 5, allow estimates household greenhouse gas emissions to be made based on 
given working patterns, then the change in emissions between the baseline and a 
scenario in which these objectives have been reached can also be estimated.  
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Changes in expenditure are also estimated to inform the discussion on the 
compatibility of greenhouse gas and social goals (in section 6.4).  Given the 
comparatively low explanatory power of the regression models for the other 
independent variable used in this thesis, Household Emissions Intensity (as presented 
in chapter 5, section 5.3.2), the effects on it of the scenarios in this chapter are not 
estimated.  Omitting this variable from the modelling does not impede on achieving 
the research aims.  An indication of the change in Household Emissions Intensity can 
still be obtained from looking at the relative change in emissions and expenditure in 
this chapter as, by definition, it is equal to household greenhouse gas emissions 
divided by total expenditure. 
 
In short, everything is available to estimate the greenhouse gas (and expenditure) 
effects of meeting these policy objectives.  To increase comparability between the 
UK and Dutch results, the greenhouse gas effects of two scenarios are modelled.  
The scenarios modelled are: 
 
Baseline:  The characteristics of the UK and Dutch populations based on the 
representative samples in the 2004-5 UK Expenditure and Food Survey, 
and the 2000 Dutch budgetonderzoek. 
Scenario 1:  The 2008 situation.  As the Dutch and UK baseline data are for 
different years, emissions and expenditure figures are estimated for 
2008 to give a common comparator year.  The emissions for 2008 are 
estimated based on the baseline data taking into account changes in 
participation rates and population sizes for different demographic 
groups revealed in the Labour Force Survey data, from Eurostat (2010).  
2008 is the most recent year for which data were available at the time of 
analysis. 
Scenario 2:  Meeting of national participation rate objectives.  Assuming no further 
change in population sizes after 2008, this is an estimate of the 
emissions arising when participation rate objectives are met, taken to be 
at some point in the near future (around 2015-2016, the times set by the 




The changes in emissions between the baseline and scenario 1, and between 
scenarios 1 and 2, are calculated for different demographic groups corresponding 
with the different policy objectives being considered.  As discussed above, 
measurable objectives relate to participation rates for older working age individuals, 
for lone parents (in the UK), for women (in the Netherlands), and for the working 
age population as a whole.  For simpler modelling, the objective for women in the 
Netherlands is not modelled.  Based on these objectives, demographic groups were 
defined based on the following criteria: 
 the labour market status (working or not working62) of the head of household 
and, if present, partner.  NB. “working” is defined here following the Dutch 
national definition of being in paid labour for at least 13 hours per week; 
 whether the head of household lives with a partner or not (here termed as 
“couple” or “single” households); 
 the gender of the person(s) who are and are not working; 
 the age band of the head of household or partner, divided into whether or not 
they are of older working age, from aged 50 to statutory retirement age. 
Statutory retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women in the UK
63
, and 65 
for both men and women in the Netherlands; 
 for single households, whether the head of household also has a child or 
children living with them. 
 
For parsimony, not all possible combinations of these criteria are distinguished as 
separate demographic groups.  The groups used for the analyses in this chapter are 
presented in Figure 6.1 below.  They represent a set of 17 mutually exclusive groups 
such that any working age household will belong to one (and only one) group. As the 
groups are defined in part based on the working patterns of the household members 
(the head of household and partner, if present), then if the working patterns of one of 
                                                 
62
 “Working” and “participating” are used interchangeably in this chapter to indicate someone who is 
in paid work. 
63
 The gradual increase in women’s retirement age in the UK from 60 to 65 which began in April 2010 
(UK Government 2011a), and the abolition of the employer’s right to end employment when an 




the household members changes, so too does the group to which the household 
belongs.  The arrows in the diagram represent the transition pathways by which a 
household may move from one group to another if a household member enters paid 
work, if they are “activated” as a result of working time policy instruments, for 
example. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that if a workless couple household 
(one in which neither the head of household nor partner are in paid work) is activated 
by policy, it will be the male, rather than the female or both, who is activated.  
Assuming that the male rather than the female will be activated is broadly consistent 
with existing working patterns in couple households: of one-worker couple 
households, it is the male that is working rather than the female in 81% of 
households in the UK, and 93% in the Netherlands (author’s own calculations, using 
the Expenditure and Food Survey 2004-5 and budgetonderzoek 2000). 
 
The method for estimating changes in emissions and expenditure between scenarios 
involves two stages.  Firstly, mean changes at the household level in expenditure and 
emissions as a result of a household member moving from non-participation to 
participation in paid labour (activation) are calculated for each of the ten 10 
transition pathways presented in Figure 6.1 (i.e. for each of the arrows indicating a 
move from one demographic group to another).  Secondly, at the national level, the 
numbers of households which change from one demographic group to another are 
calculated for each of these 10 transition pathways, so that the household level 
results can be extrapolated to estimate changes in greenhouse gas emissions at the 





Figure 6.1 Working age households by demographic group, categorised by work status of household members, age band, presence of children, and 
gender, showing originator and destination groups for activation into the labour market 
  Single households   Couple households 
  Head of household age between 50 and statutory 
retirement age 
  
Male age between 50 and statutory retirement age; female any work age 


























  One over 
retirement 
age, other of 
working age* 






            
  
 
Head of household age <50   Male age <50; female any work age 






















           Both working 
















* The definitions used in this thesis of working age couple households include households in which one partner is over retirement age but the other is still of working age.  This group 
comprises those households where one member of the couple only is over retirement age.  They are included for completeness, but it is assumed in the scenarios that they will not be 
influenced by working time policy objectives, i.e. the working age member will not be activated if he or she is not already in work.  
NB. Households may contain any number of adults additional to the head of household and partner (if present). They may also contain any number of dependent children (aged 0 to 17 
years), except where “no children” is explicitly stated.  Older and younger working age households are defined based on the age of the head of household in single households, or the 
age of the male in couple households, as presented in the figure. There are a small number of same-sex couple households in both datasets; these are included in the categories above 
and not treated separately.  Whether the household is classed as younger or older is defined for these cases based on the age of the Household Reference Person (for the UK data) or 
the main breadwinner (for the Dutch data). 
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6.2.3 Household level 
Figure 6.1 above shows the transition pathways along which households move if a 
household member (the head of household or partner, if present) is activated (i.e. 
moves from not being in paid work to being in paid work).  It is assumed that policy 
will, in the meeting of objectives, lead to a random sample of individuals within each 
demographic group being activated and thus their household moving from the group 
in which they are currently (the originator group) to the group to which they are 
matched (the destination group).  For example, if a non-participating single older 
working age male is activated, he will move to the group for participating single 
older working age males.  It is assumed that when an individual is activated, the 
greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure of their household will change, on 
average, from the mean of the originator group to the mean of the destination group 
(with a small correction described in the next paragraph).  Drawing on the models of 
household greenhouse gas emissions developed and discussed in chapter 5, this 
assumes therefore that, when activated, the household members’ working hours, 
wage rates and sources of non-earned income will, on average, change to equal the 
mean of the destination group, and hence too will their mean greenhouse emissions 
match the destination group mean.  It is assumed that the design of the policies which 
result in their activation will, along with other factors, ensure this is an outcome.  
This assumption is returned to in the discussion later, as whilst official policy aims 
may be to achieve this, the newly activated are at greater risk, for a variety of 
reasons, of entering work that is substantially worse than the average in terms of 
wage rates and opportunities (Freud 2007:3–5). 
 
In practice, chapter 5 demonstrated that there are socio-demographic characteristics 
of the household in addition to working hours, wage rate and non-earned income 
sources which have a statistically significant effect on household emissions and 
expenditure, namely: number of adults in the household, numbers of children aged 0 
to <2, 2 to <5, and 5 to <18, age of the head of household, and education level of the 
head of household. There are statistically significant differences in the means of 
some of these characteristics between the pairs of originator and destination groups.  
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As these are factors which will not be altered by the activation of a household 
member, i.e. they are outside the influence of working time policy, the differences 
are controlled for to produce more accurate estimates of the changes in emissions and 
expenditure arising from activation.  The estimated mean greenhouse gas emissions 
for the households being activated are thus adjusted by the difference in means 
between the originator and destination groups for these characteristics multiplied by 
the beta coefficient for these variables (as calculated and presented in chapter 5). 
 
This provides the following output, presented in Appendix 4.  For each of the 10 
demographic groups in Figure 6.1 containing non-participating individuals, mean 
household emissions are presented.  The mean household emissions are then 
calculated for when the non-participating individual is activated into paid labour.  
The estimate is based on the mean for the destination demographic group, correcting 
for any compositional differences in the two group populations relating to the 
numbers of adults and children, head of household/male age, and education level of 
head of household/male, as just described above.  This allows the mean per 
household effect of activation on greenhouse gas emissions for the 10 different 
originator groups to be estimated. 
 
The same method is followed to calculate the mean effects on expenditure for each 
of these 10 activation pathways, with the results also presented in Appendix 4. 
6.2.4 National level 
Total emissions are calculated for each of the 17 demographic groups in Figure 6.1 
for each of the three scenarios (Baseline, Scenario 1 and Scenario 2) described 
earlier.  The total emissions from the households in the samples are converted to 
produce national totals for all working households using conversion factors for both 
countries, calculated following the method described in chapter 4, section 4.3.3.  For 
the baseline situation, this results in total national emissions equal to those calculated 
by the Carbon Footprint of Nations project (www.carbonfootprintofnations.com, and 




Changes in emissions from the baseline up to the year 2008 (Scenario 1) are 
estimated by taking into account changes in populations and participation rates 
between the baseline year and 2008 for older working age and younger working age 
adults, and lone parents, drawn from the Labour Force Survey (Eurostat 2010).  
Changes in emissions between the 2008 situation (Scenario 1) and final UK and 
Dutch objectives (Scenario 2) are estimated in a similar way based on further 
increases in participation rates based on the UK and Dutch objectives.  It is assumed 
that there are no further changes in population sizes overall or for any demographic 
group between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. 
 
To calculate the changes in emissions between the baseline and Scenario 1, and 
between Scenario 1 and Scenarios 2, the numbers of households moving between 
demographic groups along each of the 10 transition pathways described above are 
calculated, assuming that each non-participating individual has an equal probability 
of being activated to meet the total changes in participation rates over the period.  
The resultant changes in total greenhouse gas emissions between scenarios is thus 
calculated by multiplying the number of households moving between demographic 
groups by the estimated mean change in their emissions that this results in.  Changes 
in population sizes are also accounted for between the baseline and Scenario 1.  The 
method allows the increase in national emissions arising from older working age 
households, younger working age households, lone parents, and overall, to be 
separately estimated. 
6.2.5 Methodological issues 
At the national level, both Dutch and UK objectives were subject to some 
interpretation in the modelling.  In the UK, the older working age objective of an 
extra 1,000,000 in work gave no baseline date to compare to. Compared with 2008 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, the objective implies a final participation rate of 
82.8% for older working age individuals, higher than the overall working age 
population objective of 80%.  It is unlikely that this is the actual intention of policy, 
so an objective of 80% participation for older working age adults was instead 
assumed.  In the Netherlands meanwhile, objectives are expressed in terms of 
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national definitions of participation, and required conversion to LFS definitions.  
This was done based on multiplying objectives by the observed differences between 
the year 2000 LFS defined participation rate in the Labour Force Survey data and the 
Dutch definition participation rate observed in the budgetonderzoek for each of these 
demographic groups (older working age, younger working age, and lone parent). For 
example, the lone parent participation rate in the Netherlands in the year 2000 is 64% 
according to the Labour Force Survey, but is 65.4% based on the household 
expenditure survey, 2.2% higher (1.4 percentage points).  A conversion factor of 
2.2% is thus used for lone parents throughout the modelling to convert between LFS 
definition employment rates and the Dutch definition.  Conversion factors for older 
working age and younger working age groups are calculated similarly. 
 
To maintain simplicity of modelling, it was assumed that only the head of household 
and partner, if present, were subject to activation measures, and that participation rate 
objectives pertained only to these individuals.  This omits some working age non-
participating individuals from consideration where they live in households but are 
not the head of household or partner.  In practice, this is likely to only be a small 
proportion of working age individuals, as working age adults predominantly live in 
their own property (or jointly with a partner).  Nevertheless, this contributes to the 
differences in participation rates observed between the household expenditure survey 
datasets (calculated based only on data for head of household and partner, if present) 
and those derived from Labour Force Survey data for the same years. 
 
The models assume the principles of the adult worker model as enshrined in Dutch, 
UK and EU working time policy approaches (see chapter 2, section 2.2.2), so that all 
adults are treated the same in the models, as potential labour market participants.  
Assuming this, each non-participating adult is assumed to have an equal probability 
of being activated to meet participation rate objectives.  For example, if objectives 
require 10% of non-participating older working age adults to be activated, then each 
non-participating older working age adult out of the head of household and partner, if 
present, has a 10% chance of being activated in the model.  In couple households in 
which neither the male nor the female are working, the household has double the 
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probability of one member being activated compared to households with only one 
non-participating working age adult, but it is always assumed to be the male that is 
activated.  Also, for modelling simplicity, couple households in which one member 
of the household is over retirement age and the other is below, but not working, are 
not considered susceptible to activation. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Patterns of labour market participation in the UK and the 
Netherlands 
An initial look at participation rates shows marked differences between men and 
women and by income, as well as between the UK and the Netherlands.  Figure 6.2 
and Figure 6.3 present participation rates
64
 by equivalised income quintile.
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  In the 
UK, very low participation rates among the lowest income band are observed, with 
rates increasing with income until the highest two bands.  This is to be expected as 
benefit rates for those not in work will in most cases be substantially lower than the 
income received by those in work.  Non-participation in paid work thus implies low 
income, and vice versa.  Female rates are around 16% lower than for males, with 
some variation between income bands but no overall pattern. 
 
In the Netherlands, whilst the trends are similar, participation among the lowest 
income band is somewhat higher than for the UK, especially for men.  Female 
participation rates are markedly lower than male, some 25% points lower, although 
this converges slightly at the highest income band.   
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 Dutch definition, at least 13 hours paid work per week. 
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Figure 6.2 Male and female participation rates by per capita equivalised income quintile 




















Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 6.3 Male and female participation rates by per capita equivalised income quintile 
























Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 present participation rates by demographic group.  In the 
UK, the overall 15% higher participation rate among men compared to women is 
seen to be exclusively the result of lower participation among women compared to 
men in couple households.  The difference in participation in couple households is 
most marked among households with children, with a nearly 30 percentage point 
difference (90% of men in work, 61% of women).   Among single households, there 
is little difference in participation rate between men and women.  Being older, being 
single, and having children all correlate with substantially lower participation rates 
(although in couple households this latter effect is only substantial for women).   
 
In the Netherlands, patterns are somewhat different to the UK.  Across all household 
types, men are more likely to be in work than women, the exception being among 
older single households where the rates are similar.  The greatest difference in 
participation rate is again in couples with children, with a 39 percentage point 
difference (96% for men, 57% for women).  As with the UK, being older correlates 
with a lower participation rate. The presence of children reduces only women’s 
participation rates however, and male rates are even marginally higher when children 
are present.  The greatest difference between the UK and the Netherlands, aside from 
the greater gender differences, is among single households with children, which have 





Figure 6.4 Male and female participation rates by demographic group, UK, 2004-5 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 6.5 Male and female participation rates by demographic group, Netherlands, 2000 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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These data indicate that UK and Dutch working time policy goals to increase 
participation rates should in principle affect mostly those on low income, raising 
their incomes.  High income groups already exceed the participation rate objectives.  
Increases in participation rates will be greatest among older working age households 
and lone parents in the UK, but more evenly spread between demographic groups in 
the Netherlands.   
 
Section 6.3.3 looks at the national changes in participation rates under the different 
scenarios in more detail, and their estimated social and greenhouse gas effects.  The 
next section first estimates household level changes in emissions arising from 
activation, to inform these national level results. 
6.3.2 Household level greenhouse gas and expenditure effects of 
increasing labour market participation 
In almost all cases it is found that household greenhouse gas emissions increase as a 
result of the head of household or partner, if present, moving into paid employment 
where before they were not working.  Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 below show the 
effect on household annual greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure of activation 
of one non-working household member (out of the head of household and partner, if 
present).  Statistically significant increases are indicated by stars.  Underlying data 
are presented in tables in Appendix 4, with further explanation of their calculation. 
 
In the UK (presented in Figure 6.6) activating a member of a given demographic 
group in most situations increases both the household’s expenditure and greenhouse 
gas emissions.  In general, the proportional increase in greenhouse gas emissions is 
smaller than that for expenditure.  This is consistent with the results in chapter 5, 
which indicate that wealthier households tend to have lower Household Emissions 
Intensities than lower income households, as they spend a greater share of their 
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income on relatively lower emissions intensity products, that is, products for which 




The greatest percentage increases in expenditure and emissions are for older single 
males (81% and 69% respectively), lone parents (81% and 64%) and workless 
younger couples (79% and 54%).  These are all fairly small demographic groups, and 
increases are somewhat smaller for groups representing larger sections of the 
population. 
 
For all older working age households, the increase in expenditure is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  It is only significant for the first three groups of older 
working age household for greenhouse gas emissions however.  Emissions do not 
rise significantly when an individual enters paid employment from an older working 
age couple household in which one of the head of household or partner is already in 
work. 
 
Younger household expenditure and emissions increase substantially and statistically 
significantly on activation, at least for workless households.  For households in 
which only the male is working, female activation makes only a small difference to 
expenditure and emissions (which even decrease marginally). The changes in 
expenditure and emissions for younger couple households in which only the female 
is working are not statistically significant, likely as there are very few cases of such 
households, so that the apparently anomalous results for this group cannot be 
considered reliable. 
 
Overall, one can see that activation has a strong effect of equalising expenditure and, 
especially, emissions, between demographic groups, as poorer and lower-emitting 
households increase expenditure and emissions due to activation much more than do 
already higher spending households. 
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 Including items such as services, leisure activities, white goods, and so on, whilst items such as 
vehicle fuel, food (especially meats) and home energy use (heat and lighting) produce much higher 




Figure 6.6 Mean household changes in greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure as a 




** Significant difference at the 1% level (2-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test) 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 6.7 presents equivalent results for the Netherlands.  Largest increases in 
expenditure and emissions occur for activation of workless younger couple 
households (97% and 93% increases respectively), younger couple households in 
which the male is not working (87% and 77% increases), older single women (52% 
increases for both) and workless older couples (53% and 38% increases). 
 
Among older single working age households, only females benefit significantly 
through increasing expenditure due to activation.  Among older couple households, 





Figure 6.7 Mean household changes in greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure as a 




** Significant difference at the 1% level (2-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test) 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
There appear to be substantial differences in the results between the UK and the 
Netherlands, with very different mean increases in expenditure and emissions 
resulting from activation for different demographic groups. This could be explainable 
by differences in the benefits entitlements of different groups in the two countries 
leading to different income effects of activation.  Interestingly, activation appears to 
lead to a levelling of mean expenditure and emissions between household types in 
both countries, so that couple households all end up with similar mean levels, and 
single households too end up with similar, lower, mean levels.  The differences 
between single and couple household emissions after activation appear to be higher 




Overall, household level data indicate that policies to increase participation rates will 
lead to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, as expenditure increases, assuming 
those activated obtain jobs of a similar standard to similar individuals already in paid 
work.  In most cases these increases are substantially and statistically significant.  
The story is also one of decreasing inequality as a result of activation, as long as 
workless households (both single and couple) are activated.  Perhaps due to 
differences in benefits entitlements, activating lone parent households only leads to a 
large and statistically significant increase in expenditure and emissions in the UK. 
6.3.3 National level greenhouse gas effects of increasing labour market 
participation 
The sections below present results for the UK and the Netherlands of the estimated 
increases in national greenhouse gas emissions arising from the increases in 
participation rates under the two scenarios described earlier.  The effects of changes 
in participation rates between the survey year baseline (2004-5 for the UK and 2000 
for the Netherlands) and Scenario 1 (the situation in 2008) are modelled, taking into 
account demographic and participation rate changes revealed in the Labour Force 
Survey data.  The estimated changes between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 (in which 
UK and Dutch labour market participation rate objectives have been met) are also 
presented.  To inform the subsequent discussion on the effects of the objectives, the 
effects on rates of worklessness (households with neither the head of household not 
partner, if present, in paid employment) and estimated effects on household income 
are also presented. 
6.3.3.1 UK scenario results 
Table 6.2 presents participation rate and population size data for the UK for the 
baseline situation (the year 2004-5), for Scenario 1 (the 2008 situation) and for 
Scenario 2 (when participation rate objectives have been met).  The data show some 
small demographic changes between the baseline and Scenario 1, which are taken 
into account in the scenario modelling which follows.  Participation rates overall 
increased over the period too, although among the largest section of the working age 
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population, younger working age households, the rate declined fractionally.  UK 
objectives for labour market participation rates in Scenario 2 are as presented earlier 
(in Table 6.1). The largest increases being aimed for over Scenario 1 are for lone 
parents, followed by those of older working age. 
 
Table 6.2 UK participation rates and demographics by demographic group 













69.9% 79.5% 54.8% 77.0% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 71.9% 79.5% 56.8% 77.4% 
% points change 
from Baseline to 
Scenario 1 





80.0% 80.0% 72.4% 80.0% 
% points change 
from Scenario 1 
to Scenario 2 
8.1% 0.5% 15.7% 2.6% 
Population 
size, 1000s, 
and as % of 
total 
population 
Baseline 8,983 24,522 1,954 33,505 
 (2004-5) 15.3% 41.7% 3.3% 57.0% 
Scenario 1  9,170 25,304 1,916 34,473 
 (2008) 15.2% 42.0% 3.2% 57.2% 
% points change 
from Baseline to 
Scenario 1 
2.1% 3.2% -1.9% 2.9% 
Scenario 2 Assumed no demographic changes from 2008 situation 
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat 2010), HM Government (2008:28), and own calculations 
 
Table 6.3 shows the estimated increases in national greenhouse gas emissions in the 
UK that arise from the changes in participation rates.  While working age individuals 
account for just 57% of the population, the data indicate that the households in which 
they live account for 82% of greenhouse gas emissions from private consumption 
(household emissions).  This is due to the fact that a substantial proportion of non-
working age individuals also live in these households, both children and older adults; 
as a result, mean per capita emissions among working age households are actually 





Between the baseline (2004-5) and Scenario 1 (2008), the overall working age 
participation rate increased by a small 0.5 percentage points, driven primarily by an 
increase in older working age participation.  This led to an estimated 0.2% increase 
in emissions from working age households.  Meeting the UK objective of 80% 
participation (in Scenario 2), a further 2.9 percentage point increase in participation 
rates over the Scenario 1 situation, is estimated to increase emissions a further 1.0% 
from the 2008 level, over 6 million tonnes per annum assuming no demographic 
changes.  This is a small increase compared to that between 2004-5 and 2008, but is 
driven by increasing participation rather than increases in the working age 
population. 
 
Although both the participation rate and population of older working age individuals 
grew between 2004-5 and 2008, the relatively small household increases in 
emissions arising from activation in this group mean that the increases in emissions 
from this group are mostly due to increases in population rather than participation 
rates.  However, the large 8.1% increase in the participation rate for this group that is 
required to meet UK government objectives will increase their total emissions by a 
further estimated 1.8%, 3.8 million tonnes per year, 64% of all the increases that 
would arise from meeting participation rate objectives for the working age 
population. 
 
Lone parents meanwhile represent a much smaller, and shrinking, group in the 
population (5.5% of working age adults in 2008).  Emissions from this group fell 
over the 2004-5 to 2008 period as a result of the fall in their population size, despite 
a comparable increase in participation rate.  In line with the strong targeting of lone 
parents and children in workless households by government activation policy, UK 
objectives equate to a nearly 16 percentage points increase in lone parent 
participation from the 2008 situation.  This will lead to an estimated 7.1% increase in 
emissions from this group of the population.  Despite the small size of this group, 
this increase accounts for 37% of the total emissions increase between Scenario 1 
and Scenario 2.  It also represents the entirety of the increase in emissions and 
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participation from younger working age households.  Given the precise nature of the 
UK’s objectives, it appears the participation rate of younger people other than lone 
parents is actually expected to fall slightly up to the meeting of the objectives, 
perhaps due to increases in maternity and paternity leave take-up, participation in 
education, and so on.  Hence the increase in emissions from younger households as a 
whole is in total slightly lower than for lone parents alone.  
 
Table 6.3 UK data on annual national greenhouse gas emissions by demographic group, 
tonnes CO2e per annum 













Baseline (2004-5) 213,737,781 352,904,828 31,893,601 566,642,609 
As a % of emissions from all 
households 
31% 51% 5% 82% 
As a % of emissions from all UK 23% 39% 3% 62% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 219,091,231 364,289,523 31,562,373 583,380,754 
Increase from Baseline to 
Scenario 1 
5,353,450 11,384,695 -331,229 16,738,145 
(as a % of emissions from 
group) 
2.5% 3.2% -1.0% 3.0% 
% increase due to demographic 
(population size) changes 
2.1% 3.2% -1.9% 2.9% 
% increase due to participation 
rate changes 
0.4% 0.0% 0.9% 0.2% 
Scenario 2 (participation rate 
objectives met) 
222,932,112 366,487,039 33,805,914 589,419,152 
Increase from Scenario 1 to 
Scenario 2 
3,840,882 2,197,516 2,243,541 6,038,398 
(as a % of emissions from 
group) 
1.8% 0.6% 7.1% 1.0% 
% increase due to demographic 
(population size) changes 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
% increase due to participation 
rate changes 
1.8% 0.6% 7.1% 1.0% 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
What about the impact of these scenarios on social policy goals?  The percentage of 
workless households falls in the scenarios, which take the assumption that all 
workless individuals within a demographic group (older working age, younger 
working age, or lone parents) are equally likely to be activated by policy.  Hence 
couple households with two non-working individuals are twice as likely to have an 
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individual activated as other households where there is only one not working (single 
households, or couples with one member working).  Based on this assumption, 
percentages of workless households are presented in Table 6.4.  With the highest 
starting percentage of workless households, lone parents are also the most activated 
household type, followed by older working age households. 
 















Baseline (2004-5) 18.4% 15.0% 49.0% 16.2% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 16.9% 14.9% 47.1% 15.6% 
% points change from 
Baseline to Scenario 1 
1.5% 0.1% 1.9% 0.6% 
Scenario 2 (participation 
rate objectives met) 
10.4% 13.5% 32.5% 12.4% 
% points change from 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 
6.5% 1.4% 14.6% 3.2% 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
Figure 6.8 meanwhile presents a boxplot of household incomes for different groups 
of the population.  It shows the distribution of earned income for each of the 17 
demographic groups used in the modelling in this chapter, based on the household 
expenditure survey data.  The figure can be used to give an indication of how 
household income will rise due to a household member being activated (either from 
the baseline to Scenario 1, or from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2), based on the 
assumptions in the modelling.  To recap, it is assumed that activating a household 
member will move that household from one (originator) group to another 
(destination) group (as was described in section 6.2.2 and shown in Figure 6.1) and 
that, on average, this will lead to an increase in the household’s income equal to the 
difference in the means of the two groups (with minor differences due to differences 
in the demographic characteristics between the two groups). Hence, in the figure, 
blue (workless) households on activation can be expected to take on the income 
characteristics of the next yellow population group to the right, whilst yellow one-
worker couple households can be expected to take on the income level of the next red 
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(two-worker couple) population group to the right.  Group 9 in the figure, couples 
with one over retirement age and the other of any age, is marked grey as it is 
assumed for simplicity in the modelling that these households are not subject to 
activation.  The figure indicates that the increases in emissions and expenditure 
described above arise as a result of increases in the incomes of lower income 
households: the majority of individuals activated come from workless households, 
which have lower than average incomes.  In all cases, activation can be seen to lead 
to a substantial increase in the income of households (based on the modelling 
assumptions). 
 
The data in the table and figure indicate that worklessness decreases substantially 
among all household types due to the participation rate increases, although remains 
high among lone parent households even if UK objectives are met for this group.  
The income figure, and expenditure data in the previous section, also indicate 
increasing affluence due to activation, and a reduction in income-poor households, 
due to households moving to higher levels of paid work (from no workers to one 
worker, or from one worker to two), with mean incomes, and so expenditure, 
increasing correspondingly.  Increasing labour market participation rates could 
therefore be assumed to compress wage differentials in the population, whilst 
reducing the level of workless households should reduce benefit payments by the 























































































































































































































































































































































Blue: workless households; Yellow: One-worker households; Red: Two-worker households 
Far outliers omitted from figure 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
6.3.3.2 Dutch scenario results 
Table 6.5 presents Dutch participation rate and demographic characteristics for the 
baseline year (2000), Scenario 1 (2008), and Scenario 2 (in which government labour 
market participation rate objectives are taken to have been achieved).  
Demographically, the Netherlands is in a similar situation to the UK, in that around 
42% of the population are younger working age individuals, and 18% older working 
age (slightly higher than the UK, in part due to the higher female retirement age of 
65 in the Netherlands).  Overall, almost 62% of the population was of working age in 
the Netherlands in 2008, compared to 57% in the UK.  The percentage of lone 
parents is somewhat lower (2.0% in 2008 compared to 3.2% in the UK), but showing 
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an upward trend rather than slightly decreasing as in the UK.  There are some 
marked differences in participation rates however: despite large increases between 
2000 and 2008, older working age participation is still, at 63%, nearly 9% lower in 
the Netherlands than in the UK, whilst the higher younger working age participation 
rates balance this, so that overall participation is higher than in the UK, at 79% in 
2008.  Participation among all demographic groups shows an upward trend. 
 
Table 6.5 Dutch participation rates and demographics by demographic group 











Baseline (2000) 52.0% 82.9% 64.0% 74.2% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 63.2% 86.4% 70.2% 78.9% 
% points change 
from Baseline to 
Scenario 1 















% points change 
from Scenario 1 
to Scenario 2 
4.0% 6.5% 9.1% 5.7% 
Population 
size, 1000s, 
and as % of 
total 
population 
Baseline (2000) 2,740 7,051 202 9,791 
  17.5% 45.0% 1.3% 62.5% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 3,229 6,744 321 9,972 
  19.9% 41.7% 2.0% 61.6% 
% points change 
from Baseline to 
Scenario 1 
17.8% -4.4% 59.0% 1.8% 
Scenario 2 Assumed no demographic changes from 2008 situation 
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat 2010), Ministry of Economic Affairs (2008:11,57), and own 
calculations 
 
Table 6.6 presents the estimated effects on greenhouse gas emissions from Dutch 
households due to changes in labour market participation rates between the baseline 
(year 2000) and Scenario 1 (2008), and from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2.  In 2000, 
some 87% of emissions from households arose from working age households, around 
two-thirds of this coming from younger working age households.  Around 72% of 
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working age households were of younger working age, so per household, their 
emissions are lower than for older households.   
 
Between 2000 and 2008, emissions from working age households are estimated to 
rise 4.4%, by 6.8 million tonnes per annum.  Increases in the size of the working age 
population and increases in the participation rate contribute to this increase by 
similar amounts, increasing emissions by 1.8% and 1.7% respectively.  Meeting 
Dutch participation rate objectives will increase emissions by an estimated further 
1%, or 1.6 million tonnes per annum, from the 2008 level. 
 
Among older working age households, emissions increased 22% between 2000 and 
2008, some 10.5 million tonnes.  This is more than the total increase in emissions 
from all working age households (as the fall in the younger working age population 
led to an overall 3.7 million tonne drop in emissions from that group even 
considering their increasing participation rate).  The 20% increase in population size 
of older working age individuals between 2000 and 2008 accounted for a large 
proportion of their increases in emissions, although the 11% increase in participation 
rate led to a 3.6% increase in their emissions.  Meeting Dutch objectives, implying a 
further 4.0% increase in participation, will lead to an estimated further increase in 
this group’s emissions of 1.2% over the 2008 level, or around 700,000 tonnes CO2e 
per annum. 
 
The other key risk group, lone parents, produced only 4% of household greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2000, reflecting their small share of the total population.  However 
this increases by over 60% up to 2008, almost entirely due to increasing population 
size (which accounts for a 59% increase).  The 6% increase in participation rate over 
this period increases emissions by 1%.  Meeting Dutch participation rate objectives 
implies lone parent participation will increase by a further 9%, although this is not an 
explicit policy aim.  If such an increase occurs, emissions are likely to increase from 
this group by a further 1.4% over 2008 levels, or 150,000 tonnes, some 10% of the 




Despite the large increase in emissions from lone parent households over the 2000-8 
period, younger working age household emissions as a whole fall by 3.7 million 
tonnes per annum, 3.5%, due entirely to falling population size, which more than 
counters the 0.9% increase in emissions due to increasing participation.  Meeting 
Dutch objectives would increase this group’s emissions by 0.9% over 2008 levels, 
some 900,000 tonnes, over 50% of the total increase due to increasing working age 
participation. 
 
Table 6.6 Dutch data on annual national greenhouse gas emissions by demographic 
group, tonnes CO2e per annum 













Baseline (2000) 48,087,663 106,240,477 6,717,154 154,328,140 
As a % of emissions from all 
households 
27% 61% 4% 88% 
As a % of emissions from all 
Netherlands 
18% 40% 2% 58% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 58,689,896 102,502,077 10,783,971 161,191,973 
Increase from Baseline to 
Scenario 1 
10,602,233 -3,738,400 4,066,817 6,863,833 
(as a % of emissions from 
group) 
22.0% -3.5% 60.5% 4.4% 
% increase due to demographic 
(population size) changes 
17.8% -4.4% 59.0% 1.8% 
% increase due to participation 
rate changes 
3.6% 0.9% 1.0% 1.7% 
Scenario 2 (participation rate 
objectives met) 
59,414,203 103,428,942 10,935,573 162,843,145 
Increase from Scenario 1 to 
Scenario 2 
724,307 926,865 151,602 1,651,172 
(as a % of emissions from 
group) 
1.2% 0.9% 1.4% 1.0% 
% increase due to demographic 
(population size) changes 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
% increase due to participation 
rate changes 
1.2% 0.9% 1.4% 1.0% 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Table 6.7 indicates the effect of these scenarios on levels of workless households.  
For the working age population, workless households fall from almost 15% of the 
total in 2000, to 13% in 2008, and to less than 10% on meeting Dutch objectives.  
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Bigger changes are seen in both older working age and lone parent households, with 
the level of worklessness nearly halving between 2000 and the objective in both 
cases.  Worklessness among younger working age households also more than halves, 
but started from a much lower level in 2000.   
 
















Baseline (2000) 33.7% 11.2% 34.6% 14.8% 
Scenario 1 (2008) 22.6% 9.1% 28.3% 13.3% 
% points change from 
Baseline to Scenario 1 
11.1% 2.1% 6.3% 1.5% 
Scenario 2 (participation 
rate objectives met) 
18.7% 5.4% 18.9% 9.5% 
% points change from 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 
4.0% 3.7% 9.3% 3.8% 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 6.9 meanwhile gives an indication of the effect on household income of 
increasing participation rates.  As with the equivalent figure for the UK above, this 
figure presents boxplots of household income distributions for different groups of the 
working age population, based on the Dutch household expenditure survey data.  
Blue bars are workless households, which on activation move to the next yellow 
household type to the right, with an average increase in income approximately equal 
to the differences in the mean incomes between the two groups.  Yellow boxes 
meanwhile are one-worker households: those that are couples, on activation, move to 
the next red household type to the right.  One can see that in almost all cases 
activation leads to substantively significant increases in income, such that one can 
say increasing participation rates, without other changes to the tax-benefit system, 
will tend to increase the incomes of lower income households (with less work), also 





























































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.9 Household annual gross incomes for different groups of the working age 

























Blue: workless households; Yellow: One-worker households; Red: Two-worker households 
Far outliers omitted from figure 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
6.3.3.3 Comparison of UK and Dutch results 
In both the UK and the Netherlands, meeting participation rate objectives (Scenario 
2) are estimated to increase greenhouse gas emissions from working age households 
by about 1% over 2008 levels (Scenario 1).  This equates to some 6.1 million tonnes 
CO2e per annum in the UK, and 1.6 million tonnes per annum in the Netherlands.  In 
terms of total national emissions from all sources, this is equivalent to an increase of 
about 0.66% in the UK and 0.62% in the Netherlands, independent of any other 
changes arising from increasing purchasing power, changes in product emissions 




The similarity in national-level outcomes on emissions of meeting participation rate 
objectives masks substantial differences in the explanatory factors between the two 
countries however.  Differences between the two countries in the following factors 
all influence how national emissions change between the scenarios, and are 
explained more below: 
 The contribution of different demographic groups to total national emissions 
 The distribution of households in the different demographic groups 
 Increases in household expenditure and emissions that result from the 
activation of a household member in different demographic groups 
 Participation rate objectives: percentage point increases for different 
demographic groups and overall 
 Levels of per capita consumption and emissions. 
 Methods of calculating underlying environmental data. 
 
Table 6.8 presents some of these characteristics for the three main household groups 
analysed in this chapter: lone parents, younger working age (which includes lone 
parents), and older working age. Working age households contribute a slightly lower 
share of total national emissions in the Netherlands compared to the UK.  Of the 
increases in household emissions in the two countries between Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2, the majority comes from older households in the UK, while the main 
source is younger households in the Netherlands. In the UK too, the entirety of the 
increase from younger households is from lone parents, whilst in the Netherlands, 
which lacks a strong objective for lone parent participation, only 16% of the increase 
in younger working age household emissions comes from lone parents.  
 
At the household level, mean Dutch emissions are substantially higher than UK, both 
per household and per capita, despite substantially lower per household and per 
capita expenditure.  This reflects much higher product emissions intensities (levels of 
CO2e emitted per unit of value for goods and services), although as discussed in 
chapter 4, whether this arises due to structural differences in the production and 
distribution efficiencies of the products and services bought in the two countries, or 
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to methodological differences in the calculation of these values, is not easy to tell, so 
that comparing these mean values between countries cannot be considered valid. 
 
A one percentage point increase in participation rate increases emissions as a 
proportion of national totals more in the Netherlands than in the UK meanwhile. This 
is especially the case for increases in older working age participation, whilst lone 
parent participation rate increases have a much smaller effect on emissions in the 
Netherlands than in the UK. These results reflect the substantial differences between 
the countries in the household level increases in emissions and expenditure that arise 
due to activation.  
 
In both countries, household expenditure increases with activation more than does 
emissions.  This is because Household Emissions Intensity reduces on average as 
income and expenditure rise, as observed in chapter 5.
67
  The exception is older 
working age households in the Netherlands, where a 0.30% rise in expenditure is 
estimated from a one percentage point increase in participation, leading to a 0.31% 
rise in emissions. This result arises because for the transition pathways in question, 
Household Emissions Intensity also in some cases increases, so that emissions 
increase by a higher percentage than does expenditure due to activation.  This is the 
case for when non-participating single older working age males are activated, and for 
older couple households with a working male in which the female is activated.  As 
these represent a large share of older working age households, then this leads to this 
exceptional result.  The reason that the activated households have higher Household 
Emissions Intensities than the non-activated households is due to differences in the 
shares of money spent on different goods and services, but the precise details of these 
differences are outside of the scope of the thesis to investigate.  The result does not 
affect the overall observation that Household Emissions Intensity falls with 
increasing income and expenditure, so that, overall, national emissions increase by 
less that does total expenditure as participation rates increase.  
 
                                                 
67
 See chapter 3 for a discussion of Household Emissions Intensity and how greenhouse gas emissions 
are affected both by how much a household spends in monetary terms and by the relative amounts the 
household spends on different goods and services.   
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There are also big differences in the participation rate objectives being aimed for, 
both overall and per demographic group.  Dutch objectives are for a 5.7% overall 
increase in participation rate, compared to 2.6% in the UK, on 2008 levels.  UK 
objectives target older working age adults and lone parents exclusively, to the extent 
that younger working age adult participation rates actually can be expected to decline 
slightly if lone parents are excluded from the figures.  In the Netherlands meanwhile, 
the overall working age objective is seemingly spread more evenly between different 
demographic groups. The greenhouse gas increases arising from the particular 
targeting of older and lone parent individuals for activation in the UK is countered 
somewhat by the fact that these groups represent a smaller share of the population in 





Table 6.8 Comparison of key characteristics of the UK and the Netherlands 
  
UK Netherlands Difference (NL 
value  as a % of 
UK value) 
Increase in national 
emissions, 2008 to objective 
Tonnes per annum 6,038,398 1,651,172 27% 
As a percentage of 
total emissions from 
all households 
0.9% 0.9% 108% 
As a percentage of 
total national 
emissions 
0.7% 0.6% 93% 
 
From older working 
age households 





2,197,516 926,865 42% 
 
From lone parent 
households 
2,243,541 151,602 7% 
Share of national emissions 
from households 
From all households 76% 66% 86% 
From working age 
households 
62% 58% 93% 
Mean emissions, kg CO2e 
per annum, working age 
households, 2008 estimate 
per household 22,612 31,643 140% 
per capita  8,375 12,830 153% 
Mean expenditure, euro per 
annum*, working age 
households, 2008 estimate 
per household 38,440 26,893 70% 
per capita  14,237 10,904 77% 
Mean increase in emissions 
per household as a result of 
1% point participation rate 
increase (based on 2008 
population) 
All working age 0.23% 0.27% 117% 
Older 0.22% 0.31% 143% 
Younger 0.24% 0.25% 106% 
Lone parents 0.45% 0.15% 34% 
Mean increase in 
expenditure per household 
as a result of 1% point 
participation rate increase 
(based on 2008 population) 
All working age 0.29% 0.33% 116% 
Older 0.37% 0.30% 83% 
Younger 0.28% 0.32% 116% 
Lone parents 0.54% 0.20% 37% 
Percentage point increases 
in participation being aimed 
for from 2008 situation (LFS 
definition) 
All working age 2.6% 5.7% 223% 
Older 8.1% 4.0% 49% 
Younger 0.5% 6.5% 1234% 
Lone parents 15.7% 9.1%** 58% 
Distribution of older, 
younger and lone 
household types 
(percentages of working age 
households, 2008) 
Older 26.6% 32.4% 122% 
Younger 73.4% 67.6% 92% 
Lone parents 5.6% 3.2% 58% 
* UK figures based on approximate median exchange rate for year of 0.79 euro: 1 pound (source: 
European Central Bank 2010). 
** No objective is specified, but assumed to have equal chance of being activated as other non-
working younger people. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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6.4 Discussion of results and policy implications 
Results at the household level indicate that activation leads to substantially increased 
income, expenditure and greenhouse gas emissions for nearly all demographic 
groups, assuming that the activated can be fully integrated into the labour market 
with good quality jobs, as policy at least intends to do (about which, see below for 
more).  This suggests increasing the proportion of the population in paid work could 
have substantial impacts on national levels of greenhouse gases.  In practice 
however, the case study countries of the UK and the Netherlands both have high 
participation rates, and objectives for increasing rates further are thus fairly modest.  
The 2.6 percentage point increase being aimed for over 2008 levels in the UK, and 
the 5.7% increase in the Netherlands, are likely to increase national emissions by 6.0 
million and 1.7 million tonnes of CO2e per annum respectively, some 0.66% and 
0.62% of the total national emissions from the respective countries.  The similarity in 
the final percentage emissions increases masks substantial differences in the reasons 
for them in the two countries, with differing participation rate objectives and per 
household emissions increases due to activation both overall and for different 
demographic groups.   
 
These figures represent the emission arising from households only, and omit changes 
in state expenditure, which too leads to greenhouse gas emissions.  As more people 
are moved into paid labour, one can expect that one of the policy goals for which this 
objective is set, to reduce welfare benefits expenditure, will also be met.  Income tax 
receipts too should rise.  This will increase state financial resources for expenditure 
elsewhere.  Until recent times, this would likely have been spent in other areas of 
state activity, with the result that state emissions would also increase through 
increasing public sector consumption.  This is outside the scope of this research to 
model.  In practice, it is likely that today this money would instead be spent on debt 
repayments by the state, the effect being instead to reduce planned reductions in state 
expenditure slightly.  In either case, the net effect is that the increases in emissions 
estimated here are likely to be lower than the actual effect, as government 




Even omitting this effect, these increases in national greenhouse gas emissions are by 
no means insignificant, and shift UK and Dutch emissions in the wrong direction for 
the purposes of meeting greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals.  How do social 
and economic goals fare with these policies?  
 
In terms of economic goals, fiscal sustainability of the welfare state is a key issue, 
and increasing participation rates follows the employment-focused, adult worker 
model approach to modern welfare state reforms (chapter 2, section 2.2.1), in that the 
main source of income for individuals should be from paid labour, unless there is a 
specific reason why this is not possible, or desirable (e.g. when there is a dependent 
child or adult to be looked after).  Increasing participation rates reduce benefits 
payments for both the unemployed and the inactive (such as incapacity benefits), and 
boost income taxes receipts, although strong activation policy instruments to increase 
participation rates and support people to obtain the skills to find good quality jobs 
themselves require substantial funding (Jørgensen 2009).  Increasing labour supply 
should also increase production if there is demand enough for the extra labour, 
leading to economic growth. 
 
A key social goal of increasing participation rates in both countries is to reduce the 
disadvantages faced by specific demographic groups (as discussed above in section 
6.1).  Both countries specifically target activation measures at particular “at risk” 
groups, particularly older workers, lone parents (primarily in the UK), the disabled, 
ethnic minorities, and workless households, especially those in which children are 
present.  However, the only demographic groups with explicit participation rate 
objectives were older workers, lone parents (in the UK only), women (in the 
Netherlands only) and the working age population as a whole.  Despite this, the 
results indicate that the already high participation rates of demographic groups not 
considered as “at risk” means that meeting these objectives effectively require at risk 
individuals to be activated.  Achieving these goals de facto requires an increase in the 
low participation rates of at risk groups.  Although outside the scope of this thesis to 
investigate in detail, the results presented in this chapter show a clear reduction in the 
numbers of workless households, and a corresponding, usually substantial, increase 
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in the income and expenditure (and emissions) of activated households.  As these 
households are generally those at the bottom end of the income distribution, they are 
households where increasing income is likely to do most good, providing greater 
material comfort and security, and greater opportunities and capabilities to lead a 
happy, fulfilling life.  Child poverty would also be reduced, as the number of 
children in workless households would fall (especially the case for the UK, where 
over 16% of children live in workless households, the highest rate in the EU-27, and 
10% higher than the Dutch rate; EU Task-Force on Child Poverty and Child Well-
Being 2008:28–29).  Non-material wellbeing is also arguably improved, due to 
reduced dependence on the state and increased social inclusion.  It also reduces 
income inequality.  Increasing participation rates is not always unambiguously 
beneficial however, with the benefits for young children, particularly those of single 
parents (which account for more than half of the children in workless households in 
both the UK and the Netherlands; EU Task-Force on Child Poverty and Child Well-
Being 2008:29), and for those with high levels of sickness or disability, being 
particularly contested (Lewis 2006:390; Hetzler 2009).  Attempting to increase the 
working life of older working age adults also needs careful consideration as it 
extends the total work and income earned over the life course: this may meet 
economic goals, but for wellbeing and environmental sustainability, providing 
greater support to smooth income over the life course at a lower level to facilitate full 
or part time early retirement may be preferable, especially among higher income 
households. 
 
There is however an important proviso regarding the outcomes of the increases in 
participation rates modelled in this chapter, which has implications for the policy 
instruments used to achieve these objectives.  These results assume that all 
individuals not in paid work have an equal chance of moving into paid work
68
, and 
that households in which an individual is activated takes on the working hours, wage 
rates and job security of an otherwise equivalent household in the datasets used, 
effectively becoming equivalent in terms of the employment opportunities open to 
                                                 
68
 Section 6.2.2 of the research design above discussed a particular exception to this where the 
probability of activation is considered at the household level for workless couple households, with the 
male of the couple being assumed in the modelling to be the activated household member. 
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them now and in the future.  Whilst stated policy aims are to fully integrate the newly 
activated into the labour market as “insiders” in this way, there is a real risk of 
individuals, particularly those with low skills or multiple barriers to undertaking paid 
work, simply finding that they have to accept marginal, low paid and insecure work. 
In-work income poverty is already a serious issue, as the proportion of jobs which 
are low paid, limited hours, temporary or with poor conditions has expanded (Fraser, 
Gutiérrez, and Peña-Casas 2011:3), and a significant proportion of child poverty 
cases have parents in work, although in couple households there is only a small risk 
of child poverty if both parents are working, even part time (EU Task-Force on Child 
Poverty and Child Well-Being 2008:27,35). Low paid jobs and in-work poverty may 
particularly affect the newly activated, as those not already in paid work in many 
cases face multiple barriers to labour market entry, with a high proportion being 
incapacitated, long term unemployed and/or lone parents (Gregg, Harkness, and 
Macmillan 2006:52–57). This problem is heightened in the UK where there is a 
substantial share of the population without qualifications, who in turn make up a 
large share of the unemployed, and whose labour market position intensive policy 
efforts have so far done little to improve (Freud 2007).  Whilst moving people into 
marginal jobs might mean the participation rate objectives are met, the social and 
wellbeing benefits might not be realised, and household income might rise only 
marginally.  If this were the case, then the implications for the modelling in this 
chapter are that, on the one hand, the greenhouse gas impacts would not occur to the 
same degree as estimated but, on the other, neither would the positive increases in 
levels of income and expenditure among low income households.  In short, there 
would be smaller negative environmental impacts, but also smaller positive, or even 
negative, social and wellbeing impacts.  Alternatively, those furthest from the labour 
market, with “multiple disadvantages” might simply be sidelined, or “parked”, as the 
private sector employment services contracted to provide activation services in both 
the UK and the Netherlands “cream” the unemployed to find and focus on the most 
work ready, leaving those with multiple barriers to finding work un- or less 




The implication of these results for policy design is that, in line with the adult worker 
model, substantial wellbeing benefits could be achieved through activating workless 
households, improving their material wellbeing, reducing income inequality and 
increasing social inclusion, for comparatively small, but by no means insignificant, 
environmental impacts in terms of increased greenhouse gas emissions.  That said, 
policy instruments would need to focus on supporting people, through active labour 
market policies and lifelong learning, to find and secure fulfilling and adequately 
paid jobs, rather than simply low paid and marginal jobs.  Whilst the Dutch approach 
focuses on this, and is heralded as a model of flexicurity along with Denmark 
(Viebrock and Clasen 2009b:306–307), in large part due to its active labour market 
policies, the UK would need to focus on providing more such support to its 
workforce to improve low skill levels, boosting the “security” element in flexicurity 
(European Commission 2008:113). 
6.5 Summary 
The results presented in this chapter are apparently the first time the greenhouse gas 
implications of working time policy objectives have been estimated in the UK and 
the Netherlands, or anywhere else.  The hypothesis that current UK and Dutch policy 
objectives to increase participation rates will increase national greenhouse gas 
emissions is found to hold.  Current objectives represent moderate increases in 
participation rates over the 2008 situation for the working age population overall, 
with objectives too specifically for older workers, lone parents (in the UK) and 
women (in the Netherlands).  As such, greenhouse gas emissions increases are also 
estimated to be fairly small, at 0.62-0.67% of 2008 national emissions.  Increases in 
per household emissions as a result of activation are estimated to be large 
meanwhile, especially when a member of a workless household is activated, as 
household income and expenditure increase by similarly high amounts.  Given the 
distribution of current participation rates in the population, current objectives de 
facto mean that it is primarily the lower income and workless households where 
individuals would be activated.  Increasing participation rates could therefore 
contribute, as intended, to the social policy goals of reducing poverty, flattening 
income distributions in the population, reducing labour market exclusion (which is 
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often equated with social exclusion), and reducing the fiscal burden on the 
government of the welfare state, whilst also remaining true to the ideological 
approach enshrined in the adult worker model and welfare to work principles.  The 
relatively small increases in total national greenhouse gas emissions that arise as a 
result could even be considered an acceptable price to pay for improved conditions 
for socially disadvantaged groups, and for the resultant fiscal benefits to government, 
particularly in the current economic climate where tackling state budget deficits is 
high on the political agenda. 
 
However, for these scenario outcomes to occur, policy instruments need to be well 
designed to help ensure the newly activated have the skills and opportunities 
necessary to obtain incomes, jobs and career prospects equivalent to those of similar 
demographic groups which are already in work, and are not simply moved into 
marginal low paid jobs which do little to improve their income or wellbeing (despite 
this also doing less to increase greenhouse gas emissions). 
 
The results also emphasise the issue that working time policy, and its focus on 
increasing participation rates, makes no consideration of goals for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Every source of increasing emissions increases the 
already large scale of the challenge of achieving substantial reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions, and hence reducing the risk of dangerous climate change in the 
coming decades.  Explicit modelling and consideration of the environmental impacts 
of working time policies could help ensure increases in emissions are considered. 
 
In isolation, increasing participation rates among disadvantaged groups runs counter 
to environmental sustainability goals as greenhouse gas emissions increase.  
However, the ecological economics idea of using working time reduction as an 
environmental policy is that average working hours per person will reduce in the 
population, and work will become more evenly distributed, so that all who can meet 
their income needs through paid work do so (which is also in line with the principle 
of the adult worker model in social policy too: see chapter 2, section 2.3).  Increasing 
participation rates is therefore in keeping with the principles of working time 
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reduction, so long as it is done in conjunction with a more generalised reduction in 
average working times per person large enough to offset the resultant environmental 
impacts.  The next chapter considers this, looking at how working time policy could 
be used to reduce mean working hours per worker and increase the use of career 
breaks, to contribute to greenhouse gas reduction goals.  At the same time, it looks at 




Chapter 7 A greener work-life balance? Working time 
reduction and its potential for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions 
Reduction of the average time individuals spend in paid work, with proportionally 
equivalent reductions in gross earned income, has been suggested by various authors 
as one way to reduce the environmental impacts of affluent societies, as income, 
expenditure and hence consumption of market goods (the main driver of these 
impacts) all concurrently fall (e.g. Coote et al. 2010; Hayden 1999; Robinson 2006; 
Schor 2005).  This could be via shorter hours of work over the working week or 
longer periods outside the labour market via career breaks, be they for parental leave, 
skills training, early retirement or any other purpose.  In addition, evidence from the 
psychology literature on the factors contributing to happiness have been cited to 
suggest that this reduction of working time is at least a helpful precondition for 
achieving higher levels of wellbeing, by giving individuals more time to spend on 
social, caring, creative, personal development and spiritual activities that seem to 
contribute more to wellbeing than material consumption, at least once a certain level 
of material comfort is securely met (e.g. Speth et al. 2007).  Chapter 2, section 2.1, 
reviewed these arguments in detail. 
 
Previous chapters of this thesis have provided evidence to support the argument that 
working patterns affect greenhouse gas emissions.  Chapter 5 demonstrated that at 
the household level, the working patterns of a household’s members do, primarily via 
effects on income, affect consumption, and hence greenhouse gas emissions, at least 
in the UK and the Netherlands.  Chapter 6 estimated that this relationship would lead 
to measurable increases in national emissions in the UK and the Netherlands if 




To date however, little work has been undertaken to estimate the effects of working 
time reduction on greenhouse gas emissions.
69
  Details of the working time policy 
instruments that could be used to reconcile diverse environmental, social and 
economic goals are also generally specified in only quite general terms.  This chapter 
addresses these two issues.  Formally, it tests the hypothesis, developed in chapter 3 
(section 3.1), that: 
 
Reductions in average paid working time will substantially reduce national 
greenhouse gas emissions 
 
In the next section, the form of existing working time policy instruments in the UK 
and the Netherlands are summarised to provide policy context.  Belgian policy is also 
mentioned, as an example of innovative policy design in this area.  The chapter goes 
on to present the method by which the hypothesis will be tested, and to present the 
scenarios of working time reduction for which the greenhouse gas effects are 
estimated.  The reductions in working time modelled in these scenarios are intended 
to be of a comparable scale to the rights and opportunities provided by working time 
policies that already exist in different countries, particularly drawing on Dutch 
working time rights and the structure of the Belgian Time Credit Scheme, thus 
grounding the results in current policy best practice in this field.  In the subsequent 
section, the results are presented of the estimated effects of these scenarios, firstly  
on greenhouse gas emissions at the national and household level, and then on the 
concurrent changes in paid working time, looking both at the working age population 
as a whole and also at different demographic groups.  Following this, a discussion 
section summarises the results of the modelling undertaken and assesses the 
implications for the design of working time policy instruments which could achieve 
these diverse environmental, social and economic policy goals, drawing on the 
modified life course perspective developed in chapter 2 (section 2.3) to frame the 
discussion.  The final section briefly summarises the chapter. 
                                                 
69
 Spangenberg et al. (2002) and Victor (2008, 2011), mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.1.2, are 
notable exceptions, although they consider working time only broadly, in terms of average hours per 
capita, as one of a set of macroeconomic variables, without looking at patterns of work in the 
population in detail as is done in this thesis. 
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7.1 Context: Existing policy instruments for working time reduction 
in the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium 
This section presents some examples of more innovative policy design for working 
time reduction that already exist.  There is an extensive range of working time 
reduction policies at national, sectoral and employer level around the world, and this 
section is in no way intended to be comprehensive, but rather to present those 
schemes in operation in the two case study countries, and also in Belgium, whose 
Time Credit Scheme rights inform the design of the scenarios, and the discussion, in 
this chapter.  
 
Table 7.1 summarises basic working time reduction rights in the UK and the 
Netherlands, including retirement ages, maternity and paternity leave, rights to 
flexible working hours, and more.   The Netherlands also has a range of working 
time policies for the wider population, both collectively and individually determined, 
discussed below.  In the UK meanwhile, and in most other countries, rights and 
support for reduced working time are still primarily designed for specific life events 
in isolation (Delsen and Smits 2010), dealing with “old social risks” such as 





Table 7.1 UK and Dutch working time reduction rights (in 2009) 
Policy area UK Netherlands 
Retirement 
age 
65 (men), 60 (women) 65 
Maximum 
working hours 
48 (but employees may opt out of this limit) 48 (but typically less via collective agreement) 
Maternity 
leave 
52 weeks, which can start up to 11 weeks 
before due date. 
2 week compulsory following birth. 
Pay: 13 weeks at 90% of previous earnings (or 
flat rate if child is adopted), 33 weeks at flat 
rate (£124.88 per week in 2010); 13 weeks 
unpaid.  State financed. 
Around half of employers offer more leave; 
16% offer higher pay 
16 weeks (6 before, and 10 after birth). 
Leave is compulsory from 4 weeks before due 
date until 6 weeks after birth. 
Pay: 100% of earnings up to a ceiling of 
€186.65 per day (2010). State financed. 
Paternity 
leave 
2 weeks in the first 8 weeks after child’s birth. 
Pay: flat rate (£124.88 per week in 2010) 
18-19% of employers extend the minimum 
length and pay 
2 days in the first 4 weeks after birth of child. 
Pay: 100% of earnings, no ceiling. Paid by 
employer. 
Parental leave 13 weeks per parent per child 5 years or 
under; maximum of 4 weeks, in 1 week blocks, 
in any calendar year 
Parents of disabled children are entitled to 18 





Hours equivalent to 26 weeks’ work, per 
parent per child 7 years or under. Flexible 
usage, including use over a longer period of 
time, e.g. 52 weeks at half usual hours, or in 2-
3 blocks, with employer agreement. 
Pay: tax deduction equivalent to half minimum 
wage (€4.07 per hour taken). Public sector 
workers are paid at 70-75% of wages including 
the tax deduction. 
4 weeks parental leave entitlement for 
adopting parents, from 2 weeks before to 16 




Parents of children under 16 (under 18 if child 
is disabled) and carers of adults may request 
reduced working time or flexible hours.  
Employer may only refuse if there is a “clear 
business ground for doing so” 
All employees at organisations of 10 or more 
employees, who have worked for their 
employer for at least 1 year, may increase or 
decrease working hours. Employer may refuse 





“Reasonable” amount of time may be taken 
off work to deal with “unexpected or sudden 
emergencies”. Unpaid. 
Maximum 10 days leave per year for care of 
sick child, partner or parent. Employer paid at 
70% of income. 
Palliative care leave of hours equivalent to six 
weeks’ work. Unpaid. 
“Reasonable” amount of time for unexpected 
events.  100% pay from employer. 
Developments Various proposals are in consideration to 
extend paternity leave and increase 
transferability between men and women of 
childcare rights. 
Various proposals are in consideration to 
simplify and extend leave entitlements to 
cover more purposes and merge into a 
common system, particularly to extend 
parental leave flexibility and eligibility (to new 
employers). 
Working hours flexibility is also to be 
increased by allowing employees to request 
specific fixed periods of working hours 
reductions or increases. 




In the UK, policy is relatively sparse, focusing primarily on parents only.  In addition 
to parental leave, parents with children under 16 (or 18 if the child is disabled) have 
the right to request a reduction in paid working hours. 
 
Dutch working time policy meanwhile is some of the most innovative in the world, 
in intent if not in implementation. Policy is increasingly informed by the life course 
perspective (which, as described in chapter 2, has its origins in the Netherlands), 
which considers people’s contact with the labour market over the whole life course, 
offering a common framework for addressing people’s varying preferences and 
needs to alter their work life balance at different stages of life, for varying reasons, 
and how to support these.  As such, a full range of policies support individuals to 
alter their paid working patterns, with collective control of maximum weekly 
working hours, individual rights to alter these further, and support to take extended 
career breaks full or part time, lasting several years. Collective agreements between 
sectoral employers and unions allow national standard rights to be tailored and 
extended to meet the particular needs of different industries and types of employee.   
 
Collective working time moderation was instituted with the 1982 Wassenaar 
Agreement, which moderated working time and wages in a bid to minimise 
unemployment by sharing paid work among the population (International Labour 
Organization 2011).  The 2000 Adjustment of Working Hours Act meanwhile gives 
employees individualised, rather than collective, rights to reduce, or increase, their 
working hours.  Part time employment is commonplace, and part time employees 
have the same employment rights (pro rata) as full time, including access to 
provisions in any collective labour agreements (Fouarge and Baaijens 2004).  In 
2006 the Life Course Savings Scheme was introduced.  This provides employers the 
opportunity to take unpaid career breaks extending up to three years (Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment 2011).  Employees making use of the scheme first 
save into a special savings account, then later use these savings to cover periods of 
unpaid leave taken under the scheme.  In short, the scheme aims to meet the principle 
in the life course perspective of decoupling when an individual undertakes paid work 
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and when at least some of the resultant income is received, with the intention that 
transitions in and out of paid labour then become easier. 
 
There are however various issues with Dutch working time policies.  Childcare leave 
(i.e, maternity, paternity and parental leave) is limited in a comparative European 
perspective.  Parental leave is focused on part time leave via the hourly nature of the 
framing of the rights, and the low level of wage compensation, which reflects its 
primary aim of allowing parents (particularly women) to maintain labour market 
contact, part time, rather than exiting the labour market entirely: it is focused on 
maintaining labour market supply more than facilitating strong parental childcare 
(Plantenga and Remery 2009:50–51). Furthermore, despite the provision of extensive 
individual rights to alter working hours and take career breaks, takeup has been 
rather low.  Various barriers inhibit usage of these rights.  Usage of the Adjustment 
of Working Hours Act rights seems to be restricted by fear of employer disapproval 
(although part time work is already prevalent and working time reduction requests 
that are made are commonly accepted) (Fouarge and Baaijens 2004:13). Meanwhile, 
various political compromises made in the design of the Life Course Savings Scheme 
limits its usefulness for one of its primary intended functions: supporting leave for 
childcare.  A primary barrier to use of the rights is the requirement on the individual 
to save a share of their income into a special savings account in advance of a career 
break using the scheme.  This money is intended to cover unpaid career breaks, and 
must be drawn during such breaks at between 70 and 100% of the individual’s 
previous salary.  However, the maximum one can save into the account whilst in paid 
work is 12% of the current salary
70
 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
2011), meaning that to save for a three year career break with 70% of the previous 
salary takes a minimum of 17.5 years (in practice, this would be even longer if the 
individual’s salary increases over this period, as is likely).  One can see immediately 
that this makes it virtually impossible to use the scheme to take an extended career 
break for childcare leave.  Furthermore, it is unlikely individuals in their early 20s 
would already be in an employment and life situation to be planning financially with 
regard to their future children.  There is, in short, a “sequential error” in the design of 
                                                 
70
 Employees born between 1949 and 1955 are allowed to save at a higher rate if they wish to, to be 
able to save for early retirement. 
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the scheme: the individual only realistically has the capability to save enough to use 
the scheme after the time they would want to use it (for childcare leave) (Plantenga 
2005a:59–61).  Despite the limitations for use to support childcare leave, the scheme 
has more potential to be used for early retirement (when introduced, the scheme 
replaced the pre-existing early retirement policy in the Netherlands): individuals can 
retire up to three years in advance of the statutory age (currently 65) if the full 
amount allowed of 210% has been saved and it is used at the rate of 70% of the 
employee’s previous final salary (van der Meer and Leijnse 2005:17). 
 
Other substantial barriers to the scheme’s use also exist however.  For one thing, no 
new rights to a career break are actually given by the scheme: an employer can refuse 
any request for a career break that is not based on existing statutory or collectively 
agreed entitlements (such as for maternity leave) (van der Meer and Leijnse 
2005:17–18).  The exception is for long term leave for care purposes, for which the 
employer can only refuse if they can make the case that it would cause their 
organisation “serious problems” (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2011).  
There is thus a substantial risk to using the scheme: an employee may save for many 
years into the special savings account (for which there are, in addition, significant 
penalties if the money is withdrawn for any other purpose than a career break), only 
to find the employer refuses to grant a career break.   
 
The scheme does have some incentives to encourage use, and these are partly 
tailored to the reasons for use.  If it is used in conjunction with the statutory 
maternity leave entitlement then the state pays the woman approximately €650 per 
month as a tax discount (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2011).  
However, aside from this, the otherwise modest tax breaks provided to incentivise 
the scheme’s use (currently €195 income tax relief per year saved into the account; 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2011), together with the option for 
employers to contribute to an employee’s life course savings, are too little an 
incentive to overcome its limitations, and use of the scheme (in terms of employees 
holding a life course savings account, and thus potentially able to use the scheme for 
an unpaid career break in future) is persistently low, languishing at about 3.5% of the 
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employed workforce since its introduction.
71
  Takeup rates are higher among higher 
income earners (and hence also among males, older workers and full time workers), 
and also among those with partners, suggesting potential equity issues with access to 
the scheme for those with lower incomes, despite they having an interest in using the 
scheme (Delsen and Smits 2010).  Despite these issues, government commitment to 
the policy and to the life course approach is strong, and there are ongoing discussions 
on how to reform the policy: currently, it looks likely to be merged with a parallel 
savings scheme to make a new “Vitality scheme” (Molders and Broeder 2011). 
 
Along with the Netherlands, the other EU country with particularly innovative 
individual working time reduction rights enshrined in policy is Belgium, and here the 
use of these rights is extensive.  The Belgian Time Credit Scheme gives all private 
sector employees the right, at any point in their working career, to up to one year of 
career break, or part time equivalent (2 years at 50% of full time, or even 5 years at 
80% of full time).  Workers over the age of 50 who have had a working career of at 
least 20 years, and 3 years of “seniority” in the same firm, can take such working 
time reduction (at 50% or 80% of previous working hours) until their retirement. 
Public sector employees have access to a similar scheme.  There are additional rights, 
introduced in the late 1990s, to three-month, one-off “thematic” career breaks for 
childcare, medical and palliative care purposes (Debacker et al. 2004:6,8–9).  Unlike 
the Dutch Life Course Scheme, employers are generally obliged to accept career 
break requests from their employees, although there is a threshold of 5% of 
employees in an organisation who may be on TCS leave at any one time (further 
applicants are placed in a queue prioritised by the purpose of the break, e.g. care 
leave is prioritised).  In addition, employers must give employees back their jobs on 
their return.  Pay during the break varies, but is generally low, and up to a maximum 
€592 per month for full time breaks, with a supplement in Flanders (Merla and 
Deven 2010:61–62).  Career breakers are otherwise left to manage their own finances 
during the career break, unlike the Dutch scheme, making the policy simpler to run 
and to implement.  The scheme is well used, with 2.5% of the working population 
                                                 
71
 Groenendijk and Keuzenkamp (2010) for 2007, and own calculations for 2010, based on: 270,000 
life course accounts existing in 2010 (Molders and Broeder 2011), whilst the number of employees 
(Labour Force Survey definition, as described in chapter 6) was 7.87 million in 2008 (Eurostat 2009). 
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making use of it at any one time in 2008, and nearly 6% participating over the course 
of 2006, close to the theoretical maximum given the design of the policy.  Among 
older workers over 50 years, 15% participated.  Use is increasingly for part time 
rather than full time breaks (Merla and Deven 2010:64; Devisscher and Sanders 
2007:123).  However, usage has also been “limited to a rather privileged group of 
persons”: mostly relatively high income, two earner families (Devisscher and 
Sanders 2007:123) with more financial resources to be able to afford a career break. 
By gender, takeup is primarily by women among younger workers, but the balance is 
quite equal among older workers (Devisscher and Sanders 2007:123).  Despite, or 
because of, the scheme’s popularity among employees, it faces some pressures.  
Government expenditure on the benefits it provides during breaks, and the 
administration of the scheme, is substantial, and growing (Debacker et al. 2004).  
Employer approval of the form of the policy meanwhile is rather low, particularly the 
limited ability to refuse use to employees, with employers reporting that the 80% of 
full time option in particular is problematic for them to accommodate.  
7.2 Research design 
7.2.1 Data used 
As elsewhere in the thesis, and described in detail in chapter 4 (section 4.2) Dutch 
and UK household expenditure surveys (the 2000 budgetonderzoek and 2004 
Expenditure and Food Survey) are combined with environmental data to estimate the 
mean greenhouse gas emissions from different demographic groups.  These sample 
means can then be extrapolated to estimate national emissions using data from the 
Carbon Footprint of Nations project (www.carbonfootprintofnations.com, and 
Hertwich and Peters 2009) (see section 4.3.3 for details). 
7.2.2 Approach and scenarios modelled 
This chapter estimates the effect on the greenhouse gas emissions arising from 
household consumption of different scenarios of reduced working hours and career 
breaks in the UK and Dutch economies.  When a household member reduces their 
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paid working hours, it is assumed that, on average, the household’s total income, 
expenditure and emissions will also reduce in line with the regression models for UK 
and Dutch household greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure developed in 
chapter 5. Household Emissions Intensities should also increase slightly in line with 
the regression models in chapter 5.  This partly offsets the fall in emissions that arise 
due to the fall in total expenditure in the scenarios, but only to a small extent, as 
Household Emissions Intensity varies with income far less than does expenditure. 
The regression models in chapter 5 enable estimates of household greenhouse gas 
emissions, expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity to be made based on the 
working patterns of the head of household and partner (if present), the wage rates of 
these individuals, income from other sources, the presence of other children (and 
their ages) and adults in the household, the head of household or male education 
level and age and, for the UK, the geographic region in which they live.  This chapter 
focuses primarily on emissions however, as this is the key variable of interest (the 
changes in expenditure and Housheold Emissions Intensity can be largely inferred 
without detailed modelling).  Based on the regression models, the changes in 
emissions can be estimated for any given household based on a reduction in working 
hours determined by the details of the scenario being modelled, by measuring the 
difference between the household’s estimated emissions before and after the change 
in working patterns.  These household level results can be used to calculate mean 
changes in emissions for different demographic groups, which in turn can be 
extrapolated to the national level to calculate the estimated reductions in national 
emissions from different demographic groups under the different scenarios. 
 
The scenarios modelled in this chapter are described below.  The size of changes in 
working patterns in the scenarios are substantial, but are still designed to keep within 
the boundaries of the model’s assumptions (which were presented in chapter 3, 
section 3.8): in particular, the model is a linear one so cannot account for the 
systemic effects extreme levels of working time reduction would result in.   
 
The levels of working time reduction are, at the same time, intended to be 
realistically achievable, in that they are designed to be within the range of 
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opportunities already found in existing best practice policy instruments.  The career 
breaks modelled approximately follow the opportunities provided by, and levels of 
use of, the Belgian Time Credit Scheme and associated “thematic” leave rights 
described above, and also fall well within the options more weakly supported by the 
Dutch Life Course policy.  The reductions in working hours modelled are also well 
within the rights provided by the Dutch Adjustment of Working Hours Act.  Possible 
policy instruments to realise the outcomes modelled here are discussed in section 7.4.   
 
The reductions in working hours and career breaks modelled are additional to those 
already present in the two countries.  The scenarios modelled are presented below: 
 
Baseline: Data as they appear based on the datasets, with no change in working 
patterns. 
Scenario 0: estimates household greenhouse gas emissions based on the baseline 
data using the regression models in chapter 5.  Changes in emissions 
arising in the scenarios below are calculated in comparison to these 
Scenario 0 estimates rather than the actual emissions observed from the 
households in the datasets, to obtain more realistic results (although the 
effect on the results of doing this is negligible). 
Scenario 1: A 20% reduction in working hours of all full time workers (those 
working >35 hours per week).  Equivalent to a reduction to a 4-day 
week, or 3.5 compressed-hours days, which would offer scope for 
factories to have two workers per job for a 7-day operating week. 
Scenario 2: Specific increases in career breaks for particular demographic groups, 
similar to the Belgian Time Credit Scheme core and thematic leave 
rights: 
2.a.: One year total career break over working career (for aged 20 to 
retirement age), modelled as 4 of 3 month career breaks over the career.  
Assuming a 40-year working life, this is modelled as 10% of workers in 
any one year taking a 3 month career break (this is approximately 
equivalent to 5% taking 6-month breaks, or 2.5% taking one-year 
breaks, in line with Belgian Time Credit Scheme takeup rates). 
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2.b.: 3 month increase in male and female parental leave rights for children 
under the age of 5.  100% takeup as a single, 3-month, block 
(equivalent to 25% of working males and females with children under 5 
in any one year). 
2.c.: 3 month increase in medical/palliative care leave for male and female 
older workers.  It is assumed 1 in 15 older workers use this career break 
right in any one year.  Over a theoretical 15 year working period from 
aged 50 to 64, a worker would therefore use it once on average.  
However, many workers retire earlier, and female retirement age in the 
UK was 60 in the period of study, not 65 as it is for males, so under the 
assumptions of this scenario a significant proportion of these 
individuals would retire without having made use of this right. 
Scenario 3: All the above combined. 
 
Three month career breaks are modelled as a 25% reduction in mean working hours 
for the year (this accurately estimates the income effects, and it is assumed that the 
household will smooth consumption over this period without difficulties, so that 
expenditure and greenhouse gas effects are also reliably estimated). 
7.2.3 Household level 
For each scenario, a specific change in the working hours of the head of household 
and partner, if present, is modelled for the households sampled in the household 
expenditure survey datasets.  The changes in working hours are used to estimate the 
concurrent reduction in the individual’s gross earned income, assuming wage rate is 
unaffected.  These changes are then entered into the models developed in chapter 5 to 
produce estimates of the resultant reductions in household greenhouse gas emissions 
and expenditure. 
 
For scenario 2, not every individual uses the career break rights at any one time.  For 
any given household, there is the possibility that workers within it either do, or do 
not, take a career break in that year.  For dual earner households, there are the 
possibilities of only one, either the male, or the female, or both, or neither, taking a 
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career break.  The greenhouse gas and expenditure effects of each of these 
possibilities is calculated for each household.  The total reduction in greenhouse 
gases, and expenditure, from a given household is then estimated to be the sum of the 
reduction for each possibility multiplied by the probability of a household being in 
that situation.  Taking the example of scenario 2a for a dual earner household, there 
is a 10% chance of the male taking a career break in the year of the survey, and a 
10% chance of the female taking a career break.  There is thus a 1% chance of both 
taking a career break, a 9% chance of just the male taking one, a 9% chance of just 
the female taking one, and an 81% chance of neither taking one.  The estimated 
reductions in greenhouse gases and expenditure for the household are based on the 
reduction that would arise if both were taking a career break multiplied by 0.1, the 
reduction if the male only took a career break multiplied by 0.09, and the reduction if 
the female only took a career break multiplied by 0.09 (the reduction if neither took a 
career break is zero). 
7.2.4 National level 
Mean reductions in working hours, income, expenditure and greenhouse gas 
emissions are calculated for each scenario for different demographic groups, 
excluding households for which required data are missing.
72
  Means are then 
extrapolated to the national level based on the distribution of the population observed 
in the datasets (including households for which required data were missing), so that 
neither household means nor national totals are affected by missing data. 
 
Results are presented for six different demographic groups.  These follow the groups 
used elsewhere in the thesis, determined on the basis that they have significantly 
different capabilities and preferences to use any working time opportunities open to 
them, and contribute, both per household and in total, substantially different amounts 
to the savings in greenhouse gas emissions modelled here. 
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 Older working age households (at least one of working age, and head of 
household/male aged 50 years or over): 
 Couples  
 Singles 
 Younger working age households (head of household/male under 50): 
 Couples with children 
 Couples without children 
 Single with children 
 Single without children 
 
Note that “couples” refers to households in which the head of household lives with a 
partner, plus possibly other household members (dependent children, and other 
adults).  “Single” refers to households in which the head of household does not live 
with a partner, but other household members may live there. 
 
Results are also split and presented in the chapter by income quintile (based on the 
baseline situation, before any reductions in working hours) equivalised using the 
OECD method described in chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.  This enables an analysis of 
the different contributions to emissions savings arising from different income groups.  
This is important to consider as the lowest income quintile is likely to have severely 
limited capabilities to reduce hours and take career breaks without reducing income 
unacceptably. 
7.2.5 Methodological issues 
It is assumed in the modelling that levels of state benefit, and other sources of 
income other than the paid labour of the head of household and, if present, partner, 
are unchanged as a result of changes in working time.  Benefit payments are 
frequently means-tested, so that in theory the reductions in working hours and 
subsequent reductions in incomes modelled here could increase levels of benefits 
received by a household.  The assumption that they do not change in the scenarios is 
partly due to the complexity of accurately modelling the benefits received by 
households in the two countries, particularly in the Netherlands where it is not simple 
to disaggregate household benefits received from other sources of non-earned 
income in the dataset.  Equally however, benefits form but a minor source of income 
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for all but the poorest households, many of which are not in paid work.  The 
assumption that benefits payments are unaltered by working time changes is 
therefore likely to substantially affect estimates of changes to greenhouse gas 
emissions only for the lowest income band of households, which as results in the 
chapter show, contribute only a very small proportion of the total estimated 
emissions reductions.  As such, this assumption should have little effect on the 
estimates made here.  Tax and benefits payments, the lowest income band, and their 
relation to achieving the emissions reductions modelled here, are nevertheless 
discussed in section 7.4. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Effects of working time reduction scenarios on greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 below show the greenhouse gas emissions reductions in the 
UK and the Netherlands arising from the different scenarios of reduced working 
hours and career breaks.  Total emissions from working age households are presented 
for the different scenarios. The reduction in emissions under the different scenarios 
compared to the baseline are also presented as tonnages per year and as a percentage.  
 
In both countries, by far the biggest reductions in emissions occur under Scenario 1, 
in which full time workers are assumed to reduce their working hours by 20%, 
equivalent to one day per week, or to shorter daily hours over five days or longer 
hours for 3.5 days per week. Emissions from working age households fall by some 
4.2% in the UK under this scenario, 24 million tonnes per annum, and 6.4% in the 
Netherlands, 9.9 million tonnes CO2e per annum.  These represent a reduction in total 
national greenhouse gas emissions of 2.6% and 3.7% respectively (assuming that 
emissions from the state are unaffected: see the discussion, section 7.4, for more on 




Reductions due to scenario 2, in which certain individuals take 3 month career breaks 
over the year (equivalent to a 25% reduction in working hours for that year) are 
estimated to be somewhat lower.  In the UK, scenario 2 reductions are estimated to 
be 5.6 million tonnes per annum in total, 0.6% of all national emissions, with 
approximately 60% of this resulting from the 10% takeup of career breaks across the 
whole working population, and 40% arising from higher takeup rates of specific 
career breaks for increased parental leave and for care responsibilities among older 
workers.  In the Netherlands, scenario 2 reductions are somewhat higher at 1% of 
national emissions, or 2.6 million tonnes per annum, again split roughly 60-40 
between the two career break types.   
 
Combined as scenario 3, the two scenarios are estimated to lead to a reduction in UK 
emissions from working age households of some 5.1%, or 28.6 million tonnes CO2e 
per annum.  This is equivalent to a 3.1% fall in total national emissions.  Reductions 
in the Netherlands are proportionally larger, the 12.1 million tonnes per annum being 
equivalent to 8.0% of emissions from working age households, 4.5% of total Dutch 
emissions. Note that the total savings in scenario 3 are less than the other two 
scenarios added together: this is because reductions in scenario 1 due to reduced 
working hours reduce the per household reductions achieved due to a subsequent 
career break in scenario 2, as household incomes, and so expenditure and emissions, 




Table 7.2 Greenhouse gas emissions reductions arising from different scenarios of working time reduction in the UK 
  Scenario 






in full time 
working hours 







  a: 10% takeup 
per year by all 
working 
adults 






and; 1 in 15 
take up per 






from all working 
age households 
Tonnes CO2e per year 
 
566,194,487 542,287,071 562,680,386 564,071,566 560,557,465 537,602,861 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all working age 
households 
100% 96% 99% 100% 99% 95% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all households 
82% 78% 81% 81% 81% 77% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from country 
62% 59% 62% 62% 61% 59% 
Reductions over 
Scenario 0 
Tonnes CO2e per year 
 
- 23,907,417 3,514,101 2,122,921 5,637,022 28,591,626 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all working age 
households 
- 4.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.0% 5.1% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all households 
- 3.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8% 4.1% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from country 
- 2.6% 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 3.1% 




Table 7.3 Greenhouse gas emissions reductions arising from different scenarios of working time reduction in the Netherlands 
  Scenario 






in full time 
working hours 







  a: 10% takeup 
per year by all 
working 
adults 






and; 1 in 15 
take up per 






from all working 
age households 
Tonnes CO2e per year 
 
154,332,700 144,476,497 152,774,815 153,244,984 151,687,099 142,241,400 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all working age 
households 
100% 94% 99% 99% 98% 92% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all households 
88% 83% 87% 88% 87% 81% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from country 
58% 54% 57% 57% 57% 53% 
Reductions over 
Scenario 0 
Tonnes CO2e per year 
 
- 9,856,203 1,557,885 1,087,716 2,645,602 12,091,301 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all working age 
households 
- 6.4% 1.1% 0.7% 1.7% 8.0% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from all households 
- 5.6% 0.9% 0.6% 1.5% 6.9% 
As a percentage of baseline 
emissions from country 
- 3.7% 0.6% 0.4% 1.0% 4.5% 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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These reductions are substantial.  Where in the population do they arise from?  The 
next paragraphs present the sources of emissions reductions disaggregated by key 
demographic groups and then by income. Households with children, and older 
households, are key groups targeted by working time policies relating to work family 
balance and (early) retirement, and here too have special leave arrangements in 
scenario 2.  Income is also a key factor to consider: it affects both the emissions of 
households, and also their capabilities to use career break and reduced working hours 
opportunities that are presented to them.   
 
Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 break the reductions in emissions down by demographic 
group for each of the scenarios.  For all the scenarios in both countries, the largest 
reductions in emissions come from younger working age couple households with 
children.  36-38% of emissions reductions come from this group in scenario 1, 48-
55% in scenario 2, and 38-41% in scenario 3.  In the UK, the next largest reductions 
come from older working age couple households, representing approximately 27% of 
total reductions in all scenarios.  After that, younger working age couple households 
without children are the next largest contributor to reductions in the UK, with other 
groups representing small shares.  In the Netherlands, the contributions of these two 
groups varies more between scenarios in relative importance, but are of similar 






Figure 7.1 Total national reductions in UK greenhouse gas emissions for different 
scenarios of reduced working time, by demographic group 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 7.2 Total national reductions in Dutch greenhouse gas emissions for different 
scenarios of reduced working time, by demographic group 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
 257 
The results above indicate that older couple households and younger couple 
households, especially those with children, represent the major source of savings in 
greenhouse gas emissions under the scenarios.  The share of total reductions coming 
from different demographic groups depends on the relative sizes of the groups (in 
terms of the proportion of households they represent) and the mean reductions in 
emissions per household in the group (in turn dependent on various factors such as 
mean income, working patterns and participation rates, and hence levels of working 
time reduction in the scenarios).  As presented in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 below, 
those demographic groups contributing the largest share of greenhouse gas 
reductions are those representing the highest proportion of households.  Couple 
households also have higher mean reductions in emissions per household under the 
scenarios than do single households.  Whilst couple households with children have 
lower mean reductions in emissions than do younger couples without children, they 
still contribute the largest share of total greenhouse gas reductions thanks to being 
the largest demographic group.  The larger share of reductions coming from younger 
working age single households without children in the Netherlands compared to the 
UK can also be attributed to the comparatively larger share of households that they 





Table 7.4 Mean emissions reductions by scenario for each demographic group, and 
percentage of working age population each group represents, UK 
  Demographic group Scenario         





in per household 
greenhouse gas 
emissions: kg 





All working age 
households 
952 140 85 225 1,139 
  4.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.0% 5.1% 
Older working age single 307 48 32 80 375 
  2.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.6% 2.7% 
Older working age couple 997 150 88 238 1,196 
  3.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8% 4.2% 
Younger working age 
single, no children   
575 79 - 79 639 
4.2% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 4.7% 
Younger working age 
single, with child(ren) 
172 36 20 56 222 
1.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 1.4% 
Younger working age 
couple, no children 
1,552 213 - 213 1,727 
6.6% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 7.4% 
 Younger working age 
couple, with child(ren) 
1,260 189 210 399 1,592 




(this is unchanged 
by the scenarios) 
All working age 
households 
100.0%     
Older working age single 9.3%     
Older working age couple 25.5%     
Younger working age 
single, no children  
15.4%     
Younger working age 
single, with child(ren) 
8.2%     
Younger working age 
couple, no children  
14.4%     
Younger working age 
couple, with child(ren) 
27.3%     





Table 7.5 Mean emissions reductions by scenario for each demographic group, and 
percentage of working age population each group represents, Netherlands 
  Demographic group Scenario         





in per household 
greenhouse gas 
emissions: kg 





All working age 
households 
1,990 314 220 534 2,441 
  6.4% 1.1% 0.7% 1.7% 8.0% 
Older working age single 531 97 65 162 671 
  2.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.9% 3.5% 
Older working age couple 1,843 281 175 456 2,223 
  5.0% 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 6.1% 
Younger working age 
single, no children  
1,427 215 - 215 1,606 
8.1% 1.2% 0.0% 1.2% 9.2% 
Younger working age 
single, with child(ren) 
520 148 106 254 754 
2.1% 0.6% 0.4% 1.0% 3.0% 
Younger working age 
couple, no children 
3,054 466 - 466 3,443 
8.8% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 10.0% 
Younger working age 
couple, with child(ren) 
2,658 428 595 1,023 3,526 












All working age 
households 
100.0%     
Older working age single 9.0%     
Older working age couple 21.7%     
Younger working age 
single, no children  
20.1%     
Younger working age 
single, with child(ren) 
5.3%     
Younger working age 
couple, no children  
15.3%     
Younger working age 
couple, with child(ren) 
28.6%     
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
The effect of the household’s income band on its emissions reductions is also, as 
would be expected, very important.  Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 present total emissions 
reductions from working age households split into quintiles based on their OECD 
equivalised per capita income.   
 
The disparity between income bands is marked, particularly in the UK.  In the UK, 
the lowest income quintile accounts for just 1-3% of emissions reductions in the 
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different scenarios, whilst the highest income quintile accounts for 42-47% of total 
reductions.  In the Netherlands, the results are slightly less divergent, but still highly 
unequal: the lowest income band contributes 5-8% of total reductions, and the 
highest 25-37%.   
 
The results are as would be expected.  Under the scenarios, both the probability of 
using working time reduction opportunities, and the fall in income, and hence 
expenditure and emissions, which result, increase with household income band. This 
effect is only slightly offset by the fact that Household Emissions Intensities are 
lower in higher income households: the difference in the size of changes in 
expenditure between the income quintiles is far larger than the difference in 
Household Emissions Intensity, so that emissions still fall the most in higher income 
bands.  The lowest income households are much less likely to be in (full time) paid 
work (as seen in chapter 6), so that a much smaller share of these households will 
reduce hours or take career breaks in the scenarios.  At the same time, those 
individuals in lower income bands which do reduce working time will typically have 
much lower wage rates, so that their reductions in income, and hence expenditure 
and emissions, will also be much lower.  Hence, both the proportionate and absolute 






Figure 7.3 Total national reductions in UK greenhouse gas emissions for different 
scenarios of reduced working time, by per capita equivalised income quintile of 
household 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 7.4 Total national reductions in Dutch greenhouse gas emissions for different 
scenarios of reduced working time, by per capita equivalised income quintile of 
household 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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7.3.2 Effects of working time reduction scenarios on working patterns and 
income 
Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 present summary statistics of the size of the reductions in 
total working hours in the two economies for the different scenarios, and their 
subsequent effects on income, expenditure and so emissions.   
 
One can see that in both countries, the effects of the scenarios on the total working 
hours in the two economies is similar, with scenario 1 being the predominant 
contributor to the total reduction in working hours in the scenario 3 total, and the 
career breaks of scenario 2 contributing a relatively minor amount.  The policies, 
especially for scenario 1, affect a large proportion of the population in both countries, 
the lower figures in the Netherlands for scenario 1 reflecting the already higher 
prevalence of part time work there compared to the UK.  With similar demographics 
and participation rates, scenario 2 has similar effects in both countries in terms of the 
proportions of the workforce affected by it. 
 
Greater differences are apparent in the tables for the effects on income and 
expenditure.  In the UK, the reduction in total gross income in the working age 
population is 15.9% for all the working time policies combined (scenario 3).  This 
then results in a 6.3% drop in expenditure, in turn leading to a 5.1% drop in 
emissions from these households.  In the Netherlands meanwhile, total gross income 
drops by a smaller 12.5%, but the effect on expenditure is much greater, as it drops 
8.8%, which in turn means total emissions from working age households drops by 





Table 7.6 Effects of scenarios on working patterns, incomes, expenditure and 
greenhouse gas emissions, for UK working age households 
  Scenario         
  1 2a 2b & c 2 – total 
of 2a-c 
3 – total 
of 1 & 2 
Reduction in total work hours in 
economy (as a percentage of baseline, 
from working age households) 
17% 2% 1% 4% 20% 
Percentage of workforce using policy 
(reducing hours among full time 
workers by 20% in scenario 1, or taking 
3-month career break in senarios 2a to 
2c), or at least one in scenario 3* 
74% 10% 6% 16% 79% 
Reduction in total gross income (as a 
percentage of baseline from working 
age households) 
13.3% 2.0% 1.2% 3.1% 15.9% 
Reduction in total gross expenditure (as 
a percentage of baseline from working 
age households) 
5.2% 0.7% 0.4% 1.2% 6.3% 
Reduction in total national emissions 
(as a percentage of baseline emissions 
from working age households) 
4.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.0% 5.1% 
*This counts the proportion of working heads of household and partners, if present, who have 
reduced working hours or taken career breaks under the given scenario. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Table 7.7 Effects of scenarios on working patterns, incomes, expenditure and 
greenhouse gas emissions, for Dutch working age households 
  Scenario         
  1 2a 2b & c 2 – total 
of 2a-c 
3 – total 
of 1 & 2 
Reduction in total work hours in 
economy (as a percentage of baseline, 
from working age households) 
15% 2% 2% 4% 19% 
Percentage of workforce using policy 
(reducing hours among full time 
workers by 20% in scenario 1, or taking 
3-month career break in senarios 2a to 
2c), or at least one in scenario 3* 
65% 10% 7% 17% 71% 
Reduction in total gross income (as a 
percentage of baseline from working 
age households) 
10.2% 1.6% 1.1% 2.8% 12.5% 
Reduction in total gross expenditure (as 
a percentage of baseline from working 
age households) 
7.2% 1.2% 0.9% 2.0% 8.8% 
Reduction in total national emissions 
(as a percentage of baseline emissions 
from working age households) 
6.4% 1.1% 0.7% 1.7% 8.0% 
*This counts the proportion of working heads of household and partners, if present, who have 
reduced working hours or taken career breaks under the given scenario. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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The working hours reductions in scenario 1 clearly represent a larger change in 
working patterns than the career breaks of scenario 2, and so it is worth presenting 
more details of the effects it has on working patterns.  Scenario 1 assumes substantial 
changes in the paid working hours of the population, with all individuals working 
over 35 hours per week reducing their working hours by 20%.  The effect of this can 
be seen in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 below.  These show the working patterns of men 
and women who live together (i.e. couple households), which represent the majority 
of individuals.  The baseline figures show the distribution of working patterns as 
found in the UK (2004-5) and Dutch (2000) datasets, to allow the changes under the 
scenario to be better seen.  The scenario 1 figures show the effect of the scenario in 
which full time workers reduce their hours by 20%. 
 
In the UK, apart from no worker households, the pattern that is seen in the baseline 
data is most commonly of a women either not working or working full time, but with 
significant numbers spread across the spectrum of working hours.  The male 
generally is working full time, with a much higher predominance of long hours of 
work (>40 per week) than for the woman.  There are few cases where the woman in a 
household works longer hours than the man.  The effect of scenario 1 is that there is 
a compression of working patterns, with a much larger share of households now 
following a “2 x ¾” working pattern, in which both male and female work around ¾ 
of full time hours.  Extremely long hours of work are much less common than in the 
baseline.  There is much greater equality in working hours between the male and 
female in households as a result of the scenario. 
 
In the Netherlands meanwhile, female working patterns in the baseline situation are 
much more evenly spread between no work and full time, but with substantially more 
than the UK not working at all.  Male working hours, like the UK, are mostly full 
time, but with more men tending to work shorter hours (down to 30 per week) and 
far fewer working long hours (over 40 per week), a marked contrast to the UK 
situation.  As a result of this different starting point, scenario 1 in the Netherlands 
results in far more households working 2 x ¾ or less (with the female generally being 
the one working less than ¾ of full time).  Full time work is fairly uncommon in 
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scenario 1 in the Netherlands: the Dutch part time society alluded to by Visser (2002) 
really does become reality. 
 
Due to the currently longer typical working hours of men compared to women in 
both countries, the effect of scenario 1 is a shift to more gender equal working 





Figure 7.5 Change in couple household working patterns between baseline situation and 
















































Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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Figure 7.6 Change in couple household working patterns between baseline situation and 

















































Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
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Across income bands, Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 show mean male and female 
working hours of those in paid work for all working age households, single and 
couple.  Mean working hours in the baseline situation increase with household 
income, particularly for women.  Working hours are on average substantially longer 
for men than women, over 10 hours per week difference in both countries, although 
the difference is smaller at higher incomes.  Dutch working hours for both genders, 
but particularly for women, are also substantially shorter than their British 
counterparts. 
 
As a result, the effect of scenario 1 is that male hours on average fall far more than 
do female, by almost 10 hours per week for men, and around 3-4 for women.  There 
is thus greater equality in working patterns between men and women in general, 
following the pattern found above for couple households.  Working hours differences 
across income bands also reduce, particularly for women, although there remain 





Figure 7.7 Male and female mean working hours by per capita equivalised income 





















Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
 
Figure 7.8 Male and female mean working hours by per capita equivalised income 



























7.4.1 Summary of results 
This chapter has modelled the estimated effects on greenhouse gas emissions from 
household consumption arising from different scenarios of reduced working hours.  
The hypothesis tested in this chapter is found to hold: working time reduction does 
lead to reductions in emissions, under the assumptions in the model.   The scenarios 
modelled here are by no means an exhaustive set of options for reductions in 
working time.  To fit with the assumptions in the modelling, there was a need to 
focus on smaller changes in working patterns than some authors propose (e.g. Coote 
et al. 2010).  Hence it was not, for example, considered possible to model cuts in 
weekly hours of 50% or so, or of long periods of career break spanning several years, 
as is in principle possible under the Dutch Life Course Savings Scheme.  Chapter 3 
(section 3.8) discussed the modelling assumptions in detail.  In brief, the bigger the 
change in working patterns modelled, the more likely the model assumptions are to 
not hold.  Household decisions around working and spending patterns under large 
working time reductions might differ substantially from those found in the datasets 
upon which the scenario results are based: they might, for example, smooth their 
income differently, have different opportunities to borrow, or draw down savings, or 
have different expected lifetime incomes, compared to the households in the datasets 
used.  Systemic effects would also become increasingly large with larger working 
time reductions: changes in product prices and wage rates, as both consumer demand 
and labour supply reduced substantially, would have increasing effects on 
consumption patterns (not just in the UK and the Netherlands but globally) (Alcott 
2008) that are not considered in the model. For these reasons, smaller but still 
substantial working time reductions were modelled in this chapter for which 
household behaviour, and the resultant effects on greenhouse gas emissions, are more 
likely to follow that observed in the data. 
 
Scenario 1 represents a general reduction in the mean weekly hours of full time 
workers of 20%.  Scenario 2 meanwhile models a substantial career break scheme, 
along the lines of the rights and patterns of use of the Belgian Time Credit Scheme.  
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Scenario 2’s components simulate a realistic scenario in which individuals, alongside 
usage of such rights at a background rate of one three-month career break per decade 
in paid work, also take up one extra three-month break for childcare per child under 
5, with many also taking another in the later stage of the working life, primarily for 
medical or palliative care purposes.  Scenario 3 combines Scenarios 1 and 2. 
 
The results above indicate that Scenario 1 especially, a general reduction in full time 
working hours, would have a substantial effect in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, reducing emissions from working age households by 4.2% in the UK, and 
6.4% in the Netherlands.  A career break scheme with similar rights and levels of use 
as the Belgian Time Credit Scheme meanwhile leads to a more modest but still 
significant reduction of 1.0% of working age household emissions in the UK, and 
1.7% in the Netherlands.  Combined, the two policies would lead to an estimated 
5.1% reduction in emissions from these households in the UK, and 8.0% in the 
Netherlands.  As emissions from these households represent just a proportion of both 
countries’ total emissions, these total reductions are equivalent to 3.1% and 4.5% 
respectively of total national emissions.  The annual tonnage reductions, 28.6 million 
tonnes CO2e in the UK, 12.1 million in the Netherlands, are approximately equivalent 





The marked differences between the two countries in the percentage reductions in 
emissions reflect numerous differences in socio-economic conditions and household 
behaviour between the two countries.  These differences are reflected both in the 
regression models of household behaviour developed in chapter 5 and used in this 
chapter for estimating the effects of the scenarios, and in the household expenditure 
and environmental data used.  For one thing, the relationship between gross income 
and expenditure varies between the countries, which may be due to differences in tax 
systems, benefits received, the household members’ own estimation of their likely 
lifetime income (a predictor of expenditure), availability and propensity to use credit 
facilities or to save, all in turn affected by cultural attitudes relating to debt, 
                                                 
73
 Source: www.carbonfootprintofnations.com 
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consumption behaviour, impacts of working patterns and career breaks on future 
income and career prospects, perceived economic security, etc.  The relationship 
between income and Household Emissions Intensity also varies, reflecting both 
differences in the share of total expenditure that goes on different types of good and 
service between the two countries, and also differences in the calculated product 
emissions intensities of like products between the two countries. The result is that the 
change in household greenhouse gas emissions for a given level of working time 
change differs between the two countries.  At the same time, the markedly longer 
working hours of full time workers in the UK compared to the Netherlands means 
that Scenario 1’s working hours reductions are proportionally larger in the UK than 
in the Netherlands.  Without this latter consideration, the emissions reductions in the 
Netherlands would, proportionally to the UK’s, be even larger than they already are. 
 
It should be noted that the results reflect only near-term emissions reductions arising 
from reductions in private consumption by those households reducing working hours 
and/or taking career breaks.  Two factors, discussed in section 3.8, mean that these 
are likely to underestimate the total reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
occurring.  Firstly, future expenditure may be reduced in the households which 
reduce working hours or take career breaks as, on the one hand, lower income 
households on average save a smaller proportion of their income, so they will have 
fewer savings to spend in future and, on the other hand, future working time and 
wage rates may be reduced due to accustomisation to having less paid work and due 
to reduced opportunities on the labour market, i.e. negative career impacts.  As 
discussed in chapter 3, and more below, this latter effect on future labour market 
contact can to a large extent be addressed by policy, whilst normalisation of working 
time reduction through popular use precludes employees facing discrimination 
arising from it.  The former effect of reduced savings means that there are emissions 
reductions what would arise later in time which are excluded from the model. 
 
Secondly, there is a systemic effect which also means that the model results are 
likely to be underestimates.  The scenarios would reduce tax revenue from income 
taxes and from VAT.  Either this is reflected in reduced public sector consumption, 
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or through increased taxes elsewhere, ultimately reducing income and household 
consumption by other households.  Either way, this means that further greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions not measured in this research would likely occur, so that the 
reductions estimated here are lower estimates of what might actually occur in 
practice. 
7.4.2 Policy implications 
The results presented in this chapter allow a discussion of the potential to meet 
social, economic and environmental goals through the use of substantial reductions 
in working hours.  This section looks at this and the potential compatibilities and 
tensions between goals, on the assumption that the outcomes modelled in this chapter 
have been achieved; the next section focuses on how they might be achieved and 
issues in doing so. 
 
The results indicate that working time reduction could indeed contribute to 
greenhouse gas reduction goals.  The large size of effect lends weight to the 
argument that environmental impacts should be explicitly considered in the design of 
working time policy.   
 
If policy targeted higher income households in particular, this would bring the 
highest environmental benefits, as the total income and hence expenditure reduction 
for a given level of working time reduction would be higher in this group, assuming 
policy ensured their hourly wage rate were unchanged.  The social outcomes need 
careful policy consideration too however.  In principle the result would be a lowering 
of income inequality in the population, with higher earners giving up more income 
than lower earners.  However, there is a risk of increasing inequality in non-paid time 
instead, even as income inequality falls.  The lowest income workers would likely 
need financial support to be able to reduce their working time: such support would 
likely mean that greenhouse gas reductions from this group would be smaller than 
those modelled, as their incomes would reduce less, but they anyway contribute only 
a small amount to the total reductions modelled in chapter 7, and it would reduce the 
inequality in non-paid time.  Meanwhile, if policies focused on reducing the working 
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hours of those who work the longest hours, and in encouraging increased use of 
career breaks among those who take them least (e.g. for care purposes) then there 
would be increased gender equality in paid working patterns, as it is men who tend to 
work longer and take less time out for care.  This would also be at least a helpful 
precondition for increasing gender equality in childcare and other non-paid activities 
too, paving the way for the completion of the revolution in gender roles, towards a 
genuine gender equality, that has been in process for several decades (Esping-
Andersen 2009). 
 
The results focus on the environmental, and social, implications of particular 
working time patterns, without specific modelling of how these would be achieved.  
Nevertheless, the modified life course perspective allowed some discussion of the 
policy instruments that could potentially help achieve these outcomes.  Policy 
instruments would need to be well designed to achieve these concurrent benefits, and 
reconcile diverse environmental, social and economic goals whilst being tailored to 
respond to the needs, preferences and capabilities of both different demographic 
groups and different employment sectors.  In the social policy literature, working 
time policy focuses primarily on instruments designed to influence people’s working 
time behaviour through a mixture of time rights and financial (dis)incentives, so that 
people are either individually or collectively influenced to adopt particular working 
patterns at particular stages of the life course.  In this respect, the Netherlands is 
somewhat ahead of the UK, and policy there provides an insight into how substantial 
working time reduction could be achieved.  In the Netherlands, the life course 
perspective underpins the approach taken to working time policy.  Time rights are 
approaching an ideal state, as summarised earlier in section 7.1.  Weekly working 
hours (and wage rates) are moderated collectively, with tailoring to sectoral 
requirements.  Individuals have the right to request further reductions in their weekly 
working hours for any reason, which the employer can only refuse under exceptional 
circumstances.  In terms of career break rights, employees can use the Life Course 
Savings Scheme to request a career break of up to three years.  However, this right is 
rather limited as the employer can refuse any requests, except where they involve 
statutory rights to a break (such as for maternity leave) or exit from the labour market 
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in the form of pre-retirement.  These rights need to be extended, to make them 
stronger so that employers have less opportunity to refuse requests. The UK 
meanwhile provides rights to request reductions in weekly hours for parents of 
children under 16 (or 18 if they are disabled), but in general there is little else 
available during the working age life course beyond the traditional rights to 
maternity leave and incapacity leave.  Policy needs substantial expansion to facilitate 
further working time reduction therefore. 
 
Financial support would also likely need to be extended in both countries to achieve 
equitable working time reduction.  In the Netherlands, the requirement on individuals 
to save in advance of taking a career break would need to be abolished as it inhibits 
use of the Life Course Scheme, and a borrowing provision should be introduced for 
those who need it to enable them to take career breaks early in the life course (such 
as for parental leave) before there has been sufficient opportunity to save enough to 
cover such a break.  Similar provisions would need to be introduced in the UK as 
well. 
 
Financial incentives to reduce working time may also be necessary.  These would 
need to be set to encourage generally lower levels of paid work but, in keeping with 
the modified life course perspective, be tailored to specific uses on non-paid time.  
Higher incentives should be provided for socially and environmentally beneficial 
non-paid activities (such as lifelong learning, child and elderly care, or volunteer 
work in environmental projects), for social risk events (such as redundancy or 
incapacity), and for activities which promote higher wellbeing (such as attending 
mindfulness training or creative activities in which “flow” can be experienced).  For 
equity reasons, financial incentives would need to be targeted to particular 
demographic groups too, to enable them to have the real capacity to take up working 
time reduction rights, notably low income households and those with children, 
demographic groups in which income is already more likely to be spread thinly and 
capabilities to reduce it further are more limited.  Whilst this would mean the 
income, and hence expenditure and greenhouse gas emissions effects, of working 
time reduction would be smaller than modelled for these households, the financial 
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resources used would have to be drawn from elsewhere in the economy, so that 
reductions would nevertheless take place in areas of the economy not modelled in 
this research.  Whilst these reductions would not be identical to what would have 
occurred in these households, they are likely to be of a similar magnitude.  Whilst 
both countries go some way towards having such financial incentives already, much 
more tailoring of incentives is needed, and restructuring of income tax rates and 
benefits for working time reduction is needed to reduce the financial benefits of 
working long hours and to reduce the income lost from working time reduction for 
lower income groups. 
 
The modified life course perspective also indicates that working time reduction 
should be supported and encouraged by diverse mechanisms, not just financial.  
Offering financial incentives to the employed population as a whole to reduce 
working time could be expensive, and may not even be particularly effective.  
Multiple avenues of influence on behaviour need to be used, including use of diverse 
media channels to highlight the wellbeing effects of certain activities outside of paid 
work and the limited effects on wellbeing of increasing income once a certain level is 
reached, addressing employer objections to working time reduction, and providing 
increased levels of support for doing some of the beneficial non-work activities, 
including the provision of more courses and voluntary activities. 
 
Regulation would also likely be needed to protect people’s wage rates under reduced 
working hours: an assumption in the modelling here is that people’s wage rates are 
unaffected by time changes, and hence that gross incomes fall proportionately to the 
reductions in working hours.  This is in contrast to various other working time 
moderation policies which have sought to maintain incomes even as working hours 
fall, i.e. to increase wage rates, and in contrast too to the effect of career breaks and 
working hours reductions reducing future income earning potential.  Although those 
taking career breaks often face impacts on future job opportunities and wage rates as 
a result, widespread working time reduction would also reduce labour supply, 
creating a relatively higher demand than at present, which would tend to encourage 
wage rate increases.  A gradual transition to the shorter average working hours 
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modelled in this chapter could in part ameliorate the resulting reduction in income 
households face, as wage rate increases over time at least in part counter the wage 
effects of reducing working hours (Coote et al. 2010:28).  Policy instruments may be 
needed to incentivise increased savings rates meanwhile, which are likely to decline 
under the scenarios modelled. Savings rates tend to correlate with income, so that 
reducing work and income is likely to reduce savings rates too, all else being equal.  
On the one hand, this represents another source of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions that are not measured in the modelling: if policy ensures that over a 
person’s life course, total work performed is reduced, then this implies further 
reductions in emissions in the future as a result of working time reductions now.  On 
the other hand, reduced savings rates, or greater debt accumulation, can mean greater 
pressures in future to increase work again, so that, for example, the effective 
retirement age might creep up to counter increased use of career breaks, effectively 
negating the greenhouse gas savings as lifetime work, and income earned, work out 
being unchanged.  Hence concurrent policy instruments might be needed to 
encourage greater savings, to counter the tendency under working time reduction to 
save less and borrow more (a tendency which could be enhanced by people trying to 
maintain their accustomed levels of consumption despite reduced income).   
Maintaining state finances would, as already mentioned, also need careful 
consideration.  Sectoral agreements could also be necessary to support, for example, 
sectors subject to more intense international competition, which are important export 
sectors, or which provide key services to society, to ensure that their costs and 
competitiveness are maintained, and that the country’s trade balance and public 
service levels can be maintained even as private consumption levels fall.  A range of 
wider effects on the economy therefore need to be considered beyond just the 
immediate life course policies needed to effect working time reductions.  
7.5 Summary 
This chapter has sought to estimate the reductions in UK and Dutch greenhouse gas 
emissions that would arise under different scenarios of paid working time reduction 
in the working age population.  The scenarios modelled in this chapter indicate that a 
substantial level of emissions reductions could be expected as a result of ambitious 
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levels of working time reductions.  The emissions reductions are however small in 
comparison to the levels required to reach sustainable levels and aimed for by 
governments.  This suggests that further reductions are needed via other policy 
measures, probably relating to consumption patterns and in particular to ensuring 
technology and process changes occur to reduce the levels of emissions arising from 
energy generation and manufacturing.  The scenarios are interesting in that they also 
have outcomes that could result in, or are conducive to, reduced income inequality, 
greater gender equality in paid work and non-paid care, and increased wellbeing via 
non-consumption activities.  The discussion above has highlighted too however that 
the levels of working time reduction modelled here could be taken far further.  Key 
barriers to doing so relate to impacts on the productive efficiency of the economy, 
the maintenance of public sector revenue and international competitiveness and trade 
balances, and the dominant consumption-oriented norm with respect to lifestyles and 
routes to wellbeing. It is clear the link between working time reduction and 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions would continue to hold with greater levels of 
working time reduction.  The extent to which wellbeing would continue to rise as 
working time fell is less clear, and likely dependent on the exact policy instruments 
used, and the degree of value change regarding routes to wellbeing that could be 
achieved in society. 
 
The direct reduction in greenhouse gas emissions might seem small for a given level 
of working time reduction, but the estimates are likely to be low, as there are sources 
of further reductions of emissions not modelled here.  These relate to reduced tax 
revenue needing to be matched by reduced expenditure elsewhere in the economy, 
and to reduced household savings rates which imply further curtailment of 
consumption in the future.  Although not examined in this research, there should also 
be similarly important reductions in the use of natural resources and the production 
of other pollutants, benefiting ecosystems, habitats, and the people and species which 
rely on them.   
 
Policy instruments already exist that provide the opportunities to reduce working 
time modelled in this chapter.  Dutch policy, although still needing significant 
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changes, is significantly closer to what is needed than British policy.  Policy needs to 
provide workers the opportunities and capabilities to reduce hours, and to influence 
preferences and norms surrounding working patterns: extending rights to employees 
to reduce working hours and take career breaks; providing financial support to 
reduce working hours, particularly for certain demographic groups (the low income 
and parents) whose options are likely to be more constrained; reducing the relative 
income benefits of working longer; protecting the employment and career 
progression of part time workers and career breakers; altering the tax structure to 
reduce costs to businesses of employing more people rather than making use of 
overtime and longer hours, to reduce impacts on their competitiveness and political 
opposition to measures; implementing surrounding policy instruments to encourage 
greener work and consumption patterns; and awareness-raising, facilitating and 
providing options for activities that involve less consumption and greater use of time 
for non-work activities demonstrated to support increased wellbeing. 
 
In short, policy instruments can also strongly influence behaviour not just to meet 
current preferred levels of working time, but to go beyond them to achieve further 
reductions in work, by altering opportunities and capabilities, and influencing 
preferences through incentivising and promoting different work life balance 
strategies over the working life course.   
 
In the case study countries of the UK and the Netherlands, policy support for 
working time reduction would need to be extended to achieve these greenhouse gas 
emissions and working time reductions.  In the Netherlands, the career break rights in 
the Life Course Savings Scheme need to be strengthened, with the right of 
employees to request a career break turned into a right to actually have the career 
break, as in the Belgian Time Credit Scheme.  The savings requirement should also 
be abolished, whilst optional borrowing facilities for career breaks early in the career 
(particularly for parental leave) should be introduced.  In the UK, time rights would 
need to be extended with a career break scheme along the same lines, and extension 
of existing rights for parents to reduce working hours to the rest of the population.  In 
both countries, support needs to be improved to make such rights really functional 
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freedoms, in which people have the genuine capability to use them, protected from 
adverse career impacts, across income and demographic groups.  Incentives to work 
less also need to be improved, including restructuring financial incentives to work 
less, but also covering wider initiatives to support values and activities relating to 
non-consumption routes to wellbeing such as increased time with family, in the 
community, volunteering and in personal and spiritual development. 
 
This chapter has contributed to the academic debate regarding the potential of 
working time reduction to reduce environmental impacts by producing estimates of 
the size of these effects for the case of greenhouse gas emissions in the UK and the 
Netherlands. It has demonstrated that working time reduction has large 
environmental effects that warrant consideration alongside social and economic goals 
when working time policy instruments are developed and evaluated.  It has indicated 
that social and greenhouse gas reduction goals need not be incompatible, although 
reconciling them with GDP growth is more likely to be problematic.  By selecting 
scenarios that are within the level of rights provided by existing working time policy 
instruments, and by drawing on a modified life course perspective, it has also 
contributed to an understanding of how policy might contribute, through diverse 
instruments, to achieving such working time reduction. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis took as its starting point the argument that reductions in paid working 
time, be it the time spent working per week or in total over the life course, could, via 
corresponding reductions in earned income, substantially reduce environmental 
impacts, as households spend and consume less.  Following this, policy instruments 
designed to regulate working time, through influencing, for example, participation 
rates, working hours, parental leave, and rights to career breaks, could also have 
significant environmental effects.  Whether these effects are intentional or not, the 
argument is that they warrant consideration in the design of working time policy, and 
that such policy could even be used as an instrument for sustainable development 
through reducing average paid working time and increasing the use of career breaks. 
 
The thesis has contributed to the literature through considering two related research 
questions.  Firstly, what size of environmental effects could arise from changes in 
paid working time? And secondly, if environmental goals are added to the heady mix 
of social and economic goals already addressed by working time policy, what are the 
implications for the design of such policy: how could policy instruments be designed 
to reconcile these diverse environmental, social and economic goals?  The first of 
these questions was addressed empirically, whilst the second was addressed through 
discussion of the empirical results and existing literature.  The sections below recap 
the main points from the previous chapters and how they have contributed to 
answering these research questions. 
8.1 Literature synthesis 
A review of the literature on working time revealed two distinct perspectives, 
presented in chapter 2.  Among some ecological economics researchers, concerned 
with environmental sustainability, reduction in paid working time offers the potential 
to achieve environmental benefits as people concurrently earn less, and so consume 
less, leading to fewer environmental impacts from the production, distribution, use 
and disposal of products.  At the same time, they draw on the happiness literature to 
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argue that working time reduction could also bring substantial wellbeing benefits 
alongside the environmental benefits, at least for those who can still securely meet 
their basic material needs.  The greater time available for individuals to spend 
outside of paid work in community activities, volunteering, with their families, in 
personal and spiritual development, and so on, is argued to be more important, at 
least in high income countries, to people’s wellbeing than more paid work, income 
and consumption (e.g. Speth et al. 2007, and see chapter 2, section 2.1.1.2).  The 
evidence in the happiness literature demonstrates that happiness comes to a 
substantial degree from the individual’s own mindset, but lends weight to the 
arguments that more time outside paid work is at least a helpful contributor to high 
levels of happiness.  Theories of behaviour meanwhile give an insight into why 
individual preferences surrounding levels of paid work and income are suboptimal 
for individual wellbeing and for society and the environment as a whole, as they are 
influenced among other things by consumerist and work-oriented values and norms 
embedded in culture and promoted by marketing. 
 
The study of existing working time policies meanwhile is embedded in an entirely 
different discipline, social policy, and has a perspective that focuses primarily on 
existing social and economic goals, rarely with any reference to or consideration of 
the environmental effects of such policies.  In this social policy literature, the focus 
on the study and evaluation of existing working time policy goals and instruments 
has led to a more nuanced approach to policy design and analysis, in the shape of the 
life course perspective. This aims to address and reconcile diverse government goals, 
demographic and economic situations, the capabilities and preferences of different 
demographic groups, and the needs of different economic sectors, so that working 
time limits and rights, and financial support for different working patterns, are 
tailored to employees based on an assessment of how beneficial to wider society a 
particular use of time outside of paid work is, and how much a period outside of the 
labour market is outside the individual’s control, e.g. due to incapacity from sickness 




The two literatures differ but contribute valuably to one another, and chapter 2 ended 
by synthesising the two to produce a modified life course perspective, one in which 
environmental goals are considered alongside the social and economic, leading to a 
greater overall level of support for paid working time reduction across the life course 
for environmental and wellbeing ends.  The wider understanding of the drivers of 
individual behaviours around work and consumption found in the ecological 
economics literature also expands the range of policy instruments that can be 
considered, beyond just time rights and financial instruments, to wider factors to 
influence values, attitudes and habits around work and consumption, and incentives 
to encourage routes to wellbeing that use more time and less money.  This modified 
perspective helped inform the policy discussions in later chapters. 
8.2 Methodological approach 
The empirical work in the thesis took the approach of studying the greenhouse gas 
emissions of working patterns at the scale of the household, and looked at the 
greenhouse gas emissions arising from the household’s consumption.  Drawing on 
the consumer behaviour literature, a model of the household was developed in 
chapter 3 linking the working patterns of its principle members (the head of 
household and, if present, his or her partner), primarily via the effect on earned 
income, to household expenditure and so emissions, controlling for various socio-
demographic variables (including the numbers and age bands of resident children and 
other adults, and the social class, education level, and age band of the head of 
household, or male in couple households).  The use of household expenditure survey 
and product emissions intensity data, as described in chapter 4, allowed this model to 
be tested using regression analysis (in chapter 5) to see how household emissions 
vary with working patterns for representative samples of the UK and Dutch 
populations.  These regression results were used in chapters 6 and 7 to see how 
greenhouse gas emissions would alter for the working age population as a whole and 
for different demographic groups under different hypothetical scenarios of change in 
their working patterns, allowing estimates to be made of the effects of the scenarios 
on total national emissions.  Such scenario modelling is a relatively uncommon 
methodological approach for social policy research, but more common in 
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environmental fields in which the aim is often to estimate the environmental effect of 
policy instruments that have not (yet) been implemented in practice. There were 
numerous assumptions made to produce a parsimonious model.  The assumptions, 
and their implications for the research and for policy advice, were discussed in 
chapter 3 and in the discussion sections of the subsequent results chapters, and are 
recapped later below. The approach was also challenging.  Data preparation for the 
UK dataset in particular required substantial amounts of coding, to integrate the 
expenditure survey data with the product emissions intensity data, and to combine 
the individual level variables with the household level variables, which in the UK 
dataset came in separate files not immediately amenable to combining. An approach 
had to be developed to simulate, with justifiable assumptions, how household 
emissions would change under two different conditions – moving from inactive to 
employed work statuses, and reducing working hours.  These methods were 
developed from first principles without drawing on the approaches of other authors.  
Inevitably, this required a high level of attention to detail and care with what was 
being done to ensure the results were accurate based on the data and modelling 
assumptions.  Keeping a detailed diary of activities was one way in which the author 
achieved this.  Inevitably, there were avenues which were tried but not followed for 
various reasons, as discussed in the introduction (chapter 1), and what is presented in 
this thesis reflects only the final product, and little of the interim stages that preceded 
it. 
8.3 Empirical results 
A first look at the data, in chapter 4, revealed that the demographic groups 
contributing most to total national emissions were couple households, in particular 
those with children and those of older working age (between aged 50 and 
retirement), primarily because these groups represent a large proportion of the 
national population.  Per household too, these households were the highest emitters, 
but taken per capita there was found to be little difference in emissions between 
demographic groups, except for those with children which had substantially lower 
emissions per capita: despite the higher number of “mouths to feed” the number of 
potential workers in, for example, a couple household compared to one without 
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children remains unchanged, and hence the income earning potential prevents 
expenditure rising with the number of children.  In short, even if the need to consume 
increases, the ability to do so does not much, and hence per capita expenditure and 
emissions fall.  Meanwhile, looking at the population by income band, it is clear that 
emissions increase with the household’s per capita income, as expenditure also rises. 
 
Chapter 5 used these data and the model of the household to test the first of the 
thesis’ three interrelated hypotheses that, at the household level, reductions in the 
paid working hours of household members will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions 
arising from that household’s consumption.  The hypothesis was found to hold in 
both countries, with the paid working hours of the head of household and partner (if 
present) both affecting household greenhouse gas emissions.  This was primarily 
through the effect of working hours on gross earned income, which, multiplied by 
hourly gross wage rate, it determines. Only in the Netherlands did emissions also 
vary directly with changes in working time controlling for income effects.  In couple 
households, it made little difference to emissions whether the household’s income 
was earned by the male or by the female in the couple.  A doubling of household 
income less than doubles emissions.  This is due to how both expenditure and 
Household Emissions Intensity
74
 vary with income (recall that household expenditure 
x Household Emissions Intensity = household greenhouse gas emissions). 
Expenditure also less than doubles with a doubling of income, whilst Household 
Emissions Intensity falls as income increases, so that how emissions vary with 
income is found to be affected by changes both in expenditure and in the types of 
goods and services bought.  In the case of greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure, 
the model of the household explained a large proportion of the variation in the 
dependent variable (with adjusted R
2
 values of between 0.313 and 0.499). 
 
In chapter 6, the first of the two scenarios modelled in the thesis was presented, 
testing the hypothesis that, as current UK and Dutch policy goals relating to paid 
                                                 
74
 Household Emissions Intensity was developed in chapter 3 as a measure of the household’s 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit expenditure, i.e. per pound in the UK, and per euro in the 
Netherlands.  Its value is determined by the share of total expenditure spent on different types of 
products, as these result in different levels of emissions per pound or euro spent on them. 
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work centre on increasing labour market participation rates (and hence increasing the 
total working time in the population as a whole), they will increase national 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Again, this was found to be the case, although in line 
with the relatively small increases in participation rates being aimed for, the 
increases in total national emissions that result were also fairly small: 0.66% in the 
UK and 0.62% in the Netherlands.  That said, at the household level, labour market 
activation of a household member could lead to large increases in emissions, as 
income and so expenditure increase.  Given that most income bands and 
demographic groups already have participation rates in excess of the national 
objectives, it was de facto workless and low income households that were activated 
in the models, so that the objectives also in principle lead to reduced income poverty 
and worklessness, potentially increasing wellbeing and social inclusion in the 
population.  Given that women also are less likely to be in work than men in couple 
households with children, there is potential too for increased gender equality in paid 
work in this group in particular.  The social and economic benefits of increased 
participation rates – reduced worklessness and income poverty, lower child poverty, 
lower social exclusion, greater gender equality, reduced welfare state expenditure 
and a higher skilled, more competitive labour market – if they could be achieved, 
could arguably make the comparatively small greenhouse gas increases a worthwhile 
price, particularly if working time reduction among the already in work compensated 
for this.  However, these results are provisional on the newly activated having 
employment of a similar quality to equivalent already-working households, as 
opposed instead to obtaining only marginal and low paid jobs.  The feasibility of 
achieving this in the UK and the Netherlands is questionable given that those still not 
in paid work are often the least skilled, those with disabilities or long term sickness, 
and the long term unemployed, facing either strong barriers to entering the labour 
market or only poor prospects for the types of work obtained.  There is a real risk 
that people will simply be moved into marginal low paid jobs, doing little to alleviate 
material/income poverty, although this would also increase greenhouse gas emissions 




Next, chapter 7 took up the theme of working time reduction, looking at the 
hypothesis that reductions in average paid working time will substantially reduce 
national greenhouse gas emissions.  The chapter looked at the potential for reducing 
emissions, and hence contributing to greenhouse gas emissions goals, of substantial 
working time reduction, using a combination of collective reduction in the average 
weekly working hours of full time workers of 20%, combined with increased use of 
career breaks: over the working life, a total of one year of extra career break, 
modelled as four lots of three months; plus two extra three month career breaks for 
childcare and in pre-retirement taken by the majority of the relevant demographic 
groups (those with children, and older working age households).  Around three 
quarters of households have at least one member reducing hours or taking a career 
break in the scenarios, leading to mean income reductions of 12.5-15.9%, mostly 
occurring from reduced weekly working hours.  These reductions were estimated to 
reduce emissions from working age households by 5.1% in the UK and 8.0% in the 
Netherlands, equivalent to a reduction of 3.1% and 4.5% respectively of national 
emissions from all sources (all household, state and investment expenditure).  The 
majority of these reductions arise from the reductions in weekly working hours for 
full time workers, and come from couple households, particularly those with children 
and those of older working age. The reductions arising due to the career breaks are 
comparatively small.  Looking by income band, the lowest income quintile accounts 
for just 1-8% of these emissions reductions, whilst the highest accounts for between 
25 and 47% of them.  At the same time, as women tend to be working shorter hours 
than men in the population, particularly when they have dependent children, then it is 
the men in the scenarios who reduce their weekly working hours most, leading to 
convergence between the genders in paid working time, and a pattern closer to a 
dual-earner, part time society.   
 
The results summarised above answer the first research question of the thesis, 
demonstrating that working time does indeed affect household greenhouse gas 
emissions. Furthermore, changes in working time, both increases in the form of 
increased participation rates, and decreases in the form of reductions in mean weekly 
paid working hours and increased use of career breaks, are estimated to lead to 
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substantial changes in greenhouse gas emissions, not just for the households 
concerned, but for the UK and the Netherlands as a whole.   
8.4 Implications for working time policy 
The policy relevance of these results is that they indicate that environmental goals, at 
least relating to greenhouse gas emissions, warrant consideration in the design of 
working time policy, as the impacts of changes in working patterns are large enough 
to have an effect on the meeting of emissions reduction goals.  Including 
consideration of them will likely lead to better policy design.  The next two sections 
therefore discuss the implications of the results in this thesis for working time policy, 
which was the second of the research questions. Given the centrality of the 
arguments regarding the potential environmental and wellbeing benefits of working 
time reduction, the implications of the results in chapter 7 for different working time 
reduction scenarios are the main focus, and the discussion below elaborates on that in 
chapter 7.  Section 8.4.1 below first looks at the potential to reconcile diverse 
environmental, social and economic goals through the use of working time policy.  
Section 8.4.2 then goes on to discuss the design of policy instruments to support and 
incentivise working time reduction, drawing on the thesis results and the modified 
life course perspective. 
8.4.1 Goal compatibility and tensions 
The results also show that the reconciliation of diverse environmental, social and 
economic goals requires careful consideration.  On the one hand, increasing 
participation rates may lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions, an undesirable 
outcome looked at in isolation.  However, if those moved into work were those 
currently further from the labour market, the low income and other social risk 
groups, and they were able to obtain good jobs in terms of their wage rates and 
prospects, then worklessness and income poverty should fall, with arguably 
corresponding reductions in social exclusion and the negative wellbeing impacts of 
not having paid work.  These could be seen as benefits that outweigh the 
environmental costs, if they could be achieved.  As discussed in chapter 6, achieving 
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these goals would require strong support for active labour market policies and skills 
upgrading, particularly in the UK where these factors are weaker than in the 
Netherlands.  Without this there is the real risk that the currently out of work, many 
of whom face multiple barriers to work, simply swell the numbers in in-work poverty 
(Gregg et al. 2006:52–57), adding to the group who find themselves lacking both 
sufficient time and income to stay out of poverty and meet basic needs (Burchardt 
2008).  Moving these groups into paid work is not out of keeping with the principle 
of reducing average paid working time in the population as a whole: the idea is that 
everybody works and earns his or her income where there are not good reasons not 
to, but that everyone in paid work spends, on average, a reducing amount of time 
doing their jobs, i.e. high participation rates but lower working hours and more 
career breaks. 
 
Indeed, the environmental costs of increased labour market participation rates would 
be more than compensated for if substantial working time reduction, along the lines 
of that looked at in chapter 7, were achieved for the population as a whole.  The 
scenarios modelled in chapter 7 led to substantial emissions reductions, well in 
excess of the increases due to increasing participation rates, as summarised in the 
previous section above.  However, even considering that the results represent a low 
estimate of the likely effect on emissions of specific working time reductions (as they 
omit potential future reductions in emissions from households, and reductions in 
public sector emissions, as discussed in chapter 7, section 7.4.1) they indicate that 
working time reduction is likely to only be able to contribute a small proportion of 
the total emissions reductions apparently needed to avert dangerous levels of climate 
change, in keeping with the arguments in the literature presented in section 2.1.2.  
This implies that substantial changes in production methods (notably a 
decarbonisation of energy generation and manufacturing) and in consumption 
patterns are almost certainly necessary too.  It is important to note too that such 
decarbonising of production methods would mean that product emissions intensities 
would fall, so that the tonnes of emissions averted by reducing working time would 
also fall: as production gets greener, reductions in consumption bring smaller 
environmental benefits.  Nevertheless, the production of goods and services, and 
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hence private consumption, will undoubtedly continue to result in greenhouse gas 
emissions for some decades to come, and also have multiple other impacts on the 
environment, so the environmental benefits of working time reduction will continue 
to be substantial and worth considering.  
 
In addition, there are non-material social and wellbeing benefits to consider too. 
Social goals appear to be well met by the working time reduction scenarios.  Data 
suggests that there is a substantial unmet preference to reduce working hours (see 
chapter 2, section 2.1.3.1).  As discussed in the same section, such survey data may 
underreport actual preferences for reduced hours, whilst individual working time 
preferences may be higher than is optimal for wellbeing due to a range of wider 
societal pressures such as to work longer hours.  The happiness literature suggests 
that widespread reduction of full time work could lead to great wellbeing benefits 
through more time with ones family, for community and volunteering, for personal 
and spiritual development, and so on (Speth et al. 2007), assuming material needs are 
still securely met.  At the same time, increased use of career breaks and reduced 
working hours would help take some of the pressure off the “rush hour of life” 
between the ages of around 30 to 50, when people are juggling childcare with career 
progression and mounting financial responsibilities, by providing increased 
flexibility to do this. 
 
The working time reduction scenarios all also lead to increased gender equality in 
paid working hours.  This increasing gender equality is mostly through a levelling of 
mean weekly working hours between men and women in work.  The career breaks 
modelled for households with younger children and older workers also increase 
gender equality as men, more likely to be in work during these periods than women, 
are more likely to take a break under the assumptions of the model.  This effect could 
be further enhanced if policy deliberately targeted men more than women to take 
these career breaks, rather than being “gender-blind”.  The other effect of this 
levelling in paid working hours is greater gender equality in hours outside of paid 
work.  This is at least a helpful precondition for an increase in gender equality in care 
work too: whilst existing “father-friendly” working time reduction policy does not 
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unambiguously increase paternal time spent with children (Smith Koslowski 
2008:184–5), it should at least help those fathers who wish to spend more time with 
their children to do so.  Turning to the later stages of the working life, such policies 
should also help address gender inequalities in early retirement rates. 
 
There is increasing income equality in the scenarios too, as income drops more 
among higher income groups, which are more likely to be working long hours in the 
baseline situation, and so reduce their hours under the scenarios, and also have a 
higher wage rate, so reduce income more per hour’s working time reduction.  
Arguably this could result in greater time inequality between households, with higher 
income bands having more time outside paid work, whilst the lowest income bands 
are less likely to be in paid work (see chapter 6, section 6.3.1) and so instead have 
free time in the form of involuntary unemployment which can be damaging to 
happiness (Glyptis 1989:71–91).  The issue at low income bands is rather the 
unequal distribution of labour, with some working full time (in sometimes marginal 
jobs) and others being unemployed.  Working time reduction, with concurrent 
income reductions, could potentially allow redistribution of this work, as was one of 
the original aims of both the Dutch Wassenaar Agreement and the Belgian Time 
Credit Scheme (discussed in chapter 7, section 7.1).  However, even for those 
working full time, some find themselves in a situation of being unable to reduce 
working time without facing income poverty, or are already in income poverty as 
well as having insufficient time outside of paid work, with women and young adults, 
single households and those with, particularly younger, children, and/or low 
education, being most at risk of being in this latter situation (Burchardt 2008:88–89).  
The policy implications of this are discussed more in the next section. 
 
It is relevant from the environmental perspective that emissions reductions arising 
from the lowest income band are not a major share of total reductions in any of the 
scenarios: it is likely that such households would not in reality be able to make use of 
opportunities to reduce hours and take career breaks due to income restrictions, at 
least not without some kind of financial support, so that the emissions savings from 
this group may well not occur under current tax-benefit regimes.  The contribution of 
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households in the bottom income quintile is only 1-8% of saved greenhouse gas 
emissions in the scenarios in chapter 7 (depending on country and scenario), so total 
emissions savings would not be substantially affected if they were not able to reduce 
working time as modelled. 
 
The macro, economic, results of these scenarios are potentially more problematic.  At 
the national level, there are major drops in domestic production (in terms of work 
hours), gross income, and expenditure, as chapter 7, section 7.3.2 presented.  This 
would reduce government income tax revenues, either meaning cuts in public 
services or increased taxes elsewhere in the economy or, although this is less viable 
in the current global economic climate, and ultimately unsustainable, increased 
borrowing.  There are also implications for the national trade balance and 
competitiveness.  Possible ways to address these tensions are discussed in the next 
section, which looks at the specific policy instruments which could deliver the 
outcomes modelled.   
 
A final issue is that with falling total work done in the countries, GDPs are likely to 
fall too, as total production drops.  This is likely to be only partly offset, if at all, by 
increased hourly productivity rates that have been observed to occur when people 
work less (Schor 1999:154–157). The increases in participation rates modelled in the 
scenarios in chapter 6 would also offset this effect to some degree.  Whilst 
Neoclassical economics would tend to interpret such GDP reductions as inherently 
negative, the ecological economics literature takes a more critical perspective on 
GDP, as already highlighted in chapter 2 (section 2.1), noting the scale of negative 
impacts of consumer capitalist economic models on the environment and, in high 
income countries, on the wellbeing of certain groups.  From the ecological 
economics perspective, reductions in GDP can therefore be an appropriate solution to 
environmental problems and the disbenefits of consumerist lifestyles, at least until 




8.4.2 Implications for policy instruments 
The scenarios modelled in chapter 7 are, on the one hand, designed to look at the 
potential role that working time reduction could play in reducing national greenhouse 
gas emissions in the UK and the Netherlands.  At the same time however, they are 
designed to be realistic goals for which there are precedents for policy instruments 
which have been implemented in practice in different EU nations, which could 
potentially be applied in both countries to realise these outcomes. Whilst instruments 
exist, are the goals for working time reduction as modelled in chapter 7 realistic?  
Certainly under current conditions they appear to be what the UK’s Committee on 
Climate Change classifies as a “stretch ambition”: that is, a scenario “for which at the 
moment no policy commitment is in place, including more radical new technology 
deployment and more significant lifestyle adjustments” (Committee on Climate 
Change 2008:117).  However, the recent financial crisis and recession shows how 
external shocks to the economic system can suddenly change the situation and allow 
such changes.  The number of full-time workers dropped by over 1 million in the UK 
since the start of the recession up to August 2010, whilst part time jobs increased by 
330,000, marking a rapid shift to a truly mixed hours labour market, with “as many 
people in the UK working between 16 and 30 hours per week as were working 45 
hours or more per week” in spring 2010, moving the UK down the EU rankings of 
working time to be the country with the fifth shortest hours (Inman 2010).  This is 
without the intervention of national policy, which could in principle have further 
encouraged this trend and avoided some of the increase in unemployment of 580,000 
people that also occurred (ibid.).  Working time reduction can therefore happen 
spontaneously (at least in a relatively “free” labour market such as the UK’s) when 
external conditions force reductions in the total work in an economy.     
 
Leaving aside such external shocks, how could policy instruments achieve such 
working time reduction? Policy can help ensure that working time changes occur in a 
way that is controlled and benefits the wellbeing of different demographic groups as 
well as the environment.  To analyse this, this section draws on the modified life 
course perspective developed in chapter 2 (section 2.3), which combines the insights 
of the ecological economics and social policy literatures on this subject.  Policy 
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instruments in this perspective need to provide not just the opportunities to reduce 
working hours, in terms of rights to alter ones working time via shorter weekly hours 
and career breaks, but also need to make sure these rights are functional freedoms, 
such that people are protected from career impacts from making use of these rights, 
and have the support to manage financially.  On top of this, given the misalignment 
between the socially and environmentally optimal level of work and actual working 
patterns, diverse policy instruments need to incentivise working time reduction, via 
financial incentives and efforts to influence cultural, and individual, values, norms, 
habits and behaviours surrounding paid work, consumption and non-material routes 
to wellbeing.  These need finally to be tailored to different demographic groups and 
different industrial sectors, and be backed up by instruments to address the 
perspective of employers and to garner their acceptance. 
 
In terms of opportunities provided by policy, the right to reduce working hours is 
already present in the Netherlands for nearly all employees, as discussed in chapter 7, 
section 7.1. In the UK, similar rights are reserved only for parents of children aged 
under 16 (or 18 if the child has a disability), so they would need extension to the rest 
of the working population.  With regards to career break rights, those modelled in 
chapter 7 draw on the Belgian Time Credit Scheme and surrounding rights for child, 
medical and palliative care leaves.  However, all the rights required to be able to take 
such career breaks already exist in principle in the Netherlands, in the form of the 
Life Course Savings Scheme, which offers the opportunity to take career breaks even 
far in excess of what is modelled in chapter 7. The rights in the Life Course Scheme 
are rather weak however, and would be improved by making it possible for 
employers to refuse a request for a career break only under exceptional 
circumstances, when they could make the case that it would seriously impact on their 
business, as in the Belgian scheme.  In the UK, no similar policy exists, and so a 
substantial extension of rights would be required, and something along the lines of 
the Dutch or Belgian policies would suffice. 
 
Financial facilities, available to those that need and want to use them, may also be 
needed to help people to save and borrow for a period of shorter working hours or 
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career break.  The Dutch Life Course Savings Scheme is not ideal in this respect: as 
discussed in chapter 7, section 7.1, the requirement to save before a career break 
within the restricted terms of the scheme acts to inhibit its use, not facilitate it, whilst 
the absence of a borrowing facility makes its use for parental leave very difficult due 
to the “sequential error”: the (desired) career break comes before the period of a 
person’s career when they could more realistically afford to save enough for it 
(Plantenga 2005a:59–61).  The Dutch scheme would require changes in these areas 
to be made more functional.  The UK meanwhile generally lacks policy in this area 
(although, the Student Loan Scheme could be argued to be along the same lines, 
providing a loan to be paid back later for a particular group at the beginning of their 
career, for the particular purpose of University study). 
 
Time rights and standards can also be set collectively as well as individually, such as 
the working time and wage moderation collectively negotiated in the Netherlands in 
the Wassenaar Agreement in 1982, or the French 35 hours maximum working week 
law.  The details of collective instruments are, as with individualised ones, also 
important: as mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.2), the French 35 hours week 
rules can lead to negative wellbeing effects where employers require irregular or 
unsociable working times of their employees (Fagnani and Letablier 2004).  
Employee control of their paid working patterns as well as their total working time is 
important too. 
 
There are hence collective and individualised, voluntary and mandatory, policy 
instruments that have been used in practice to achieve working time reduction.   
 
In some respects, the choice of patterns of reduction in weekly working hours 
modelled in chapter 7 (Scenario 1, a 20% reduction in weekly hours for all workers 
working over 35 hours per week) is not the easiest for which to envisage appropriate 
policy instruments.  It has some of the characteristics of both an individualised 
change (in that the number of hours per week reduction varies by employee), and a 
collective one (in that all full time workers change their hours).  A maximum 
working week of 35, or even fewer, hours, would have translated more easily into 
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policy instruments, i.e. collectively mandated change similar to the French scheme.  
However, as this would also mean pro-rata reductions in gross income, it is hard to 
see such a mandated working time reduction being acceptable to the public as a 
whole.  Indeed, the modified life course perspective favours the individualised 
approach, so that individuals are free to choose their working patterns over the life 
course and their choices are merely influenced, not determined for them. 
 
The modified life course perspective suggests that such incentives are needed to 
encourage generalised working time reduction as modelled in chapter 7.
75
  In terms 
of financial incentives, these could include both benefits paid for shorter hours of 
work and during career breaks (LaJeunesse 2009:235–242; Koopmans and Plantenga 
2008), as well as a higher rate of income tax applied to longer hours of work 
(Hayden 1999:108).  These would alter the relative costs and benefits of different 
work life balance patterns for households, to incentivise lower levels of paid work 
and income, and with careful design could even end up fiscally neutral for 
government (LaJeunesse 2009:235–242).  The level of benefits paid can also be 
tailored to the purpose to which the extra time outside of paid work is put: the social 
policy literature suggests higher benefits for non-paid activities which are considered 
socially beneficial or acceptable (such as skills training or care work), or which are 
due to risks outside the individual’s control (such as redundancy or incapacity) 
(Koopmans and Plantenga 2008:5; Schippers 2004:197).  Activities with 
environmental benefits (such as volunteering on conservation projects) or which the 
evidence shows contribute to increasing wellbeing through non-consumption routes 
(such as mindfulness training, creative activities in which “flow” can be experienced, 
and community activities) could also receive greater support to encourage behaviour 
change.  This tailoring of support and incentives exists in both the UK and the 
Netherlands, but only in a few specific areas (notably for maternity leave and for 
redundancy and incapacity), so would need substantial further development. 
 
                                                 
75
 Although there appears to be unmet demand for working time reduction, incentives would still be 
needed to overcome barriers to realising this demand, and to encourage even further reductions in 
working time in line with individual optima for wellbeing, and social and environmental optima.  See 
chapter 2, section 2.1.3, for a discussion on this. 
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The modified life course perspective also discusses the need to target rights and 
incentives to different demographic groups, recognising that they have different 
preferences, needs, capabilities and opportunities to alter their working patterns.  The 
working time reduction scenarios in chapter 7 would likely need such policy 
targeting to achieve.  Certain demographic groups in particular may need financial 
support to be able to reduce working time.  Low income households particularly may 
not be able to take up the opportunities open to them, even in cases where the 
household members are in (full time) paid work, as low income limits their 
capabilities to reduce hours and income further (Burchardt 2008).  In addition, 
households with children, both singles and couples, may be facing the “combination 
pressure” (Plantenga 2005a:54) of simultaneous high demands on their time and 
income, and hence be similarly constrained.  LaJeunesse (2009:235–242) suggests 
ensuring those households on less than median income (equivalised per capita) can 
reduce their working hours without income loss, via receiving compensatory 
benefits.  The self-employed meanwhile face particular barriers to taking career 
breaks and reducing hours, as they are their own employers, and their livelihoods 
depend directly on maintaining the business which they own.  Chapter 7 assumed no 
difference in the behaviour of the self-employed compared to other employees in the 
scenarios, but it is likely that they would also need specific policy instruments and 
support to enable them to make use of such rights, including similar financial 
benefits, at least in cases where they have no or very few employees.  Whilst such 
financial transfers to incentivise and facilitate working time reduction would affect 
the greenhouse gas results modelled, as the eligible households would see their 
incomes reduce less than they would otherwise, hence they would probably spend 
more and so have higher emissions than otherwise, this would be countered by 
reductions elsewhere in the economy of a similar scale. 
 
It is not just financial transfers and restructuring of the tax system that could 
incentivise working time reduction, and the modified life course perspective includes 
a host of other, broader, determinants of behaviour that could be considered.  
Perceived (and actual) threats to future career progression and job security from 
reducing working time inhibit use of many existing schemes (Groot and Breedveld 
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2004:294). Where these barriers rest with employer attitudes, measures can be taken 
to adjust incentives for them.  Anti-discrimination laws could help with this, such as 
requirements for the equal treatment of part and full time workers in the Netherlands.  
Incentives for employers are also likely needed to reduce the costs they face from, 
and hence their resistance to, working time reduction.  In skilled jobs particularly, 
working time reduction, and filling the vacancies that arise as a result, would be 
harder and more costly for employers (Coote et al. 2010:29), as a result of which 
some employers feel that working time reduction is incompatible with senior jobs, 
for example in management (European Commission et al. 2005).  There would be an 
extra cost of working time reduction to employers, which suggests either such rights 
would need to be negotiated at the sector level and be more restricted in some areas 
where they would lead to insufficient skilled labour supply, or that other approaches 
would be needed to address this, such as increasing funding for skills training in 
particular careers, or encouraging immigration of people with particular skills sets.  
This is not purely a cost however: employing two skilled part time workers instead of 
one full time worker reduces risks to businesses too, as they become less vulnerable 
to impacts from staff falling ill, retiring, leaving to a new job, or taking a career 
break.  Restructuring taxes and benefits on employers could help with costs, to make 
it better to employ more people for shorter hours than to employ fewer people for 
longer hours. 
 
Social norms around gender roles can also have a large effect on the use of paternity 
and maternity leave.  Whilst high takeup rates for paternal leave would negate the 
possibility of discrimination by employers, and normalise more gender equal work 
and care patterns, achieving the transition from low to high takeup can be effected by 
policy design, as has been seen in Scandinavian countries, in which a share of 
parental leave is lost if it is not taken by the father (Smith and Williams 2007:189).  
How transferable these policies would be to other countries is debateable however: to 
what extent do they merely lend support to, and rely on for their success, existing 
cultural values for greater gender equality? The UK for example has relatively high 
levels of paternal time in EU comparison despite the absence of supportive policy 




Policy can also attempt to influence values and attitudes towards work-and-spend 
consumerist lifestyles themselves.  Policy could promote the, seemingly genuine, 
wellbeing benefits of working and consuming less, using diverse channels of 
communication to raise awareness of the value of particular non-paid activities in 
supporting wellbeing, and the comparatively limited wellbeing benefits of high levels 
of paid work and consumption.  There is also scope to greatly increase the ease of 
access to such activities, by providing courses in mindfulness training, for example, 
greater access to creative, voluntary and community activities, and so on.  There 
could even be moves to restrict marketing which actively promotes material 
consumption as a route to increased happiness.  Unfortunately, based on the 
empirical research in this thesis, little can be said about how to design such policies 
so that they are effective, but it seems that achieving effective policy intervention in 
such areas of value and attitudinal change is likely to be just as hard as it could be 
important.  They represent policy areas which, again, are largely unexplored in 
practice in the UK and the Netherlands. 
8.5 Modelling assumptions and the wider policy context 
Many of the modelling assumptions included in this research could be addressed by 
specific policy instruments to ensure they occurred as modelled.  One key 
assumption in the research is that wage rates are unaffected by working time change. 
Currently there is a clear relationship between working hours and wage rates, with 
higher wage rate jobs frequently being only full time.  However, if substantial 
working time reduction were achieved in the population, such effects would be 
minimised, because there would be no relative disadvantage to a particular employee 
from reducing their working time as there is now (in that it shows less commitment 
to the employer and impacts on promotion prospects, for example).    
 
Other key assumptions relate to the macroeconomic context.  The research 
considered the effects of changes in working patterns on emissions driven by private 
household consumption in the immediate term.  Excluded were public sector 
emissions and delayed effects on private consumption due to changes in savings 
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rates, and impacts on future wage rates and working pattern choices.  The key point 
for the research results is that, under the modelling assumptions, public sector 
revenue, savings rates and, potentially, future wage rates are likely to fall from what 
they would otherwise be, hence further expenditure and emissions reductions would 
arise in other parts of the economy and in future due to working time reduction in the 
present.  The greenhouse gas emissions reductions calculated in this thesis are likely 
to be underestimates rather than overestimates therefore.  Again, some of these 
factors can be controlled by policy.  It could be considered undersireable that savings 
rates fall (especially where these relate to private pensions savings) or that tax 
revenue fell (as this affects public sector fiscal sustainability).  However, policy 
instruments can be used to encourage higher savings rates, most crudely (but also 
perhaps not very effectively; Harris et al. 2002:221) by raising interest rates, whilst 
tax and benefits restructuring can help maintain the fiscal balance of the state and the 
absolute size of state expenditure even as private household expenditure fell. The 
complexity of such dynamic interactions between private households and the state, as 
well as effects on the macro-economy and the global economic system including 
prices changes due to falling demand, and changes in international competitiveness 
and the balance of trade, were all factors that had to be excluded from this modelling 
for parsimony, which is why the scenarios modelled do not involve such substantial 
working time reduction as some authors suggest (e.g. Coote et al. 2010).  These 
issues highlight the complexities of modelling large scale changes in a complex 
interacting system such as the economy.  They also demonstrate the wide range of 
policy implications that need to be considered when acting to change working 
patterns: the life course perspective needs to include a wide range of surrounding 
policy areas aside from those directly involved in altering working patterns. 
 
Aside from these assumptions, other policy considerations are needed. Employers 
will have genuine impacts on their businesses, with some increased costs and also 
potentially increased benefits, but government may need to intervene to reduce the 
costs to encourage employer support, and ultimately then the feasibility of effecting 
substantial working time reduction.   Phasing in such reductions gradually to mitigate 
costs has been suggested as an option, but the effectiveness of this strategy is 
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untested.  The cultural attitudes of employers to working time reduction and 
flexibility also need consideration.   
 
Finally, the politics of working time reduction also demands more attention than 
could be given in this thesis.  For government, there are issues regarding the benefits 
of encouraging working time reduction.  A significant share of greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions that result will occur in other countries, the producers of the 
goods and services that consumers buy, and thus not contribute to the meeting of 
domestic emissions goals.  This increases the effective cost of such a method of 
abating domestic emissions. Then there are wider issues arising from the impacts on 
GDP growth, on government fiscal sustainability, on balance of trade, on 
international influence: these more fundamentally relate to how the economy can 
transition from an unsustainable growth-oriented path to one in which material 
throughput is at a sustainable level, particularly if it is one nation state making this 
transition in a sea of growth-oriented states.  These issues were outside the scope of 
this work to consider. 
8.6 Comparison and generalisability of results 
The results demonstrated a substantial level of similarity between the UK and the 
Netherlands.  This is perhaps unsurprising given the similarity of the countries in a 
number of key respects, such as income levels and participation rates, economic 
systems and demographic distributions, and household living patterns focused on 
single or couple occupancy and nuclear families.  In both countries, a high level of 
household emissions can be predicted using just a small set of variables, including 
income and working hours, although the relationship between them needed first to be 
established using household expenditure survey data and product emissions intensity 
data to determine the detailed consumption patterns and resultant emissions of 
representative samples of the population.  For a given level of change in working 
patterns, the scale of emissions changes that result is similar in both countries.  
Differences in the outcomes of the scenarios nevertheless arise from multiple factors.  
There are differences in the starting points of the two countries in terms of labour 
market participation rates and typical working hours, and different policy objectives 
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for increasing participation rates.  This means that the modelled increases in 
participation rates in chapter 6, and the decreases in working hours and increasing 
use of career breaks in chapter 7, represent different levels of change from the 
baseline situations, and hence different total changes in emissions.  In addition, 
differing underlying datasets and correlations between the independent and 
dependent variables in the household models between the two countries also affect 
the size of changes predicted to occur in the scenarios.  Nonetheless, and considering 
that the results are inevitably only estimates of the changes likely to occur, they show 
a high level of similarity and lead broadly to the same conclusions regarding the 
potential role of working time reduction as a tool for reducing emissions.  The study 
of two countries with similar socioeconomic situations has helped confirm the 
robustness of the research results, whilst their substantially differing policy support 
for working time flexibility and reduction has allowed the policy implications of 
these results to be considered for different contexts. It has also given an indication of 
the generalisability of the research here: it seems reasonable to expect that for other 
high income nations with employment focused welfare systems, changes in 
emissions of similar magnitude and direction could be expected from working time 
changes of a similar size.  What is likely to differ more substantially would be the 
levels of change in working patterns different countries are aiming to, or would aim 
to, achieve, a result of both different starting points and different labour market 
objectives.  Additionally, substantial differences in existing working time policies 
between countries mean policy recommendations would need to be tailored to their 
particular situations.  Results and policy advice here are more likely to adapt easily to 
a similar northern European country (such as Germany) or welfare state model 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) than to, for example, a southern European welfare state 
(such as Spain or Italy) where there are substantially different levels and patterns of 
labour market participation and current policy objectives and instruments. 
8.7 Possibilities for future research 
There are many possible scenarios of change in the working patterns of the 
populations that could have been considered in this research.  Whilst the participation 
rate increases modelled in chapter 6 were based on existing UK and Dutch policy 
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objectives, for the reductions in working time modelled in chapter 7 there were no 
such objectives, and the choice of scenarios was much more open.  Various other 
scenarios of change could have been modelled instead in this research, including a 
mandated maximum working week of 35 hours similar to that in France, and, given 
the relatively small emissions reductions arising from the career breaks modelled, 
much longer career breaks totalling several years of the working life, and perhaps 
including a reduced retirement age.  Future research could therefore include the 
modelling of such alternative scenarios. 
 
Repeating this research using data for more countries would be another avenue of 
future research. Data limitations to some extent restrict the possibility of replicating 
this research design in most other countries, as the required product emissions 
intensity data are not available for many.  This situation is likely to improve with 
time however as research in this area progresses. 
 
However, given this thesis has established the validity of the arguments surrounding 
the environmental effects of changes in working patterns, and the scale of changes 
that could be expected for a given level of change in working time, more relevant 
and important to policy goals would perhaps be further research into how to achieve 
greater working time reduction.  On the one hand, this would relate to the 
experienced barriers of employees to reducing working time.  One avenue of 
research here would be to conduct a qualitative study of the experiences of those who 
have, despite the barriers, “voluntarily simplified” (McDonald et al. 2006) their lives 
– working, earning and consuming less – to uncover the labour market, social, 
cultural, attitudinal and other barriers they faced, still face, and overcame, and how 
their values and attitudes around paid work and consumption differ from others.  
Another approach would be to study grassroots, community-building projects such as 
the Transition movement (Hopkins 2008) or the Slow movement (Parkins 2004), 
which combine explicit consideration of the potential environmental and wellbeing 
benefits of life outside the work and spend consumer culture.  These were all 
interesting related issues that were included as research questions in the early stages 
of this PhD research, but which ultimately had to be omitted to maintain a 
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manageable scope to the thesis: initially, contacting participants in the Dutch Life 
Course Scheme had been considered for this research, to investigate their use and 
experience of the scheme, but it was too soon after its introduction for there to be 
anyone actually using it for career breaks.  This could also be an area of future study. 
 
On the other hand, the design of policy instruments to support and incentivise 
working time reduction would also be of interest to research further.  One avenue of 
research could therefore attempt to establish more rigorously the effects on 
household consumption and emissions of existing working time reduction policies. 
The Belgian Time Credit Scheme or French 35 working week could be ideal case 
studies, as they have been in force for substantial periods of time and have 
measurable working time effects.  Company-level working time reduction and career 
break schemes could also be ideal test cases as they enable the inclusion of a control 
group (e.g. employees in another similar firm in the same country who do not have 
access to such schemes) to compare against.  However, it would also be of interest to 
go beyond studying the working time outcomes of traditional policies that focus on 
time rights, financial incentives and benefits in kind, as these have already been 
extensively researched in the social policy literature.  Whilst this thesis drew on the 
modified life course perspective to argue that a wider range of policy instruments are 
needed to address cultural and employer values and beliefs around work and 
consumption, and to boost the provision of non-consumption activities that support 
happiness, it was not possible given the empirical work undertaken to say how these 
might be effectively designed. Qualitative research on voluntary simplifiers and 
community projects as suggested above might shed light on how to motivate such 
behaviour changes.   
 
A final area of possible future research relates to the political and structural barriers 
to introducing strong and widely used working time reduction policy.  What are the 
attitudes of different policy actors to working time reduction, and the underlying 
conditions which shape, influence, and could potentially change, these?  How and 
why do these attitudes vary between countries, sectors, and employers? 
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8.8 Final thoughts 
The modified life course approach developed in chapter 2 offers a novel contribution 
to the study of working time policy in the social policy discipline.  It introduces 
explicit consideration of environmental issues that are increasingly likely to impact 
on, and be impacted by, social policy in the coming decades (Gough et al. 2008).  By 
considering the happiness literature too, it also introduces the possibility to evaluate 
and critique existing working time policy goals more generally than is currently the 
case in the social policy literature: at present, critical assessment of working time 
policy goals, as opposed to instruments, is largely restricted to the areas of gender 
equality and child wellbeing.  At the same time, the modified life course perspective 
introduces a more varied understanding of human behaviour, to consider policy 
instruments to influence working time behaviour that go beyond time rights, 
financial incentives and services in kind such as childcare, offering the potential to 
address in new ways the often paltry take-up rates of existing working time reduction 
opportunities enshrined in parental leave, career break and other work life balance 
policies.  As it stands however, further research is needed to detail how such value 
and behaviour change can be encouraged effectively.  Also, the modified perspective 
offers no easy answers to the central tension between economic growth goals on the 
one hand, and environmental sustainability and increased wellbeing on the other. 
 
The scenarios of working time change modelled here contribute to the ecological 
economics literature by giving an indication of the scale of contribution to 
sustainability goals that can be expected from working time reduction.  Despite the 
difficulties and assumptions inherent in such modelling, and encountered in this 
research, the results lend weight to the argument that these environmental effects of 
working time change are large enough to warrant explicit consideration in working 
time policy design, but highlight too that it can probably play only a limited role in 
achieving environmental sustainability.  It seems that changes to production methods 
and patterns of consumption, to make them less environmentally damaging, are 




That said, there seems to be substantial benefit to be had from working time 
reduction, not just environmental, but also for wellbeing, social equity, gender 
equality and childcare.  The scenarios modelled here represent just the beginning of 
what might be achievable with time and concerted effort to motivate value and 
behaviour change around time use and consumption.  Integrating environmental 
considerations, a fuller understanding of the conditions that lead to happiness, and a 
more nuanced understanding of how to support and incentivise more sustainable 
work and consumption patterns and values, could be key to achieving an equitable, 
environmentally sustainable future, and working time policy in this respect seems 
one appropriate place to start, by giving people more opportunity and support to 
break the cycle of work and spend.  Some countries, including the Netherlands, 
already have many of the policies in place to achieve substantial working time 
reduction, albeit in nascent form, lacking as they do any environmental goals or 
strong and diverse support and incentives for people to make substantial reductions 
in their working time.   
 
Reducing the role of material consumption, and the commodification of human time 
and interactions through paid labour, could leave people the time to cultivate the 
ideas and activities that improve the wellbeing and happiness of themselves and their 
children, families and communities, increase time for contact with and appreciation 
of nature, and provide people and society as a whole more time for personal and 
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Appendix 1: Methods of product environmental impact calculation 
This appendix provides a brief description of the methods and data used to calculate 
the environmental impact intensity data used in this research.  The specific datasets 
used were calculated by Vringer et al for the Netherlands and Stockholm 
Environment Institute-York for the UK, as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.  
They provide a measure of the environmental impact per unit of final market price 
involved in the production of the same categories of goods and services as used in 
the corresponding household expenditure surveys.  For greenhouse gas emissions, 
the environmental impact considered in this thesis, this is measured in terms of the 
kg of CO2e per pound or euro of sale price of the product.   
 
The data are calculated by drawing on an approach that dates back to the oil crises of 
the 1970s.  These early studies analysed household energy use (as opposed to 
environmental impacts), to attempt to provide advice on where best to direct policy 
to achieve the largest reductions in fuel use (Hertwich 2005b:4680).  This started 
with work by, among others, Hannon, Bullard, Herendeen and Tanaka (for example, 
Hannon 1974; Bullard and Herendeen 1975; Herendeen and Tanaka 1976).  Studies 
were performed for many developed countries, and were based on economic input-
output tables, which give financial data on resource movements between sectors of 
the economy and imports and exports, to chart the flow (in monetary terms) of 
resources. 
 
More recent studies generally attempt to measure environmental impacts rather than 
just energy use, such as the use of specific resources and the emissions of specific 
pollutants, notably carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, reflecting the change 
in emphasis of the studies towards environmental issues.  Three approaches exist.  
One, input-output analysis, combines the input-output financial data with 
environmental accounts, which provide measures of the physical flows of materials: 
this provides a relatively quick analysis based on widely available data, but can only 
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be disaggregated into about 30-60 different product categories, so is relatively 
coarse.  Second, process analysis uses Life Cycle Assessments to assess the impacts 
of specific products from cradle to grave: these are more data and research intensive, 
but can provide accurate results disaggregated by far more product categories 
(several hundred).  A third approach, a “hybrid” analysis, attempts to combine the 
benefits of the two, using Life Cycle Analysis for what are considered to be the 
highest impact stages of a product’s production, distribution and disposal, and using 
the coarser IO analysis for the rest.  The approach has been found in practice to be 
rapid enough to be useable and still provide substantial detail and disaggregation by 
product category (Vringer and Blok 1995; Vringer et al. 2010:2511–2512).  
Furthermore, the most advanced methods incorporate “multi-region input-output 
analysis” (MRIO analysis), which uses environmental and input-output data for 
several different regions of the planet, so that the different production efficiencies of 
different regions, and hence the variations in environmental impact intensities of 
different products depending on where in the world they are produced, are taken into 
account (Vringer et al. 2010:2510–2511).  In a study by Vringer et al. (2010) 
applying the different methods to the same raw data for the Netherlands, substantial 
differences in results are found, with the hybrid MRIO approach theoretically being 
the most accurate. 
 
Studies in this field vary in which of the methods above are used, and in the precise 
details in which they are applied.  Kok, Benders and Moll (2006), Hertwich (2005b) 
and Wiedmann (2009) provide detailed reviews of different studies and the methods 
they use.  The Dutch dataset used in this thesis from Vringer et al uses a hybrid 
approach combining MRIO analysis and process analysis, while the UK dataset from 
the Stockholm Environment Institute-York uses MRIO analysis.  Both represent the 
most robust such data available for the respective countries.  More detailed 
descriptions of the methodologies for the calculation of these data are given in 
Vringer et al (2010) and Paul et al (2010). 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
Table A2.1 presents the distributions of the dependent variables annual greenhouse 
gas emissions, total annual expenditure and Household Emissions Intensity for UK 
and Dutch households in the survey data used in this thesis.  See chapter 4, section 
4.4, for more description of the variables. 
 
Table A2.1 Distribution of the dependent variables for all households in the UK (2004-5) 
and the Netherlands (2000) 
N: 6,798 (UK); 2,395 (NL). Weighted  























Mean 20,204  £25,854 0.87 29,124 €24,714 1.19 
Median 16,890 £20,824 0.84 26,870 €22,180 1.19 
Skew 
(S.E.) 
2.71 (0.03) 8.11 (0.03) 1.41 (0.03) 1.05 (0.05) 1.76 (0.05) 0.13 (0.05) 
Kurtosis 
(S.E.) 
15.73 (0.06) 182.26 
(0.06) 
5.37 (0.06) 2.33 (0.10) 8.70 (0.10) 0.47 (0.10) 







Appendix 3: Supplementary regression results for single households 
The tables below present regression results for working age single households for the 
UK and the Netherlands for greenhouse gas emissions and expenditure.  These 
results complement those for working age couple households presented in chapter 5, 
and are used to inform the scenario modelling in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Table A3.1 Regression estimates for household total annual greenhouse gas emissions, for 
UK working age single households 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.346 
Weighted, n= 1,641 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
14,220 kg CO2e per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per annum 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) -1211.37 1825.73 -4789.73 2367.00 
Variables regarding head of household: 
Head of household usual weekly hours (inc 
overtime), for employed or self employed 
9.33 26.63 -42.88 61.53 
Head of household gross annual income 
from employment and self-employment, £ 
0.15 0.05 0.05 0.24 
Head of household gross annual private 
non-earned income from investments, 
pensions and other, £ 
0.47 0.06 0.35 0.59 
Head of household gross annual income 
from Social Security benefits, £ 
0.21 0.10 0.01 0.41 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household, £ 
0.21 0.05 0.11 0.31 
Number of adults 4201.88 736.76 2757.85 5645.90 
Number of children - age under 2 1739.59 874.20 26.19 3453.00 
Number of children - age 2 and under 5 1247.20 579.92 110.57 2383.83 
Number of children - age 5 and under 18 2726.83 298.26 2142.26 3311.40 
 




Table A3.1 continued. 
 Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per annum 




      B Std. Error 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 61.17 20.41 21.18 101.17 
Age male left full time education 14.23 28.56 -41.74 70.20 
Household class: 
(Reference value: routine worker) 
    
Higher Professionals 3106.18 1477.70 209.94 6002.41 
Intermediate 2117.92 975.04 206.87 4028.96 
Large Employers & Higher Managerial 4925.26 2073.47 861.33 8989.19 
Lower Managerial & Professionals 2775.11 868.01 1073.84 4476.39 
Lower Supervisory & Technical 1820.13 923.66 9.80 3630.46 
Never Worked and Long-Term Unemployed -1714.26 946.64 -3569.64 141.12 
Semi-Routine -78.17 695.08 -1440.50 1284.16 
Small Employers and Own Account Workers 2428.14 1296.76 -113.46 4969.75 
Students 2637.03 2137.39 -1552.19 6826.24 
Not classifiable for other reasons -453.13 874.26 -2166.64 1260.38 
Occupation not stated -2186.96 1051.30 -4247.47 -126.46 
Government region of residence: 
(Reference value: London) 
    
Eastern 990.78 1021.93 -1012.16 2993.72 
East Midlands 1242.17 1176.34 -1063.41 3547.74 
Northern Ireland 2013.48 882.68 283.46 3743.51 
North East -312.53 899.95 -2076.39 1451.33 
North West and Merseyside 698.65 812.40 -893.62 2290.92 
Scotland 165.85 874.40 -1547.95 1879.66 
South East -5.07 857.98 -1686.68 1676.53 
South West 3217.00 1280.26 707.74 5726.25 
Wales 1002.19 974.43 -907.65 2912.03 
West Midlands -687.51 883.00 -2418.15 1043.13 






Table A3.2 Regression estimates for household total annual greenhouse gas emissions, for 
Dutch working age single households  
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.484 
Weighted, n= 491 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
19,077 kg CO2e per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: kg CO2e per annum 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) -986.18 2116.07 -5133.60 3161.24 
Variables regarding head of household: 
Head of household usual weekly hours 96.00 42.41 12.87 179.13 
Head of household gross annual income 
from employment and self-employment, € 
0.35 0.05 0.25 0.46 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household’s 
earned income, € 
0.32 0.05 0.21 0.42 
Number of adults 4665.72 1310.30 2097.57 7233.87 
Number of children - age under 2 5324.68 1726.62 1940.55 8708.80 
Number of children - aged 2 and under 5 2509.11 1074.10 403.90 4614.31 
Number of children - aged 5 and under 18 4003.01 575.57 2874.91 5131.11 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 77.32 32.87 12.90 141.74 
Male education level: 
(Reference value: no educational 
qualifications) 
    
Highest educational attainment: level 3 1319.45 1142.19 -919.19 3558.09 
Highest educational attainment: level 4 2156.84 1064.27 70.90 4242.78 
Highest educational attainment: level 5 4538.92 1312.60 1966.27 7111.57 
Highest educational attainment: level 6 1936.35 1872.60 -1733.87 5606.58 
Highest educational attainment: unknown 2376.07 3812.06 -5095.43 9847.57 
Household class: 
(Reference value: unemployed) 
    
Elementary -2630.62 1874.69 -6304.93 1043.70 
Lower -1224.03 1580.72 -4322.17 1874.12 
Middle -2738.42 1501.89 -5682.07 205.22 
Higher -1213.34 1697.81 -4540.99 2114.30 
Academic -2291.36 2297.01 -6793.42 2210.70 





Table A3.3 Regression estimates for total annual household expenditure, for UK working 
age single households  
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.218 
Weighted, n= 1,641 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
£19,924 per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: £ per annum per 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 6257.72 3002.62 372.70 12142.74 
Variables regarding head of household: 
Head of household usual weekly hours (inc 
overtime), for employed or self employed 
23.16 40.41 -56.04 102.36 
Head of household gross annual income 
from employment and self-employment, £ 
0.31 0.08 0.16 0.46 
Head of household gross annual private 
non-earned income from investments, 
pensions and other, £ 
0.53 0.06 0.40 0.66 
Head of household gross annual income 
from Social Security benefits, £ 
0.16 0.12 -0.09 0.40 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household, £ 
0.34 0.07 0.20 0.49 
Number of adults 4234.47 1090.43 2097.27 6371.67 
Number of children - age under 2 816.64 1196.68 -1528.80 3162.09 
Number of children - age 2 and under 5 1275.04 950.96 -588.81 3138.90 
Number of children - age 5 and under 18 2535.46 446.97 1659.40 3411.51 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years -50.55 44.94 -138.63 37.52 
Age male left full time education -5.60 59.68 -122.57 111.36 
Household class: 
(Reference value: routine worker) 
    
Higher Professionals 5688.23 2423.43 938.39 10438.07 
Intermediate 2406.14 1396.92 -331.77 5144.06 
Large Employers & Higher Managerial 16605.12 10722.79 -4411.16 37621.41 
Lower Managerial & Professionals 3131.33 1499.23 192.90 6069.76 
Lower Supervisory & Technical 116.43 1471.90 -2768.45 3001.30 
Never Worked and Long-Term Unemployed -834.22 1282.71 -3348.30 1679.85 
Semi-Routine -637.21 1104.39 -2801.77 1527.35 
Small Employers and Own Account Workers 3667.03 2028.89 -309.52 7643.59 
Students 13272.73 6036.13 1442.13 25103.33 
Not classifiable for other reasons 625.04 1259.26 -1843.07 3093.14 
Occupation not stated -833.21 1445.90 -3667.11 2000.70 
Table continues on next page.  
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Table A3.3 continued. 
 Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: £ per annum per 




      B Std. Error 
Other control variables continued: 
Government region of residence: 
(Reference value: London) 
    
Eastern 1058.53 1504.95 -1891.12 4008.19 
East Midlands -1087.70 1607.47 -4238.29 2062.89 
Northern Ireland -1991.61 1266.84 -4474.56 491.34 
North East -1784.11 1294.86 -4321.99 753.76 
North West and Merseyside -1359.10 1219.99 -3750.24 1032.04 
Scotland -2080.88 1614.75 -5245.73 1083.96 
South East -469.35 1283.43 -2984.82 2046.13 
South West 2335.94 1716.98 -1029.29 5701.16 
Wales -1545.93 1491.74 -4469.68 1377.82 
West Midlands -2167.28 1361.53 -4835.82 501.27 





Table A3.4 Regression estimates for total annual household expenditure, for Dutch 
working age single households  
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.483 
Weighted, n= 491 
Bold figures are statistically significant, at the 5% level 
 
Mean value of dependent variable: 
€16,695 per annum 
Unstandardised beta 
coefficients 
Unit: € per annum per 




      B Std. Error 
(Constant) 1520.20 1906.28 -2216.04 5256.43 
Variables regarding head of household: 
Head of household usual weekly hours 12.35 25.12 -36.90 61.59 
Head of household gross annual income 
from employment and self-employment, € 
0.34 0.05 0.25 0.44 
Variables regarding other household members: 
Gross household annual income from 
sources other than head of household’s 
earned income, € 
0.31 0.05 0.21 0.40 
Number of adults 2839.63 1172.06 542.44 5136.83 
Number of children - age under 2 3439.15 1786.02 -61.38 6939.67 
Number of children - aged 2 and under 5 1958.46 961.45 74.05 3842.87 
Number of children - aged 5 and under 18 2748.88 487.58 1793.25 3704.51 
Other control variables: 
Male age, years 55.34 25.84 4.70 105.98 
Male education level: 
(Reference value: no educational 
qualifications) 
    
Highest educational attainment: level 3 -64.42 1119.03 -2257.67 2128.84 
Highest educational attainment: level 4 1036.80 1108.72 -1136.24 3209.84 
Highest educational attainment: level 5 3688.76 1289.60 1161.19 6216.34 
Highest educational attainment: level 6 2265.00 1525.98 -725.87 5255.86 
Highest educational attainment: unknown 2238.43 2790.94 -3231.71 7708.57 
NB. Class variables are omitted from the model as they are found to reduce model fit and beta 




Appendix 4: Data on mean household emissions and expenditure 
changes due to activation 
Table A4.1 to Table A4.4 below present the data underlying the graphs presented in 
chapter 6, Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7.  They show the estimated mean effects on 
household greenhouse gas emissions and household expenditure of activating a non-
working household member.  They represent the best estimate of mean change in 
household emissions and expenditure when a household in the originator 
demographic group (column 1) has a household member activated (so moving to the 
destination demographic group indicated in column 2).  Columns 3 and 4 present the 
mean emissions/expenditure of households in the originator and destination groups 
respectively.  The final estimate of emissions/expenditure for an activated household 
is presented in column 7.  This is the mean emissions/expenditure of the destination 
group plus a correction factor determined by the statistically significant differences 
between the groups in key sociodemographic characterisics, as described in the 
research design.  Column 7 equals column 4 corrected for these composition 
differences between the originator and destination groups.    The size of correction 
applied is based on the differences between the mean values for the 
sociodemographic variable in question, multiplied by the beta coefficient linking that 
variable to greenhouse gas emissions/expenditure, as calculated and presented in 
chapter 5.  For instance, there are statistically significant differences between older 
single males not working and older single males working in mean numbers of adults 
living in the household  and mean age of the male.  The differences in these means 
are multiplied by their corresponding beta coefficients to give a correction factor 
which is then added to the mean emissions in the destination group (column 4) to 
give the value in column 7.  Column 7 thus provides the best estimate, based on the 
scenario modelling assumptions, of the mean effect of activating a household 


































Corrections made for 
differences in mean 













increase in household 
emissions due to 
activation 
  


















 1.  Male, not working 2.  Male, working 8,814 14,524 ** No. adults*, age** 14,933 6,120 69% 







5.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
22,511 29,042 ** Children 5- <18**, age**, 
education level* 
29,358 6,847 30% 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
8.  Both working 29,042 29,951  Age** 29,787 745 3% 
7.  Male not working, 
Female working 















10.  Male or female, not 
working, no children 
11.  Male or female, 
working, no children 
9,955 14,654 ** Education level** 14,654 4,699 47% 
12.  Male or female, not 
working, with child(ren) 
13.  Male or female, 
working, with 
child(ren) 
11,886 19,107 ** No. adults**, children 0- 
<2**, children 2- <5**, 
age**, education level** 







14.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
17,036 26,083 ** Education level** 26,199 9,163 54% 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
17.  Both working 26,083 26,282 ** Children 0- <2**, children 
2- <5**, children 5- <18** 
25,554 -529 -2% 
16.  Male not working, 
Female working 
17.  Both working 25,597 26,282  - 26,282 685 3% 
*,** Significant difference at the 5% (*)/1%(**) level (2-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test) 

































Corrections made for 
differences in mean 









effects, £ per 
annum [column 7] 
Mean estimated 
increase in household 
expenditure due to 
activation 
  

















 1.  Male, not working 2.  Male, working 10,638 18,768 ** No. adults*, age** 19,288 8,651 81% 
3.  Female, not working 4.  Female, working 15,861 21,438 ** Age**, education 
level** 







5.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
25,998 34,494 ** Children 5- <18**, 
age**, education level* 
35,338 9,340 36% 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
8.  Both working 34,494 37,838 ** Age** 37,838 3,344 10% 
7.  Male not working, 
Female working 















10.  Male or female, not 
working, no children 
11.  Male or female, 
working, no children 
15,648 23,288 ** Education level** 23,288 7,640 49% 
12.  Male or female, not 
working, with child(ren) 
13.  Male or female, 
working, with 
child(ren) 
14,339 25,361 ** No. adults**, children 
0- <2**, children 2- 
<5**, age**, education 
level** 







14.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
19,888 35,596 ** Education level** 35,596 15,708 79% 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
17.  Both working 35,596 37,493 ** Children 0- <2**, 
children 2- <5**, 
children 5- <18** 
35,887 292 1% 
16.  Male not working, 
Female working 
17.  Both working 45,061 37,493  - 37,493 -7,567 -17% 
*,** Significant difference at the 5% (*)/1%(**) level (2-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test) 


































Corrections made for 
differences in mean 













increase in household 
emissions due to 
activation 
  



















 1.  Male, not working 2.  Male, working 18,341 22,863  No. adults**, age** 23,638 5,296 29% 







5.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
30,135 40,100 ** No. adults*, children 5- 
<18**, age**, education 
level** 
41,621 11,486 38% 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
8.  Both working 40,100 40,886  Children 5- <18*, age** 40,332 231 1% 
7.  Male not working, 
Female working 















10.  Male or female, not 
working, no children 
11.  Male or female, 
working, no children 
12,017 19,062 ** Age**, education level** 20,323 8,306 69% 
12.  Male or female, not 
working, with child(ren) 
13.  Male or female, 
working, with 
child(ren) 
22,753 26,470  No. adults*, children 0- 
<2*, age* 







14.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
20,108 37,285 ** Children 0- <2**, 
education level** 
38,812 18,705 93% 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
17.  Both working 37,285 39,647 ** Children 0- <2*, children 
2- <5*, children 5- <18**, 
age*, education level** 
38,357 1,072 3% 
16.  Male not working, 
Female working 
17.  Both working 22,905 39,647 ** Education level** 40,476 17,571 77% 
*,** Significant difference at the 5% (*)/1%(**) level (2-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test) 

































Corrections made for 
differences in mean 









effects, € per 
annum [column 7] 
Mean estimated 
increase in household 
expenditure due to 
activation 
  


















 1.  Male, not working 2.  Male, working 15,965 18,356  No. adults**, age** 18,801 2,836 18% 







5.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
23,761 34,778 ** No. adults*, children 5- 
<18**, age**, 
education level** 
36,379 12,618 53% 
6.  Male working, 
Female not working 
8.  Both working 34,778 34,322  Children 5- <18*, age** 33,983 -795 -2% 
7.  Male not working, 
Female working 
8.  Both working 31,174 34,322  Children 5- <18**, 
age** 
















10.  Male or female, not 
working, no children 
11.  Male or female, 
working, no children 
11,599 16,531 ** Age**, education 
level** 
17,524 5,925 51% 
12.  Male or female, not 
working, with child(ren) 
13.  Male or female, 
working, with 
child(ren) 
19,261 22,918  No. adults*, children 0- 
<2*, age* 







14.  Male not working, 
Female not working 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
16,231 30,251 ** Children 0- <2**, 
education level** 
32,032 15,801 97% 
15.  Male working, 
Female not working 
17.  Both working 30,251 33,878 ** Children 0- <2*, 
children 2- <5*, children 
5- <18**, age*, 
education level** 
33,308 3,057 10% 
16.  Male not working, 
Female working 
17.  Both working 18,615 33,878 ** Education level** 34,845 16,231 87% 
*,** Significant difference at the 5% (*)/1%(**) level (2-tailed Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test) 
Source: Author’s own calculations. See section 4.2 for details of datasets used. 
